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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis examines the interpretation of the 
Warsaw Convention and its amendments and supplement by 
the courts of several countries. The Warsaw Convention 
was chosen as the vehicle for comparison because it is 
one of the oldest treaties unifying a certain area of 
private law and consequently has a time span sufficient 
to allow the appearance and development of problems in 
the application of a uniform law convention and their 
analysis in proper perspective.
The thesis attempts to explain why the courts of 
the several countries examined often arrived at conclusions 
which differed although they were applying a text which, 
apart from the difficulties and errors of translation, 
was identical. This examination reveals many problems 
that arise in the application of uniform law conventions. 
The underlying causes for these problems are explained 
and analyzed.
The examination of the interpretations given to 
the Warsaw Convention by the courts of the countries 
examined and the analysis of the reasons for divergencies 
in these interpretations enabled the isolation of a 
number of factors which led to these differences. Finally, 
the thesis offers a number of proposals for reducing the 
extent of this divergence in the interpretation of present 
and future uniform law conventions.
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INTRODUCTION
The object of this thesis is to make a comparative 
study of the interpretations given by the courts of several 
countries to the Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at 
Warsaw in 1929o This Convention, commonly known as the 
Warsaw Convention, has been amended by a Protocol adopted 
at The Hague in 1955» and by another Protocol adopted at 
Guatemala City in 1971* It has also been supplemented by 
the Guadalajara Convention in 1961. The expression "Warsaw 
system" used in the title of this thesis refers to that 
ensemble of international treaties, as well as to the so- 
called "Montreal Agreement" concluded in 1966 between the 
United States Civil Aeronautics Board and the major air 
carriers, whereby these carriers undertook to modify their 
Conditions of Carriage in accordance with the Agreement.
The Warsaw system has been chosen as the field of 
comparison between various interpretations given by munici­
pal courts of a uniform law because the Warsaw Convention 
is one of the oldest treaties unifying a certain area of 
private law. Its time span is sufficient to allow the 
appearance and development of problems which can be placed 
in proper perspective. This explains why some problems 
will be examined even though they have been long resolved. 
It is of interest to see why they arose in some countries 
and not in others and to see if any lessons can be learnt 
from them for future unification of law conventions.
2The Warsaw system also has a very important practical 
advantage enjoyed by few other uniform law conventions, i.e. 
it is widely accepted in many countries and covers most of 
the cases of international carriage by air of passengers 
and goods. This means that there is a rich field of juris­
prudence from which the results of the attempted unification 
can be examined and analyzed.
The geographical scope of the comparison in the 
thesis has been limited by several factors. Firstly, it is 
believed that "there is a structural logic in every activity, 
involving a fine mesh of presuppositions” ^ , This is also 
true in judicial reasoning which produces decisions where 
the presuppositions are only rarely indicated. The results 
are that a person coming from one legal system faces a 
hazardous task when trying to correctly understand the 
judicial decisions of another legal system where the "mesh 
of presuppositions" is different because of the natural 
tendency to use one’s own presuppositions, as if they were 
universally valid, in the study of situations determined 
by other presuppositions. It is my personal experience that 
"any involvement on the basis of the wrong framework or 
even an error in regard to any particular element in the 
frame of an activity will lodge the actor in a diffusely 
inappropriate relationship to events" ^ . In order to alle­
viate these dangers, at least some of the presuppositions 
that appear to be used in Warsaw cases are spelt out in this 
thesis. The difficulty to come to grips with a legal envi­
ronment different from that of my original training placed 
a severe restriction on the number of countries which could
\ J  E. Goffman, Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization 
of Experience, Harper & Row, New York, 197^, p"l 310,
2/ Goffman, Frame Analysis, p. 310.
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be usefully considered. It is hoped, despite my efforts to 
immerse myself in the common law in order to understand it 
as it is, that the pervasive influence of in-built ways of 
thinking due to my original civil law training has not led 
to serious misunderstandings about the common law.
Secondly, I am fluent only in French and English.
This made it impossible to focus interest on countries in 
which the primary legal materials are in neither of these 
languages. One cannot rely on personal approximations or 
on indirect materials provided by translation when, for the 
reasons just given, wide areas of a legal system have to be 
explored in order to realize what are its basic concepts 
and assumptions. This exploration requires a freedom of 
research which does not exist when there is a language 
barrier.
Thirdly, research concerning foreign legal material 
is dependent upon the ready availability of comprehensive 
foreign materials ^ , This is the reason why this study 
concentrates on countries whose legal materials were readi­
ly available in the various law libraries used for the re­
search. Cases coming from other jurisdictions are simply 
used as an illustration of what might happen in the countries 
primarily considered.
The particular countries involved are limited to 
five, with France representing the civil law approach, and 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States 
representing the common law approach. The selection of 
France is justified on several grounds. Firstly, and from 
a practical point of view, France offers a considerable 
number of air law cases. The legal regime applicable to
_2/ See for instance the difficulties experienced in 
Riverstone Meat Co. Pty Ltd, v, Lancashire Shipping; Co. Ltd. [1961} A.C^ 807 (H.L. 1961), per Lord Hodson, at p. 87V.
international air transport has been made applicable to 
domestic air transport. Domestic carriage cases will thus 
be an additional source of jurisprudence to the interna­
tional carriage cases governed by the Warsaw Convention—  
the proper "Warsaw cases". Both categories of cases illus­
trate the attitudes adopted by French courts in interpreting 
the Warsaw Convention. Secondly, and from a historical point 
of view, the French legal system exercised a dominant influ­
ence in the gestation of the Warsaw Convention ^  and so it 
provides a helpful background to the understanding of many 
of the provisions of the treaty.
The selection of the United Kingdom is justified as 
it is the archetype of the common law system. Australia and 
Canada have legal traditions closely related to the British 
system , These countries will often be considered together 
as the law applicable in their respective courts is, in most 
cases, substantially the same.
The United States was also an obvious choice. The 
sheer number of cases provides a wealth of examples of 
constructions and applications of the Convention. More 
importantly, the manner in which the Convention is inter­
preted in the United States has an unrivaled influence on 
international air carriage as a whole because of the impor­
tance of the United States in such carriage.
Because of the different countries involved, a
number of practical problems had to be overcome t
(i) selection of the English translation of the Warsaw Con­
vention.
The Warsaw Convention was drawn up in 1929 in French
4/ See Chapters 3 and 4 below.
j)/ With the exception of the Canadian Province of Quebec, 
whose legal system is one example of both Romano-Germanic 
and Common Law elements being embodied together, see R. 
David & J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today, (London, 1968), p. 17*
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only and no internationally recognized English translation 
was ever provided. One translation into English is given 
in the Schedule to the United Kingdom Carriage by Air Act 
1932 ; the same text appears in the Schedule to the Canadian 
Carriage by Air Act and the Australian Civil Aviation (Car­
riers1 Liability) Act 1959-1973« Another translation is 
provided by the text ratified by the United States Senate 
on 15 June 193^« When the Convention is quoted in this 
thesis, it will be in the wording used by the United Kingdom 
Act. In most cases, the difference between that text and the 
American translation is not substantial. In other cases 
however, the differences are more meaningful ; they will 
then be indicated and analyzed.
(ii) translation of French legal material.
All French legal material which appears in the text 
of the thesis is translated into English. Most of the trans­
lations are my own. When that is not so, the source of the 
translation is indicated. Footnote material has, however, 
often been left in the original French.
(iii) identification and citation of cases.
It is thought that the system used for referring to 
cases should be uniform, as least as far as practicable. In 
the usual English system, a case is identified by its name 
followed by a citation of the report in which it appears.
The United States system provides more information because 
the name of the court and the year of the decision usually 
appear as well. Because of the great number of American 
decisions, the American system has been selected for common 
law cases.
In France, cases are usually identified by the name 
of the court and the precise date of the decision. In order 
to have a uniform system of identification and citation in
-  6 -
the thesis, French cases will also be identified by the 
names of the parties. In addition, the citation v/ill 
contain the name of the report in which the case appears, 
the name of the court, and the precise date of the decision. 
The precise date of the decision is included to enable cross 
references to be made to French textbooks and articles.
(iv) use of official or unofficial reporxs.
In the common law countries, references are in 
most cases given to official or authorized reports. But it 
is not always easy to find complete sets of the official 
reports of one particular countries in law libraries of the 
other countries. Similarly, in France, the usual reports 
are Dalloz, Sirey, and La Semaine Juridique, complete sets 
of which are difficult to consult in Australia. These ques­
tions of availability of materials do not exist when one 
uses unofficial specialized aviation reports which can be 
found in almost any law library that has an aviation law 
collection. Such is the case for the Commerce Clearing 
House Aviation Reports, and the United States Aviation 
Reports in the United States, or for the Revue Franpaise 
de Droit A&rien and the Revue G£n£rale de lfAir et de l8Es- 
pace in France. Accordingly, references will usually be 
given to these specialized reports. The complete reference 
for each case, with the reference to the official reports, 
is given in the Table of Cases.
The thesis itself first examines the scope of 
application of the Warsaw Convention, and the applicability 
of the various instruments which have modified and supple­
mented the original treaty (Chapters 1 and 2). It then
-  7 -
considers how the liability regime created by the Convention 
has been applied in the different courts (Chapters 3 to 11). 
Finally, it discusses several aspects of the action in 
liability brought under the Warsaw Convention (Chapters 12 
to 15)* The questions of jurisdiction and time limitation 
have been excluded because they were the object of my LL.M. 
thesis ^ . The conclusion of the thesis isolates a number 
of factors which have contributed to divergent interpreta­
tions between the courts of the various countries examined 
and offers a number of suggestions for reducing the diver­
gences in future uniform law conventions.
6/ G. Miller, Protection of victims in the exercise of ac­
tions against air carriers, Institute of Air and Space Law, 
McGill University, LL.M. thesis, August 1971.
8Chapter ONE. - SCOPE OF THE UNIFORM REGIME OF AIR
CARRIERS’ LIABILITY.
When aviation started to develop, lawyers in many 
countries pointed out the complexities which would 
inevitably arise in assessing the liability of air carriers. 
It was easy to imagine situations which would present 
inextricable conflict of laws difficulties. The Warsaw 
Convention was conceived with the purpose of avoiding such 
problems by providing a uniform regime for the liability 
of air carriers. The first Chapter of the Convention 
delineates the scope of that regime. Several important 
provisions of the Convention have been modified and 
supplemented in later years, but all alterations have 
taken place within this original framework • Article l(l) 
contains a broad statement of principle as to the scope of 
the Convention. This will be the object of Section One of 
this chapter. Articles 1(2), 1(3)» and 2 contain more 
specific requirements which will be examined in Sections 
Two and Three.
Section One. - The broad statement of principle
(Article 1(1).)
The generality of Article l(l) appears to give
1/ See Article XVIII of the Hague Protocol and Article XVI 
of the Guatemala City Protocol. On the relationship between 
the various instruments, see further Chapter 2, below.
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the Convention an extremely wide range. It provides i
" This Convention applies to all international 
carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed 
by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to 
gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an 
air transport undertaking."
No clear divergence has appeared in the judicial interpret­
ations given to this text. However, a study of the text is 
necessary because differences exist which create the 
possibility of divergence on several points.More importantly, 
Article l(l) contains a number of assumptions which will 
influence the interpretation of the whole Convention.
1) Meaning of "carriage".
Article 1(2) defines "international carriage" but 
focuses exclusively on the "international" element. It seems 
that the meaning of the word "carriage" was assumed to be 
clear by the drafters of the Convention. This is not always 
true, as appears in several French cases where mere physical 
presence on board an aircraft in flight was held to be 
insufficient to characterize the operation as a "carriage".
In addition to the fact of carriage, French courts require 
that the essential purpose of the presence on board the 
aircraft is transportation —/ , and not any other purpose 
such as teaching flying techniques ^ , or testing a plane , 
In such cases, the fact of being carried on the plane is
2/ Gin c. A^ro-Club de Chelles, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 3^6 
(T.G.I. Meaux, 21 April 1966) ; Lefebvre c. Stil Aero-Club 
"Les Ailes Dieppoises", (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 202 (C.A. Rouen
20 November 1973) Riviere c. Franc, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A.319* 
note Georgiades (C.A. Lyon-, 2 July 1970), cassation (1973)
27 R.F.D.A. 419 (Cass. civ. ire, 15 May 1973)*
_2/ St6 Mutuelle d1Assurances Aeriennes c. Gauvain, (1967)
21 R.F.D.A. 436, note Georgiades (Cass. civ. Ire, 4 July 
1967).
4/ Alro-Club de l'Aisne c. Klopotowska, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 
195» note Georgiades (Cass. civ. Ire, 20 January 1970).
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not the essential aim of the operation ; it is only 
accessory — albeit necessary — to the essential purpose 
of the flight. Several French decisions have made it clear 
that when this is the case, the liability has to be 
assessed on a basis other than the Warsaw Convention.
This reasoning is based on the technique, used 
in many Continental systems, of regulating a contractual 
relationship by reference to a contrat-type, e.g. sale, 
lease, carriage, etc.-*/. The relationship between the 
parties to a contrat-type is fixed by an autonomous body 
of rules. These rules govern a particular situation when 
there is no applicable term or condition expressly agreed 
upon by the parties. This technique is well described by 
Sundberg in relation to air charter situations :
" The system of contract law is simple and works 
with a small number of contract types. But the 
needs of everyday life and the contracts made to 
meet these needs represent an infinite number of 
variations and combinations. To make ends meet, 
Continental jurisprudence is required to subsume, 
as far as possible, all the contracts actually 
made under the existing contract type structures. 
The law of each type is made to apply in toto, as 
a unit, undisturbed if possible by competition 
with the law of neighbouring types." 6/
5/ Identification of the proper contract type is a recurring 
problem in French courts. Numerous instances can be given, 
e.g. all the problems relating to the introduction of the 
contract of "leasing" which has kept many of its original 
common law features. See, inter alia, Barrere c. Ste 
Bergerat-Monnoyeur, J .C .P. 1974"• 5X7 1775^» note E.M. Bey 
(Cass. com.20 February 1973) I St6 Locaroute c. Casties, 
J.C.P. 1973* II« 17503> note E.M. B.", (C. A. Paris", 8 January 
1973)* For cases more directly related to the situation of 
carriage, see Aero-Club du Limousin c. 0*Hanlon, J.C.P. 1973* 
II. 17339» note H. Mazeaud (C.A. Limoges, 18 January 1973) » 
S.A.R.L. P&tisfranee c. Canitaine commandant le S/S Glaciar 
Blanco, D.S. 197^» Somm. 5o (C.A. Rouen, 8 March 197*0 •
6/ J. Sundberg, Air Charter (Stockholm, 1961), pp. 272-273*
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In order to determine the applicable contrat-typet 
the courts characterize the essential purpose or essential 
performance of the contract. This process is also neatly 
described by Sundberg i
" Each contract type has a central performance, and 
whenever the actual contract is found to centre 
on the same performance in the contemplation of 
the parties, subsumption under the available 
contract type will follow. The essentiality test 
thus establishes the principle of the contractual 
performance." "jJ
This was precisely the object of the French decisions cited 
above.
There has been no similar difficulties in common 
law courts, simply because the technique of contract type 
is unknown and completely unnecessary. Instead attention 
is focused on the relationship existing between the parties 
involved. This attitude is characteristic of the common 
law ^ . Williston explains that in a relational obligation, 
"certain respective rights and duties are defined by law 
and imposed upon the parties without any question of their 
knowledge or assent to these specific terms" ^ * This does 
not prevent a possible alteration of these rights and 
duties by contract, within certain limits Eut the
important thing is that the parties do not create them ; 
they can only modify them.
2/ Sundberg, Air Charter, p. 273«
8/ For Pound the relational source of obligation is the 
fundamental idea of the common law. See R. Pound, 
Interpretations of Legal History (Cambridge Studies in 
English Legal History), (Cambridge, 1923)* P* 5^ ; "The 
End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought", (1916-1?)
30 Harv.L. Rev. p. 219.
2/ S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3d ed. 
by W.H.E. Jaeger, Mount Kisco, N.Y., 1968), §§ 32 A, 90«
10/see below p. 374.
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In the specific situation of carriage of persons, 
the passenger is placed in a particular relationship vis-a- 
vis the air carrier. Specific rights and duties automatically 
arise. In particular the carrier is under a duty to carry 
the passenger safely to his destination. This is imposed by 
law independently of whatever might have been in the parties' 
minds. A breach of this duty by the carrier would constitute 
the tort of negligence . Similarly, if a carrier is in 
charge of goods, he is under a duty to deliver these goods 
safely. This is imposed upon the carrier because he is in 
possession of another person's goods . The source of the 
carrier's duty is the relationship of bailment .
In fact, in most cases, a contract has been
concluded by the carrier and the passenger or the owner of
the goods. This contractual relationship exists side by side
with the other relationships. If there is a breach of duty
by the carrier, he may be sued either on the contract, or on14/the basis of the law of negligence, or the law of bailment— J. 
The important point here is that his basic duties exist 
independently of the intent of the parties to the contract 
of carriage.
11/ 0. Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage by Inland Transport, 
T"4th ed., London, 1965)» P • 450•
12/ Kahn-Freund, Law of Carriage, p. 194.
13/ F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possession in the 
Common Law, (Oxford, 1898)» gives the classical description 
of a bailee : "Any person is to be considered as a bailee who 
otherwise than as a servant either receives possession of a 
thing from another or consents to receive or hold possession 
of a thing for another upon an undertaking with the other 
person either to keep and return or deliver to him the 
specific thing or to (convey and) apply the specific thing 
according to the directions antecedent or future of the 
other person." at p. 163.
14/ see below p. 364.
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Given this background, it would not be natural for 
a common lawyer to read the word "carriage" in the Convention 
as requiring some intentional element in addition to the 
physical act of transportation. Whether going from A to B 
is the essential purpose of the operation, or whether it is 
only a means towards achieving another end is irrelevant. It 
does not affect the factual relationship existing between the 
carrier and the owner of the goods.
These differences between French law and the common 
law are only potential sources of divergence in the interpret­
ation of the Convention. It is only rarely that an inter­
national carriage would not be subsumed under the contract 
type "transport" by French courts. The cases cited above 
were not "international" within the meaning of the Convention^ 
In each case, the flight had a very limited range and the 
alleged "carrier" was a private person whose normal business 
was not the transportation of people or goods. Thus, in 
fact, the analysis given by French courts was limited to 
cases which were not directly within the scope of the 
Convention. It is unlikely that such situations will arise 
in "international" flights.
2) Meaning of "goods".
The French text refers to the carriage of 
"marchandises" which is translated as "goods" in both the 
English and the American versions of the Convention. But 
the meaning of marchandises does not exactly coincide with 
the meaning of "goods". Marchandises in French law includes 
any chattel which can be the object of a commercial trans­
action . "Goods", in a contractual common law context,
15/ On the meaning of "international", see below p. 26ff.
16/ A. Perraud-Charmantier, Dictionnaire de droit (3d ed.by 
R. Barraine, Paris, 1967).
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refers to inanimate objects only, thus excluding live 
animals Because of that exclusion, a Legal Sub-
Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organisation^^ 
at one stage considered that the English text should use 
the word "cargo", the French text being accordingly amended 
by substituting fret to marchandises • However, it was 
later decided that since the Convention was to be amended 
only on the most important points, matters involving what 
was seen as simple drafting difficulties should be left 
untouched . Accordingly, Article l(l) was not amended 
by the Hague Protocol in 1955»
The absence of identity in the meaning of "goods" 
and marchandises did not however cause any particular
difficulty in relation to live animals. Several courts21/ 22/ belonging to the civil law — ' as well as the common law —
systems have applied the Convention to the carriage of live
animals without question.
17/ P.G. Osborn, Concise Law Dictionary (4th ed., London,
1954) ; Black, Law Dictionary (revised 4th ed., St Paul,
1968). The same exclusion of live animals appears in 
Article 1(c) of the Hague Rules governing the carriage of 
goods by sea.
18/ hereinafter referred to as ICAO.
12/ ICAO Doc. LC/SC "Warsaw" WD No. 4l of 22/l/l952. "Cargo" 
was there defined as "anything accepted for carriage by 
aircraft, except baggage."
20/ ICAO Legal Committee (9th session, Rio de Janeiro, 1953)* 
Doc 7450 - LC/136, vol. 1, pp. 18 ff.
21/ For a Dutch case dealing with the carriage of 325 live 
minks, see N.V. Heerfur t.v.v.d. Vellen-En-Pelteri.jenhandel 
v. J.M. Heert.ie v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, IATA Reports,
No. 127.
22/ For an American case, see Parke Davis & Co. v. British 
Overseas Airways Corn., 5 Avi. 17,838 (N.Y. City Ct 1958)» 
dealing with a shipment of 185 Rhesus monkeys. For a 
Canadian case dealing with the carriage of horses, see 
United International Stables Ltd. v. Pacific Western Airlines, 
5 D. L. R. 3d~£>7 ’(Brit. ColV" Sup. Ct. 1969)*
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A more real potential divergence appears to be in
relation to the carriage of corpses. A corpse in undoubtedly
an inanimate object and, as such, it seems to be included in
the meaning of "goods" in common law. But the emphasis put
by French law on the commercial aspect of the object carried
as a marchandise constitutes a very serious obstacle to a
corpse being a marchandise. The human body, and its remains,
are outside the world of commercial transactions, on grounds
21/of ordre public — “  . Several cases illustrate this difference
in attitude. In the French case of Djedraoui c. Tamisier ,
the court stated that a cadaver could not be assimilated to
a marchandise, even though the price of carriage might be
calculated on an identical basis, i.e. by weight and
dimensions. By contrast two American cases simply assumed
that the shipment of cadavers was to be treated on the same2</basis as any other shipment — J .
Here again, the different attitudes adopted by the
courts have not caused a conflicting interpretation of the
Convention itself. Only one of the cases mentioned above was26/governed by the Convention — ' . The others were cases of 
carriage governed by municipal law. However, these cases 
point to the risk created by a slight difference in the 
meaning of two technical expressions such as "goods" and 
marchändises♦ One way to avoid difficulties would be to 
argue that since a corpse is placed outside the world of 
commercial transactions because of its link with the idea 
of a human body, that link should be used to include the 
carriage of corpses in the scope of the Convention through 
the category of carriage of persons.
23/ B. Starck, Droit civil: Obligations (Paris, 1972) p. 433.
24/ (1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 494, note E.G. (Trib. paix Paris, 31 
March 1952).
25/ See especially Compton v. American Airlines, Inc., 7 
Avi. 17»559 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961). See also Milhizer v . 
Riddle Airlines, 6 Avi. 18,209 (D. Mich, i960), aff'd, 7 
Avi. 17,379~(6th Cir. 1961).
26/ Compton v. American Airlines, Inc., 7 Avi. 17»559 
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961).
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3) Carriage performed for reward, or gratuitous carriage 
by an air transport undertaking.
The drafting history of the provision shows that 
a great deal of emphasis was placed on the caractere 
commercial of the carriage to be performed. If a particular 
carriage was of a commercial nature, it would be governed 
by the Convention, not otherwise. This was the solution 
contained in the Avant-Projet submitted by the French 
Government to the Paris Conference on Private International 
Air Law in 1925 . The principles behind this attitude
were never challenged, nor were they spelt out before the 
adoption of the final draft of the Convention.
Assessing the commercial nature of a particular 
carriage appeared an easy task to most of the experts who 
discussed the provision at the meetings of the Comit6 
International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Alriens £0/ 9 
which was in charge of preparing a draft Convention to be 
presented to a diplomatic Conference. This is only natural 
when it is remembered that in several civil law countries 
there is a whole body of rules which govern transactions of 
a commercial nature -^/. One of the basic skills of a French 
lawyer is the ability to delineate the scope of application 
of commercial law rules. This is done essentially by 
characterizing as commercial or non-commercial the specific 
transaction involved, and by characterizing as commercant
27/ Article 2 of the Avant-Projet read » "La presente 
Convention s’applicjue aux transports internationaux par 
alronefs de caractere commercial, effectues avec ou sans 
remuneration, y compris ceux qui sont effectues par l'Etat 
et les personnes juridiques de droit public." Conference 
internationale de droit privl a6rien (Paris, 1925), (Minis- 
tere des Affaires Etrangeres 4l-42, Series c-179, Paris, 
1926).
28/ hereinafter referred to as CITEJA..
29/ See generally K.W. Ryan, An Introduction to the Civil 
Law (Sydney, 1962), Chapter 2 ; G.A. Zaphiriou, European 
Business Law, (London, I97O), Chapter 6.
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or non-commergant the parties to that transaction 2 2 / 1 in 
relation to transportation, all transactions made by an 
entreprise de transport, i.e. any person, natural or legal, 
who makes transportation a usual business activity > are 
deemed to be of a commercial nature by Article 632 of the 
Commercial Code 2 2 /  %
When the CITEJA experts analyzed what was meant by 
the "commercial nature" of the transportation referred to 
in the first drafts, it was assumed that all transportation
performed by an entreprise de transport would be of such
22/nature . In addition, it was felt that any transportation
made for reward, be it as an entreprise de transport or not,34/should also be considered as having a commercial nature .
30/ "Le droit commercial est la partie du droit, privi relative 
aux operations .juridiques faites par les commergants, soit 
entre eux, soit avec leurs clients. Ces operations se rap- 
portent a l'exercice du commerce et sont dites pour cette 
raison actes de commerce. Comme un de ces actes peut etre 
accompli accidentellement par une personne non commergante, 
le droit commercial regit aussi les actes de commerce sans 
consideration de la personne de leur auteur." This definition 
is given in G. Ripert, Traite gllmentaire de droit commercial,
(7th ed. by R. Roblot, Paris, 1972)., vol. T~, p~i IT
On the identification of commergants, see Ripert, Traite 
elementaire, vol. 1, pp. 84 ff. On the characterization of 
actes de commerce, see Ripert, Traits Elementaire, vol. 1, 
pp. 171 ff.
31/ In Delaby c. Sotramat,(1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 66, (C.A. Brussels 
12 January 19^5)> the carrier was characterized as an entre­
prise de transport on the following grounds 1 
" - eile etait proprietaire de 1*avion accident^ qui, dans
les limites de 1*objet social, servait au transport des
administrateurs et du personnel de la societl SOTRAMAT, des 
societes affiliees au groupe Feron et de soci&tes ou 
personnes en relations d'affaires avec ce groupe,
- la base de 1*avion se trouvait a 1'aerodrome de Bruxelles- 
National, ce qui n'est possible que pour un appareil commercial
- eile s'est conform£e a la reglementation relative au trafic 
commercial a laquelle eile £tait soumise . . ." at p. 67.
32/ Article 632 provides, in part : "La loi repute actes de 
commerce : . . . Toute entreprise de manufactures, de com­
mission, de transport par terre ou par eau . . . "
33/ CITEJA, Compte rendu, Second meeting (5 April 1927), p. 20 
(per M. Cogliolo), p. 21 (per M. de Vos;.
34/ CITEJA, Second meeting, p. 20 (per M. Ripert).
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However, express mention of the "commercial nature" of the 
transportation disappeared after the British expert to the 
CITEJA had pointed out that the expression would he meaning­
less in English law The final draft simply indicates
the kinds of transportation to which the Convention applies, 
without mentioning the name of the legal catagory to which 
they belong in French law.
The drafters of the Convention also assumed that
they were laying down rules which would govern a commercial
contract. This assumption, which appears clearly in the
drafting history of the provision , explains the wording
of a number of subsequent sections 2 2 / 1 and the great number
of express references to the contrat de transport in the
18/Convention . The notion of contract in the civil law is 
considerably wider than in the common law. The civil law 
notion covers all the hypotheses that the drafters of the 
Convention seem to have had in mind. This is not true for 
a common law contract. It is not the place here to undertake 
a comparison of contracts in civil law and common law. It 
will be sufficient to indicate the differences which are the 
most important for our point of view.
15/ CITEJA, Second meeting, p. 22 (per M. Clarke).
16/ See the Report to the Conference in Conference Interna­
tionale (1925). p. 60. See also the report presented on 
behalf of the CITEJA to the Delegates at the Warsaw 
Conference, where it was indicated that the Convention would 
apply only "au contrat de transport dans ses manifestations 
de forme exterieure d'abord, et dans les liens de droit qui 
s'etablissent entre le transporteur et les personnes trans- 
portees ou qui font transporter ensuite." Heme Conference 
Internationale de droit prive aerien, 4-12 Qctobre 1929. 
(Warsaw, 193°) p . 1^9•
17/ See, e.g. Article 1(2) where the Convention refers to 
the stipulations des parties, i.e. the contractual terms 
agreed upon by the parties.
W  Articles 1(3), 3(2), 4(4), 5(2), ll(l), 12(1), 13(3).
14, 28, 30(1), 32, 33.
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In French law, a contract may be gratuitous. It 
is perfectly normal to consider as a contract the carriage 
gratuitously performed by an entreprise de transport, as 
envisaged in the Convention. This is not a contract in 
common law because of lack of consideration. Furthermore, 
since consideration is not required as a matter of principle 
by French law, there is no equivalent to the common law 
requirement that consideration must move from the promisor 
to the promisee 22/, Privity of contract in English law 
is considerably stricter than in French law ^2/  * Thus, 
there is no obstacle to considering as a contract the 
carriage performed by a carrier when the fare has been 
paid by someone who is neither the passenger, nor the owner 
or consignor of the goods. Contracts for the benefit of 
third parties are freely admitted by French law 1
The differences between the common law notion of 
contract and the French concept adopted in the Convention 
were underlined in the American case of Block v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France ^ /  where Circuit Judge Wisdom said i
" The applicability of the Convention undeniably 
is premised upon a contract, but on a contract 
of a particular kind. It is based on a contract 
of carriage that arises from the relationship 
between a ’carrier* and the passengers. This 
contractual relationship requires only that the 
carrier consent to undertake the international 
transportation of the passengers from one 
designated spot to another, and that the 
passenger in turn consent to the undertaking."43/
39/ Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 1 B. &S. 393 » 121 E.R. 762 (a.B~ I86l) ; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd, v. Selfridge 
& Co. Ltd. [1915] A .C. 847 (H.L. 1915)
40/ For an example of a strict application of the requirement, 
see Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd. 56 Lloyd’s L.R. 209 
(K.B. 1936).
4l/ Article 1121 Civil Code. See further Carbonnier, Droit 
civil, vol. 4 (7th ed. Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1972) pp. 187 ff.
42/ lo Avi. 17,518 (5th Cir. 1967)
43/ at 17,523.
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The court then pointed out that the Convention does not 
anticipate bargaining between the parties, with the 
consequence that participation of a third party is possible. 
The court also underlined the incompatibility between the 
common law requirement of consideration flowing between 
the two parties and the Convention’s provisions which 
contemplate cases of gratuitous carriage.
It is most likely that, had such an approach been
adopted in the earlier case of Ross v. Pan American Airways,44/Inc. — / , the court would not have had to struggle so hard 
to dismiss the claim that the limitation of liability is 
available only when a carrier can prove that the individual 
who purchased the ticket was the passenger himself or 
someone specifically authorized by the passenger to consent, 
on the latter’s behalf, to the limited liability.
Whatever the differences in the concepts underlying 
the French and common law notions of contract, they do not 
seem to have led to diverging interpretations by the various 
courts. By listing the cases where the Convention would 
apply, i.e. to all international carriage of persons, 
luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward, and to 
gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport 
undertaking, any difficulty flowing from the fact that 
French law knows of binding contracts without consideration 
was removed. The only remaining uncertainty concerns the 
meaning of carriage for reward or gratuitous carriage.
44/ 190 Misc. 974 (N.Y. Sup. 1947), aff’d 2 Avi. 14,556 
Tn .Y, Sup. App. Div. 1948), aff’d 2 Avi. 14,912 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1949).
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There is no difficulty in the vast majority of 
cases where passengers and shippers pay the fare required 
for the transportation. There is no difficulty either in 
the cases where the carrier draws no benefit, direct or 
indirect, from the carriage he performs. The former are 
clearly cases of carriage for reward, the latter are 
clearly cases of gratuitous carriage. Some hesitation 
appears in relation to cases which are in between the two 
previous categories, i.e. cases where the carrier does 
not receive monetary consideration for the particular 
carriage to be performed, but nevertheless draws some 
kind of benefit from the performance of the carriage.
Whether the advantage received by the carrier 
amounts to remuneration, hire, or reward, seems to be a iLS/question of fact to be ascertained in each particular case
For instance, in Compagnie La Minerve c. Societe Pugnat t
the pilot of a helicopter took some electrical equipment to
a specific spot in the Alps. He was guided by an employee of
the owner of the equipment. An accident occurred during the
landing, and the employee was injured. The carrier argued
that this was a case of gratuitous carriage because no
specific fare had been paid for the transportation of the
employee. The court dismissed the argument because that
transportation was part of an ensemble of contractual duties
and the carrier had been paid for the whole operation. In47/Delaby c. Sotramat — u  , the Brussels Court of Appeal decided 
that, although the carrier drew some indirect advantages 
from the "gratuitous" carriage of members of the airport 
administration, the carriage remained essentially gratuitous.
45/ See e.g. Gin c. Aero-Club de Chelles, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 
346 (T.G.I. Meaux, 21 April 1966). In Malbec c . Durand, J.C.P . 
1962. II. 12932 (second case) ( Trib. civ. Clermont-Ferrand,
9 February 1962), the court rejected the sophisticated dis­
tinction then usually made by French courts between transport 
gratuit and transport interess£, being two categories of not- 
for-reward carriage. Within the meaning of the Convention, 
gratuitous carriage was any carriage which was not for reward.
46/ (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 445 ( T.G.I. Grenoble, 1 July 1970).
4?/ (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 66 (C.A. Brussels, 12 January 1965)*
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4) Meaning of "aircraft".
The Convention does not provide any definition of 
the word "aircraft". There is no reason to doubt that the 
usually accepted meaning would apply. ICAO has adopted the 
following definition i
" Any machine that can derive support in the 
atmosphere from the reactions of the air other 
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s 
surface." 48/
The absence of difficulty in relation to traditional 
means of air carriage is evident in the few cases where the 
Convention governed transportation by helicopter. The 
applicability of the Convention was not questioned -^/.
Transportation by air cushion vehicles presents 
more complex issues . These vehicles are lifted and 
moved above the surface of land or water by means of the
48/ Annex 7 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
T"3rd ed., May 1969)*
49/ See for instance Lamberth c. Guiron, (26) R.G.A. 185» 
note G. Cas (C.A. Paris, 7 June 1962), cassation (1966)
29 R.G.A.E. 377» note M. de Juglart (Cass. civ. 2e, 9 
June 1966), on remand (1968) yi R.G.A.E. 68 (C.A. Dijon,
31 January 1968), aff1d (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 290 (Cass. civ.
Ire, 2 March 1971) ; Orent v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
8 Avi. 17,273 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
50/ The following studies deal with the various aspects of 
the question s P. Chauveau, "Les vehicules a coussin d'air 
(aeroglisseurs)", Report to the Air Law Committee of the 
International Law Association, The Hague, 1970, Report of 
the 54th Conference, p. yi6 ; W.P. Heere, "Air Cushion 
Vehicles. A Legal Puzzle", (1971) 2 Netherlands Y.B.
Intl'l L. p. 117 ; E. du Pontavice, "Les aeroglisseurs 
sont-ils des navires ?", (1970) 23 Rev. Trim. Dr. com. p. 198 ; 
"Le Statut de 1*aeroglisseur", (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. p. 125 » 
"Aeroglisseurs", (1971) 24 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. p. IO83,
(19727 25 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. 687 ; R. Rodiere, "Le Statut 
des aeroglisseurs — sur les rapports entre les inventions 
techniques et les concepts juridiques", (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 
p. 167 ; UNIDROIT, "The legal status of air cushion vehicles 
(hovercraft), Preliminary Secretariat note", (1974) Uniform 
Law Review p. 17.
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reaction of air on the ground or on the water L^-/ . The 
question is whether such vehicles are "aircraft" within 
the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. There is no immediate 
answer, but several elements indicate that the Convention is 
not applicable to carriage by hovercraft. The ICAO definition 
of aircraft quoted above excludes air cushion vehicles since 
they derive theii- support "from the reactions of the air 
against the earth's surface." This exclusion was one of 
the purposes of the new definition of aircraft adopted by 
the ICAO Council on November 8, 1967 • But the authority
of that definition in the construction of the Warsaw 
Convention is limited. Moreover, strictly speaking, the new 
definition applies exclusively for the purposes of Annexes 6 
(Operation of Aircraft), 7 (Aircraft Nationality and 
Registration Marks), and 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft) to 
the Chicago Convention . Thus, on the international level, 
there is no clear cut answer. However, the rejection by ICAO 
of "hovercraft" from the definition of aircraft, and the 
various attempts which are now being made to establish a 
special uniform regime of liability for carriage by hover­
craft point towards the inapplicability of the Warsaw 
Convention to such carriage.
51/ The definition given in the text is based on Dean 
Chauveau's draft Convention submitted to the International 
Law Association at The Hague, 1970» which reads as follows 1 
"Article 1.- For the purpose of the present Convention, 
hovercraft means any craft capable of lift and movement 
above the surface of land or water by means of the reaction 
of the air on the ground or on the water." Report of the 
54th Conference, p. 326.
52/ ICAO, Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly for
1967, p. 48.
53/ ICAO, Report of the Council, 1967» P» 48.
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The general tendency of the attitude in individual
countries seems to make most public law aspects of the
operations of air cushion vehicles governed by rules derived
from maritime law, e.g. safety regulations, rules relating
to the vehicle and its crew, traffic regulations and sea 
<4/pollution -z—/ . In relation to private law, and more specific­
ally to the rights and duties created by transportation on 
an air cushion vehicle, there is no unanimity as to the 
applicable law. Several proposals have been put forward, some 
adopting air law as a basis, some adopting maritime law. The 
rationale in each case is the similarity existing between 
hovercraft transportation with that by either an aircraft or 
a ship. But this is very different from saying that some 
rules of air law, and in particular the Warsaw Convention, 
apply because hovercraft are encompassed in the word 
"aircraft" used by the Convention.
In the United Kingsom, special legislation has been 
enacted to deal with liability for carriage by hovercraft. 
This legislation indicates that hovercraft are not included 
within the ambit of the Warsaw Convention since such 
legislation would have been unnecessary and unwarranted 
if the term "aircraft" in the Warsaw Convention included 
hovercraft. Pursuant to the Hovercraft Act, 1968 , and
the Hovercraft (Civil Liability) Order, 1971 » the
carriage of passengers and their luggage is governed by the
54/ For specific examples, see W.P. Heere, "Air Cushion 
Vehicles, A Legal Puzzle", (1971) 2 Netherlands Y.B. Int'l 
L. p. 108 at p. Il6 ; E. du Pontavice, address to the 
International Law Association (New York, 1972), Report of 
the 55th Conference, p. 732*
15/ 1968 c. 59.
56/ S.I. 1971/720.
-  25 -
provisions of the Carriage by Air Act, 1961, and the 
Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1962 uJJ , 
which implement the Warsaw Convention as amended by the 
Hague Protocol and supplemented by the Guadalajara Convention. 
The carriage of goods is governed by the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act, 1924 .
This is only one example of how a country could 
determine the extent to which carriage by hovercraft should 
be governed by pre-existing rules which were not originally 
devised to be applicable to such cases it is clear
that another country could make a completely different 
selection of applicable rules. However thus far the United 
Kingdom appears to be the only country where special 
legislation has been adopted.
In any event, the solution adopted by English law 
in relation to hovercraft is applicable only insofar as 
English law itself is applicable. In the case of an inter­
national carriage by hovercraft, the applicability of 
English law would have to be assessed on the basis of the 
conflict of laws rules of the forum.
57/ Hovercraft Act, 1968, S. I(l)(i)(i) ; Hovercraft (Civil 
Liability) Order, 1971, S. 3*
58/ Hovercraft Act,1968, S. I (l)(i)(ii) ; Hovercraft (Civil 
Liability) Order, 1971, S. 4.
59/ The discretion exercised in that choice by the United 
Kingdom appears particularly clearly in the Hovercraft 
(Application of Enactments) Order, 1972, (S.TT 1972 / 971), 
which lists the enactments and instruments relating respect­
ively to (i) vessels, (ii) aircraft, and (iii) motor 
vehicles which are made applicable to hovercraft. When 
necessary, modifications of these enactments and instruments 
are made in order to adapt their provisions to the specific 
requirements of the hovercraft.
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Section 2. - Definition of "international carriage" .
Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention provides *
" For the purposes of this Convention, the expression 
’international carriage? means any carriage in which, 
according to the contract made by the parties, the 
place of departure and the place of destination, 
whether or not there be a break in the carriage or 
a transshipment, are situated either within the 
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or 
within the territory of a single High Contracting 
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within 
a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, 
mandate or authority of another Power, even though 
that Power is not a Party to this Convention. A 
carriage without such an agreed stopping place 
between territories subject to the sovereignty, 
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High 
Contracting Party is not deemed to be international 
for the purposes of this Convention."
Article 1(3) provides guidelines for the application of 
that definition to cases of successive carriage.
This Section considers the judicial interpretations 
given to the various elements of this definition with the 
exception of the complex notion of High Contracting Party 
which is discussed in the following Section.
I) Paramount importance of the contract made by the parties.
A number of different courts have emphasized that 
the terns of the contract prevail over the facts when it 
becomes necessary to ascertain whether a carriage is inter­
national. The early English case of Grein v. Imperial 
Airways, Ltd. stated this very clearly :
" The contract (or under para. 3 the series of 
contracts) is, so to speak, the unit to which 
attention is to be paid in considering whether the 
carriage to be performed under it is international 
or not." 6l/
60/ 1 Avi. 622 (Ct App England, 193^)
_6l/ per Greene, L.J., at 63 .^
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62/A similar attitude was adopted in the other countries 
Accordingly, for the purposes of Article 1, it is irrelevant 
that a journey is interrupted by inclement weather This 
does not affect the point of destination selected when the 
ticket was bought. Likewise, it is irrelevant that a 
passenger decides to stay indefinitely in what was supposed 
to be a stopping place only ,
There are some difficulties relating to the phrase 
"contract made by the parties". They have already been 
examined a propos the differences between a French contrat 
and a common law contract ,
2) Points of departure and destination.
There is almost unanimity on the technical meaning 
of "point of departure" and "point of destination". The 
classic definition was given by the Court of Appeal of 
England in Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. These
62/ In the United States x Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
9 Avi. 17,280 (N.Y. Sup. 1964), 9 Avi 17,789 (N.Y. Sup. 1965). 
aff1' d,9 Avi. 18,247 (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. 1966), rev* d ,10 Avi.
17,651 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967), cert, denied,88 S.CtT 1636 
(U.S. Sup 1968) ; Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian International 
Airlines, 7 Avi. 17»6l4 (N.Y. Sup. I96I).
In Canada : Stratton v. Trans Canada Air Lines, 32 
D.L.R.2d 736 (Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1 9 62 )  ; United Internat­
ional Stables Ltd, v. Pacific Western Airlines, 5 D.L.R.3d 
67 (Brit. Col. Sup. Ct. 1969)•
In France : Caisse regionale de Securite Sociale du 
Sud-Est c. Della Roma, (1959) 22 R.G.A. 194, note J. Borricand 
TC.A. Aix-en-Provence, 13 March 1959)* aff* d , (1962) 25 R.G.A. 
273» note J. Borricand, J.C.P. 1963.II.12997» note P.Chauveau 
(Cass. civ. soc. 16 November 1961). See also Bedeau c . 
Touring-Club de France, (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 321, note Georgia- 
des (T. G . I. Paris , 26 March 1969") •
63/ e.g. in Egan v. Kollsman (above n. 62), see also Parker 
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 731 (Texas 
Ct. Civ. App. 1969).
64/ e.g. in Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Int'l Airlines(above n.62) 
65/ above p. 18-20.
66/ 1 Avi. 622 (Ct. App. England 1936).
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expressions mean *
" the place at which the contractual carriage 
begins and the place at which the contractual 
carriage ends." 67/
Thus, in the case of a circular journey or a return journey, 
the points of departure and destination will coincide t 
One must consider the entire contract of carriage, and not 
simply the leg of the trip during which an accident occurred 
in order to assess whether the carriage is international or 
not. This interpretation has been adopted by many cases in 
the United States . It has also been adopted in
62/ at 635.
68/ at 636.
69/ The number of cases in the United States may be due to 
the fact that the place of destination is designated as one 
of the possible fora by Article 28 of the Convention. American 
courts do not seem to make a distinction between the cases 
where the place of destination is determined for the purposes 
of Article 1 and those where it is determined for the 
purposes of Article 28. See : Parkinson v. Canadian Pacific 
Airlines, Ltd.. 10 Avi. 17,967 (S.D. N.Y. I968), 10 Avi.
18,237 (STD. N.Y. 1969) ; Kelley v. Sabena Belgian World 
Airlines . 9 Avi. 17,512 (E . D . N. Y . i"965) ; Dunning" v. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc., 4 Avi. 17,394 (D. D . C. 195*0 * 
Glenn v. Cia Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 3 Avi. 17,836 (S.D.
Fla. 1952) ; Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 3 Avi. 17,404 
(S.D. N.Y. 195ÖT ; Burde11 v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd.
11 Avi. 17,351 (IllT Cook Co. 1969) ; Atlantic Fish & Oyster 
Co. v.'Pan American Airways, Inc., (1950) U.S. Av. Rep. 23 
(111. Cook Co. 1948") ; Bowen v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 8 Avi. 
18,043 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Felsenfeld v, Societe Anonyme 
Beige dfExploitation de la Navigation Adrienne, 8 Avi.17,199 
(N.Y. City Ct. 1962) ; Galli v.Re-Al Brazilian International 
Airlines, 7 Avi. 17,614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I96I) ; Berner v.
United Airlines, Inc., 5 Avi. 17,169 (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. 
1956), aff1d, 3 N.Y.2d 1003 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957) ; Ross v.
Pan American Airways, Inc., 2 Avi. 14,911 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1949) ; Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1 Avi. 1,280, 
aff* d , 269 App. Div. 287 (N.Y. Sup. App. Div. 1945), aff *d,
295 N.Y. 852 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1946), cert, denied 329 U.S. 741, 
(U.S. Sup. 1946) ; Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1 Avi. 
1,093 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943") ; Rosen v. Lufthansa German Air­
lines , 10 Avi. 17,314 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pla, I966).
The only discordant note is sounded by the recent case of 
Aanestad v. Air Canada Inc., 13 Avi. 17,505 (C.D. Cal. 1974) 
and 13 Avi. 17,515 (C.D. Cal. 1975) where the court held that 
the place of destination was the place of destination of a 
particular flight. The court did not discuss or even refer to 
any of the numerous contrary precedents existing on the point.
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Canada ^ / 1 and in France It is interesting to note
that the definition in the Grein case was made widely 
available to French lawyers . When the issue finally 
arose in French courts, a definition similar to that in 
Grein was adopted.
23/
3) Agreed stopping places.
In Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. , the court 
gave the following definition of agreed stopping place :
" a place where according to the contract 
the machine by which the contract is to be 
performed will stop in the course of performing 
the contractual carriage, whatever the purpose 
of the descent may be and whatever rights the 
passenger may have to break his journey at that 
place." 74/
7 ^There are no serious challenges to this definition1-^  
One difficulty arises in relation to agreed stopping 
places which are not expressly mentioned on the ticket. When 
could it be said that they had been "agreed to" ? An Americai^
70/ Surrrenant v. Air Canada (1973) Fecueils de Jurisprudence 
107 TC.A. Quebec, 1972).
71/ Caisse regionale de S^curite Sociale du Sud-Est c. Della 
Roma" (1959) 22 R.G.A. 194, note J. Borricand (C.A. Aix-en- 
Provence, 13 March 1959)» aff1d, (1962) 25 R.G.A. 273» note 
J. Borricand (Cass. civ. soc., 16 November 1961). See also 
Mavdeck c. Cie E1-A1,(1962) 16 R.F.D.A. 182 (T.G.I. Seine,
8 December l86l) , aff*d, (1962) 16 R.F.D.A. 179 (C.A. Paris,
27 March 1962).
72/See for instance M. Guinchard, "La notion de ’transport 
international* d’apres la Convention de Varsovie", (1956)
10 R.F.D.A. p. 14, at pp. 20-21.
73/ 1 Avi. 622 (Ct. App. England 1936)
2ä/ at 635.
75/ See however Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc., 13 Avi. 17,505 
(C.D. Cal. 1974) and 13 Avi. 17,515 (C.D. Cal. 1975) where 
what was seen as the place of destination would have been . 
seen as an agreed stopping place according to the Grein* s 
definition.
76/ Kraus v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 2 Avi. l6,ol7 (N.Y.Sup. 
Ct. 19^9)• See also American Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 4 Avi. 17,413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.195*0, 
af f * d , 4 Avi. 18,234 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1956), where the court 
held that the stopping place did not necessarily have to be 
indicated on the ticket.
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77 /and a French court J-L/ have decided that the tariffs and 
timetables of the carrier are incorporated into the contract ; 
the passenger and the shipper are deemed to have known and 
agreed that the selected route included the stopping places 
indicated in the carrier*s tariffs and timetables J— 7 .
4) Requirements for the existence of an "undivided carriage".
Article 1(3) provides the basis on which the 
definition of "international carriage" is to be applied in 
cases of successive carriage. It reads i
" A carriage to be performed by several successive 
air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this 
Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it 
has been regarded by the parties as a single 
operation, whether it had been agreed upon under 
the form of a single contract or of a series of 
contracts, and it does not lose its international 
character merely because one contract or a series 
of contracts is to be performed entirely within 
a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, 
mandate or authority of the same High Contracting 
Party."
The purpose of Article 1(3) is to simplify matters 
when several successive air carriers perform a carriage.
It singles out the original point of departure and the final 
point of destination as the only elements to be considered 
in ascertaining whether a carriage is international. In the 
absence of Article 1(3)» each successive air carrier would 
have had a separate contract with the passenger/shipper.
Each contract of carriage might or might not have been 
subject to the Warsaw Convention according to the location 
of the particular points of departure and destination of the 
carriage considered. Thus, various regimes of liability
77/ Caisse regionale de S£curit£ Sociale du Sud-est c. Della 
Romal (1959) 22 R.G.A . 194, note J. Borricand (C.A~. Aix-en- 
Provence, 13 March 1959)» aff1d, (1962) 25 R.G.A. 273» note 
J. Borricand (Cass. civ. soc., 16 November 1961).
78/ The same reasoning was applied in the English case of 
Rotterdamsche Bank N.V. v. B.O.A.C., [19531 1 All E.R. 675 
(Q.B. 1953)/“
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could have applied during the same journey. An added dis­
advantage would have been the complexity of having to assess 
the international character of each portion of the journey.
The scope of Article 1(3) must be determined before
examining whether a particular situation complies with the
essential requirement that the carriage "has been regarded
by the parties as a single operation". A leading text argues
that the presumption of undivided carriage can apply only if,
from the start, the parties have agreed that there would be
79 /successive carriers . This view is based on the English 
translation of Article 1(3) which refers to carriage "to be 
performed by several successive air carriers." A literal 
interpretation of that sentence renders the presumption of 
undivided carriage inapplicable to a carriage in several 
stages to be performed by one carrier only when another 
carrier is substituted after the carriage has started. This 
literal interpretation was rejected by an American court .
It is also inconsistent with the ruling of a French court 
that the substitution of another carrier for the original 
carrier — who was to perform the whole transportation — was 
covered by the first contract, and that the second carrier 
simply became a party to the original contract . The 
rejection of the literal interpretation appears to be based 
mainly on the fact that there is no practical difference in the 
making of a contract whether the carriage is to be performed 
by one or several carriers. It would thus be somewhat artific­
ial to introduce a sharp distinction between situations which 
are similar in fact. This argument appears to have had a
particular weight in the American decision 82/ In addition,
79/ C.N. Shawcross & K.M. Beaumont, On Air Law (3d ed., London, 1966), p. 412.
8Ci/ Briscoe v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 10 Avi. 18,108
Ts .d . n .y . 1968).
81/ Maydeck c. Cie El Al. (1962) 16 R.F.D.A. 182 (T.G.I. Seine, 
8 December 1961), aff’d , (1962) 16 R.F.D.A. 179 (C.A. Paris,
27 March 1962).
82/ Briscoe v. Compagnie Nationale Air France at 10 Avi. 18,109.
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the literal meaning of the French text ("Le transport a 
ex£cuter par plusieurs transporters par air successifs" ) 
places less emphasis than the English translation on the 
fact that the particular carriage is, in the future, ”to be 
performed by several successive air carriers".
If a particular carriage is within the scope of 
Article 1(3)» it will be undivided only if it "has been 
regarded by the parties as a single operation". Here again, 
great emphasis is placed on the intent of the contracting 
parties. Several cases illustrate the judicial search for 
their common intention The elements relied upon by the
courts vary depending upon the particular facts. However some 
guidelines can be discerned. For instance, the payment of the 
whole price of the air fare has often been regarded as reveal­
ing that the parties considered the journey as a single 
operation . The reverse is also true, i.e. if a passenger 
has only paid the fare for the first part of his journey, 
this has been seen as demonstrating the lack of unity between 
the two parts of the journey .
83/ In the United States 1 Galli v. Re-Al Brazilian Inter­
national Airlines, 7 Avi. 17,6l4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) insist­
ing on the common intention of the parties. In Canada :
Stratton v. Trans Canada Air Lines, [1962”] 32 D.L.R.2d 736
"(Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1962) ; United International Stables Ltd. 
v. Pacific Western Airlines, 5 D.L.R./d 67 (Brit. Col. Sup.
Ct: 1969)• In France ; Bedeau c. Touring Club de France,
(1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 321, note E. Georgiades (T.G.I. Paris,
26 March 1969).
84/ In the United States : Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 
1 Avi. 1,280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) . In Canada : Stratton v . ~~ 
Trans Canada Air Lines, [I962I 32 D.L.R.2d 736 (Brit. Col.
Ct. App. 1962) at 747* In France : Caisse regionale de 
Securite Sociale du Sud-Est c. Della Roma, (1959) 22 R.G.A.
194, note J. Borricand (C.A . Aix-en-Provence, 13 March 1959)» 
aff*d , (1962) 25 R.G.A. 273» note J. Borricand (Cass. civ. 
soc., 16 November 1961).
85/ MacCarthy v. East African Airways, Corp. 13 Avi, 17,3^5 
I s. D~ N.Y. 1974). See also Atlantic Fish & Oyster Co. v. Pan 
American Airways, Co. Inc. (I950) U.S. Av. Rep. 23 (111. Cook 
Co. 1948).
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Assessing the intent of the parties to the contract 
becomes more complex when the original travel plans are 
altered after the commencement of the journey. A mere change 
in the hour or date of the flight to be performed by the same 
carrier is of no consequence . But it is a different
matter when the change is more substantial, e.g. another 
carrier is substituted for the original carrier or the original 
route is modified. Such changes are common. They may be made 
by the passenger or by the carrier. When this occurs, are 
the parties still in the original contractual relationship, 
or have they formed a new contractual relationship ?
Most changes made by the carrier are authorized by 
the conditions of carriage which allow, for instance, subs­
titution of alternate carriers or aircraft without notice^-^f 
Any change made by the carrier within the conditions of 
carriage appears to be authorized by the original contract, 
thus complying with the requirement of Article 1(3) •
It is more difficult to determine whether changes 
made by passengers terminate the original contract or not.
The facts of each case play a decisive role in ascertaining 
whether a new contractual relationship has been created. The 
issue of a new ticket assumes great practical importance 
because it often is the only objective element available.
If an additional ticket is issued to cover a side-trip,
86/ For an example of a case where the parties clearly 
considered the change as a minor alteration of the original 
contract, which unquestionably remained in force, see 
Tanneries de Lutece c. Air France, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 105 
(trib. com. Seine, 23 February 1965). rev'd on other grounds, 
(1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 70 (C.A. Paris, 16 November 1966).
8_7/ See the conditions of contract issued by the International 
Air Transport Association (hereinafter referred to as I.A.T.A.) 
particularly Clause (9) of the Passenger ticket and Clause(5) 
of the Air waybill.
88/ Rotterdamsche Bank, N.V. v, British Overseas Airways Corn. 
[1953J 1 All E.R. 675 (Q.B. ”1953)-
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it indicates that that trip was not part of the original 
carriage 0%/• similarly, when a new ticket is issued for a
22/new destination, this was seen as an entirely new contract 
Conversely,- if a passenger simply substitutes an airline for 
one part of the trip, but keeps the original ticket for the 
rest of the journey, the original undivided carriage is not 
affected . But issuing a new ticket is only one element» 
All facts must be considered in order to discover the 
intention of the parties %
5) Special cases of carriage excluded by the Convention.
Article 2(1) applies the Convention to carriage 
performed by the States or by legally constituted public 
bodies provided it falls within the conditions laid down in 
Article 1^ /  The only exception is provided by Article 2(2) 
which excludes carriage performed under the terms of any 
international postal Convention ^ / .
89/ Stratton v. Trans Canada Air Lines, [1962^ 32 D.L.R.2d 
736 (Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1962).
90/ Mohammed v. Air Canada, 12 Avi. 18,023 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973& •
91/ Stratton v. Trans Canada Air Lines, (supra n. 89) for the 
leg Seattle-Vancouver ; Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
9 Avi. 17,280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), 9 Avi. 17,789 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1965), afftd , 9 Avi. 18,247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), rev*d,
10 Avi. 17,651 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967), cert, denied, 88 S.Ct. 
1636 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1968).
92/ as was made clear in Parkinson v. Canadian Pacific Air­
lines, Ltd., 10 Avi. 17,967 (S.D. N.Y.' I968), 10 Avi.18,237 
(S .D. N. Y. 1969), where the fact that no new ticket had been 
issued was not sufficient by itself to establish whether there 
was a new contract or not (at 10 Avi.17,969)* When the court 
finally decided that there had been no new contract, the fact 
that the ticket presented by the passenger reflected on its 
face the original route was given as much importance as the 
absence of delivery of a new ticket (at 10 Avi. 18,237)»
93/ This follows the translation given in the Schedule to the 
United Kingdom Carriage by Air Act 1932. The United States 
translation speaks of "transportation performed by legal 
entitied constituted under public law". Both translations 
are mere approximations of a concept unknown in common law 
countries, i.e. "personnes .juridiques de droit public."
94/ The exception was applied in Pan American World Airways, 
Inc, v. S.A. Fire & Accident Insurance Co. LtdT  ^ (I965) a 
A .d3 150 (South Africa) ; see also Moukataff v. B.Q.A.C., 
[1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 396 (Q.B. 1967)»
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The Additional Protocol to the Convention gives 
each Contracting Party the right to declare that the 
Convention will not apply to international carriage by air 
performed directly by the State, its colonies, protectorates, 
or mandated territories or by any other territory under its 
sovereignty, suzerainty, or authority. Among the States dealt5V , only the United States has made this
96/declaration . As yet, no American court has decided that
a particular transportation was "performed directly by the
State". The Convention was applied to a case where a ticket
had been bought by the American Army to allow an artist to
perform for American troups in Europe 22j % The same ruling
was made in relation to a flight performed by an aircraft
chartered by the United States Government for the trans-
98/portation of soldiers 2—J . A dictum in another case indicates 
that a carriage performed by State-owned airlines would not 
be performed directly by the State 22/ % All these cases 
favour a restrictive interpretation of the Additional 
Protocol, thereby ensuring a wider scope to the regime set 
out in the Convention.
Finally, Article 34 of the Convention provides that 
the Convention does not apply to international carriage by 
air performed by way of experimental trial with the view to 
the establishment of a regular line of air navigation, nor 
does it apply to carriage performed in extraordinary 
circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s
95/ i.e. Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.
96/ It is not enough that a State has the right to make the 
declaration ; the right must be exercised. Kelley v. Sabena,
9 Avi. 17,512 (E.D. N.Y. 1965).
£2/ 190 Misc. 974 (N.Y. Sup. 1947), aff'd, 2 Avi. 14,556 (N.Y. 
Sup. App. Div. 1948), aff* d, 2 Avi. 14,912 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1949).
98/ Warren v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 9 Avi. 17,621 
(S.D‘ Cal. 1964), rev'd and rem1d, 9 Avi. 17,848 (9th Cir. 
1965) ; Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 9 Avi. 17,187 
(S.D. N.Y^ 1963), aff’d and remld, 9 Avi. 17,475 (2d Cir. 
1965)» cert, denied, 3^2 U.S. ITT? (US Sup. 1965)•
99/ Kelley v. Sabena, 9 Avi. 17,512 (E.D. N.Y. 1965).
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business. There are few cases where the applicability of 
Article 3^ was a real issue A Belgian court held that
Article 3^ must be restrictively interpreted and that, in 
doubtful cases, the Convention must be applied -1^/. The 
same restrictive approach was adopted in a charter case in 
the United States , The court ruled that Article 3^ was
drafted to cover a very narrow field which did not include 
a charter situation. In brief, all the provisions excluding 
special classes of carriage from the scope of the Convention 
have been construed very restrictively, with the consequence 
that the uniform regime was given the widest possible scope.
Section Three. - High Contracting Parties .
In numerous cases, the Convention was held inapplic­
able because the particular carriage did not originate or 
terminate in the territory of a High Contracting Party 102/. 
This illustrates the importance of ascertaining which countries 
are High Contracting Parties. Two main questions arise : (i) 
what are the formalities required in order for a country to
100/ In Vanderburg v. French Sardine Co., 4 Avi. 17»189 (Cal. 
Super. cTi 1953)» the court simply stated that the transport­
ation was outside the normal scope of an air carrier’s 
business.
101/ Defer c. Sabena, (1950) Pas. III. 96 (trib.Bussels, 12 
May 1950).
102/ Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 8 Avi. 18,335 
T nTd . Ga. 1964), aff'd, 10 Avi. 17,518 (5th Cir. 1967).
103/ For a Lebanese decision dealing with Saudi Arabia : Cie 
Middle East Airlines c. La Baloise Transports, (1970) 33 
R.G.A.E. 44 (C.A . Beirut, 27 November 1969). aff'd, (1972)
26 R.F.D.A. 186 (Cass. Liban, 20 January 197lT^ For a Swiss 
case dealing with Nicaragua 1 Lacroix Baartmans c. Swiss 
Air, related by H. Mankiewicz in (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 75 
(Tribunal Federal Suisse, 11 July 1972). For a Californian 
case dealing with Iran, see Ne.iat v. British Overseas Airways 
Corporation, 9 Avi. 18,154 (Calif. Sup. Ct. 1966)• There are 
similar examples dealing with the Hague Protocol t Alexandre 
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 Avi. 17»844 (W.D. N.Y. I965)•
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become a High Contracting Party, and (ii) whether newly 
independent States, previously under the jurisdiction of a 
High Contracting Party, are to be considered as High 
Contracting Parties if they have not expressly adhered to 
the Convention.
A) Formalities required in order to become 
a High Contracting Party.
l) Does the expression "High Contracting Party" include 
States who are only signatories to the Convention ?
This problem was examined in the early English case 
of Philippson v. Imperial Airways A quantity of gold
was to be flown from England to Belgium, but the gold was 
stolen at Croydon airport. The I.A.T.A. General Conditions 
of carriage of goods were applicable. They provided that in 
the case of a carriage which was not international, suit must- 
be brought within six months ; when the carriage was inter­
national, suit could be brought within two years. "Inter­
national carriage" was defined in the Conditions as including:
" all carriage by air in which according to the 
contract made by the parties, the place of 
departure and the place of destination . . . are 
situated either within the territory of two High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention of Warsaw 
for the unification of certain rules relating to 
International Air Transport of October 22, 1929» 
upon which these conditions are based, or within 
the territory of a Single High Contracting Party 
if there is an agreed stopping place within a 
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, 
mandate or authority of another Power, even though 
that Power is a non-contracting Power."
The consignor started his action more than six months, but
less than two years after the date of the proposed carriage.
It was therefore essential to determine whether the carriage
was international.
104/ [1939] A.C. 332 (H.L. 1939)-
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The Carriage by Air Act 1932, which implemented the 
Warsaw Convention in the United Kingdom, was not applicable. 
It could apply only to flights between States who were 
certified to be High Contracting Parties by Order in Council. 
Belgium, which had signed but not ratified the Convention, 
was not listed as a High Contracting Party in the Order in 
Council then in force. But the Warsaw Convention itself was 
applicable as the law of the contract of carriage pursuant 
to the General Conditions of carriage of Imperial Airways.
The Court of Appeal held that the carriage was not 
international because Belgium could not be considered as a 
High Contracting Party. The House of Lords reversed this 
decision but it did so on grounds which by no means establish 
that, as a signatory, Belgium was a High Contracting Party. 
The ratio decidendi is not easily found. Lord Atkin and Lord 
Wright held that, in the Convention, "High Contracting 
Parties" meant "signatories" on the ground that the text 
of Articles 36 to 40 of the Convention could only mean 
"signatories" —  . They also held that "High Contracting
Parties" in the Conditions of Carriage must have the same 
meaning as they had in the Convention itself, since the 
conditions were based on the Convention and made express 
reference to it. Lord Russel and Lord MacMillan dissented 
and were of opinion that ratification was necessary 
Lord Thankerton concurred with Lord Atkin and Lord Wright in 
reversing the Court of Appeal decision, but his decision was 
based on entirely different grounds. He disagreed with Lord 
Atkin and Lord Wright on the question of ratification*.
" I think it may be said that the High Contracting 
Parties referred to in Art. 1, para.2, and Art.28 
can only apply to those which have bound themselves . 
by ratification. It seems to me that the Convention 
has been drawn on the footing that all the 
signatories have ratified." 107/
10 5/ per Ld Atkin at pp. 347ff ; per Ld Wright at p. 368. 
106/ per Ld Russel at pp.358-9 ; per Ld MacMillan at p. 361. 
107/ at p. 353-
39 -
Nevertheless, he concurred in allowing the appeal because 
the time limitation clause in the contract was ambiguous. 
Accordingly the air carrier could not avail himself of the 
shorter period since the consignor could reasonably have 
thought that the longer period was applicable 222/, This 
reasoning was also mentioned by Lord Wright as an alternative 
ground for reversing the Court of Appeal decision 2£2/1
Thus a majority of the Lords were of opinion that 
"High Contracting Parties" in Article 1 meant countries who 
had ratified, as well as signed the Convention. However, this 
decision has often been quoted as authority for the propos­
ition that signature of the Convention may be sufficient to 
give the quality of High Contracting Party to a State. Viewed 
in this light, the case has been strongly criticized 2=19/1 
The United Kingdom Government officially dissociated itself 
from such a construction and the United States Department of 
State agreed with the emphasis put on ratification by the 
British Government 2-2-^-/ 1
The question has not been really discussed in other
cases. Courts have simply assumed that only countries which
have ratified the Convention can be High Contracting Parties^
111/In Corocraft Ltd, v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. --%
Lord Denning, M.R., stated that s
" The Warsaw Convention is an international convention 
which is binding in international law on all the 
countries who have ratified it" ll4/(emphasis added)
108/ at p. 353- 
109/ at pp. 365 ff.
110/ See for instance M. Guinchard, "La notion de transport 
international d*apres la Convention de Varsovie" (1956) 10 
R.F.D.A. p. 14 at p. 17» n.4 ; D. Lureau, La Responsabilite 
du transporteur aerien, (Paris, 1961), p. 88 ; 0. Riesen, 
"Reflexions sur 1*unification internationale du droit aerien, 
sa situation actuelle, ses perspectives’,' (1951) 5 R.F.D.A.pJ36
111/ See further McNair, The Law of the Air,(3d ed., London, 
1964) p. 173 5 H. Briggs, The Law of Nations, (2d ed. New York 
1952) p. 844.
112/ as in Grein v. Imperial Airways, 1 Avi. 622 (Ct.App.i936)
H i /  [1969] 1 All E.R. 82 (Ct. App. England 1968) at p. 87. 
114/ at p. 87.
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Whatever the real authority of the Philippson case 
its relevance has almost disappeared since countries which 
signed the Convention have also ratified it. Article XVII of 
the Hague Protocol avoids future difficulties by providing »
" In Article 37» paragraph 2, and Article 40, 
paragraph 1, the expression High Contracting 
Party shall mean State. In all other cases, the 
expression High Contracting Party shall mean a 
State whose ratification of or adherence to the 
Convention has become effective and whose 
denunciation thereof has not become effective,"
2) Forms of ratification.
The validity of the ratification made by Belgium 
was questioned in the American case of Kelley v. Sabena 
Belgian World Airlines . The plaintiffs argued that
Belgium was not a High Contracting Party and consequently 
the carriage was not governed by the Warsaw Convention.
Their argument was based on the Belgian Act of April 7» 1936, 
which purported to make the Convention applicable in Belgium 
and to convert the Convention’s monetary standard into 
Belgian francs. Plaintiffs claimed that the limits set in 
Belgian francs were much lower than the limits in Poincari 
francs set by the Convention itself, and that such a variation 
from the Convention was fatal to the ratification.
The court refused to accept the argument. It pointed 
out that a few months after the Act in question had been 
passed, Belgium had filed a formal instrument of ratification 
with the Polish Government in strict conformity with the 
Warsaw Convention. The court decided that the only relevant 
factor was whether a proper instrument of ratification had 
been deposited. The Act of April 7» 1936, might violate the 
Convention, but this did not affect the validity of the 
ratification proper.
115/ 9 Avi. 17,512 (E.D. N.Y. 1965).
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3) Comparison.
Both Philippson and Kelley illustrate the difficult­
ies which may appear when a country passes special legislation 
in order to implement an international treaty. In England, a 
treaty is made by the Crown exercising its prerogative but 
Parliament must implement the treaty to give it internal 
effect . The same is true in Canada and Australia. It
follows that the courts of those countries do not have to
refer to the Warsaw Convention itself, but only to the Act
117/which implements it. For instance, in Philippson — u  , the 
English Act made the quality of High Contracting Party depend 
upon inclusion into a special Order in Council, and since 
Belgium was not included in the Order this was conclusive 
evidence for the court that Belgium was not a High Contracting 
Party. It has been pointed out in a later case that this 
could create discrepancies ^ 0 / ,  An English court might not 
recognize a country as a High Contracting Party because of 
non-inclusion in the Order in Council and yet it may be so 
recognized in other countries.
In the United States and France no special 
legislation is necessary to bring the Convention into force.
In the United States, the Convention is viewed as a "self­
executing treaty" which became the "supreme Law of the Land"
119 /as soon as it had been adhered to by the United States — ^  .
116/ See further D.P. O’Connell, International Law (London,
"l9o5) , vol. 1, pp. 60 to 62.
117/r19391 A. C. 332 (H.L. 1939).
118/ Samuel Montagu & Co. Ltd, v, Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. 
El966J 2 Q.Eh (Ct. App. England 1966).
119/ Indemnity Insurance Company v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 
1 Avi. 1,243 V 1 Avi. 1,247 ‘(S.D. N.Y. 1945). Article VI(2) 
of the United States Constitution provides 1 " This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof ; and all the Treaties made, or 
v/hich shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ; and the judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwith­
standing. " See also Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc.1 Avi. 
1280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 A.D. 287 (N.Y. Sue. Ct. 
App. Div. 1945), aff'd. 295 N.Y. 852 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1946), 
cert, denied. 329 U.S. 741 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1946).
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In France, treaties are assimilated to legislation ; the
actual provisions of a ratified treaty acquire the force of
internal legislation . In theory at least, possible
conflicts between a treaty provision and a normal statutory
provision are easily solved. The Constitutions of 1946 and
121/of 1958 gave priority to international treaties ---' .
B) Situation of newly independent countries.
After the accession to independence of a great 
number of new States, it became essential to determine whether 
the previous "colonies, protectorates, territories under 
mandate, or any other territory" subject to the sovereignty 
or authority of a High Contracting Party, or any other 
territory under his suzerainty ought to be considered as 
High Contracting Parties when the former colonial power had 
ratified the Convention or adhered to it on behalf of those 123/territories, pursuant to Article 40 of the Warsaw Convention— ¥
120/ R. David, The International Unification of Private Lav/, 
in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. II, 
Chapter 5» p. 90» Para. 235*
121/ See further P. Lardy, La force obligatoire du droit 
international en droit interne (Paris,I966), pp. 107 ff. ;
J. Dehaussy, "The conditions of application of conventional 
norms in the French forum", (i960) 87 Journ. Dr. Int'l p.703.
122/ On the question of State succession, see generally 
M. Marcoff, Accession a 1*ind6pendance et succession d'Etats 
aux traites internationaux (Fribourg, I969) ; D . P. 5~* Connell, 
State Succession in Municipal and International Law (Cambridge, 
1967) ; Udokang, Succession of New States to International 
Treaties (Dobbs Ferry^ N.Y., 1972) ; Report on State Succession 
and Governmental Contracts, International Law Association,
New York, 1972, Report of the 65th Conference, pp. 654 ff. ;
S. Glaser, "Decolonisation et succession aux traites" (1970)
74 Rev. Gen. Dr. Int. Pub. pp. 906 ff. j R.H. Mankiewicz,
"Air Law Conventions and the new States" (1963) 29 J* Air L.
& Com. pp. 52 ff.
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There is no difficulty when a newly independent 
State has expressly made it known that it considers itself 
bound by the Warsaw Convention, or when it has ratified the 
Hague Protocol since Article XXI(2) of the Protocol provides :
" Ratification of this Protocol by any State 
which is not a Party to the Convention shall 
have the effect of adherence to the Convention 
as amended by this Protocol."
The problem arises when a newly independent State remains
silent. Divergent solutions have been given in the courts
of various jurisdictions.
There are a number of decisions relating to
territories previously subject to France’s colonial power.
These shall be examined together because they all seem to
illustrate a common attitude. The issue has arisen only in
isolated cases in relation to territories previously subject
to England’s colonial power. These shall be considered
separately because each case appears to adopt a different
approach.
l) Territories previously subject to France’s colonial power.
There are several cases where the territories of 
Senegal, Lebanon, Laos, Vietnam, Tunisia and Morocco were 
points of departure or destination of an international flight. 
In order for the Warsaw Convention to be applicable, it was 
necessary for the new States to be considered as High 
Contracting Parties. In several cases, the courts simply
assumed, without discussion, that the Convention applied 123/
123/ For Lebanon (a trust territory of France until the Second 
World War") t Caisse Parisienne de R^escompte c. Air France, 
(1955) 18 R • G .A . 6l (Trib. civ. Seine, 14 January 1955)» aff1 d,
(1958) 19 R.G.A. 291 (C.A. Paris, 31 May 1958) ; for Senegal,
all the following cases relating to the same accident which 
took place on August 29, i960, have been argued on the basis 
of the Warsaw Convention 1 Spiers c. Cie Air France, (1966)
29 R.G.A.E. 42 (T.G.I. Seine, 6 November 1964), re'v* d , (1966) 
29 R.G.A.E. 49, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Paris, 15 February 
1966), cassation, J.C.P. 1969.11.15814 bis, note M. de Juglart 
and E. du Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire, 4 November 1968), on
remand, (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 404, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Rouen,
11 May 1970) ; Kamara c. Cie Air France, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 42
(cont1d)
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Four cases decided by the Tribunal de Grande Instance de la 
Seine are more explicit.
Two cases deal with Laos and Vietnam They
arose out of a crash which occurred on June 16, 1953» during 
a flight between Laos and Vietnam. The court had to decide 
whether the French Treasury's claim against the carrier was 
subject to the two-year limitation contained in Article 29 
of the Convention. The court referred to Article 1(2) and 
stated that the Convention would apply only if Laos and 
Vietnam could be considered as High Contracting Parties.
This required that Laos and Vietnam were independent from 
France in 1953 otherwise the case would be subject to French 
domestic law. The tribunal interpreted the various diplomatic 
conventions as granting full independence to Laos and Vietnam 
in 19^9* The next step was to determine whether these 
independent countries, who had not adhered to the Warsaw 
Convention, could be regarded as High Contracting Parties.
The court noted firstly that France had ratified the 
Convention and deposited the instruments of ratification 
without making any reserves in relation to the application 
of the Convention to French colonies and protectorates. The
123/ (cont1d) (T.G.I. Seine, 6 November 1964), rev1d, (1966) 
29 R.G.A.E. 49, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Paris, 15 February 
1966), cassation, (1968) D.S. 475» note P. Chauveau (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 24 June 1968) ; Diop c. Cie Air France, (1966) 29 
R.G.A.E. 42 (T.G.I. Seine, 6 November 1964), rev'd, (1966)
29 R.G.A.E. 49, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Paris, 15 February 
1966), aff1d , (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 6l, note G. de La Pradelle, 
J.C.P. 1969.II.I5704, note M. de Juglart et E. du Pontavice.
124/ Tresor Public c. Cie Aigle Azur, (i960) 14 R.F.D.A. 214 
(T.G.T~. Seine, 1 February i960) ; Tresor Public c. Cie Air 
Laos, (i960) 13 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com"! 4 3 , note M. de Juglart, 
Tfrlb. civ. Seine, 4 March 1958), aff’d, (I96I) 15 R.F.D.A. 
276 (C.A. Paris, 17 June i960).
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court continued i
" Therefore it is undoubted that Laos and Vietnam 
were and remain bound by the commitments taken on 
their behalf by France before their accession to 
independence, in so far as they have not themselves 
taken the initiative of a formal denunciation of 
these commitments, which was not argued."(emphasis 
added) 125/
The same reasoning was applied in a later case involving 
Tunisia, an ex-French Protectorate %
The same court applied identical reasoning when 
considering whether Senegal was a party to the Convention, 
as modified by the Hague Protocol % The court simply
stated that Senegal was to be considered a party because 
of France’s ratification on her behalf before independence.
The court pointed out that, at the time of ratification by 
France, no declaration had been made that the Hague Protocol 
would not apply to Senegal as was possible under Article XXV 
of the Protocol, and that there had been no denunciation by 
Senegal after its independence, in relation either to the 
Warsaw Convention or to the Hague Protocol.
The reasoning has been criticized mainly because the 
court seems to deduce the quality of High Contracting Party 
from France's ratification on behalf of her previous colonies 
and protectorates without envisaging the possible effects of 
accession to independence . It simply assumed that the
territory of the newly independent States, which were previous­
ly subject to the Warsaw Convention, remained subject to the 
Convention after independence.
125/ The court said : "Qu’il n'est done pas douteux que le 
Laos et le Vietnam etaient et demeurent tenus par les en­
gagements pris en leur nom par la France avant leur accession 
a 1'independance, pour autant qu'eux-memes n'ont pas pris 
1*initiative d'une dgnonciation formelle desdits engagements, 
ce qui n'est point pretendu." (i960) 14 R.F.D.A. at 216.
126/ Agent Judiciaire du Tresor c. S.A.G.E.T.A., (1965)
19 R.F.D.A. 466 (T.G.I. Seine, 15 June 1965)*
127/ Lerarc c. Air France, (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 129, note G.Cas 
TtTg .I. Seine, 10 April 1964) ; MacKinnon c. Air France, 
(1964) 28 R.F.D.A. 402 (T.G.I. Seine, 10 April 1964).
128/ O'Connell, State Succession, vol. 2, pp.327-8.
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It is true that there seems to be a missing link 
between i (i) France’s ratification of the Convention on 
behalf of her previous colonies and protectorates and (ii) 
the fact that the newly independent States are considered 
as High Contracting Parties. That missing link is provided 
when one takes into account the fact that French courts tend 
to consider as a fundamental rule of the .jus gentium the 
principle that newly independent States succede to all rights 
and duties contracted by the former colonial power when it 
was exercising powers which were transferred to the new State 
at independence .
Explicit reference to such a principle of inter­
national law was made by a Moroccan tribunal dealing with 
a similar problem ^2 0 / 1 The plaintiff had claimed that the 
carriage was not international because Morocco was not a 
High Contracting Party to the Warsaw Convention. The court 
rejected the argument. It first noted that France had ratified 
the Convention without making any reservation for Morocco and 
continued :
" Whereas continuity of the rights and duties of a 
State is a fundamental rule of public international 
law, which remains valid when a territory or a 
nation separates itself or creates itself to 
constitute a new State, contrary to plaintiff’s 
claim,
Whereas it is undisputable that Morocco, in 
regaining its independence pursuant to the Common 
Declaration on March 2, 1956, remained bound by the 
commitments previously taken on its behalf by France 
insofar as it did not take the initiative of a 
formal denunciation of the said commitments,
129/ In Agent Judiciaire du Tresor Public c. Labeunie, (1972) 
99 Journ. Dr. Int. 812, note D. Ruzie (Cass. civ. Ire, 15 
June 1971)» the Cour de Cassation approved the court below 
to have interpreted a particular provision "seion la regie 
du droit des gens dite de succession des Etats, comme posant 
le principe fondamental seion lequel I’Algirie assume toutes 
les obligations et beneficie de 1'ensemble des droits contrac­
tus par les autorites frangaises dans l'exercice des competen­
ces transferees lors de 1*independance du nouvel Etat 
algerien . . ."at 813.
130/ Ecoffard c. Air France, (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 1771 note 
Benathar (Trib. Ire inst. Rabat, 28 April 1964).
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" Whereas, far from taking such a position, Morocco, 
although exempted by the above mentioned principle 
of public international law, has pursuant to an 
agreement concluded with France on May 20-28, 1956> 
declared that it assumed the obligations arising 
out of international treaties made by France on its 
behalf . . .
Whereas, without it being strictly necessary,
Morocco has expressly adhered to the Warsaw Con­
vention on January 8, 1958 . . . "  131/
Thus, for the court, succession to rights and duties 
created by international treaties is a basic rule of public 
international law. The devolution agreement was seen only as 
a confirmation of that rule. Morocco’s formal adherence to 
the Warsaw Convention was mentioned, but obviously only as 
a further confirmation of the already ascertained legal 
position.
However, the very existence of such a principle
of international law is far from being unquestioned. It is •
completely negated by the practice of those States who have
repudiated all the treaties applicable to their territory
prior to independence % The same attitude generally
133/prevails among soviet legal writers — . In the western 
world, the view taken by the above cases would be shared only 
by a small minority of writers , The vast majority would
disagree at least with the sweeping generality of the terms 
used. Careful distinctions are usually made between various 
types of treaties. In the end, it may well be that a country
131/ at p. 179.
132/ e.g. Algeria^ Israel, Upper Volta. See further Marcoff, 
Accession a 1*independance et succession d’Etats, p. 163 ; 
O’Connell, State Succession, vol. II, pp. 113-114.
133/ See for instance I.I. Lukashuk, "Parties to Treaties-- 
The Right of Participation", 135 Recueil des Cours p. 253*
134/ For a survey of the various tendancies, see Marcoff, 
Accession a 1*ind6pendance et succession d’Etats, pp. 11-47.
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does not have to expressly adhere to the Warsaw Convention in 
order to become a High Contracting Party, but this would not 
be on the basis of some general principle applicable to all 
situations. It would be because of the particular situation 
of the newly independent State involved.
As it happens the cases discussed above could have 
been justified on several grounds other than the general 
principle which was used as an explicit or implicit basis of 
reasoning. Firstly, in relation to Senegal, the accession to 
independence took place so gradually that it is described by 
O’Connell as "a shift of a constitutional character clearly 
not involving any alteration either of international commit­
ments or of the legal consequences of internal governmental 
activity, and being decidedly more akin to change of 
government, as traditionally understood in international lav/,13</than to a change of sovereignty." — The author adds that
it is not surprising that Senegal has recognized itself to be
bound in principle by French treaties » "at no point in time,
in this evolutionary process, could it be said that a decisive
break in the chain of legal continuity had occurred."i2^/
Secondly, in relation to countries which were
French protectorates before independence, one can take the
view that, as a rule, protectorates are bound by the treaties
concluded by the "protecting State" which "represented" them
137 /at the time the treaty was made — ^  . Hence, Laos and Vietnam, 
for instance, were represented by France when she signed and
135/ O'Connell, State Succession, vol. I, p. 76.
136/ O'Connell, State Succession, vol. I, p. 77.
137/ The basis of the doctrine of representation is found in 
two cases decided by the International Court of Justice : 
United States Nationals in Morocco Case, I.C.J. Reports 1952, 
124, and Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, I.C.J. 
Reports 1962, 35- See particularly Cambodia's oral pleadings 
in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, I.C.J. 
Reports 1962, pp. 71 ff.
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ratified the Warsaw Convention. They automatically became 
High Contracting Parties once the Protectorate ceased. 
However, this doctrine of representation for Protectorates 
is not established beyond doubt in international law — •2—\
Thirdly, in most of the cases cited above, there was 
a bilateral agreement between France and the particular 
country involved, according to which the new State would 
succede to treaties. For some countries, it was a specific 
devolution agreement. The Laotian agreement for instance 
provides :
" The French Republic recognizes and declares that 
the United Kingdom of Lao's is fully independent 
and sovereign. Consequently, it is substituted to 
the French Republic in all the rights and oblig­
ations arising out of all international treaties 
or particular agreements contracted by the former 
on behalf of the Kingdom of Laos or of French 
Indochina before this Agreement." 139/
No specific devolution agreement was signed by
Tunisia . However when full internal autonomy was
141/granted ---' , she recognized the primacy of international
conventions and treaties over internal law and undertook 
to take, within the framework of her internal autonomy, the 
measures necessary for rendering applicable treaties 
concerning her, and for assuring their execution % The
final independence of Tunisia was achieved by a Franco- 
Tunisian Protocol of 1956
138/ O’Connell, State Succession, vol. II. p. 147.
139/ Agreement made on October 22, 1953* Decret No.59-593» 
J.O. April 22,  1959. P* 4758 ; Documentation Francaise, Notes 
et Etudes Documentaires 1953. No 1811. For the Vietnamese 
agreement, see Documentation Francaise, Notes et Etudes Docu­
mentaires 1964, No 067. For Morocco, see Documentation Fran- 
gaise, Notes et Etudes Documentaires 1956, Ncb 0328 and O363.
l40/ O’Connell, State Succession, vol. II, p. 143.
l4l/ General Convention of June 3. 1955* Decret No 55-1179. 
J.O. August 31. 1955-
142/ Articles 3 and ^ of the General Convention.
143/ The text can be found in (1957) 13 Revue Egyptienne de 
droit international, p.222.
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2) The case of India and Pakistan.144 /In Dabrai v. Air India ---\ a parcel containing gold
was sent from Karachi, Pakistan, to Bombay, India. One of the 
issues was the applicability of the Warsaw Convention which 
depended on India and Pakistan being High Contracting Parties. 
The court decided that the Convention was applicable, mainly 
on the basis of the provisions of the Indian Independence 
(International Arrangements) Order, 1947. According to that 
Order, the Warsaw Convention, as implemented in India before 
independence, had devolved on both India and Pakistan, so that 
each was a High Contracting Party vis-a-vis the other. It has 
been pointed out that the court regarded succession of 
Pakistan to the status of High Contracting Party as achieved 
in Indian law by legislation binding India, and that it 
resolved the issue only on the ground of Indian statutory 
law
In all the cases examined so far, the courts involved
were either the courts of the former colonial power, or the
courts of the former protectorate or colony. They considered
the particular attitude prevailing in their country vis-a-vis
succession to treaties, together with any bilateral agreement
between the former colonial power and the former protectorate
or colony. The importance of the latter element is clear in
146/Dabrai v. Air India ---' , and in the Moroccan case of Ecoffard
c. Air France — u  , where the reasoning was totally or partly 
based on the terms of a devolution agreement. The attitude of 
a foreign court could be quite different as shall be seen below
144/ 42 A.I.R., N.U.C. 18 (High Court Bombay, 195,3)*
145/ O’Connell, State Succession, vol. II, p. 327. A similar­
ly reserved attitude was adopted by the Privy Council in 
Molefi v. Principal Legal Adviser, [l97ll A.C. 182 (P.C.1970) 
where the question was to determine whether Lesotho was a 
Party to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. It was held unnecessary in that case "to consider 
the various views which have been held by international lawyers 
as to the circumstances under which there may be succession to 
treaties or conventions by a new State." (at 192).
146/ 42 A.I.R., N.U.C. 18 (High Court Bombay, 1953)*
147/ (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 177» note Benathar (Trib. Ire inst. 
Rabat, 28 April 1964).
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3) The status of Singapore vis-a-vis the Warsaw Convent!on.
In Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd.-^—^ f
an Illinois court found that the place of destination of
the carriage was Singapore. The Warsaw Convention would
govern the carriage only if Singapore was a High Contracting
Party. The court held that it was not,because this would
have required formal adherence or ratification to the
Convention, and that had not been done by Singapore at the
time of the accident. The court quoted an article written
by 0*Connell where it was stated that no international
authority had decided that the Warsaw Convention wasl4o /automatically applicable after independence — 27 . It also 
quoted an article by Jones where it was said that a new 
State had to determine its acceptance or otherwise of 
international treaties by express declaration or by 
conduct 2J2 ® / 1
The court completely ignored the statutory situation 
relating to treaty continuity by Singapore . The situation
is quite complex due to the fact that Singapore was part of 
Malaysia before separating from that Federation in 1965^ ^ /  
Malaysia was constituted in 1957 by agreement between the 
United Kingdom and the territories concerned. Article 169 
of the Constitution of Malaysia affected the acceding the 
acceding territories. It provides that any treaty, agreement 
or convention entered into before independence between the
148/ 11 Avi. 17,351 (111. Cook Co. 1969)
149/ D.P. O'Connell, "Independence and Succession to Treaties", 
TT962) 38 Brit. Y.B. Inf 1 L. 84 at p. 143.
150/ J.M. Jones, "State Succession in the Matter of Treaties", 
T1947) 24 Brit. Y.B. Inf 1 L. 360 at p. 366.
151/ D.P. 0"Connell thinks that the decision in Burdell is 
"probably wrong" because this statutory situation has been 
overlooked in the proceedings. See"Recent Problems of State 
Succession in Relation to New States'", (1970) 130 Recueil des 
Cours 101 at p. 178.
152/ For an exhaustive analysis of the situation of Singapore, 
see S. Jayakumar, "Singapore and State Succession : Inter­
national and Internal Lav/" (1970) 19 Inf 1 & Comp. L.Q. 398.
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United Kingdom Government and another country on behalf of
the Federation or any part thereof shall be deemed to be a
treaty, agreement or convention between the Federation and1 <3/that other country ^  . There is no doubt that the Warsaw 
Convention was applicable to S' ’ its accession
Article 169 of the Constitution, the Convention was applic­
able after the accession. When Singapore separated from 
Malaysia in 1965, the legislation concerning the separation 
provided that treaties of Malaysia, including those deemed 
to be such by Article 169» should, in so far as they had 
application to Singapore, be deemed to be treaties of 
Singapore
Thus, if the Burdell case had been brought in 
Singapore, it is likely that the court would have considered 
Singapore as a High Contracting Party, on the basis of the 
provisions which had organized first the accession to the 
Federation of Malaysia, then its separation from it.
One obstacle to a uniform attitude on the status 
of Singapore may be due to the unavailability of the relevant 
information to foreign courts. But even if the unilateral or 
bilateral declarations of succession were known, it is not 
certain that they would be considered as conclusive evidence 
of the' fact of succession. It is not enough for a country to 
assert that it is a party to a treaty in order to become one
153/ See further O’Connell, State Succession,vol. II, 
pp. 68 ff.
15^/ For an example of the application of the Warsaw 
Convention to a flight between Geneva and Singapore before 
Singapore’s accession to the Federation of Malaysia, see 
Braathens South American & Far East Air Transport A.S. v .
The Borneo Company, Ltd., (i960) Journ. Bus. Li 213•
155/ (1965) IV International Legal Materials p. 9^1-
to the Federation of Malaysia according to
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in the eyes of the courts of another country Since, in
our hypothesis, the new State has not complied with the normal 
procedure of ratification or adhesion, recognition as a party 
to a particular treaty implies that there exists some rule of 
international law on which the succession to a treaty is based. 
If the particular country where the question is considered 
does not recognize the existence of such a rule, that is the 
end of the matter, whatever the newly independent State might 
claim.
In addition to the doubts surrounding the existence 
of a customary rule of international law ensuring succession 
to treaties, and to the limited authority of unilateral 
declarations or bilateral agreements vis-a-vis foreign States, 
a third element adds to the general uncertainty. The 
postulate on which all doctrines favouring State succession 
are based is that it is good and desirable to ensure the 
continuity of legal order. In relation to the Warsaw 
Convention, the objective of continuity can justify that a 
flight which would have been subject to the Warsaw Convention 
before independence remains so afterwards. But it cannot 
justify the fact that, after independence, the Convention 
would become applicable to a flight which, before independence, 
would not have been subject to it. However, this is precisely 
the result of most of the cases which have held that the new
156/ There may be a discrepancy between the diplomatic 
practice observed by a State on the question of succession to 
treaties and judicial attitudes on that issue. Compare the 
Burdell decision with the United States attitude towards 
Tunisia. The United States Treaties in Force refers to the 
fact that the General Convention between France and Tunisia 
of June 3» 1955> provided for the recognition of the primacy 
of international conventions and treaties over internal law, 
and Tunisia's undertaking to take the measures necessary for 
securing the execution of treaties concerning Tunisia, and 
the fact that the Protocol of March 20, 1956, recognized 
Tunisia's plenary competence in foreign affairs as the basis 
for including relevant French treaties under Tunisia's name. 
See further O'Connell, State Succession, vol. II, p. 143, 
n. 7*
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State was a High Contracting Party. For instance, before 
independence, a flight between France and Laos was governed 
only by the provisions of French domestic law. As a result 
of the decision of the Tribunal de la Seine, the Warsaw 
Convention applied to a flight which took place after 
independence. It is difficult to argue that legal continuity 
can justify the creation of a new vincula juris between two 
States-^-^. The same can be said of Dabrai v. Air India 
which considered India and Pakistan as High Contracting 
Parties vis-a-vis each other when they had not been so 
before independence.
157/ O'Connell, State Succession, vol. II, p. 328. 
158/(1955) ^2 A.I.R. , N.U.C. 18 (High Court Bombay 1953)*
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Chapter TWO. - RESPECTIVE DOMAINS OF THE ORIGINAL
CONVENTION AND OF ITS AMENDMENTS.
Survey of the applicable texts.
Only a few years after the Warsaw Convention had 
been adopted, its imperfections became evident and the 
question of its revision arose. In 1955 the Hague Protocol 
made several crucial amendments. In particular, the limit of 
the carrier*s liability was raised from about $8 , 3 0 0 to 
$l6 , 6 0 0 and the conditions for unlimited liability were re­
defined. In 1961, the Guadalajara Convention sought to solve 
problems arising when the transportation was performed by a 
person other than the contracting carrier.
Meanwhile, the United States had not ratified the 
Hague Protocol, mainly because its new limits were still 
considered to be too low. This had the effect of retaining 
the original Warsaw limits for the United States even though 
these limits were then too low by most countries* standards. 
American public opinion reacted strongly against these low 
levels and the United States Government unsuccessfully 
applied pressure on other Governments to secure much higher 
limits. The United States then gave notice of its intention 
to denounce the Warsaw Convention. Shortly before the 
denunciation was to take effect an agreement was reached 
between the major air carriers and the American Administration 
through the International Air Transport Association. The 
"Montreal Agreement" was signed in 1 9 6 6. It raised the limit 
of liability for carriage of passengers to $75,0 0 0 . Particip­
ating carriers waived their right to rely on Article 20(1). of 
the Convention by which they could exonerate themselves from 
liability by proving that they had taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage.-i/
1/  On the background of the Montreal Agreement, see A.Lowenfeld 
& A. Mendelsohn, "The United States and the Warsaw Convention", 
(1 9 6 7) 80 Harvard L.R. p. 497*
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Finally, in 1971» "the Guatemala City Protocol 
substantially modified the whole regime of liability for 
the carriage of passengers and baggage. It introduced an 
unbreakable limit which, in 1971» was equivalent to $100,000^
Applicability of these various instruments.
The situation is simple in relation to the Guadala­
jara Convention which only "supplements" a liability regime 
organized by the other texts. Its provisions are merely added 
to the original Warsaw Convention, or to the Convention as 
amended at The Hague ^ .
There is also no problem in relation to the Montreal 
Agreement. Provided the defendant carrier is party to the 
Agreement, it will apply if the carriage has at least one 
point of contact with United States territory, be it a point 
of origin, destination, or an agreed stopping place. The 
Montreal Agreement applies equally to carriage governed by 
the original Convention or the Convention as amended at The 
Hague. In both cases, the Agreement becomes operative through 
a special contract between carrier and passenger whereby the 
carrier agrees to a higher limit of liability than that set 
forth in the Convention or in the Protocol. Such an agreement 
is authorized by Article 22(1) of the Convention. But the 
Montreal Agreement is not applicable to carriage governed by 
the Guatemala City Protocol because the Protocol*s limit 
exceeds that of the Montreal Agreement. No carrier can rely 
on a special contract with the passenger to lower his 
liability limit because such a contract is made null and void 
by Article 23 of the Convention
2/ on the actual amount of the limit, see below p. 266ff. 
/  Article 1(a) of the Guadalajara Convention.
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The question of the applicability of the two 
Protocols amending the Convention is more complex. They are 
not mere additions to a pre-existing regime but replace 
important provisions of the original text with new rules. 
Several problems occur. Some arise in selecting the form of 
the Convention which is appropriate to the particular fact 
situation. This is discussed in the following section. Section 
Two deals with the case of transitional difficulties between 
the Convention and its Protocols.
Section One. - Solutions provided by the Hague
and Guatemala City Protocols.
Two Protocols rather than a new Convention.
It was proposed, both at The Hague in 1955 and at 
Guatemala City in 1971» that a new Convention should replace 
the original Warsaw Convention. This would have had the 
advantage of providing one easily consulted document which 
was simple to apply. The proposal was twice rejected, for 
two main reasons . Firstly, the re-writing of an entire 
Convention is a much bigger enterprise than merely amending 
an existing text ; it would have required more resources than 
were available at the time the matter was being considered. 
Secondly, the original Convention has been adopted by many 
countries, creating wide uniformity. It was thought that this 
uniformity would be endangered if the Convention was repealed 
and replaced by an entirely new instrument. But if the 
Convention was amended, the general framework would subsist, 
however great or small the number of ratifications of these 
amendments.
4/ ICAO Legal Committee (9th session, Rio de Janeiro, 1953), 
Doc"! 7450 - LC / 136, vol. 1, p. xv, pp. 7ff ; International 
Conference on Air Law (Guatemala City, February-March 1971). 
Doc". 904o -"'LC / I67, vol. 1, pp. 219ff.
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The text of the Protocols.
At the time of writing, the Guatemala City Protocol 
has not come into force. Thus it is only in relation to the 
Hague Protocol that questions of applicability of the amended 
or unamended text of the Warsaw Convention have arisen in the 
courts. Article XVIII of the Hague Protocol states that the 
Convention, as amended, shall apply »
" to international carriage as defined in Article 1 
of the Convention, provided that the places of 
departure and destination referred to in that 
Article are situated either in the territories 
of two parties to this Protocol or within the 
territory of a single party to this Protocol 
with an agreed stopping place within the territory 
of another State."
Article XVI of the Guatemala City Protocol is identically 
worded in providing for the application of the Warsaw 
Convention, as amended at The Hague and at Guatemala City.
The amended regime of liability thus applies if the 
carriage originates and terminates in two States which are 
parties to the amending Protocol, or within one State which 
has ratified the Protocol when there is an agreed stopping 
place within the territory of another State. Accordingly, 
carriage originating or terminating in the United States is 
not subject to the provisions of the Hague Protocol because 
the Protocol has not been ratified by that country. This is 
particularly important because international travel from, or 
going to, the United States represents a considerable propor­
tion of all international air travel.
Consequences.
The principles which delineate the respective 
domains of the Warsaw Convention and its amendments result 
in differing liability limits in relation to passengers 
travelling on the same plane. For instance, in the case of
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the crash of the Turkish Airlines DC-10 near Paris in 197^» 
it is likely that some passengers had Turkey as their country 
of departure or destination. Turkey is not a party to the 
Warsaw Convention. Thus the applicable law can be determined 
only on the basis of the conflict of laws rule prevailing in 
the court seized of the case. Some passengers may have been 
travelling between two States which were parties to the 
Warsaw Convention, or between one State which was a party to 
the Warsaw Convention and another which had ratified the 
Hague Protocol. The unamended Convention governs such cases. 
Perhaps there were passengers travelling between points 
located in two countries which ratified the Hague Protocol, 
or in one State party to the Protocol with an agreed stopping 
place in the territory of another. Their carriage would be 
governed by the Convention as amended at The Hague. The 
Montreal Agreement would not apply to any claim directed at 
Turkish Airlines because that carrier is not a party to the 
Agreement.
An additional element of uncertainty is introduced 
when an action is brought in a court located in a State not 
party to the Warsaw Convention or its Protocols. No country 
is bound to give force of law to a treaty to which it is not 
a party ^ . For instance, since Turkey is not a party to the 
Warsaw Convention, Turkish courts are not bound to apply it, 
even though the points of departure and destination of the 
carriage may be located in States which have ratified the 
Convention. Similarly, there is no principle of international 
law which compels United States courts to apply the provisions 
of the Hague Protocol to a carriage between places situated 
in countries which have ratified the Protocol. It may be that
See E. du Pontavice, "Responsabilit£ du transporteur 
aSrien" (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. pp. 77-78.
6o
the Protocol would in fact be applied, as the proper law of 
the contract, but it would not be in order to comply with an 
international duty ^ *
Section 2. - Transition between the various regimes .
A) Situation in France.
Difficulties due to the transition between the 
Warsaw regime and the regime as amended by the Hague Protocol 
have arisen in a number of French cases. They reflect 
controversies on the more general issue of the retrospective 
effect of new statutes.
Background ; Uncertainties on the principles to be applied.
Article 2 of the Civil Code simply states the 
broad principle that the law is not to be retrospectively 
applied ^ . But it does not define the word "retrospective". 
This task is left to the courts and the doctrine. The 
classical view was that Article 2 did not apply to procedural 
and declaratory statutes which were to be applied immediately. 
For other statutes, a distinction was made between vested 
rights and mere expectations. The application of a new 
statute would be retrospective, and therefore prohibited by 
Article 2 of the Civil Code, only if it modified vested rights.
6/ Even though the United States is not a party to the Hague 
Protocol, the applicability of the Hague Protocol by United 
States courts was contemplated by the Civil Aeronautics Board 
when it gave the dollar equivalent of Poincare- francs for 
both the unamended Convention and the Convention as amended 
at The Hague. See further below p. 273*
2J Article 2 of the Civil Code provides : "La loi ne dispose 
que pour l'avenir ; eile n*a point d'effet retroactif."
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Although the distinction between vested rights and mere 
expectations has always been very difficult to make, the 
system based on that distinction prevailed all during the 
19th century and the first part of the 20th century ^ .
The classical view then became the object of severe 
criticism by the doctrine, mainly because of what appeared 
as arbitrary distinctions between vested rights and mere 
expectations. New approaches were advocated which claimed to 
be free of the uncertainties of the classical analysis. The 
new system, as developed by its principal exponent, Dean P. 
Roubier, is quite complex -2/. However, only a brief outline 
is needed to understand the judicial developments which took 
place in France in air law cases. The first distinction to be 
made is between 1
(i) situations which were totally completed when the new 
statute was adopted,
(ii) situations which came into existence after the adoption 
of the new statute, and
(iii) situations which were in existence before the new 
statute intervened, but continue to produce effects after­
wards .
There is no difficulty in relation to the first two 
situations. For situations totally completed when the new 
statute was adopted, any application of the new statute would 
be retrospective ; therefore, it is prohibited by Article 2 
of the Civil Code. For situations which came into existence 
after the adoption of the new statute, there can be no 
justification to apply anything but the new statute.
8/ See further on the classical view : Aubry & Rau, Droit 
civil frangais (7th ed. by A. Ponsard, Paris, 1964), vol. 1, 
pp. 1 5 3 f f .
2 /  P. Roubier, Le droit transitoire (2d ed., Paris, i960).
For a specific application of the principles to air law cases 
see E. du Pontavice, comments in (1965) 18 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com 
pp. 472ff., 950ff.
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As to situations already in existence before the 
new statute intervened, but producing effects afterwards, 
further distinctions are necessary. Firstly, effects already 
realized are to be left untouched by the new statute. For 
the effects which appear after the coming into force of the 
new statute, the decisive factor is whether a particular 
situation is contractual or not. If it is contractual, it 
will be governed by the law at the time of its creation 
and the new statute will not affect it. If it is l£gal, i.e. 
not contractual, the situation is subject to the provisions 
of the new statute. A further distinction is made within the 
contractual category. There are a few contractual relation­
ships which are so heavily regulated for reasons of ordre 
public that it is considered artificial to subject them to 
contractual rules. Such relationships are governed by a 
Statut legal. The reasons of ordre public which led to the 
regulation of the situation also command an immediate 
application of all later modifications in order to provide 
a regime better suited to the present situation of the 
parties.
The new doctrine reveals a fundamentally different 
attitude from the classical view which considered the right 
or interest affected by the application of the new statute.
The new approach does away with the uncertainty of the dis­
tinction between vested rights and mere expectations by 
providing a system which should automatically yield the 
correct solution once all the elements of the case are proper­
ly assessed. The first step is to determine when a particular 
situation is created, when its effects are produced, and when 
the new statute becomes law. This will allow the situation 
to be classified either as one which was totally completed 
when the new statute was adopted, or one which came into 
existence after the adoption of the new statute, or one which
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was in existence before the new statute intervened but 
continued to produce effects afterwards. The solution flows 
from this classification. It should be noted that the dis­
tinction between contractual and non-contractual situations 
is done quite frequently in French law and that, in general, 
it is achieved without special difficulties
The new system does not focus on producing results 
different from those obtained under the old system. It 
purports to be more scientific, the results being entirely 
predictable given the facts of a case . By contrast, in 
the first system, the solution depends on the subjective 
analysis made by the judges seized of the case.
While la doctrine was expounding the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two systems, the courts were a great 
deal less explicit, appearing to adopt one theory of the 
other without spelling out in any detail the reasoning which 
led to their conclusions. This attitude of the courts is 
evident in relation to cases dealing with the applicability 
of the Hague Protocol.
Applicability of the Hague Protocol.
The Hague Protocol came into force in France in 
August 1963* Soon afterwards, a series of decisions of the 
Seine Tribunal applied the higher liability limit of the 
Hague Protocol to accidents which had occurred before August 
1963 The court characterized the contract of international 
air carriage as a Statut llgal, adopting the distinction made 
by Roubier within the category of contractual situations. 
Accordingly, any modification improving the previous Statut 
was to be immediately applied.
10/ see further Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 421ff.
11/ Roubier, Le droit transitoire, pp. 171ff.
12/ Leparc c. Air France, (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 129 (T.G.I. Seine 
10 April 1964) ; MacKinnon c. Cie Air France, (1964) 28 R.F.D.A 
402 (T.G.I. Seine, 10 April 1964) " Seghers c . Air France,
(1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 25 (T.G.I. Seine, 29 January 19^37^
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This analysis was rejected by the Paris Court of
Appeal which held that "the situation created by the faulty
performance of a contract is constituted as from the date of 
11/the damage."— “ Rights and liabilities are fixed on that date 
and must be assessed by the law which was in force at that 
time. The Court of Appeal denied the relevance of character­
izing the situation as a Statut lggal. Thus, the decision of 
the court below was reversed because it had characterized as 
a Statut legal a relationship which was a normal contractual 
situation. In other words, the Seine Tribunal had misunder­
stood the Roubier system. Ey contrast, the reasoning used by 
the Court of Appeal appears to correctly apply the basic 
principles of that system by focusing on the date on which 
the particular situation was constituted instead of asking 
whether the carrier had a vested right to the application 
of the lower limit of liability.
It seems that the Paris Court of Appeal again used 
the Roubier system when it determined whether the fault which 
would deprive the carrier of the limitation of liability
ought to be defined on the basis of the Convention, or on the14/basis of the Protocol — / . The court emphasized the contract­
ual nature of the relationship as the main justification of 
its refusal to apply the Hague definition to an accident 
which had occurred before August 1963* These decisions were 
approved by the doctrine and followed by lower courts in
11/ S.A.G.E.T.A. c. Aauilana, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 68 (C.A. 
Parish 29 October i960) at p . 69.
14/ Syndicat d7assurances des Lloyds c. St£ Alrofret, (1967) 
30 R.G.A.E. 168, J.C.P. I967.II.1526I, note M. de Juglart and 
E. du Pontavice (C.A. Paris, 27 June 1966), aff*d, (1969)
23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. com., 22 April 1969) T Societe 
Mat Transports c. Cie Air France, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 337 
(C.A. Paris, 7 June 1966).
15/M. de Juglart and E. du Pontavice, note under Syndicat 
d*assurances des Lloyds c. Ste Alrofret, J.C.P. 1967.II.
15261 ; E~. du Pontavice, comments in (1967) 20 Rev. Trim. Dr. 
Com. p. 613 ; (1966) 19 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. pp. 417-422, 432.
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later cases — ' .
The Cour de Cassation has neither expressly endorsed 
nor rejected the Roubier system. Instead, it used a reasoning 
specific to the kind of rule the applicability of which was 
in doubt. In Soc. Mutuelle d'assurances a£riennes c. Thi£ra-17/ehe— u  , the court deduced from the principle stated in
Article 2 of the Civil Code that when a new statute \
" determines the amount of the indemnity due for 
compensating a damage, it is the law in force 
at the time of the accident which alone is to 
be applied." 18/
In other words, the reason for the inapplicability of the 
Hague Protocol was that the new norm was one which deter­
mined the amount of a compensating indemnity. But no clue was 
given as to how the court deduced that specific rule from the 
broad wording of Article 2 of the Civil Code. It might have 
been on the basis of the distinction between vested rights 
and mere expectations, or on the basis of the Roubier system, 
or on some other basis.
The same specific reasoning, which seems to purpose­
ly avoid integration within any particular doctrinal system, 
was used in relation to the Act of March 2, 1957» which 
unified the regime of liability applicable to domestic and 
international carriage by air. The issue was the applicability 
of Article 29's two-year time limit to accidents which had 
occurred before the promulgation of the Act. The problem 
appeared because, prior to the 1957 Act, no time limit was 
specified for cases of domestic carriage. This meant that 
actions could be brought within thirty years of the date of
16/ The ruling was followed by the Seine Tribunal in Gilmore 
c. Air France, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 88 (T.G.I. Seine, 25 
November 1966). A similar attitude was adopted in Gin c. 
A6ro-Club de Chelles, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 346 (T.G.I. Meaux,21 April 1966).
22/  (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 443 (Cass. civ. 2e, 18 July 1967).
18/ at p. 444.
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the accident. In Lorans c. Air France 
Cassation stated »
12/ the Cour de
" a statute shortening the length of a time
limitation is immediately applicable to actions 
relating to facts prior to its promulgation, 
the reduced prescription starting to run only 
from the date of coming into force of the new 
statute." 20/
Here again, the court used very specific reasoning. It is 
because the 1957 Act was a statute shortening the length of 
a time limitation that it was immediately applicable. The 
court considered it unnecessary to elaborate further on the 
reasons why statutes shortening the length of a time limit­
ation should apply to actions relating to facts occurring21/before the coming into force of the new statute — ' .
The concise reasoning of the Cour de Cassation in 
the above two cases is particularly striking when it is 
compared to the decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal whose 
language is more explicit and clearly reveals the influence 
of the new doctrinal system %
12/ (1973) 36 R.G.A.E. 107, D.S. 1973.J.361, note P. Chauveau 
TCass. civ. Ire, 12 July 1972).
20/ (1973) 36 R.G.A.E. 107 at p. 108.
21/ In Cie Aigle Azur c. Agent Judiciaire du Tresor Public, 
T1970) ^ TTT fTdTT! 93* note E. Georgiades (Cass. civ. Ire,
14 October 1969), the Cour de Cassation had already asserted 
the applicability of the two-year time limit to actions 
relating to facts prior to the 1957 Act, with the exception 
that the new statute could not be applied to actions 
instituted before it came into force. These actions remained 
governed by the law as it was on the date the action was 
started.
22/ In addition to the Paris Court of Appeal1s decisions 
cited above, see Lorans c. Air France, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A.
3^0 (C.A. Paris, 27 June I967). cassation on other grounds, 
(I973) 36 R.G.A.E. 107, D.S. 1973.J.36I, note P. Chauveau 
(Cass. civ. Ire, 12 July 1972) ; C.A.M.A.T. c. Agent 
Judiciaire du Tresor Public, (I965I 19 R.F.D.A. SjZjT (C.A. 
Paris, 3° June 1965)•
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In brief, there is still no equivocal answer to 
questions of transition between two legal norms. The Paris 
Court of Appeal appears to have endorsed the new theory, 
but the Cour de Cassation is reluctant to commit itself to 
any system. Its decisions may be equally well explained by 
either of the theories. But whatever the reasoning used, 
there is no doubt that the Hague Protocol is not applicable 
to events which took place prior to its entry into force.
Applicability of the Guatemala City Protocol,
The solution may not be so simple when the Guatemala 
City Protocol comes into force. It is true that most of its 
provisions deal with the same questions as the Hague Proto­
col. Thus, presumably, the same solutions should prevail in 
relation to those provisions. But the Hague Protocol contains 
no analogy for the new Article 28 which provides that an 
action may now be brought "in the territory of one of the 
High Contracting Parties, before the Court within the juris­
diction of which the carrier has an establishment if the 
passenger has his domicile or permanent residence in the 
territory of the same High Contracting Party."
It could be argued that the relationship between 
the parties was contractual and that an action based on the 
faulty performance of a contract should be governed by the 
law in force at the time of the contract, including the 
rules determining jurisdiction. Thus, no action could be 
brought in the additional forum if the facts of the case 
happened before the coming into force of the Guatemala City 
Protocol. But this global approach is inconsistent with the 
Lorans case where, in a similar contractual situation, the 
Cour de Cassation decided that it was not the law in force 
at the time of the contract which should determine the length 
of the time limitation but a new statute passed after the 
date on which the contract was to have been performed. This
68
shows that the contractual character of a situation may be 
insufficient by itself to determine the applicable law in 
all cases. It follows that the applicability of the new 
Article 28 to cases relating to facts prior to its coming 
into force is an open question.
B) Transition in common law countries.
There are no cases dealing with the transition 
between the unamended and the amended regimes of liability 
of air carriers. However, a very brief survey of the prin­
ciples which would apply should the issue arise offers an 
interesting contrast to the attitude of French law.
In the United Kingdom, specific statutory provisions 
have settled the issue. Section 1(4) of the English Carriage 
by Air Act 1961 provides 1
" This section shall not apply so as to affect 
rights or liabilities arising out of an 
occurrence before the coming into force of 
this section."
Section 1 of the Act came into force in the United Kingdom 
on June 1, 1967. Accordingly, it is only in relation to 
rights and liabilities arising out of an occurrence after 
that date that the amended regime of liability is applicable. 
For all the other cases, the unamended Convention alone is 
to be applied.
A similar provision existed in the Australian Civil 
Aviation (Carriers* Liability) Act 1959 until 1973 when it 
was repealed Presumably, it was considered that the
23/ Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959-1973* 
Section 4 of the 1959-1962 Act provided s 
" (l) The Carriage by Air Act 1935 is repealed.
" (2) Notwithstanding the last preceding sub-section, the 
provisions of the Carriage by Air Act 1935 coiitinue to apply 
in relation to causes of action that arose before the date 
of commencement of this section, and Part III of this Act 
does not apply in relation to any such cause of action."
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provision was no longer needed. The Hague Protocol had been 
in force for many years and thus any case would now undouted- 
ly be governed by the Convention as amended at The Hague, 
provided the amended regime was applicable to the particular 
flight. 24/The Canadian Carriage by Air Act — ' does not have 
a special provision dealing with the question of transition. 
Any difficulty would have to be dealt with on the basis of 
common law principles. Broadly speaking, the general rule is 
that there is a presumption that no statute is to be construed 
to have a retrospective effect unless such a construction 
appears very clearly from the terms of the Act, or arises by 
necessary and distinct implication. However, the presumption 
against retrospectivity does not apply to legislation con­
cerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence ; on 
the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed 
as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such
was not the intention of Parliament. These principles are25/very rarely challenged — -J .
There does not seem to be any provision in the Hague 
Protocol which could be seen as requiring a retrospective 
application. The normal rules outlined above would presumably 
apply. The first step for a Canadian court would be to 
characterize the provisions of the Hague Protocol Some
provisions would undoubtedly be seen as substantive, such as 
the increase in the limit of liability, or the new definition 
of the conditions of unlimited liability. The solution would 
be less clear for other provisions such as the amendments to
24/ Carriage by Air Act, R.S. c. 45 ; Revised Statutes of 
Canada 1970» C-14.
2 5/ See generally The Canadian Abridgement, 2d series,vol. J>6, 
Statutes, §§722 ff. ; Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes,
(12th ed., London, 1969)» pp. 215ff. It is only in special 
circumstances that the presumption against retrospectivity 
is not applied, see e.g. Dixie v. Royal Columbian Hospital, 
[1941] 2 D.L.R. 138 (Ct. App. Brit. Col. 1941).
26/ The same general approach would be valid for an Australian 
court should the issue arise.
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the contents of the documents of carriage. However, failure 
to conform with the new requirements has such important 
consequences that they would be likely to be seen as being 
of a substantive rather than of a procedural or evidential 
nature. It seems that almost all the provisions of the Hague 
Protocol would similarly be seen as substantive. Accordingly, 
a retrospective application of the amended regime of air 
carriers1 liability is unlikely.
It remains to assess what is retrospective. Gener­
ally speaking, a statute is retrospective "which takes away 
or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or 
creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches 
a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations 
already past."-^^ One can observe a striking similarity 
between this attitude and the attitude which prevailed in 
France under the influence of the classical doctrine.
Air carriers would undoubtedly argue that the 
Protocol creates new obligations and imposes new duties on 
them and that, accordingly, they have a vested right to the 
application of the liability regime in force at the time of 
the carriage. This argument appears convincing.
Although the United States has not ratified the 
Hague Protocol, American courts might have been asked to 
decide on the issue of transition if the Hague Protocol was 
considered as the proper law of the contract of carriage £0/ . 
The Federal constitution, and many State constitutions, con­
tain no express prohibition of laws which are retrospective 
in operation and in the absence of such express provisions
22/ W.F. Craies, Craies on Statute Law (7th ed., London, 
I97I)» p. 387* The Supreme Court of Canada worded the same 
rule in a shorter form in Spooner Oils Ltd, v. Turner Valley 
Gas Conservation Board, (1933) S.C.R. 629 (Sup. Ct. Canada, 
1933) s"A legislative enactment is not to be read as preju­
dicially affecting accrued rights, or an *existing status1.." 
(per Duff, C.J. at p. 638).
28/ above p. 59-60.
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retrospective laws are not prohibited as such but their 
validity is determined by whether they impair contractual 
obligations, violate due process, disturb vested rights, 
or conflict with any other constitutional provision or fun­
damental right . Laws affecting only procedure for the 
enforcement of existing rights are valid even if retrospec­
tive because they do not enter into any of these categories-^-7 
In relation to air carriers' liability, it seems that air 
carriers would plead that the new regime cannot be applied 
retrospectively either on the basis that it would impair 
contractual obligations or on the basis that it would 
disturb their vested right to the application of the legal 
regime in force at the time of the carriage.
It follows from all this that, in relation to the 
Hague Protocol, it is likely that there would be no differ­
ence whether a transitional problem were to be solved on the 
basis of a statutory provision or on the basis of the common 
law or of constitutional law. The amended regime would govern 
only the causes of action which occurred after its coming 
into force.
The situation may be different in relation to the 
addition of a new forum by the Guatemala City Protocol. As 
a rule, procedural statutes may be retrospective. Therefore, 
in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the 
new Article 28 could apply to all actions as soon as the 
revised text comes into force even though the facts on which 
they are based occurred before the coming into force of the 
new regime.
29/ See generally American Jurisprudence 2d series, vol. 16, 
Constitutional Law" §§ 4l3ff. ; Corpus Juris Secundum 2d 
series, vol. ISA, Constitutional Law, §§ 4l4ff.
30/ l6A Corpus Juris Secundum 2d series, Constitutional Law 
§418.
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C) Comparison
A great similarity exists between the solutions 
actually given or which would have presumably been given 
by each legal system to the transitional problems created 
by the introduction of the Hague Protocol. The amended lia­
bility regime is applicable only to causes of action which 
occurred after the coming into force of the new provisions.
However, the manner in which these solutions are 
obtained is very different. In the United States, Canada, 
and now Australia, the solution is found in the common law 
or in constitutional law. In England, the answer is given in 
a specific statutory provision. In France, most difficulties 
were created by a change in the doctrinal basis on which the 
solutions were elaborated. In the doctrinal system which now 
prevails, there is no longer the imprecision which affected 
the previous distinction between vested rights and mere 
expectations, but courts are faced with the subtlety of a 
theory which implies a delicate analysis of the facts of 
each case. It may be because the system is too complex that 
the Cour de Cassation simply refers to the solution which 
is to be applied in specific cases, such as limitation of 
liability, or time limitation.
Perhaps the difference in attitude between French 
law and the common law is best illustrated when one takes 
policy considerations into account. It seems to be estab­
lished in the common law that the sense of fairness and 
justice is at the root of the prohibition of retrospective 
application :
" Upon the presumption that the legislature 
does not intend what is unjust rests the 
leaning against giving certain statutes a 
retrospective application." 31/
31/ Maxwell, On Statutes, p. 215.
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The determination of what is unjust is left to the discretion 
of the courts. This approach avoids any unnecessary rigidity. 
It may even lead to the retrospective application of a 
statute which would normally be covered by the presumption 
against retrospectivity
In French law, the same flexibility was once claimed 
to be a great advantage of the distinction between vested 
rights and mere expectations 32/ a By classifying the facts 
courts could reach the appropriate decision. This in fact 
implies that the court makes a policy judgment on the par­
ticular claim by deciding whether it would be just that a 
new norm be applied, and then characterizes the claim as a 
mere expectation or a vested right in accordance with this 
desired result. But this type of attitude is criticized by 
the doctrine because the outcome of each case is unforesee­
able and depends on how a court views specific facts. What 
had once been seen as the advantage of flexibility became 
the defect of imprecision. From then on, new theories were 
elaborated which would not be subject to this criticism.
Such theories may have been too successful, going to the 
other extreme of excessive rigidity. The conciseness of the 
Cour de Cassation's reasoning may be designed to avoid that 
rigidity.
The whole question of transition illustrates a 
basic difference between French law and the common law. The 
characteristic importance and role of doctrinal writings-- 
la doctrine-- in French law is high-lighted. Doctrinal 
criticisms of the distinction between droits acquis and 
simples expectatives succeeded in its abandonment by the 
courts. Further, even though the alternate system which was 
proposed by la doctrine cannot claim a complete victory, 
since it lacks the endorsement of the Cour de Cassation, it 
has been adopted by many decisions of lower courts.
32/ as was done in Doro v, Victorian Railways Commissioners 
(i960) V.R. 84 (Sup. Ct. Victoria 1959)•
33/ see conclusions by Procureur General Sarrut in D.P. 
1917*I.81, note H. Capitant, at p . 83.
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The importance of la doctrine is more fully appre­
ciated when one considers its role as a source of law in 
34/France -z-7 . It is through doctrinal writings that the rule
of law is enunciated after a systematic organization and
presentation of the materials offered by judicial decisions.
"From this mass, formed day to day through the chance of
events and under urgent pressure and without very clear
guiding principles, it extracts the rules of law which v/ill35/guide judges and practitioners in the future."-^7 Moreover, 
la doctrine establishes the methods by which the law will be 
understood and the statutes interpreted. Finally, la doctrine 
exercises an important influence on the legislators by con­
tinuously offering proposals for law reform so that the law 
can be better suited to the needs of society. Frequently, 
statutes simply adopt tendencies that have developed doctri- 
nally, or enact laws which have been drafted by legal 
writers .
In relation to the question of transition, the 
doctrine first enunciated the rule that the distinction 
between vested rights and mere expectations was essential 
in assessing whether the application of a new statute in a 
particular case would be retrospective. Thai it was realized 
that no reasonably safe prediction of the outcome of a case 
could be made because of the discretion left to the courts. 
The new system proposed by la doctrine did not primarily aim
34/ See further R. David & J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Sys­
tems in the World Today (london, 1968), pp. 74-76, 112-114 ;
0. Kahn-Freund, C. Levy, B. Rudden, A Source-book on French 
Law (Oxford, 1973)» PP- l45ff. ; E. Meynial, "Les recueils 
d'arrets et les arretistes", in Livre du centenaire du Code 
civil (Paris, 1904), vol. 1. pp. lyjff,
35/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 75-
36/ For instance the French Act of March 2, 1957» unifying the 
regimes of liability applicable to international and domestic 
air travel was lifted from an article published by P.Chauveau, 
"Le projet de loi sur la responsabilite du transporteur par 
air", D. 1955» Chr. p. 81.
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at obtaining results other than those achieved by previous 
rulings. These results were in fact integrated into the 
proposed new frame of analysis and used as examples of the 
new system. The final goal was to enunciate a rule precise 
enough to ascertain whether the application of a new statute 
would be retrospective without having to rely on the judicial 
determination of whether there was a vested right or not.
In a common law system, there is no equivalent to 
la doctrine considered as a source of law. The legal rule 
is enunciated by each case and needs no further formulation 
by doctrinal writings -22/. This explains why, even though 
the starting point was the same in both systems, i.e. the 
protection of vested rights against changes in the law, no 
challenge could develop in a common law country in the same 
manner as in France.
37/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, pp. 303-30^*
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Chapter THREE. - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CARRIERS* LIABILITY.
Chapter III of the Convention is entitled 
•Liability of the carrier" and lays down the uniform sub­
stantive rules which are applicable to actions against air 
carriers. The basic principles underlying these provisions 
are not spelt out in the Convention. They can however be 
deduced from an analysis of the Convention*s provisions.
But this, per se, is dangerous because it assumes that all 
jurists will analyse a particular provision in the same light 
and draw the same conclusions from that analysis. This danger 
clearly appears in the way courts tend to refer to the 
carrier*s liability as a whole. In the few decisions mention­
ing the liability regime in general, it is done as part of 
the background of the case. It seems to be assumed that the 
basic principles are perfectly clear and unquestioned. But 
the risk is that what is implicit tends to be assimilated 
to what is natural, and what is natural, in turn, tends to 
be the domestic law.
In order to understand the general attitude towards 
the provisions of the Convention dealing with the liability 
regime, the domestic rules of liability for inland carriage 
in common law and in French law will be outlined. Then, the 
rules of maritime law will be considered. These rules offer 
a particularly interesting precedent because an international 
convention governing liability for carriage of goods by sea 
was adopted in 1924, only five years before the Warsaw Con­
vention. The following Chapter will examine the Warsaw Con- . 
vention in the light of this analysis.
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Section One. - Principles governing carriers* liability
in Common law countries.
The common law principles or rules which will be 
outlined are those applied by English and American courts.
Such principles by themselves no longer always regulate the 
liability of carriers because of frequent statutory and con­
tractual modifications. However, the principles developed by 
the courts remain in the background and continue to be referred 
to, if only to be excluded. Thus, a study of common law 
principles is very important to the understanding of the 
background of all carriage cases ^ • They provide a key to 
the conceptual apparatus used by common law lawyers.
Common carrier and private carrier.
First of all, a distinction must be made between 
common carriers and private carriers. In the United States, 
a common carrier is defined as a person who undertakes to 
transport for hire goods or passengers or both for all who 
reasonably apply, according to the method of transportation 
which he offers to the public ^ , In English law, a common 
carrier of goods is a carrier who holds himself out as being 
prepared to carry for any one who wishes to engage his ser­
vices and is prepared to pay his charges. His public calling 
to carry goods may be limited to goods of certain types, or 
to certain areas or routes ^ . A common carrier of passengers 
is a carrier who holds himself out as providing transport 
from one place to another for all who are prepared to pay his
1/ as pointed out in Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p.201. 
2/ Williston On Contracts (3d ed.), section 1071B.
J2/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 196.
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charges . A common carrier cannot refuse to carry a 
particular person, or for a particular person, unless he has 
reasonable grounds to do so ^  • Any one who does not hold 
himself out as a common carrier is a private carrier.
Liability of common carriers.
A common carrier of goods is an insurer of the safe6/carriage of the goods he undertakes to carry —/ . He is liable 
for all loss of, or damage to, those goods whilst they are 
in course of transit, unless such loss or damage is caused 
by one of the few exceptions recognized by the common law.
The first exception is Act of God . This means that "a 
common carrier is not liable for any accident as to which 
he can show that it is due to natural causes directly and 
exclusively, without human intervention, and that it could 
not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains 
and care reasonably to be expected from him" ^ . The second 
exception at common law is where loss or injury is caused by 
the Queen’s enemies ^ , or, in the United States, by public 
enemies . That exception has been developed and now covers 
a number of situations which were outside its original scope. 
Many types of governmental intervention, both in peace and war 
have been classified as exceptions to the general rule of
4/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 452.
5/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 198 (goods), p. 452 
(persons).
6/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 198-199 ; Williston 
On Contracts, section 1102A.
Z/ see further Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 243 ; 
Williston On Contracts, section IIO3.
8/ Nugent v. Smith, (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423,(Ct. App. I876)
2/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 246.
10/ Williston On Contracts, section 1104.
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liability . The third common law exception is where damage 
is due to the inherent vice of the goods themselves, such as 
decay of perishable goods, or injury or death of animals due 
to their own characteristics The last exception is where 
loss or injury is entirely due to the shipper’s own fault, 
e.g. improper packing of the goods , When the question of 
liability is raised, the burden of proof is upon the carrier 
to show that the facts bring him within one of the exceptions. 
Moreover, he is protected only when he shows that he could 
not, by the use of proper care, have avoided the loss or 
damage. Thus, his responsibility for the safety of goods until 
delivery to the consignee is onerous ^ /  %
There is no similar liability placed upon the common 
carrier of passengers . He has a duty to use the greatest 
amount of care and foresight which is reasonably necessary 
to secure the safety of the persons whom he undertakes to 
carry. Failure to do so amounts to negligence and common car­
riers of passengers are liable in damages if injury is caused 
through negligence on their part or on the part of their ser­
vants acting within the scope of their employment. The rule 
that a carrier is not responsible for personal injuries to 
his passengers unless negligence is established is made less 
harsh for plaintiffs by the application of Res ipsa loquitur^^
11/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 246ff. ; Williston, 
On Contracts, section H 05.
12/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 250 ; Williston, Oh 
Contracts, sections 1106-1107.
13/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 252 ; Williston, On 
Contracts, section 1108.
14/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 200.
1$ /  see further on the carriage of passengers, Kahn-Freund, 
The Law of Carriage, p. 453 ; Williston, On Contracts, sec­
tion II23.
16/ see further Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 459ff*
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The principle encompassed by the maxim was explained in 
Easson v. London & North Eastern Railway by du
Parcq L.J. :
" where a thing which causes an accident is shown 
to be under the management of the defendant or 
his servants, and the accident is such as in the 
ordinary course of things does not happen if those 
who have the management use proper care, it is a 
reasonable inference, in the absence of explanation 
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want 
of care." 18/
The distinction between a common carrier and a 
private carrier is crucial in relation to the carriage of 
goods. A common carrier of goods is a virtual insurer of the 
goods carried, being strictly liable subject to very few 
exceptions. The private carrier is liable only if he has 
wilfully damaged or lost the goods or if he has been guilty 
of negligence. His duty is that of taking reasonable care : 
if the goods are lost or damaged, he can exonerate himself 
by showing that he and his servants took reasonable care. In 
the case of passenger carriage, liability of both the common 
and private carrier depends upon negligence or wilful miscon­
duct of the carrier or his servants .
Attempts to exclude or limit liability.
The heavy responsibilities placed on the common 
carrier of goods enticed carriers to rid themselves of that 
burden. Two ways were used which were viewed very differently 
by courts in England and in the United States , The first
12/ [1944] K.B. 421 (Ct. App. 1944).
18/ at p. 426.
19/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 
20/ J. Sundberg, Air Charter, p. 166.
199.
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way to avoid the burden of a common carrier’s liability is
to repudiate the status of a common carrier. This is easily
achieved in England by exhibiting a notice or otherwise
reserving the right to accept or reject offers within the
carrier’s discretion • In the United States, by contrast,
no statement by the carrier, per se, has any effect, and it
is the actual character of the service rendered to the public
which is to be taken into consideration. Any disclaimer, or
subterfuge designed to simulate private carriage, will not22/be sufficient to absolve a carrier from his duties —  .
The second manner in which common carriers* duties 
can possibly be avoided is to insert exclusion or limitation 
clauses in the contract of carriage. In England, in 1804,
firmly established the right of aNicholson v. Willan
common carrier to contract out of his obligations. At common 
law, he was free to attach whatever conditions he saw fit to 
the performance of his duties. This was true for the carriage 
of passengers as well as for the carriage of goods Since
that date however, statutes have been adopted imposing on 
most carriers duties very close to those of common carriers, 
even though they have attempted, in their contract, to repu­
diate them In the United States, considerations of
public policy intervened towards the end of the 19th century, 
and courts looked unfavourably upon clauses excluding or 
limiting liability. Accordingly, a common carrier is prevented
21/ Sundberg, Air Charter, p. 170.
22/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1071B.
23/ 5 East Rep. 507, 102 E.R. 1164 (K.B. 1804). See further 
Sundberg, Air Charter, p. 167.
24/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 562. For an example 
of an exclusion clause upheld in a case of transportation by 
air of a passenger, see Jones v. Aircrafts Pty. Ltd., [1949] 
St. Rep. Queensland 196 (Cir. Ct. 1948). For an exemption 
clause upheld in an air waybill, see Aslan v. Imperial Airways 
(1939) 45 Lloyd's Rep. 316 (K.B. 1933*T
25/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 201-202, 218.
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from excluding his liability for injury or loss caused by his
own negligence, or that of his servants, within his public
service duty. He is only allowed to exempt himself by contract
from liability for the consequences of events beyond his
control It has also been held contrary to public policy
for a carrier to enter into an agreement with a passenger to
limit his liability for injury occasioned by the carrier's
negligence But, in relation to goods, a common carrier
is usually permitted to contract for a limitation of his
liability to a reasonable value, agreed to by the shipper.
This value has the dual purpose of serving as a base rate
to fix the charges due to the carrier and of providing the
measure of the carrier's obligation in case of loss of, or
28/damage to, the shipment — .
Section 2.- Principles governing carriers'
liability in French law.
The basic principle : Obligation de resultat, i.e. strict 
liability.
Carriers of passengers and carriers of goods are 
both under the strict "contractual" -^/ duty to safely 
transport passengers and goods They have the duty to
26/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1119.
27/ Williston, On Contracts, section III9A.
28/ Williston, On Contracts, section III9A.
29/ see further below p. 356 on the nature of liability.
80/ R. Rodiere, Manuel des transports terrestres et aeriens, 
(Paris, 1969) pp” 16^rff. for goods, and pp. 277ff• for 
passengers ; G. Ripert, Traite £l£mentaire de droit commercial, 
(7th ed. by R. Roblot, Paris, 1972, pp. 262ff for goods, and 
pp. 272ff. for passengers.
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achieve a result — French law speaks of the existence of an 
obligation de resultat 2~k/ _ which is to carry passengers and 
goods safely. The mere fact that a passenger is injured, or 
that goods are lost or damaged during the transportation is 
evidence of a breach of duty. By application of the general 
principles governing contractual liability, the carrier can 
avoid liability only by showing that the damage is due to a 
cause which cannot be attributed to him or, in the wording 
of Article 1147 of the Civil Code, to a "cause £trangere qui 
ne peut lui etre imputee." The typical case of cause gtran- 
gere is force ma.ieure which will relieve all carriers from
00/liability 7 . Beyond that, the carriage of goods and the 
carriage of passengers are governed by specific rules.
The exception common to carriage of passengers and goods i 
force ma.ieure.
Force ma.ieure is a legal concept which can be used 
in any situation which allegedly prevents the carrier from 
performing his undertaking 22/ % a situation will be charac­
terized as force ma.ieure when the three following conditions 
are met :
(i) the particular occurrence was unforeseeable. The assess­
ment of this factor creates as many difficulties as it does
34/in English law in relation to foreseeability of damages .
31/ On the implications of the characterization of obligation 
de resultat, as opposed to obligation de moyens, see note by 
M. Nast, D.C. 1941.J.53» Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, 
pp. 235-236 and 242.
32/ Article 1148 of the Civil Code provides :"I1 n'y a lieu 
a aucuns dommages et interets lorsque, par suite d’une force 
majeure ou d‘un cas fortuit, le d£biteur a £te empech6 de 
donner ou de faire ce a quoi il itait oblige, ou a fait ce 
qui lui etait interdit."
33/ On the notion of force majeure, see note A. Tunc, D. 1947. 
J.387 ; Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 245ff.
34/ J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed., Sydney, 1971)» 
pp. l83ff.
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For years, the Cour de Cassation appeared to require only
35/that the event could not have been reasonably foreseen .
But recently the court has adopted a much stricter interpre­
tation which imposes a heavier liability on the carrier. For 
example, it has been held that the S.N.C.F. — the French rail­
ways — was responsible for a derailment caused by an act of 
sabotage. Threats of sabotage had been received twenty days 
before the accident. For the court, this circumstance made 
the accident foreseeable, and, consequently, the S.N.C.F. 
could not plead force ma.jeure. The strictness of the decision 
is emphasized when one notes that the court below had pointed 
out that the only real protection against the threat would 
have been to stop all traffic, and that was not feasible
(ii) the particular occurrence was insuperable. Courts have
consistently interpreted this requirement very strictly. A
difficulty which could be overcome by the carrier is not
insuperable even if it entailed a severe financial loss for 
37/the carrier .
(iii) the particular occurrence was extraneous to the carrier*s 
business and activi- 
has been questioned
ties. The existence of this third conditionw but recent decisions of the Cour de
JJ5/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 177 » Ripert, Traite 
bllmentaire , p~! 265.
36/ S.A. Electricite de Strasbourg c. S.N.C.F., Bull.I, No.27 
TCassTT civ . Ire, 26 January 1971) . For another example of a 
very strict interpretation of force ma.jeure, see S.N.C.F. c. 
Thomas, D.S. 197^.Somm.64 (Cass. civ. Ire, 26 February 197*0*
37/ Maison Agnes c. Maalderinck, D.P. 1916.1.22 (Cass. civ.
4 August 1915) ; Morel freres c. Bardon et Cie, D.P. 1917*2. 
33» note Capitant ; Valot c . Jamet, D. 1950.J.227 (Cass.civ. 
com. 18 January 195°)*
38/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 177*
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Cassation have made it clear that, in order to free himself 
from liability, a carrier must establish that the alleged 
force ma.ieure had nothing to do with him, his employees 
the means of transportation, or the running of his business 
m  general — ' .
Provided the three above conditions are fulfilled,41/any situation can be characterized as force ma.ieure — ' . In 
actual fact, the result will often be identical in common 
law and in French courts. Situations such as an extremely 
violent storm, or a state of war, would exonerate the carrier 
in a common law court on the ground of Act of God, or Act of 
public enemies — the Queen’s enemies in England. In a French 
court, the carrier would also be exonerated on the ground of 
force ma.ieure if he could show that the particular situation 
was unforeseeable and insuperable — the third requirement that 
the situation be extraneous to his activities would be easily 
complied with in our hypotheses. There are cases however 
where there would not be similar results. For instance, a 
state of war is not force ma.ieure if the carrier can still 
perform his duties even if the circumstances make it much 
harder ; there is no force ma.ieure because the "insuperabil­
ity" element is lacking.
39/ For the difficulties in case of strike by employees, see 
Sti Anonyme Musee Gr8vin c. Electricite de France,(Cass. civ. 
com. 21 November 1967), D.S. 1968, J, 279» note H.S. ; Bouvier 
c. Electricity de France. J.C.P. 1966.11.14878, note J. Ma- 
zeaud (Cass'". civ. Ire, 7 March 1966) .
4o/ Greard c . Air France, (1971) 3^ R.G.A.E. 200, note M.F. 
Mialon (Cass”, civ. soc. 15 April 1970) ; S.N.C.F. c . Humbert 
D.S. 1967* Somm. 101 (Cass. civ. Ire, 3 October 1967) ; Chouzy 
c . R .A .T.P ., D. 1961. J. 701, note Radouant (Cass. civ. Ire,
22 March i960).
4l/ A great number of situations are included under the head­
ing "fait ou faute d'un tiers" (act or fault of a third party) 
which may be listed as a separate cause of exoneration. But 
it has no specific features ; fait or faute d'un tiers must 
fulfill all the requirements of force ma.ieure in order to free 
the carrier from liability. See Regie autonome des transports 
de la ville de Marseille c. Defez et autres, D.S. 1972, Somm. 
l60 (Cass. c"iv~. Ire, 22 March 1972). See further Rodiere, 
Manuel des Transports, p. 288 (for passengers), and p. 182 
(for goods).
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Exceptions other than force ma.jeure in passenger cases.
An important difference between the carriage of 
passengers and cargo is that passengers enjoy an autonomy 
of movement which is completely lacking in the case of goods. 
This explains the possibility of the carrier exonerating 
himself from liability, either wholly or partly, by relying 
on the passenger’s conduct . The carrier will avoid 
liability if he can prove that the injury complained of by 
the passenger was entirely caused by the passenger himself.
If the passenger was only partially the cause of his own 
injury, there will be an apportionment of liability .
A difficult problem arose in wrongful death cases 
where the death was partly due to the passenger's fault — 
had the passenger's fault been the only cause of the death, 
the carrier would not have been liable. What principles ap­
plied to actions brought by the relatives of a deceased pas­
senger 7-^-^S eve ral decisions held that even if the fault of the 
passenger would have resulted in a reduction of the damages 
recoverable by him, the fault of the victime initiale had no 
effect on the rights of the relatives (the victimes par rico­
chet) . Other decisions took a contrary view, and a severe 
conflict arose between various courts of appeal, and even be­
tween the various Chambers of the Cour de Cassation. Finally, 
the Chambres Reunies of the Cour de Cassation held that in 
wrongful death actions, the defendant could plead the passen­
ger's own fault as a partial defence and, consequently, be
42/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 289 ; Ripert, Trait£ 
ITl&mentaire, p. 274.
43/ For an example of apportionment, see C.P.A.M. de Cholet 
c. S.N.C.F., D.S. 1971.J.220 (T.G.I. Angers, 12 October 
I970) ; for an example of complete exoneration, see M .G.C.
I.A. c. R.A.T.P., D.S. 1972.Somm.127 (Cass. civ. Ire, 9 
February 1972).
44/ On that problem, which exists in contractual and tortious 
liability, see, among many other studies, G. Viney, "L'auto- 
nomie du droit a reparation de la victime par ricochet par 
rapport a celui de la victime initiale", D.S. 1974.Chr.3 ; 
W.J. Wagner, "The victim's fault in wrongful death actions 
in French law", (1963) 12 Am. J. Comp. L. 82.
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partially relieved from liability .
All the cases dealing with the exception of faute, 
or fait de la victime, have in common the severity with 
which courts examine the facts. It is usually an extremely 
difficult task for a carrier to convince a court that the 
passenger’s behaviour was the cause, or one of the causes, 
of the injury and that, accordingly, he should be totally 
or partially relieved from liability ,
Exceptions other than force majeure in cargo cases.
There are two exceptions : inherent vice of the 
goods and the consignor’s own fault The meaning
and scope of these exceptions are basically similar to the 
corresponding common law exceptions However, there is
one difference in respect of the effect of these exceptions 
In common law, the common carrier is totally liable for 
damage to the goods unless one of the exceptions is the 
only cause of the damage ^0 / 1 But, in French law, he can 
be partially relieved from liability if the damage was 
partially caused by the inherent vice of the goods or the 
consignor’s own fault.
45/ Esteve c. Guenier, Sacre c. Broux, both decided by Ch. 
Reunies, 25 November 1964, D.1964.J .733 » conclusions Aydalot.
46/ Ripert, Traite i-l&nentaire, p. 274 ; Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, p. 288. The difficulty of the carrier’s task is 
well illustrated in Ste auxiliaire des chemins de fer secon- 
daires c . Maffre, D . I96I.J.75 (Cass. civ. Ire, 29 November 
i960).
47/ Ripert, Traite el£mentaire, p. 264 ; Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, p. I85.
48/ Ripert, Traite &l£mentaire, p. 264 ; Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, p. 183.
49/ see above p. 79.
50/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 200.
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Exclusion and limitation clauses.
Article 103(3) of the Commercial Code prevents a 
carrier from excluding his liability in cases of carriage of 
goods. This prohibition was introduced by way of an addition 
to Article 103 by the Loi Rabier adopted in 1905 The
amendment was due to the abuses of exclusion clauses made by 
railway companies which resulted in shippers being practically 
without any protection . Limitations of liability are al­
lowed, provided the limit is not so low that it would in fact^0/be equivalent to an exclusion of liability . In most cases, 
however, proof of gross negligence or dol on the part of the 
carrier will prevent him from relying on the contractual 
limitation of liability 5h/t
There is no similar prohibition in relation to the 
carriage of passengers, possibly because exclusion or limit­
ation clauses are not in fact used in cases of passenger car­
riage by road or rail Although several writers have
strongly advocated that neither exclusion nor limitation 
clauses should be allowed as a matter of principle t these 
clauses have been enforced by French courts, provided there
51/ Article 103(3) provides * "Toute clause contraire inseree 
dans toute lettre de voiture, tarif ou autres piece quelcon- 
que, est nulle.”
52/ On the background of the Loi Rabier, see Rodiere, Manuel 
des Transports, p. 191.
53/ Ste nouvelle de manutention c. Abecassis, D. 1950. J.
225 (Cass. civ. com. 3 January 1950) ; Administration des 
Chemins de fer de l'Etat c. Jourdan, D.P~ 1926.I.229 (Cass. 
civ. 12 July 1923).
54/ Ripert, Traits £l6mentaire, p. 268 ; Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, p. 191 ; B. Starck, "Observations sur le regime 
juridique des clauses de non-responsabilit£ ou limitatives de 
responsabilite, D.S. 1974.Chr.157• For a recent example in a 
case of carriage by road, see St§ des Transports Cauchois c . 
S.A. Kleber-Colombes, (1971) 6 Eur. Tr~. TT. 397 (Cass. com. 21 
December 1970). In carriage by rail, dol itself must be proved; 
faute lourde is insufficient to set the limitation of liability 
aside : S.N.C.F. c. Cie Ass. La Neuchateloise, D.S. 1972.J.607 
(Cass, civ. com. 26 June 1972). See further below p.
55/Ripert, Trait£ £l6mentaire, p. 276 ; Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, p. 293-
56/ L. Josserand, "La personne humaine dans le commerce
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was no intentional harm or gross negligence (dol, or faute 
lourde) on the part of the carrier , But this is of lim­
ited practical importance since, firstly, exclusion and lim­
itation clauses are not in fact used in cases of carriage by 
rail or road, and, secondly, they have now been prohibited 
in cases of carriage by sea ^ 0 /  t and domestic carriage by 
air -52/.
Section 3* - The Maritime Law precedent.
The diplomatic Conference held at Warsaw in 1929 
took place only five years after the signature at Brussels 
of an international convention relating to maritime bills 
of lading. This latter convention provides rules governing 
the rights and liabilities of cargo-owners and ship-owners 
which apply in most of the countries involves in sea carriage.. 
The relationship between the two conventions clearly appears 
in the preparatory works of the Warsaw Convention, in the 
course of the CITEJA meetings as well as during the Warsaw 
Conference itself, where the 1924 Brussels Convention was 
explicitly referred to on several occasions
56/( cont' d . ) .juridique" , D.H. 1932, Chr. 1 ; Mazeaud & Tunc, 
Traite th6orique et -pratique de la responsabilitg civile dj- 
lictuelle et contractuelle, tome III, Nos. 2530, 2586> T~
JL Hemard, Les cont rats cominerciaux (Paris, 1953)* vol 2,
No. 1040. But their argumentation is strongly criticized by 
other authors : R. Rodiere, Les Transports (Paris, 1953)» 
vol. 3* No. 1266 ; R. Savatier, Traite de la responsabilite 
civile, (2nd ed. Paris, 1951) vol"! 2, No. 661.
57/ Machg c. Air France, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 311 (Cass. civ.
Ire, 3 June 1970) ; Cie Glnerale Transatlantique c . Dominici 
D. 1966, J, 238 (Cass. civ. com3 19 October 1965) •
58/ Act of 18 June 1966.
19/ Act of 2 March 1957.
60j/ For instance, CITEJA, Third session (May 1928), pp.48-50 ; 
H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 29 (in relation to the 
concepts of fault in the management of the ship), p. 3° (un­
seaworthiness), p. 31 (due diligence), p. 33 (in general).
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Background of the 1924 Brussels Convention.
Under the common law and the general maritime law, 
the common carrier was under a very strict liability regime 
making him the virtual insurer of the goods unless he could 
show that the damage to the goods had been caused by an Act 
of God, a public enemy--or the Queen’s enemies— the inherent 
vice of the goods, or the fault of the shipper , But the 
carrier was allowed to alter his common law liability through 
a special contract with the shipper. The number of exceptions 
increased to such an extent that the original positions of 
the shipper and the carrier were almost reversed : "the 
carrier was no longer the insurer of the goods. In fact, in 
many instances, he was not even liable for damages caused 
by his own negligence."
This situation provoked a strong reaction in the 
United States at the end of the 19th century. Because of 
the small size of the United States merchant marine at that 
time, American shippers had to rely on British and Norwegian 
shipowners. The United States appeared as a nation of ship­
pers placed at a disadvantage by nations of shipowners .
In 1893» 'the American Congress adopted the Harter Act which 
embodied a compromise between the interests of the shippers 
and shipowners. The wording of the Act makes it clear that 
it was a reaction against what was considered to be an intol­
erable practice by the carriers. The Harter Act is framed in 
terms of what cannot be inserted in a bill of lading. It pro­
hibited clauses excusing carriers from liability caused by 
(i) lack of due care to make the vessel "seaworthy" prior to 
the voyage, and (ii) lack of due care in the management of 
cargo. At the same time, it provided that if "due diligence"
6l/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1080B.
62/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1080B (at p. 117)«
63/ R. Rodiere, Droit maritime, (5th ed. Paris, 1971). 
p. 271.
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was exercised in providing a seaworthy vessel, "neither the 
vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall be­
come or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from 
faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said
vessel. 64/ This is the compromise of the Harter Act. Provided
there had been due diligence in supplying a seaworthy vessel, 
there would be no responsibility for faults or errors in nav­
igation or the the management of the vessel. But the liability 
for faults or errors in the management of the cargo was to be 
borne by the ship-owner.
Acts similar to the Harter Act were soon adopted by 
other nations desirous of protecting the interests of their 
shippers against exclusion and limitation clauses imposed by 
most bills of lading . After the first World War, the 
movement gained momentum and resulted in a Conference being 
held at The Hague in 1921 under the auspices of the Interna­
tional Law Association. The Hague Rules were formulated at 
that Conference . It was hoped that the countries repre­
sented would voluntarily follow the model bill of lading which 
was formulated by the Rules. But it soon became clear that no 
unification would be achieved in this way, and a diplomatic 
conference was convened at Brussels in 1924 with the object
of adopting an international convention which would be manda-
67/tory for all contracting parties and their nationals — ^  . A 
Convention which incorporated all the essential of the Hague 
Rules was adopted by the Conference. It has been ratified by 
many countries ,
64/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1080B (p. 118).
65/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 272. In Canada : Water Carriage 
of Goods Act 1910 ; in Australia : Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1904.
66/ International Law Association, Report of the 30th Confer­
ence , Proceedings of the Maritime Committee, vol. 2~, pp. 254- 266.
67/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 272.
68/ For a list of countries having passed legislation giving 
statutory effect to the Hague Rules, see Payne and Ivamy's 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (9th ed., 1972, London), Appendix F,
P • 245.
Liability regime provided by the 1924 Brussels Convention.
One of the basic concepts of the Harter Act, i.e. 
the concept of due diligence, was adopted by the Hague 
Rules and the Brussels Convention. It is the carrier's 
duty to exercise due diligence to (i) make the ship sea­
worthy, (ii) properly man, equip, and supply the ship, and 
(iii) make the parts of the ship in which goods are carried 
fit and safe for their reception, carriage, and preserva­
tion . Further, the carrier must "properly and carefully 
load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the 
goods carried" -2^ /. The Convention provides that any clause 
in a contract of carriage that purports to lessen these 
obligations is null and void
The Convention provides a long list of exemptions 
to the carrier's obligations. The first one is when loss or 
damage has resulted from unseaworthiness of the ship, pro­
vided the carrier can prove that he has exercised due dili-72/gence to make the ship seaworthy 1—  . The Convention then 
lists seventeen exemptions -2^ /, All the common law exceptions 
to common carriers* liability are there, as well as many 
others which had become traditional in most bills of lading-^^ 
One significant excepted peril relates to errors in the 
navigation or in the management of the ship. The Harter Act 
already provided that the carrier would not be liable in 
such cases In any event, neither the carrier, nor the
ship can become liable for an amount exceeding £100 per 
package or unit, unless the shipper has made a special 
declaration of value before shipment -2-^ /
69/ Article III, r. 1. 70/ Article III, r. 2.
22/ Article III, r. 8. 22/ Article IV, r. 1.
73/ Article IV, r. 2.
74/ On the practice customarily followed by the British 
merchant marine, see R.G. Marsden, Digest of Shipping Cases, 
(London, 1899)1 PP«
75/ See further Williston, On Contracts, section 1088.
76/ Article IV, r. 5*
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Adoption of the 1924 Brussels Convention in domestic laws.
It is striking to note the ease, or else the diffi­
culty with which the Hague Rules, as formulated at Brussels 
in 1924, were received in different countries. One could 
foresee such variations because of the clear connection of 
the Rules to the United States Harter Act and similar statutes 
in other countries, and to the maritime practice dominated by 
English and Norwegian ship-owners. In England, the Rules were
simply set out in a Schedule to the 1924 Carriage of Goods by 
77/Sea Act J-L/ . In the United States, the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act of 193& substantially adopted the Hague Rules after 
having set them out in the traditional mould of the United
78/States statutes •*— ' . The delay in the adoption of the Rules 
may be explained by the fact that United States' interests 
were adequately protected by the Harter Act, which was sub­
stantially similar to the Hague Rules. But in May v. Hamburgh  
(The Isis case), the Supreme Court held that the existence of 
an unseaworthy condition unrelated to the cause of loss or 
damage precluded the carrier from benefiting from the Harter 
Act exemptions. This resulted in requests to the Congress for 
legislation to alter this decision . The 193& Act was the 
product of the Congressional agitation following the Isis 
case and, at the same time, it achieved the ratification of 
the Hague Rules as adopted at Brussels in 1924. The new Act 
"embodied the essentials of the Harter compromise although 
expressed in a slightly different form."^'
77/ S. 1 of the Act limits the applicability of the Rules to 
cases of carriage where the port of departure is situated 
either in Great Britain or in Northern Ireland.
78/ 46 U.S.C. §§1300-1315. The Act relates to bills to lading 
or similar documents of title which are evidence of a contract 
for "the carriage of goods by sea to or from pcrts in the 
United States, in foreign trade. . ." See further Williston,
On Contracts, section 1080C. For a comparison of the Harter 
Act and the Brussels Convention, see Carver, Carriage by Sea 
Tl2th ed., London, 1971), vol. 1, §§240ff.
22/ 290 U.S. 333
80/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1080B (p. 118, n. 11).
81/ Williston, On Contracts, section 1080B (p. 118, n. 12).
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In France, the Brussels Convention was ratified by 
an Act of 9 April 1936. The Convention’s provisions directly 
applied to all contracts of international carriage by sea 
coining within its scope , For other types of sea carriage, 
and provided the proper law of the contract was French law^-^, 
the applicable rules were to be found in an Act of April 2, 
1936. The Act has now been replaced by an Act of June 18, 
1966. The purpose of these Acts was to adapt the Convention’s 
provisions to the domestic law background and to establish a 
liability regime as close as possible to both the Brussels 
Convention and the usual concepts of domestic law. The re­
sult was to produce two different compromises, one in 1936, 
one in 1966, each showing how a legal system can react to 
"naturalise" imported rules.
The 1936 Act contained several rules characteristic 
of the Brussels Convention and completely alien to the French 
legal tradition. For example, fault in the navigation or in
was a case of exemption of liabil- 
This considerably departed from 
the normal rule of French law rendering the entrepreneur 
answerable for any damage caused by the persons he employs 
to perform his contractual duties .
Some of the differences between the Act and the 
Convention were mainly a matter of presentation rather than 
substance. For instance, the Act did not expressly mention 
the following exemptions listed by the Convention : Act of 
God, Act of war, Act of public enemies, arrest or restraint 
of princes, rulers or people, seizure under legal process, 
or quarantine, i.e. cases (d) to (h) of Article IV, r. 2 of 
the Convention. Instead, the carrier was to be freed from 
liability if he could establish that the damage could not be
the management of the shi84 'ity for the shipowner
82/ Article 10 of the Convention provides :"The provisions 
of this convention shall apply to all bills of lading is­
sued in any of the contracting States."
83/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 321 84/ Article 4, 1).
8 5/ Article 1797 of the Civil Code.
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attributed to him, pursuant to the principle of cause etran- 
gere non immutable laid down by Article 1147 of the Civil 
Code More specifically, the carrier would have to show
that a particular situation which is exempted under Article 
IV, r.2(d) to (h) satisfies the requirements of force ma.jeure 
in order to exonerate himself. In most cases, the final re­
sult would be identical-^-^ Let us take the example of facts 
which are susceptible of being characterized as "Act of God". 
Under the Brussels Convention, a carrier would have to show 
that the situation was due to "natural causes directly and 
exclusively, without human intervention, and that it could 
not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains 
and care reasonably to be expected from him"-^^. Under the 
1936 Act, the carrier would have to prove that the facts 
were unforeseeable and insuperable in order to establish 
force ma.jeure. Thus, from the very definition of Act of 
God, it appears that all the conditions of force ma.jeure 
would necessarily also be met ^2/ o
Other differences between the Convention and the 
1936 Act were more substantial. Unseaworthiness, for ins­
tance, was not included as an exemption cause by the Act.
This did not mean, however, that the carrier had to provide 
an absolutely safe means of transportation, as is the case 
in other forms of transportation. The carrier would be ex­
empted from liability if he proved that the damage was due 
to a latent defect--vice cach£--of the ship 20/1 Another 
important difference between the 193& Act and the Brussels
86/ See above p. 83. On the special case of latent defect, 
see Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 303 ; J» Calais-Aulnoy, 
"Armateurs et acconiers, benificiaires de la loi du 38 juin 
1966", D.S. 1966, Chr.ll? at p. 118.
87/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 317«
88/ Nugent v. Smith, (1876) i C.P.D-. 423 (Ct. App. I876) . 
89/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 318.
90/ The notion of vice cach6 is frequently resorted to in 
various areas of French law, such as the lav/ of the sale 
of goods (Articles l64lff. of the Civil Code).
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Convention was that, under the Act, the carrier was not
exempted by the mere occurrence of a fire, as he would have
been pursuant to Article IV, r. 2(b) of the Convention. He
had to prove that the particular fire satisfied the require-
91/ments of force ma.ieure / .
The 1966 Act brought the French law of carriage of 
goods by sea more into line with the Brussels Convention in 
relation to exemptions. This is particularly true of the ex­
cuses of unseaworthiness and fire which are now included 
among the excepted perils 2Ä/t jn relation to unseaworthiness, 
one may think that the change took place because, after thir­
ty years of applying the excuse of unseaworthiness to cases 
of carriage governed by the Convention, that excuse had lost 
the alien appearance it had at first -2^ /.
91/ see further J. Calais-Aulnoy, "Amateurs et acconiers" , 
D.S. 1966. Chr. 117 at p. 118.
92/ Respectively Article 27(a) and 27(c) of the Act.
93/ However, the rule still looks rather odd when it is seen 
in a French law environment. Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 301.
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Chapter FOUR. - PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE LIABILITY
PROVISIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION.
The principles upon which the liability provisions 
of the Warsaw Convention were founded were defined as early 
as 1925 at the Paris International Conference on Private 
Air Law. The Rapporteur of the Commission which was studying 
the question of liability of carriers stated »
" The Commission asked itself which liability 
regime had to be adopted : risk or fault. The 
general feeling is that, whilst liability towards 
third parties must see the application of the 
risk theory, by contrast, in the matter of the 
carrier's liability in relation to passengers and 
goods, one must admit the fault theory.
That being so, one can ask oneself on whom 
will fall the burden of proof ; it has seemed fair 
not to impose that heavy burden on the injured 
party and a presumption of fault bearing on the 
carrier has been admitted. But since it is only 
a presumption, the carrier has obviously the right 
to adduce contrary evidence and the limit of the 
fault must be established ; where does it start ?
What can one require from the air carrier ? A 
normal organisation of his business, a judicious 
selection of the members of his staff, a constant 
supervision of his agents and servants, a serious 
checking of his accessory appliances and materials 
utilized.
One must admit that anyone using an aircraft 
does not ignore the risks inherent in a mode of 
transportation which has not yet reached the point 
of perfection that one hundred years have given to 
the railways.
Thus it is just not to impose on the carrier an 
absolute liability and [ it is just *] to relieve him 
from any liability when he has taken the measures 
which are reasonable and normal in order to avoid 
the injury ; this is the diligence that one can 
require from a bonus pater familias." 1/
1/ The original French text appears in Confirence Internatio­
nale (Paris. 1925), Rapport Pittard, Annexes, p. 60.
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The 1925 Conference produced a draft Convention 
based on these principles ^ * The wording of the draft was 
subsequently altered and a number of additional provisions 
were included, but the underlying principles were not seri­
ously questioned between 1925 and the adoption of the final 
draft in 1929 ^ '.
The main features of the Convention shall be exam­
ined against the background of these principles, from both 
a common law and a civil law point of view.
Section One. - The basic regime of liability .
A uniform regime of liability for carriage of passengers, 
baggage, and goods.
The Warsaw Convention provides an identical regime 
to govern the liability of an air carrier for the carriage 
of passengers, baggage, and goods. The same unity exists in 
French law, where carriers of passengers and carriers of 
goods are both under the contractual obligation de resultat 
to ensure a safe carriage By contrast, at common law,
the liability of a common carrier of goods differs from the 
liability of a common carrier of passengers ^ , This differ­
ence was eliminated by the Warsaw Convention whose provisions 
do not require a plaintiff to prove fault. This is closer to 
the common carrier’s liability for the carriage of goods than 
his liability for the carriage of passengers. However, since 
1929, the increasing use of the principle of Res ipsa 
loquitur has taken away this advantage offered by the Warsaw
2J The complete text of the draft appears in Conference In­
ternationale (Paris, 1925). Documents, pp. 85-90.
4/There was only a partial attempt to substitute the risk 
theory to the fault theory (CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, 
pp. 50-5l)‘ D^t this was defeated at the Warsaw Conference 
in 1929' Heme Conference Internationale, pp. 3°-37»
5J above p. 82.
6/ above p. 79-
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regime and the contrast today is more in the use of two 
different techniques than in the final results.
Wording of the -presumption created by Articles 17. 18, and 19.
Articles 17. 18, and 19 of the Warsaw Convention 
create a presumption against the carrier in case of damage 
affecting passengers, baggage, and goods, and in the case of 
delay. This wording follows the pattern used in similar pre­
sumptions existing in other areas of French law. For instance, 
these articles and Article 27 of the 1966 Act governing the 
carriage of goods by sea start with the identical statement : 
"Le transporteur est responsable . . . "  ^ '.
Articles 17, 18, and 19 only establish the existence 
of the presumption and delineates the cases where that pre­
sumption applies. The nature of the presumption does not ap­
pear from their wording. Recourse must be had to other pro­
visions which reveal the strength of the presumption by indi­
cating how and when it can be rebutted. The same technique 
was used in the 1936 and 1966 French Acts governing sea car­
riage . The only difference was that, in the Warsaw Convention, 
the additional information is found in the following articles 
whilst, in the 1936 and 1966 Acts, it is found in the fol­
lowing paragraphs of the same article U
6/ The first sentence of Article 27 of the 1966 Act governing 
the carriage of goods by sea reads : "Le transporteur est 
responsable des pertes ou dommages subis par la marchandise 
depuis la prise en chanrge jusqu'a la livraison . . . "
2/ For instance, Article 4 of the 1936 Act provided :
"Le transporteur est garant de toutes pertes, avaries ou 
dommages subis par la marchandise a moins qu'il ne prouve 
que ces pertes, avaries ou dommages proviennent :
1. De fautes nautiques du capitaine, des marins, pilotes ou 
autres preposes ;
2. De vices caches du navire ;
3. De faits constituant un cas fortuit ou de force majeure ;
4. De greves ou locks-out ou d*arrets ou entraves apportes 
au travail pour quelque cause que ce soit, partiellement ou 
completement ;
5. Du vice propre de la marchandise ou d*un defaut d'emballa- 
ge ou de marques, de d^chets de route en volume ou en poids
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The influence of the French legal traditions on 
these articles of the Warsaw Convention is clear. Consequent­
ly, these provisions were likely to create difficulties in 
common law jurisdictions. The alien character of Articles 17, 
18, and 19 appears in its full light when their provisions 
are compared with the accumulation of details and precisions 
contained in Articles III and IV of the Hague Rules governing 
the related matter of liability for the carriage of goods by 
sea-^. More specifically, difficulties have appeared because 
Articles 17, 18» and 19 have to be read in conjunction with 
other provisions in order to provide a complete regime of 
liability. It has been argued in several common law courts
that Articles 17 and 18 created, as an initial matter, abso-
9/lute and unlimited liability or, even more significantly,
that the carrier had the status of an insurer of the goods
under Article 18(1) 7*2/. These arguments have never been
followed by any court, but it has been necessary, at least
on two occasions, for a court to rule that Article 17 -^^and 12/Article 18 — ' ought to be read together with the other pro­
visions relating to the carrier*s liability so that the true 
regime created by the Convention could be applied.
2J (cont*d) dans la mesure des tolerances d*usage aux ports 
destinataires ;
6. D*un acte d*assistance ou de sauvetage ou de tentative 
faite dans ce but ou encore de d£routement du navire effectui 
a cet effet.
Toutefois, dans tous ces cas exceptls, le chargeur pourra 
faire la preuve que les pertes ou dommages sont dus a une 
faute du transporteur ou a une faute de ses preposes non 
couverts par le paragraphe ler de cet article."
8/ see above p. 92.
9/ Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 9 Avi. 18,319 (3r  ^Cir. 1964). 
The plaintiff relied on the previous cases of Grey v. American 
Airlines, 4 Avi. 17,811 (2d Cir. 1955)» and Westminster Bank 
Ltd, v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 55 Lloyd's Rep. 242 (K.B .
19367^
10/ Rugani v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 4 Avi. 17,257 (N.Y. 
City Ct. 1954).
11/ Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 9 Avi. I8,319(3rd Cir. 1964).
12/ Rugani v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 4 Avi. 17,257 (N.Y. 
City Ct. 1954) .
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Nature of the liability regime. Necessary measures (Art.20(1).)
Article 20(1) relieves the carrier from liability 
if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage, or that it was impossible for 
him or them to take such measures.
The drafting history of the provision makes it clear 
that the origin of Article 20(1) is the concept of "due dili­
gence" enforced first in the Harter Act, then in the Hague 
Rules . The Rapporteur to the 1925 Paris Conference stated:
" I remind the British delegates that it is at
their request that we introduced the consideration 
of 'mesures raisonnables1 in 1925. It is the 
British delegates who asked for this addition to 
be made. We asked them, in 1925 * what does it 
mean ? The British delegates replied that what it 
meant was perfectly known back home. We accepted 
that formula in order to compromise with the Eng­
lish delegation and to attract it towards us in 
the wording of that article." 14/
There is no easy translation of "due diligence" into French, 
as is shown by the various drafts of Article 20(1) . The
1925 Paris Conference had admitted in principle that the car­
rier would not be held liable if he could establish that he 
had taken all reasonable and normal measures . The CITEJA 
draft spoke of "reasonable measures" . All the discussions 
on that subject at the Warsaw Conference were based on the 
idea of reasonable measures. At the second reading in plena­
ry meeting, the text was still the same. One delegate then 
expressed the wish to see this concept more precisely definei-^
13/ above p. 90-92.
14/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. Jl,
15/ Similar difficulties were experienced in relation to the 
1924 Brussels Convention on Bills of lading. Sea H. Aubrun, 
commentaire de la convention internationale pour l'unifica- 
tion de certaines regies en matiere de connaissement, sign£e ai Bruxelles le 25 AoÜt 1924, D. 1937.IV.p. 18.
16/ Conference Internationale (Paris, 1925)» Rapport de la 
Deuxieme Commission sur la responsabilite du transporteur 
par aeronefs, p. 62.
17/ Heme Conference Internationale, pp. 112-113.
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,.20/
At the third reading in plenary meeting, the Chairman read 
again the text which included the phrase "reasonable measures". 
Then, one member of the Drafting Committee observed, as a mi­
nor detail, that the Committee had in fact adopted another 
wording, which was "all necessary measures". The Chairman of 
the Committee agreed on that point, and the definitive text 
was adopted without further discussion . In this chapter, 
it is assumed that the drafters of the Convention have a- 
chieved their purpose and that the text of Article 20(l) 
represents the closest equivalent of "due diligence". The
varying judicial interpretations of that Article will be con-
19/sidered in a later chapter — 27 . The assumption made here is 
consistent with the interpretation that a number of French 
lawyers give to Article 20(l) of the Convention : "Cfest ce 
que le droit anglo-saxon appelle fournir la due diligence.
Although the concept of due diligence was embodied 
in the Convention, the purpose that it was made to serve was 
very different from its purpose in its original common law 
environment. In the Harter Act, and in the Hague Rules, "due 
diligence" describes the contractual duties that the carrier 
owes to the shipper ; a breach of these duties will make the 
carrier liable. In the Warsaw Convention, "due diligence" 
must be proved to relieve the carrier from liability. Thus, 
instead of being the yardstick with which the carrier's con­
duct will be evaluated — as in the Harter Act and the Hague 
Rules — "due diligence" becomes the basis for exonerating 
the carrier from liability.
"Due diligencd' completely looses its original col­
oring when it is used by French authors in conjunction with 
Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Convention to describe the 
whole liability regime. The analysis is as follows : The 
carrier is liable unless he proves due diligence. "Due dili­
gence" is then translated into the closest concept of French
18/ Heme Conference Internationale, pp. I36-I37. 
19/ below p. 242.
20/ Ripert, Traits el£mentaire, p. 299*
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law, i.e. absence of fault — ' . Then everything falls into 
place. Articles 17» 18, and 19 create a presumption. Arti­
cle 20(1) indicates that the presumption can be rebutted by 
proving the absence of fault. The logical conclusion is that 
the Convention places a presumption of fault upon air car­
riers. Viewed in this light, the Convention is but one 
example of a well-known system which governs the liability 
of parents for damage caused by their children. Like air 
carriers, parents can be exonerated if they prove that they 
have not committed any fault .
One cannot help but be astonished at seeing the 
concept of due diligence made to fit into the French system 
of legal presumptions. All that was needed were two appar­
ently slight technical operations, i.e. the very special use 
made of "due diligence" by the Convention, and the assimila­
tion of the already altered "due diligence" to "absence of 
fault".
From the point of view of French law, the presump­
tion of fault which was created appeared more favourable to 
the air carrier than the liability regime governing inland 
transport. An air carrier is not under an obligation de re- 
sultat to perform a safe carriage ; he can be relieved by 
adducing evidence that he was not negligent and that, ac­
cording to the Convention’s drafters, would be very easy to 
do % A carrier by road or by rail is not allowed to ad­
duce evidence to that effect. He has to prove the specific 
cause of the damage and then has to establish that such 
cause was a cause etrangere non imputable — / . But whilst
21/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, pp. 200 and 295»
22/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 358-359«
23/ CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, pp. 50-51 ; Heine 
Conference Internationale, pp. 32ff and particularly p.
35 (per M. de Vos).
24/ see above p. 83.
21/
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air carriers were placed by the Convention in a better posi­
tion than carriers by road or by rail, their liability was 
in fact much heavier than in the domestic law of air carriage
because the exclusion clauses which domestic law allowed were
25/prohibited by the Convention — “  .
To a common law lawyer, the Warsaw regime appeared 
more favourable to the air carrier than the common carrier*s 
liability in relation to goods, but less favourable than his 
liability in relation to passengers. In relation to goods, 
the carrier could not be seen as an insurer since he could 
free himself by proving due diligence . But in relation 
to passengers, the burden of proving negligence was elimi­
nated ^ 2 / 1 That relative advantage was lessened in practice 
by the widening application of Res ipsa loquitur in aviation 
cases -^ 2/. At present, it is only in the rare cases when 
Res ipsa loquitur does not apply that the Convention presents 
a positive advantage for the plaintiff 2 2 /  t
The Hague Protocol did not alter the basic regime 
of the Convention. The Montreal Agreement did so by prevent­
ing the carrier from availing himself of the provisions of 
Article 20(1) of the Convention. It is no longer possible to 
say that there is a presumption of fault and that, accord­
ingly, a carrier can rid himself of all liability by proving 
that he has committed no fault. Several American courts have 
stated that the Montreal Agreement has created a regime of
absolute liability 11/. But it is not always easy to ascertain
2 5/ below p. 110. 26/ above p. 78.
27/ above p. 79* 28/ above p. 79-80.
29/ As an example of such a marginal case, see Berguido v . 
Eastern Airlines, 9 Avi. 18,319 (3rd Cir. 1964).
30/ The Montreal Agreement provides that the carriers shall 
include the following clause in their Conditions of Carriage : 
"The Carrier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out 
of the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, 
avail itself of any defense under Article 20(1) of said Con­
vention or said Convention as amended by said Protocol."
31/ Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 17.304 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), rev*d on other grounds, 12 Avi. 17.634 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972), rev'd after consolidation with
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what is meant by "absolute liability" The Montreal Agree­
ment altered the liability regime in relation to passengers 
only. The previous situations remains untouched insofar as 
baggage and goods are concerned.
The Guatemala City Protocol provides drastic changes 
to the liability regime concerning passengers and baggage-^-^ 
The only possible opening left to the carrier is to prove
that the death or injury resulted solely from the state of
34/health of the passenger , or that the damage was caused 
or contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of the person claiming compensation -2-5/. jn rela­
tion to baggage, the carrier can avoid liability only if he 
proves that the damage resulted solely from the inherent 
defect, quality, or vice of the baggage
31/ (cont’d) Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi. 
17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 19?4) ; MacDivitt v. Pan American World 
Airways, Inc . , 11 Avi. 18,040 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 197 o") ; Sheris 
v. The Sheris Company, 12 Avi. 17,394 (Va Sup. Ct, 1972)•
32/ Compare the definitions in Herman v. Trans World Airlines 
Inc., 12 Avi. 17*304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) and in Feibelmann 
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 12 Avi. 17*575 (N.Y. City 
Ct. 1972) where the air carrier wanted to avail himself of 
the contributory negligence of the passenger. See further 
Sheris v. The Sheris Company, 12 Avi. 17,394 (Va. Sup. Ct.
1972)where the court considered the Warsaw Convention together 
with the Montreal Agreement and analyzed the combination as 
"a waiver of certain defenses in return for a limitation of 
liability in event of an action alleging a breach of duty and 
damages therefrom", (at p. 17,397)*
33/ Por an analysis of the new regime, see R.H. Mankiewicz, 
"Warsaw Convention : The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City", 
(1972) 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 335 i "The 1971 Protocol of Guate­
mala City to Further Amend the Warsaw Convention" (1972) 28 
J. Air L. & Com. 519 ; E. du Pontavice, observations in 
(1971) 24 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. 1095*
34/ New Article 17(1) of the Convention.
35/ New Article 21 of the Convention.
36/ New Article 17(2) of the Convention.
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Section 2. - Error in piloting, in the handling of the 
aircraft, or in navigation. Article 20(2).
In the transportation of goods and baggage, the 
carrier is not liable if he proves that the damage was occa­
sioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the air­
craft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he 
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid 
the damage.
The possibility of exoneration for what is often 
described in French textbooks as faute nautique ^2/— a 
concept peculiar to Maritime Law— was included in the first 
draft of the Convention 30/a The analogy with the similar 
provisions of the Harter Act and of the Hague Rules is 
obvious . The CITEJA experts later modified the draft 
and limited the scope of the provision to cases of trans­
portation of goods and baggage so that passengers could be 
better protected in cases of accident . Much discussion 
took place at the Warsaw Conference, where several delegates 
unsuccessfully attempted to include passenger cases within 
the scope of the provision %
37/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 3°1.
38/ The draft elaborated by the 1925 International Conference 
of private air law read s "Article 60- Le transporteur repond 
des fautes commises par ses preposes. Toutefois, en cas de 
faute de navigation, le transporteur ne sera pas responsable 
sfil fait la preuve prSvue a 1*article precedent [i.e. mesu- 
res raisonnablesj."
39/ Article IV r. 2(a) of the Hague Rules grants immunity 
to the carrier by sea for loss or damage arising fron "Act, 
neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the ser­
vants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management 
of the ship." In 1929» the British delegate to the Warsaw 
Conference defended the rule by saying that almost the same 
conditions existed in Air Law and in Maritime Law and that, 
consequently, the same rule should apply. The other delegates, 
conscious of the Maritime Lav/ precedent, did not oppose the 
introduction of the rule in the new Convention, even though 
it was not familiar to them. Heme Conference Internationale, 
pp. 29-30.
4o/ CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, pp0 47-48.
4l/ Heme Conference Internationale, pp. 28-33«
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At the Hague Conference, in 1955» the delegates did
not even discuss the text. They merely adopted the Rio Pro-42/tocol which had deleted the second part of Article 20 —  .
The Rio Protocol itself had been elaborated at the Ninth 
session of the ICAO Legal Committee. The deletion of Article 
2 0 (2 ) had quickly been decided after it had been observed 
that it was illogical to have different legal systems for 
the carriage of goods and baggage on the one hand and persons 
on the other It was also recalled that the cases of exon­
eration provided by paragraph (2) originated in Maritime Law,44/but that this was not justified in respect of air transport— . 
Section 3 . - Contributory negligence (Article 21).
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by 
or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person, 
the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own 
law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his lia­
bility.
It was not until the Warsaw Conference in 1929 that 
a first draft of this provision was introduced at the request 
of the British delegate . The silence of the previous 
drafts is explained by the fact that, for the civil law dele­
gates, there was no need to make a special provision for the 
fault of the victim if the liability regime was considered 
as a whole ^/. The carrier is presumed to be at fault ; he 
is relieved from liability if he proves his absence of fault, 
his "due diligence”. If it is established that the damage was
42/ The deletion is made by Article X of the Hague Protocol.
4 3/ ICAO Legal Committee (9th session, Rio de Janeiro, 1953)» 
Doc. 7 4 5 0-LC/I3 6 , p. 91.
44/ ICAO Legal Committee (9th session, Rio de Janeiro, 1953)» 
Doc. 7 4 5 0-LC/1 3 6 , p7 927
45/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 112. The text of the 
amendment appears at p. 1 9 2.
46/ This attitude still prevails today : Rodiere, Manuel des 
Transports, pp. 201 and 295*
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due to the victim*s negligence, this ipso facto demonstrates 
that the damage was not due to the carrier’s negligence, and 
the carrier is free from liability. A special mention of the 
fault of the victim appears to be useless because that fault 
is just one avenue--among many unspecified others--that are 
available to the carrier to exonerate himself. It seems to 
have been assumed that, according to the usual rule in 
force in most continental countries, exconeration could be 
complete or only partial, depending on whether the injury 
was wholly or partly due to the injured party's negligence.
The British delegation submitted a proposal exoner­
ating the carrier from liability if he could prove that 
"notwithstanding his own fault, or the fault of his servants, 
the injured person would have been able to avoid the damage 
by adopting reasonable measures to that effect." This
introduced the common law concept of contributory negligence 
into the Warsaw scheme. A person is guilty of contributory 
negligence if he fails to meet the standard of care to which 
he is required to conform for his own protection and if his 
failure was a legally contributing cause, together with the 
defendant's default, in bringing about his injury , At 
common law, contributor egligence was a complete defence
legislatively abolished in a number of common law countries 
but, in 1929» it was still in force in its original form in
47/ The proposal read ; "La responsabilite etablie par 1*ar­
ticle 21 est ecartee si le transporteur prouve que, nonobs- 
tant sa propre faute ou celle de ses pr§pos£s, la personne 
llsee eüt ou iviter le dommage en prenant les mesures rai- 
sonnables a cet effet."
48/ Restatement Second. Torts 2d (1965) §463* See further 
J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed., Sydney, 1971), p. 215 ; 
W.L. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed., St. Paul, Minn. 1971), 
pp. 4l6ff.
49/ Fleming, Torts, p. 216. In the United States and Canada, 
the consequences of the common law rule could be avoided by 
the application of newly formed doctrines, such as the last 
opportunity rule, or the last clear chance rule. See Fleming, 
Torts, p. 217 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 427.
to a negligence action . This harsh rule has now been
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countries such as England, Australia, New Zealand, as well 
as in a number of American states .
Two specific reasons seem to explain the British 
proposal » (i) contributory negligence is a fundamental con­
cept of the common law. A common law court would apply such 
a concept more easily than a regime of presumed negligence 
where the fault of the victim would be only one way to rebut 
the presumption, and (ii) the provision was designed to avoid 
the rule of compulsory apportionment being introduced into 
English law against the common law tradition.
The other delegates accepted that the negligence of 
the injured person should be provided for in the Convention, 
but they refused to say that it should result in complete 
exoneration, in all cases, for the carrier. For many dele­
gates, apportionment between the carrier and the injured per­
son was simply natural justice. A compromise was elaborated, 
according to which the lex fori would determine the conse­
quences of any negligence on the part of the injured person­al/
Section 4. - Mandatory limits of liability (Articles 22, 23)
Originally, the limitation of liability was seen as 
a quid pro quo for the presumption of fault which was placed 
on the carrier. Plaintiffs would not be required to prove 
the carrier’s negligence, but the liability of the carrier 
would be limited This balance between the conflicting
50/ The apportionment of damages in accordance with the degree 
of fault of the parties has been introduced in a great number 
of common law jurisdictions. See Prosser, Torts, pp. 435ff. 
for the United States and Canada. For England, Australia, and 
New Zealand, see Fleming, Torts, p. 419. Apportionment of 
damages had been introduced in Canada before 1929 in Ontario 
(1924) and New Brunswick and British Columbia (1925)*
51/ Ileme Conference Internationale, pp. 137-138«
52/ Rapport de Vos, CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, p^. 99«
See also Rapport de Vos to the Warsaw Conference in Ileme 
Conference Internationale, p. 16. Another advantage of the 
limitation was to facilitate insurance of the carrier’s 
risks. Conference Internationale (Paris, 1925)» Annexes, p.64.
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interests of carriers, passengers and shippers is protected
by Article 23 which declares that any provision tending to
relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than<3/that provided in the Convention shall be null and void .
The Hague Protocol has limited the scope of the 
prohibition of any contractual clause excluding liability 
or lowering the limits of liability. According to the new 
Article 23(2), the prohibition does not apply to
" provisions governing loss or damage resulting 
from the inherent defect, quality or vice of 
the cargo carried."
It is noted that such provisions could not endanger the bal­
ance of interests organized by the Convention. Moreover, the 
new Article 23(2) reflects a rule which is deeply entrenched 
in the common law as well as in the French law governing the 
carriage of goods
As to the precise limits contained in Article 22, 
it is difficult to ascertain exactly why they were selected 
by the delegates. For passengers, the text of the Convention 
retains the amount adopted by the CITEJA draft. For goods 
and luggage, air carriers had let it be known that the limit 
of 500 francs per kilogram, adopted by CITEJA, was too high. 
They suggested 130 francs per kilogram. The final figure of 
250 francs was simply a compromise '.
The CITEJA draft used the French franc as the mone­
tary unit for the limitation of liability. But it was pointed 
out at Warsaw that the value of that currency could be uni- 
lateraly altered with the consequence that the balance of 
interests between the various parties would be upset . In 
order to avoid this result, the Franc Poincari, based on a 
defined gold value, was selected and its definition in terms 
of gold was embodied in Article 22(4).
53/ A similar rule is contained in Article III, r. 8 of the 
1924 Brussels Convention.
54/ see above p. 79, 87.
55/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 6l.
56/ Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 6l.
Ill
The maritime law precedent had already demonstrated 
that there was a world-wide acceptance of the principle of 
limited liability for international carriage ^1/, But the 
Hague Rules and the 1924 Brussels Convention contemplated 
only the carriage of goods, and not the carriage of passen­
gers. Moreover, it was a general rule in all the jurisdictions 
considered here that carriers of goods were allowed to limit 
their liability .
The situation was different in relation to carriage 
of passengers. Although limitation clauses are not usual in 
France , or in England t they are not rejected outright. 
In the United States, by contrast, courts have held for a 
very long time that contractual terms limiting liability for 
personal injuries are contrary to public policy . In rela­
tion to wrongful death actions — governed by statutory pro­
visions — there is a sharp difference between the various 
states. Some impose a rather low statutory limit. But in 
others, not only is there no limitation, but the courts re­
fuse to apply the law of sister states selected by the con- 
lict of laws rule when that that law would limit the amount 
of damages. The best example is given by the courts of the 
state of New York which initiated this movement on grounds 
of public policy ,
57/ above 
58/ above 
59/ above 
60/ above 
6l/ above 
62/ below
P- 93.
p. 81, 88. 
p. 88.
p . 81.
p. 81-82.
p. 279, n. 34.
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Section 5* - Unlimited liability in case of dol, wilful
misconduct, or equivalent default.
l) Importance of the concept of flol in French law.
The inability to rely on contractual limitations 
of liability in cases of intentional wrongdoing is the log­
ical consequence of a principle common to most legal systems 
derived from Roman law. No one can escape the consequences 
of one’s dol, or intentional fault (malitiis non indulgendum). 
The same is true in cases of fraud (fraus omnia corrumpit). 
These principles apply to a wide range of situations in 
France. For instance, the Act of 13 July 193° governing 
contracts of insurance provides that the insurer will not 
be liable for the loss and damages caused by the intentional 
fault or dol of the insured . Another application is
found in relation to exclusion or limitation clauses in con­
tracts. Their validity is usually recognized, but they will 
not be enforced in cases of dol , The rule is extended to 
cases of gross negligence (faute lourde) in many areas but, 
although usual, the extension is not always made , What 
remains constant is the complete unenforceability of exclu­
sion and limitation clauses in all cases of dol.
The rule is so entrenched in French law that it is 
applied even when its application would prima facie seem to 
be excluded by the wording of a particular statute or con­
vention. A very good example is given by the interpretation
63/ Article 12(2) of the Act provides : "Toutefois, l'assu- 
reur ne repond pas, nonobstant toute convention contraire, 
des pertes et dommages provenant d’une faute intenticnnelle 
ou dolosive de l'assuri."
64/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 265 ; B. Starck, 
Droit civil, Obligations (Paris, 1972), p. 636.
65/ There is no extension to faute lourde in cases of insur­
ance contracts, or in cases of carriage by rail. Starck, 
Obligations, p. 637. See also B. Starck, "Observations sur 
le regime juridique des clauses de non-responsabilit£ ou li- 
mitatives de responsabilite", D.S. 1974, Chr. 157-
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of Article IV r. 5 of the Hague Rules, and of the correspond­
ing Article 5 of the French Act of 2 April 193& . Article
IV r. 5 reads i
" Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any 
event "be or become liable for any loss or damage 
to or in connection with goods in an amount 
exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or 
unit or the equivalent of that sum in other 
currency . . . "  (emphasis added).
The only question French courts and writers were 
concerned with was to determine whether, despite the seem­
ingly contrary wording of the Hague Rules, the limitation
of liability could be set aside in cases of faute lourde as- --------------
well as in cases of dol — . The impossibility of limiting 
one’s liability in cases of dol was never seriously ques­
tioned. Any hesitation was removed in 1969 when the Cour de 
Cassation ruled that the limit set forth in the 1924 Brussels 
Convention could not be enforced in cases of intentional
fault and fraud, but was applicable in other cases, however'
68/serious the carrier's fault may have been — .
The same attitude would presumably prevail in rela­
tion to Article 24(2) of the Warsaw Convention as amended 
at Guatemala City, 1971» which provides in part :
" Such limits of liability constitute maximum
limits and may not be exceeded whatever the cir­
cumstances which gave rise to the liability."
The similarities between this text and the text of the 1924
69/Brussels Convention have been underlined by the doctrine — “  
which has pointed out the likelihood that, in French courts,
66/ Article 5 of the 193& Act provides : "La responsabilite 
du transporteur ne peut, en aucun cas, depasser, pour les 
pertes ou dommages subis par les marchandises, une somme de 
8.000 frs. par colis ou par unite, a moins que la nature et 
la valeur de ces marchandises aient £t§ declarees par le 
chargeur avant leur embarquement."
67/ Rodiere, Droit maritime, p. 3-f0 » H. Aubrun, commentaire 
de la loi du 2 Avril 1936 relative aux transports de mar­
chandises par mer, D. 1937*TV.1 at p. 10.
68/ St£ Air Cameroun c. Cie maritime des chargeurs reunis, 
Bull~ Civ. p. I39, No~ 142 (Cass. com. 29 April 1969)«
69/ E. du Pontavice, observations in (1971) 24 Rev. Trim.
Dr. Com. 1098*
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Article 24(2) will not constitute an obstacle to unlimited
liability in cases of dol and fraud if the Guatemala City70 /Protocol comes into force 1 — ' .
It should be added that the above principles apply 
only when it is the particular defendant who is guilty of 
dol In an action against a carrier, liability would be
unlimited if the plaintiff can prove dol on the part of the 
carrier. In an action against a servant of the carrier, lia­
bility would be unlimited if the plaintiff can prove dol on 
the part of the servant. But in an action against a carrier, 
if the plaintiff proves dol on the part of the servant, this 
will not constitute an obstacle as serious as in the two 
previous cases, and it is possible that the liability limi­
tation could be enforced. These rules found an echo during 
the drafting of the original Convention. No one questioned 
that liability would be unlimited if the carrier himself 
was guilty of dol, but the possibility of the limitation
being maintained in the case of dol by a servant or agent72/of the carrier was envisaged 1— ' . The final solution, how­
ever, was to make liability unlimited in case of dol, or 
equivalent fault, on the part of servants or agents of the 
carrier acting within the scope of their employment.
2) Common law attitudes in cases of intentional wrongdoing.
In common law, there is no special rule which would 
similarly set aside limitations of liability in situations 
where there has been intentional wrongdoing, or gross negli­
gence. However, various techniques have been used to achieve 
this result in certain cases.
70/ The same danger exists in other civil law countries, as 
appears from the discussion which took place at the Guatemala 
City Conference in 1971* International Conference on Air Law 
(Guatemala City 1971)» ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/l67 - 1, Minutes, 
pp. 135ff.
71/ E. du Pontavice, observations in (1971) 24 Rev. Trim. Dr. 
Com. 1098
72/ CITEJA, Third session» May 1928, pp. 52-53 * Heme Confe­
rence Internationale, pp. 42ff.
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Deviation.
One of these techniques developed in relation to 
the carriage of goods by sea. At common law, it is implied 
in all bills of lading that no deviation will be made from 
the contractual route, unless such deviation is justified, 
i.e. when it is necessary for the prosecution of the voyage, 
or for the safety of the adventure, or to save human life-^^ 
When there has been deviation, the shipowner cannot rely on 
exemption clauses, or on clauses limiting his liability, as 
was explained by Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in Thorley v .
Orchis S.S. Co. ^  s
" The cases shew that, for a long series of years, 
the Courts have held that a deviation is such a 
serious matter and changes the character of the 
contemplated voyage so essentially, that a ship­
owner who has been guilty of a deviation cannot 
be considered as having performed his part of 
the bill of lading contract, but something fun­
damentally different, and therefore he cannot 
claim the benefit of stipulations in his favour 
contained in the bill of lading." 75/
The 1924 Brussels Convention incorporates the 
concept of deviation in Article IV r. 4 which provides :
" Any deviation in saving or attempting to save 
life or property at sea, or any reasonable 
deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringe­
ment or breach of this convention or of the 
contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not 
be liable for any loss or damage resulting 
therefrom."
Several observations need to be made. Firstly, the 
Brussels Convention, following the Hague Rules, altered the 
common law notion of deviation by adding two cases in which 
deviation would not constitute a breach of contract, i.e. 
"any reasonable deviation", and deviation for the purpose
73/ Payne & Ivamy, Carriage of Goods by Sea, p. 75
2h/ [1907] 1 k .b . 660 (ct. App. 1907).
7 5/ at p. 669.
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of saving property at sea. Secondly, there is no definition 
given of "deviation". The drafters apparently assumed that 
the original meaning was clear and simply proceeded to add 
a few cases where deviation would be justified. This assump­
tion is particularly significant when it is remembered that 
the Hague Rules were drafted under the predominant influence 
of common law lawyers for whom the common law concept of 
deviation needed no special explanation *2^ /, Such was not 
the case for civil law lawyers, as appears from their com­
mentaries on this provision -2-2/. Thirdly, the effects of an 
unwarranted deviation are not spelt out. There is little 
doubt that the "excepted perils" of Article IV r. 2 cannot 
be relied upon in such a case -2^ /, But the situation is 
much less clear in relation to the limitation of liability. 
Article IV r. 5 provides that "neither the carrier no the 
ship shall in any event be or become liable . . . in an 
amount exceeding 100 pounds sterling per package or unit. . " 
(emphasis added). The same provision appears in both the 
English and American Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts. Several 
American cases have held that the limitation was not appli­
cable when the damage resulted from an unwarranted deviation 
because the deviation doctrine was so entrenched in the gen­
eral maritime law that any contemplated change would have to
79 /be clearly spelt out J-z/ . The relevant provision does not do 
that and, accordingly, the carrier assumes his common law 
status and is deprived of benefits such as exception or 
limitation of liability provisions. A subsequent decision
76/ above p. 90.
77/ see for instance H. Aubrun, commentaire de la convention 
internationale pour 1 * unification de certaines regies en ma- 
tiere de connaissement, signle a bruxelles le 25 Aoftt 1924,
D. 1937.IV.15 at p. 21.
78/ Stag Line Ltd, v. Foscolo Mango & Co., Ltd., [1932*1 
A .C. 328 (H.L. 1932) ; see further Payne & Ivamy, Carriage 
of Goods by Sea, p. 142 ; Williston, On Contracts, section
1094 (p. 175).
79/ Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 
I953*) ; Jones v. The Flying Cliuper, 116 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1953) ; Shackman c. Cunard White Star, 31 F. Supp. 948 
(S.D. N.Y. 1940).
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how ever  r e a c h e d  t h e  o p p o s i t e  c o n c l u s i o n  on t h e  g ro u n d ,  i n t e r  
a l i a , t h a t  t h e  c l e a r  w o rd in g  o f  A r t i c l e  IV r .  5 d o e s  n o t  
a l l o w  f o r  any  e x c e p t i o n  t o  i t s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  l i m i t e d  l i a b i l ­
i t y  ^ .
These  A m erican  c a s e s  a l l o w  an i n t e r e s t i n g  compar­
i s o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  same p r o v i s i o n  by common 
law  and c i v i l  law c o u r t s .  D e s p i t e  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  p l a i n  word­
i n g  o f  t h e  p r o v i s i o n ,  c o n c e p t s  d e e p l y  e n t r e n c h e d  i n  each  
l e g a l  s y s te m  i n t e r v e n e d  and ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  s e v e r a l  c a s e s ,  s u c ­
c e e d e d  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o ­
v i s i o n ,  b e t  i t  on t h e  g round  o f  d o l  o r  f a u t e  l o u r d e  i n  F r e n c h  
c o u r t s ,  o r  on t h e  g round  o f  d e v i a t i o n  i n  common law  c o u r t s .  
But on a  more f u n d a m e n ta l  l e v e l ,  i f  t h e  c o n c e p t s  t h e m s e l v e s  
a r e  com pared ,  an  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  a p p e a r s  : d o l  i s  a  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a l l  c a s e s  w h i l s t  d e v i a t i o n  
i s  a s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  law o f  c a r r i a g e  o f  goods by 
s e a .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  d o l  c an  be a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  same way i n  
c a s e s  o f  c a r r i a g e  by s e a ,  by a i r ,  o r  by any means,  a s  w e l l  
a s  i n  any o t h e r  c o n t r a c t u a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  But  t h e  d o c t r i n e  
o f  d e v i a t i o n  c a n n o t  e a s i l y  be t r a n s p l a n t e d  from i t s  o r i g i n a l  
m a r i t i m e  law  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n t o  t h e  law o f  a i r  c a r r i a g e  .
No r e a l  a t t e m p t s  have  been  made i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n  .
" F u n d a m e n ta l  b r e a c h " .
A n o th e r  t e c h n i q u e  h a s  been  u se d  t o  p r e v e n t  a  wrong­
d o e r  from b e n e f i t i n g  from f a v o u r a b l e  c o n t r a c t u a l  t e r m s .  The 
d o c t r i n e  o f  f u n d a m e n ta l  b r e a c h  u sed  d e v i a t i o n  c a s e s  f o r  t h i s
8 0 /  A t l a n t i c  M utua l  I n s u r a n c e  Co. v .  P o s e id o n  S c h i f f a r t ,  206 
F. Supp. 15 (N.D. 111.  1962) ,' a f f ' d , 313 F .2 d  872 ( 7 t h  C i r .
1 9 6 3 ) .
8 1 /  F o r  a  c o n v i n c i n g  expose  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw e e n  a i r  
and s e a  c a r r i a g e  m aking  d e v i a t i o n  h a r d l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  c a s e s  
o f  c a r r i a g e  by a i r ,  s e e  K ahn -F reu n d ,  The Law o f  C a r r i a g e , 
p p . 736 and 7 5 8 .
8 2 /  T here  was a s u g g e s t i o n ,  o b i t e r  d i c t u m , i n  t h a t  s e n s e  i n  
R o t te r d a m s c h e  Bank v .  B .O .A .C .j 19531 1 W.L.R. 493 a t  P* 502. 
See a l s o  P h i l c o  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  The F l y i n g  T i g e r  L in e ,  I n c . , 
11 A v i . 17*278 (Mich.  C t .  App. 1969 ) where t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  
d e v i a t i o n  was a p p l i e d  i n  a c a s e  o f  d o m e s t i c  c a r r i a g e - b y  a i r .
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purpose but it did not consider them as belonging to a sepa­
rate legal category-^Öeviation cases were used as a specific 
illustration of a general rule. Thus, instead of saying that 
a party cannot rely on an exempting clause in cases of devia­
tion, the fundamental breach doctrine would say that, by devi­
ating, the shipowner has broken the basic duties created by 
the very nature and character of the contract. Therefore, he 
cannot rely on exemption clauses contained in his contract.
In that formulation, the rule that a contracting party cannot 
rely on an exempting clause is not limited to cases of devia­
tion, but it applies to all the cases where there has been a 
breach of the basic duties created by the nature and character 
of the contract. The fundamental breach doctrine is much 
closer to the civil law approach than the doctrine of devia­
tion, because it appears to be equally valid for all types 
of situations, provided a "fundamental breach" is found. One 
important difference to cases of dol remains because courts 
have to examine the acts of the wrongdoer subjectively in 
order to determine whether there was an intention to cause 
harm. But that difference disappears when a wrongdoer is 
deprived of the benefit of an exemption clause because of 
faute lourde. Both faute lourde and fundamental breach are 
considered objectively.
Suisse Atlantique.
The doctrine of fundamental breach was rejected by 
the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement 
Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale which 
held that there was no rule of substantive law to the effect 
that no exempting clause, however widely drawn, will avail 
a party who has committed a fundamental breach of contract.
83/ On fundamental breach in general, see Cheschire & Fifoot, 
Law of Contract (3d Australian ed., Sydney, 1974) PP • l40ff ; 
Chitty, On Contracts (23rd ed., London, 1968) pp. 734ff.
84/ [1967] A.C. 36I (H.L. 1966).
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The House of Lords decided that it was in each case a matter 
of construction of the contract whether the exempting clause 
was wide enough to exclude an action for the alleged breach-^ -^ . 
If we compare this new attitude to the civil law rule, it 
seems that identical results might be achieved in both systems. 
Given a deliberate breach of contract, which would in most 
cases be characterized as dol or faute lourde, a French court 
would not allow the application of an exemption clause as a 
matter of principle ; an English court would do the same in 
most situations simply because it is unlikely that exemption 
clauses will be drafted so as to exclude liability for delib­
erate breaches . This is an illustration of one essential 
difference in the approaches used in common law and in civil 
law, i.e. pragmatism and case by case method on the one hand, 
as against general principle formulated in abstract, concep­
tual terms on the other .
3) Introduction of dol into the Warsaw Convention.
None of these differences emerged in 1929* The 
clearly formulated civil law attitude as to the introduction 
of a provision preventing carriers from relying on exclusion 
or limitation clauses in cases of dol met no opposition from 
the British delegation.
The difference between the civil law and the common 
law attitudes is revealed by comparing Article 25 of the 
original Convention with Article 24(2) of the Convention as 
amended by the Guatemala City Protocol. The original Conven­
tion shows the influence of Roman law by simply incorporating
85/ see further on that case and its implications Cheshire & 
Fifoot, Contract, pp. l42ff ; Chitty, On Contracts, pp.736f’B*
86/ Chitty, On Contracts, p. 739* But a very careful drafting 
mey cover deliberate breaches, as explained by Lord Atkin 
in The Cap Palos [1921] P. 458 (Ct. App. 1921) :"I am far 
from saying that a contractor may not make a valid contract 
that he is not to be liable for any failure to perform his 
contract, including even wilful default ; but he must use 
very clear words to express that purpose." (at pp.471-472)
87/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, pp. 73^f*
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the rule that there can be no limitation of liability in
case of dol or equivalent fault. Article 24(2) of the amended
--- 88 /Convention resulted from a "package deal" — ' designed to
answer most of the objections against the previous regime
voiced by the United States. One of these objections was the
difficulties inherent to the concept of dol, and the problems
caused by the application of Article 25 • The solution adopted
deleted any mention of dol and instituted what was seen as
"unbreakable limits" which "may not be exceeded whatever
90/the circumstances which gave rise to the liability.
It is interesting to establish a parallel between 
the Warsaw Convention and the 1924 Brussels Convention. In 
the Brussels Convention, drafted under the predominant in­
fluence of common law principles, the common law concept of 
deviation made its way naturally into the provisions of the 
Convention. In the Warsaw Convention, drafted under the pre­
dominant influence of civil law principles, the civil law 
concept of dol made its way naturally into the provisions of 
the Convention. In both instances, it was assumed that the 
meaning of each particular concept was clear and no definition 
or further exposition was thought necessary.
4) Difficulties in the elaboration of Article 25.
Throughout the elaboration of the successive drafts 
of the Convention, the wording of Article 25 created diffi­
culties which the delegates were still trying to solve during 
the final meeting of the Warsaw Conference in 1929 • From
the minutes of the CITEJA meetings, and mainly from the minutes
88/ See ICAO Legal Committee (Montreal 1970), Doc. 8878-LC/162, 
pp. 131ff. on the New Zealand "package deal".
89/ This was the point 3 of 'the New Zealand proposal. See 
LC/Working draft No. 745-15* Doc. 8878-LC/162, p. 3^4.
90/ last sentence of Article 24(2) of the Convention as 
amended by the Guatemala City Protocol.
91/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 149.
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of the Warsaw Conference, it appears that there were two 
distinct problems, one of substance (in which cases would 
the limit of liability be set aside ?), and one of expres­
sion (what is the formulation in French which could receive 
the most accurate translation into English ?).
The question of substance : when is liability to be unlimited?
The experts from the civil law countries wanted the
concept of dol introduced in the Convention to ensure that
the carrier would not be allowed to rely on the limitation
92/of liability in cases of dol 2— / . No one challenged the
principle of the unavailability of the limitation where
93/there was a "willingness to harm someone" ■z-‘/ . But some
hesitation appeared among delegates from civil law countries
as to whether the principle of the equivalence of faute
lourde to dol should be included in the Convention so that
there would be no limitation of liability in cases of faute
94/ -----lourde as well as in cases of dol ■z—7 . For some delegates, 
the only difficulty was that there was no similar concepts 
in other countries , But for other delegates, the intro­
duction of faute lourde was very dangerous because it was 
a very vague concept which could allow almost any fault to 
be qualified as faute lourde, thus rendering meaningless 
the limitation of liability m But, apart from these 
criticisms, there was no objection to faute lourde being 
added to dol in the text of the Convention.
92/ Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 40.
93/ This is the definition of dol given by the Chairman of 
the third session of CITEJA. CITEJA, Third session, May 1928
P- 53-
94^ CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, p. 54 (German delegate) ; 
Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 40 (German delegate).
95/ Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 4l (Luxemburg dele- 
gat e7T~^T-4TXSwTss~d^TegaTeyr-
96/ Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 4l (French delegate).
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The question of expression.
The final text refers to the carrier’s dol and to
"such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the Court seised of the case, is considered to be equivalent
97/to wilful misconduct. " u L U  Thus, if there is in the lex fori 
a rule providing that a particular category of fault is 
equivalent to dpi, the liability will be unlimited in both 
cases. But if the lex fori does not have any equivalent to 
dpi, the liability will be unlimited in cases of dol only.
The final draft has several advantages \ (i) it 
allows the application of the concept of faute lourde in the 
countries where it already exists, without imposing it on 
other countries, and (ii) its complicated manner of referring 
to what is, in fact, faute lourde, lessens the risk of courts 
too easily characterizing as lourde what would in fact be an 
ordinary fault. The final text however is meaningful only in 
a legal system which is based on Homan law principles and 
which not only knows the meaning of dol but has taken a stand 
on the applicability of the maxim Culpa lata dolo aequiparatur 
i.e. on the equivalence of dol with another fault (culpa lata) 
be it faute lourde in France and Belgium, or any other cor­
responding phrase in another language.
The other problem was that the concept of dol. was 
unknown in English law. The CITEJA experts first attempted 
to alleviate the difficulty by substituting "acte illicite 
intentionnel" to dol 23/ % But this was strongly criticized 
by the British delegation on the ground that the new phrase 
could not be adequately translated into English 22/ .Moreover,
97/ The French text reads :"une faute qui, d'apres la loi du 
tribunal saisi, est considerie comme Iquivalente au dol."
98/ as related in Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 4l 
(Luxemburg delegate). The corresponding Article of the 
CITEJA draft read "Art. 24(2).- Si le dommage provient d’un 
acte illicite intentionnel dont le transporteur a la respon- 
sabilitt?, il n'aura pas le droit de se privaloir des dispo­
sitions de cette Convention qui excluent en tout ou en par- 
tie la responsabilit§ directe ou d§riv£e des fautes de ses 
pr§pos£s."
99/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 40.
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some civil law delegates had difficulties with "acte illi- 
cite intentionnel"-^^which was far less precise for them 
than the "pure and safe" dol , The meaning of dol had
been explained several times during the elaboration of the 
Convention • it was summarized by the British delegate
as "an act deliberately performed v/ith the intent to injure, 
to cause harm" ^ 2 / ,  He then proposed to express that con­
cept by "wilful misconduct" in the English text 1 It
clearly appears from his subsequent remarks that "wilful 
misconduct" was wider than dol since it included acts per­
formed recklessly, regardless of the consequences
;s < LV Wil­
ful misconduct, in turn, was seen by other delegates as cor­
responding "maybe not entirely, but almost entirely to * dol*106/and • faute lourde*." Before the vote on the Article was
taken, the British delegate made the following statement :
" I should like it to be recorded in the minutes 
that it followed from the explanations which 
have been exchanged that we have in English the 
expression 1 wilful misconduct* to translate 
these words, which expression is well known and 
has a well defined meaning in our law." 107/
It seems that all the delegates were happy with the 
final result. In an English court, air carriers would be sub­
jected to unlimited liability in cases of wilful misconduct, 
and, in civil law courts, there would be unlimited liability 
in cases of dpi, and in cases of a fault equivalent to dol 
if there was such a fault in the lex fori.
100/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 40 (Greek delegate).
101/ Dol represents "le droit pur et sür". Herne Conference 
Internationale, p. 4l (Luxemburg delegate).
102/ see for instance CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, p. 53*
103/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 40. Compare with the 
interpretation of dol given by French courts in recent cases, 
below p .
104/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 40.
105/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 40.
106/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. 4l (Italian delegate)
107/ H e m e  Conference Internationale, p. l40. The translation 
is given by H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in Interna­
tional Air Law (The Hague, 1954), p^ 207» n^ 178.
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None of the delegates seem to have realized that 
the text they had adopted was meaningful only in civil law 
countries. No literal translation could he given which would 
express the intention of the drafters. In order to do that, 
the English text would have had to he much shorter than the 
French text and to amalgamate into the one concept of "wil­
ful misconduct" the two ideas of dol and fault equivalent to 
dol. Instead, the English text is in terms of "wilful mis­
conduct" and such default which is equivalent to wilful 
misconduct.
Amendments to Article 25.
Some of the more obvious defects of Article 25 were 
remedied hy the Hague Protocol in 1955« The new Article 25 
does not refer to concepts such as dol, or wilful misconduct. 
Instead, it described the actual circumstances in which 
liability limitations may be set aside :
" The limits of liability specified in Article 22 
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage 
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, 
his servants or agents, done with intent to cause 
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that 
d am a ge wo uId pro bably result. ! ."(emphasis added)
This is almost identical to the description of the cases of 
unlimited liability which had been agreed to by the delegates 
at the Warsaw Conference. But the delegates to the Hague Con­
ference did not repeat the mistake of their predecessors. 
After the substantive rule had been agreed upon, it was ex­
pressed in a factual formulation rather then being labeled 
as a specific concept which could not be "translated" into 
another legal system, whatever the language used.
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During the drafting stages of the Guatemala City 
Protocol, a number of delegations supported the idea that 
the possibility of breaking the limit of liability should 
be deleted on the basis that it was commercially unsound and 
that it would be the source of costly and unwarranted liti­
gation ^00/1 Prominent supporters of this proposal were the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand 
Canada*s position was less clear-cut, perhaps because of the 
influence of the civil law system of the province of Quebec. 
It was forcefully argued by many countries opposing the 
proposal — particularly Italy and France — that it was con­
trary to ordre public that anyone guilty of dol should be 
allowed to limit his liability, however high the limit was. 
Accordingly, if the new Protocol merely deleted Article 25 
without expressly saying that the limitation was applicable 
even in cases of dol, courts would refuse to apply the limit 
to those cases ^ 2/, This argument did not convince the majo­
rity of the delegates who decided to delete Article 25 in 
relation to passengers and luggage.
108/ ICAO Legal Committee (Montreal 1970), DOC. 8878-LC/I62, 
pp. 51ff.
109/ International Conference on Air Law (Guatemala City 
1971), ICAO Doc". 9Ö40-LC/167 - 1, Minutes, pp. 135ff.
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Chapter FIVE. - DOCUMENTS OF CARRIAGE AND CARRIER’S LIABILITY..
The Warsaw Convention requires that documents of 
carriage be delivered to the passenger or shipper. Specific 
particulars are required for each type of transportation, 
i.e. the transportation of passengers, luggage, and cargo. 
In some cases, the Convention imposes a penalty for non- 
compliance with its requirements.
Broadly speaking, courts dealing with documents of 
carriage are confronted with three difficulties *
(i) what amounts to delivery of the document ;
(ii) what has to be included in the documents ;
(iii) what is the penalty for non-compliance with the Con­
vention.
This Chapter examines these problems.
Section One. - Delivery of a document of carriage.
There is no difficulty, and no room for diverging 
interpretations, when there has been no delivery of a docu­
ment of carriage ^ . In addition, it appears that a proper 
document of transportation must be delivered. Several courts 
have held that a carrier cannot rely on the existence of 
vaguely related documents which would allegedly give similar
1/ In the United States : Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion 
S .A ., 3 Avi. 1 7 ,8 3 6 (S.D. Fla. 1952). In Canada ; Frederick 
v. Ottawa Aero Services Ltd., [1964] 42 D.L.R.2s 122 (Ont.
High Ct. 1 9 0 3)"• In France T Cie Gyrafrance c. E.D.F. , D . S. 
I9 0 9, J, 327, note P. Chauveau (C.A. Chambery, 18 February 
1 9 6 9) ; Cie La Minerve c. Sti Pugnat, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A.
445 (T.G.I. Grenoble", 1 July 1970).
But once a document has been made out and given to 
the shipper, it does not matter that the documents have been 
lost subsequently : Ste S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972)
26 R.F.D.A. 49 (C.A. Paris, 3 February 1971)•
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2/information to the shipper — .
As regards the luggage ticket and the air waybill, 
the question of their delivery has not created difficult 
judicial problems ; it was merely a matter of assessing 
whether the fact of delivery had taken place. Difficulties 
arose mainly in relation to the content of these documents, 
i.e. whether they complied with the particulars listed in 
the Convention. This is a different problem which is dealt 
with in the next section. It is enough here simply to mention 
the fact that a sanction is provided for non-compliance of 
these two documents with the required particulars as well as 
for their non-delivery.
The special case of "delivery" of the passenger ticket.
As regards the passenger ticket, the Convention 
provides a sanction only for non-delivery of the ticket. If 
there is solely a failure to comply with the particulars 
listed in Article 3(1)> there is no sanction at all -2/. On 
the basis that the Convention simply requires that a pas­
senger ticket be delivered, and not that it comply with the 
other requirements listed in Article 3» several cases have 
held that it was of no consequence that the agreed stopping
2/ In the United States : The Flying Tiger Line, Inc, v.
The United States, 6 Avi. 17,291 (U.S. Ct. Claims, 1959)•
The court agreed with the carrier that most of the relevant 
information normally contained in the air waybill was con­
tained in a bill of lading. But the court prevented the 
carrier from relying on a "Charter Agreement" to provide the 
additional information required by the Convention which was 
missing in the bill of lading.
In France : The American Casualty Cv of Reading c . Air- 
nautic, (1964) 18 R.F.D.A. 4l3 (Trib. comm. Seine 20 De- 
cember 1963)1 aff9 d, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 3^6 (C.A. Paris,
19 December 1964).
3/ Article 3(2) provides : "The absence, irregularity or 
loss of the passenger ticket does not affect the existence 
or the validity of the contract of carriage, which shall 
none the less be subject the the rules of this Convention. 
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a 
passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be 
entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this Con­
vention which exclude or limit his liability."
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places were not indicated in the document —7 . On the very 
requirement that the ticket be delivered, an early American 
decision held that that requirement had been satisfied 
although the ticket had been handed not to the passenger 
herself, but to her agent ,
A very different attitude is now prevalent in 
United States courts ^ . "Delivery" is no longer the physi­
cal delivery of the ticket by the carrier. The requirement is 
qualified in such a way that the "delivery" must allow the 
passenger : (i) to realize that the carrier's liability is 
greatly limited, and (ii) if he so wishes, to buy additional 
insurance. In other words, there must be adequate notice of 
the liability limitations.
A priori, it seems that failure to give adequate 
notice might easily have been viewed as a violation of 
Article 3(1)(e) which requires that "a statement that the 
carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability 
established by this Convention" be included in the passenger 
ticket. But this would have achieved nothing since Article 
3(2) provides a sanction only in the case of non-delivery 
of ticket, and not in the case of delivery of an incomplete 
or imperfect ticket. Accordingly, several United States 
courts have decided that failure to give adequate notice of 
the liability limitation amounted to an absence of delivery 
of the ticket, thereby preventing the carrier from relying 
on the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit 
his liability.
4/ In the United Kingdom : Preston v. Hunting Air Transport 
Ltd. [1956] .1 Q.B. 454 (Q.b : 1956) i in the United States s
Grey v. American Airlines Inc. 3 Avi. 17,404 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); 
in Belgium : Ficher c. Cie la "Sabena" (1950) 4 R.F.D.A. 4ll 
(Trib. Bruxelles, 6 May 1950). The last decision does not 
indicate in what respect the ticket was irregular.
5./ Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 190 Misc. 974 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1947"), aff'd, 2 Avi. 14,556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1948), aff'd, 2 Avi. 14,556 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1949).
6/ The analysis of the American courts has been endorsed by 
the Civil Aeronautics Board in relation to passengers and 
baggage : Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 12 Avi. 17,836 (D.S^ Cir. 1973)•
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Failure to give adequate notice amounting to the
absence of delivery of the ticket has been recognized in
two types of situations. In the first place, there is no
proper delivery of the ticket if the conditions in which
the passenger receives his ticket are such that he cannot
realize the existence of liability limitations and does not
have the opportunity to obtain additional insurance. This
was the holding of Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.-^ , and
Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.-^ ' . In the second place, ------------ — --- ------------
Lisi v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. ^  ruled that 
where the passenger has received the ticket in normal con­
ditions, but if the ticket itself is difficult to read or 
to comprehend, then the passenger*s attention has not been 
properly drawn to the liability limitations and he cannot 
really protect himself by taking additional insurance. Con­
sequently, there was no adequate notice, i.e. no proper 
delivery of the ticket.
The requirement of adequate notice in the passenger 
ticket appears to be directed only at the monetary limitation. 
It has been held in Molitch v. Irish International Airlines-^ ^  
that there was no justification to require adequate notice 
of the two-year time limitation imposed by Article 29 of the 
Convention.
2 /  9 Avi. 17,187 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), aff*d and rem*d, 9 Avi. 
17,475 (2d Cir. 1965)» cert, denied,382 U.S. 816 [U.S. Sup.
1965) .
8/ 9 Avi. 17,621 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev*d and rem'd, 9 Avi. 
17,848 (9th Cir. 1965)•
9/ 9 Avi. 18,120 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), aff*d, 9 Avi. 18,374 
(2d Cir. 1966), aff*d by an equally divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (U.S. Sup. 1968). The case was followed by numerous 
decisions, e.g. Bavless v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aires Rio 
Grandese (VARIG), 10 Avi. 17,484 (S.D. N.Y. 1967')' and 10 Avi. 
17,881 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) ; Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.
9 Avi. 17,280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), 9 Avi."17,789 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1965), aff *d, 9 Avi. 18,247 (N.Y.' Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1966) , rev* d , 10 Avi. 17,651 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967), cert. 
denied 88 S.Ct. 1636 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1968).
10/ 11 Avi. 17,396 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), rev* d, 11 Avi. 17,893 
"(2d Cir. 1970).
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The analysis given by United States courts of the 
Convention*s requirements in relation to monetary limitation 
in passenger cases has not been generally adopted in ether 
countries. In attempting to explain this difference of inter­
pretation, two analyses are required i one for common law 
courts outside the United States, and the other for French 
courts.
Common law courts outside the United States.
It seems that all common law courts could adopt the 
basic reasoning used by United States courts. Firstly, in 
recent years, a feature of the Convention on which much 
attention has been focused is its low liability limitation. 
For a court reading Article 3(1)(e) ’today, it is understand­
able that the statement referring to "the rules relating to 
liability established by [the]] Convention" essentially refers 
to the limitation of liability. Secondly, the reasoning in 
Warsaw cases is similar to that in common law cases dealing 
with the validity of contractual terms that exclude and 
limit liability. When an unsigned document containing such 
a term is given by one contracting party to the other — as 
is the case for a ticket — the question is whether reason­
able notice of the terms has been given This test has
12/been considered as crucial by the common law since 1877 — ' .
11/ Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract (3rd Aust. ed.) pp. 133TT ; 
Chitty On Contracts (23rd ed., London, 1968), vol. 1, 276ff,
. 5§6ff ; Williston, On Contracts, Sections 90B, 1119A.
What the common lav/ requires is that a particular provision 
be adequately notified, not necessarily that the contracting 
party had actual knov/ledge of that provision. See Trans World 
Airlines v. Christophel, 12 Avi. 18,135 (Ky Ct. App. 1973).
12/ Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 4l6 
let. App. 1877)• The House of Lords approved the test in 
Richardson v. Rowntree [189*+] A.C. 217 (H.L. 189*0»
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There is a clear analogy between the rules used in 
assessing the adequacy of the notice, and the examples pro­
vided by Warsaw cases in the United States. For instance, at
common law, it is essential that notice be adequately given
13/before or at the time of the making of the contract — “ . It 
is precisely because the air carrier did not comply with that 
requirement that he was held to be fully liable in the cases 
of Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. t and Warren 
v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. . Similarly, it is some­
times mentioned in the United States Warsaw cases that the 
attention of the travelling public must be drawn to the 
limitation because there is nothing similar in domestic air
carriage 16/. Here, we have an a contrario example of the
rule according to which adequate notice may be given through
previous dealings on similar terms between the same parties^-^
Given the common approach existing on questions
of notice in general, it is interesting to observe that no
common law court outside the United States has yet found
that there was no ticket delivery because of an inadequate
notice. In the Canadian case of Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific 18/Airlines Ltd. , the Superior Court of Montreal H/ which
was the court of first instance, reasoned that the Convention
13/ Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract (3rd Aust. ed.) pp. 133-13^•
14/ 9 Avi. 17,187 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), aff'd and rem’d, 9 Avi. 
17,475 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 8l6 (U.S. Sup.
ct. 1965).
15/ 9 Avi. 17,621 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev’d and rem'd, 9 Avi. 
17,848 (9th Cir. 1965)•
16/ This was expressly mentioned in Lisi v. Alitalia at 9 Avi. 
18,377- The same idea was implicit in Borvk v. Aerolineas 
Argentinas, 11 Avi. 18,04l (S.D. N.Y. 197*1) •
YjJ Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract (3rd Aust. ed.) p. 134.
18/ 12 Avi. 17,191 (Sup. Ct. Montreal 1971), rev'd in part,
13 Avi. 17,454 (Ct. App. Montreal 1974). For an analysis of 
the first instance decision, see R.H. Mankiewicz,"Irregula- 
rite des documents de transport prescrits par la Convention 
de Varsovie", (1973) 8 Eur. Tr. L. 200.
19/ It should be noted that, although Montreal is in the 
Province of Quebec, whose legal system belongs to the family 
of civil law systems, the case will be treated as a common 
law case. Numerous instances of the influence of common law
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provides no sanction for failing to state in the ticket
that the carriage is subject to the rules of the Warsaw
Convention. The sanction is provided only for the case of
a total absence of ticket. Accordingly, the fact that the
statement was in very small print could not suppress the
liability limitation. The court strongly emphasized the
difference in wording between Article 3(2) and Articles
4(4) and 9 % Since a sanction is provided by Articles
4(4) and 9 for omission of particulars in the baggage check
and the air waybill, the absence of any sanction for a
similar omission in the passenger ticket must be interpreted
as allowing the carrier to deliver "any kind of ticket,
without including any of the particulars required by the
Warsaw Convention, since the Convention has not provided21/for any sanction against such omissions." — ' . The court’s 
analysis was openly influenced by the early American case 
of Grey v. American Airlines which was quoted at length.
This reasoning was rejected on appeal. The Court 
of Appeal stated :
" The limitation contemplated by the Convention 
must be earned : the Carrier must deliver a 
ticket which satisfies the mandatory require­
ments of Article 3(1) which article is, in 
effect, a definition. If the ticket delivered 
does not satisfy these requirements it is not 
a ticket within the meaning of that article 
and the sanction of Article 3(2) will apply."23/
19/ (cont1d) principles can be found in the Quebec Civil 
Code. The question of "notice" is one of them. Article 1676 
of the Civil Code provides that "notice by carriers of spe­
cial conditions limiting their liability is binding only 
upon persons to whom it is made known."
20/ at 12 Avi. 17,192 and 17,193-
21/ The court quoted D. Goedhuis, National Air Legislations 
and the Warsaw Convention (The Hague”, 1937) , P^  1*57 •
22/ 3 Avi. 17,404 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
23/ at 13 Avi. 17,455.
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The court further explained its position by saying :
" no one could object to the proposition that a 
ticket which lacks a reasonably legible statement 
of what is required by Article 3(e) is not a 
ticket within the meaning of 3(l) and for this 
reason the sanction of 3(2) will apply."24/
While disagreeing with the reasoning adopted by the 
court of first instance, the Court of Appeal refused to allow 
the appeal because the required statement was sufficiently 
legible. The standards of readibility set in Lisi and other 
American cases were rejected. The court disapproved the 
deprecating description of passenger tickets found in these 
cases :
" Language of this sort suggests that sympathy 
for the Plaintiff may have clouded the user's 
objectivity and this tends to render suspect 
the judgment in which it is used." 25/
It is submitted that the reason why the United States 
has remained the only common law country where air carriers 
were subject to unlimited liability on the basis of Article 3 
of the Convention is the enormous campaign against the low 
limits of liability of the Warsaw Convention which took place 
in that country and culminated in the threat to denounce the 
Convention . No similar campaign took place in the other
24/ at 13 Avi. 17,455. 2£ /  at 13 Avi. 17,455.
26/ See for instance : Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, "Report on the Warsaw Convention as amended by the 
Hague Protocol" (1959) 26 J. Air L. & Com. 255 ; J.J. Kennelly, 
"The Warsaw Convention Treaty. Validity? Application? Incon­
sistencies! Absurdities! Injustices to Passengers, Airlines, 
Manufacturers and the United States Government" (1969) 13 
The Trial Lawyers Guide 35 ; "A Novel Rule of Liability :
Its implications" (1971) 37 J* Air L. & Com. 343 ; Lee S. Kreindler, "The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention",
(1965) 31 J« Air L. & Com. 291 ; "A Plaintiff's View of 
Montreal", (1967) 33 J* Air L. & Com. 528 ; "Limitations on 
Liability in Aircraft Crash Cases : Some Reflections on Avia­
tion Litigation Trends and Inequality", (1970) 36 1* Air L.
& Com. 467*
On the background of the threat to denounce the Convention, 
see A. Lowenfeld & A. Mendelsohn, "The United States and the 
Warsaw Convention", (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497.
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common law countries, even though the low limits were some­
times criticized -^/. The United States courts followed the 
arguments of the trial lawyers who orchestrated the campaign 
against the Warsaw Convention. This is revealed by the nu­
merous references to policy considerations which are found 
in most of the passenger cases decided in the United States 
over the last ten years £0/,
French courts.
In Canale c. Air France % a French court was
given a full expose of the United States courts* attitude
30/by the passenger’s counsel *dL—/ . Nevertheless, any require­
ment that an "adequate notice" be given to the passenger was 
forcefully rejected. The rationale of the decision is that
27/ A.B. Rosevear, "The Future of the Warsaw Convention",
T1968) 14 McGill L. J. I6l ; H. Caplan & A.W.G. Kean, "The 
Warsaw Convention and the Guatemala City Protocol", (1971)
J. Bus. L. 210.
28/ See for instance : Lisi v. Alitalia, 9 Avi. 18,120 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1966), aff* d, 9 Avi"^  18,374 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Warren v .
Flying Tiger Line, 9 Avi. 17,621 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev*d and
rem* d, 9 Avi. 17,848 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Mertens v. Flying
Tiger Line, 9 Avi. 17,187 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), aff1d and rem* d ,
9 Avi. 17,475 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Burdell v. Canadian Pacific 
Airlines, Ltd. , 11 Avi. 17,351 (111. Cook Co. 1969") • In that 
case, the court had given a first opinion, later withdrawn, 
in which the policy considerations were given great weight.
The first opinion appears at 10 Avi. 18,151* The dissenting 
opinion of Moore, Circuit Judge, in the Lisi case throws a 
very clear light on the spirit in which the majority of the 
appeal judges took its decision : "The majority do not approve 
of the terms of the treaty and, therefore, by judicial fiat 
they rewrite it.They think a * one-sided advantage* is being 
taken of the passenger which must be offset by a judicial 
requirement that the passenger have notice of the limitation 
of liability." at 9 Avi. 18,378.
It must be observed that the Convention may easily 
appear to be inequitable when its provisions are compared 
to municipal law where liability limitations for death and 
personal injury are generally held invalid. See above p.
29/ (1972) 35 R.G.A.E. 186 (T.G.I. Ajaccio, 25 November 1971)*
30/ See the brief presented by Me Filippi, plaintiff*s counsel, 
in (1972) 35 R.G.A.E. 198.
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there is legally no need for such a requirement since the 
Convention’s provisions dealing with liability limitations 
are binding upon the parties v/ithout them having to consent 
to their application. The parties are not in a purely con­
tractual situation . It follows that purely contractual 
rules, e.g. the requirement that a limitation clause be 
accepted by both parties, are not relevant.
Thus, for the court, the parties to a contract of 
international air carriage do no appear to need the judicial 
protection which is exercised when there is complete freedom 
of contract. The carrier cannot take advantage of its privi­
leged position to impose unjust terms and conditions because 
the contents of the contract are mandatorily fixed by the 
Convention. The carrier is obliged to conform to its provi­
sions, which were designed to strike a balance between the
32/various interests at stake -L-/ . The fact that that balance 
might have become inadequate over the years does not alter 
the position that the carrier cannot at will impose clauses 
unfavorable to the other party.
It should be added that strictly regulated contracts, 
such as the contract of carriage by air, are quite common in 
France -23/. Once the content of such a contract is compulso­
rily determined by an outside authority — be it an inter­
national convention, a code, a statute, or even a court 
34/ruling ' — there is no point in assessing whether the
31/ at p. 195*
32/ above p. 109.
33/Regulation of the contents of a contract is of the essence 
of the technique of contrats types which is used in many 
civil law countries (see above pp. ). A more recent fea­
ture is the madatory character of the determination of the 
contents of the contract in areas such as insurance or hire- 
purchase where weaker contracting parties are protected 
against stronger ones. See Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, 
pp. 108ff.
jl4/ Such was the case for the obligation de s£curite towards 
the passenger, and the stipulation pour autrui for the bene­
fit of the passenger and his relatives which were "discovered" 
i.e. imposed, by courts in contracts of carriage of passen­
gers. Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 424-426.
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parties have really consented to the particular clause. They 
will be bound by the terms of the "contract" in any c a s e ^ .
The mere fact that several decisions have described the con­
tract of carriage by air as a Statut l6gal 2k/ f i.e . a body 
of mandatory regulations, as opposed to a normal contract, 
is a clear indication of the absence of freedom of the parties.
Another reason explaining the difference between 
common law and French law attitudes in relation to the enforce­
ability of limitations of liability in the carriage of passen­
gers is that the corresponding areas of the general law of 
contract are also different. Both systems require that con­
tractual terms be accepted by the parties in order to be 
binding. But they differ in their manner of assessing whether 
that requirement is satisfied. The common law has formulated 
tests which reveal whether a person knew or was given a fair 
chance to know of the term before making the contract, e.g. 
whether adequate notice of the clause excluding or limiting 
liability was given 22/1 French law has no equivalent rules. 
Courts assess whether a contracting party has consented to 
a particular clause from the facts of each c a s e ^ .  Although
35/ The only real freedom left to the parties is to decide 
whether they will enter into a specific relationship. See 
below p p . 370ff. about the view of the contract as a kind of 
shell.
36/ above p. 63.
37/ L* Estrange v. F. Graucob, Ltd.|~1934~] 2 K.B. 394 (K.B.1934) ; 
Jones v. Aircraft Pty Ltd. I 1949] St. Rep. Queensland (Cir.
Ct”. Queensland 1948). See generally Cheshire & Fifoot, Con­
tract (3rd Aust. ed.) p p . 132-148.
38/ Recent decisions have emphasized that the party who may 
have its claim subjected to the limitation must have known, 
and agreed to, the relevant condition : Ste Mutuelle d*assu­
rances a£riennes c. Gauvain, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 438 (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 4 July 1967) ; Aero-Club du Limousin c. O'Hanlon, 
J.C.P. 1973* II. 17339» note H. Mazeaud (C.A. Limoges, 18 
January 1973)* See also Mache c. Air France, D.S. 1968. J.
515» note P. Chauveau (C.A. Rouen, 12'April 1967), aff1d ,
(1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 311 (Cass. civ. Ire, 3 June I970TT The 
agreement must really exist between the two contracting par­
ties : Les Pelerinages de Paris c. Cie Air France, (1970)
24 R.F.D.A. 199 (C.A. Paris, 13 February 1970).
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knowledge and acceptance of limitation clauses may be vital
to the outcome of a case, the whole question is usually
rapidly discarded as a mere issue of fact 2 2 / 1 Moreover,
French courts are generally reluctant to investigate the
reality of the parties* consent when the condition at issue
40/is written in the contractual document itself — ' . Such 
clauses are generally enforced by courts. It is only in 
relation to clauses giving exclusive jurisdiction to a par­
ticular court — the inconvenience for the plaintiff amount­
ing almost to the impossibility to sue — that French courts4l/readily look more deeply into the matter —  . All this ex­
plains why it would not be easy, or natural, for a French 
court to think in terms of "adequate motice" in relation 
to a provision limiting liability in the carriage by air.
Besides these technical points, there are policy 
considerations which might be of fundamental importance for 
explaining the difference in attitude between United States 
and French courts, For a French court, there is nothing 
objectionable about the Warsaw limits. Before 1957» domestic 
air carriage was governed by a 1924 Act which allowed air 
carriers to exclude completely their liability by including
a clause to that effect in the ticket. Such a clause was al-
42/ways included, and enforced by the courts in most cases — / . 
Thus, by comparison, the Warsaw regime was an improvement
39/ It is significant that the issue is disposed of in one 
footnote in a recent treatise on the law of Obligations. 
Starck, Obligations, p. 684, n. 81.
40/ G. Berlioz, Le contrat d*adhesion (Paris, 1973)» pp. 66ff.
4l/ Berlioz, Le contrat d*adhesion, pp. 73ff. See for ins­
tance Capitaine commandant le Neptume amethyste c . The Indem­
nity marine insurance company, D.S. 1974. Somm. 72 (C.A .
Rouen, 8 February 197^)*
42/ For instance : Giner c . Aero-Cargo (Trib. civ. Cusset,
To March 1949), Randoin c. Air France (Trib. civ. Grenoble,
11 February 1948") both reported at (1949) 3 R.F.D.A. 111.
The clause could not be enforced when negligence was esta­
blished, apart from cases of fautes nautiques which left the 
clause standing. The liability could be neither limited nor 
excluded in cases of dpi or faute lourde. See further on 
that point above pp.
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since the carrier was not allowed to exclude his liability 
completely. In 1957* the Warsaw regime was adopted for all 
forms of air transportation, domestic as well as international. 
This improved the situation of passengers on domestic flights. 
The limit was then doubled in 1963 when the Hague Protocol 
came into effect. All this explains why the limit never 
appeared outrageously low to courts or legal scholars. By 
contrast, as seen above, United States courts have echoed 
the strong feelings of public opinion which was violently 
critical of the Convention's limitation of the right to 
obtain full compensation for death or personal injuries-^/.
The combination of all these reasons explains why 
it appears very unlikely that French courts will adopt the 
attitude of the United States courts in relation to passen­
ger tickets.
Effect of the Hague Protocol, and the Guatemala City Protocol 
on the passenger ticket.
1.- The Hague Protocol.
The requirements of the original Article 3 of the
Warsaw Convention were altered by the Hague Protocol. The
new ticket only has to indicate whether a particular trip44/is governed by the Warsaw Convention — ' ; it must also 
contain a notice of the possible application of that Conven­
tion it is to be observed that the Protocol requires a
"notice" of the applicability of the Convention instead of
the previous "statement". In Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian
46/Pacific Airlines Ltd.— ' , the court of first instance pointed 
out this change of wording, which might secure slightly
43/ above p. 134.
44/ Article 3(1)a, h, of the Warsaw Convention as amended 
at The Hague, 1955*
45/ Article 3(l)c of the Warsaw Convention as amended at The 
Hague, 1955*
46/ 12 Avi. 17*197 (Sup. Ct. Montreal, 1971)» rev* d, 13 Avi. 
17,455 (Ct. App. Montreal, 197^)«
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better protection of the passenger*s rights. The Protocol*s
"notice" would have to be brought home more clearly than the
Convention*s "statement". But no real improvement in the
passenger’s situation is to be expected since, firstly, the
original requirement of a "statement" has already been read
as requiring an "adequate notice" by common law courts and,
secondly, the analysis of French courts is based on reasons
which are left untouched by the amendment to Article 3*
More significantly, the Protocol provides that
failure to give the notice, as well as failure to deliver
a ticket, shall cause the carrier to lose his rights to limit
his liability, There is now no obstacle preventing common law
courts from applying their normal requirement that notice of
limitation or exclusion of liability must be adequately given.
the reasons which had been listed by the court of first ins-
47/tance in Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. — u  to 
the effect that an inadequate notice could have no conse­
quence on the carrier’s liability have now disappeared. But 
this is no longer a matter of equating failure to give ade­
quate notice and non-delivery of the ticket, as was the case 
under the original Convention. It is now a question of assess­
ing whether the particulars listed in Article 3» or Article 4, 
or Article 8, have been properly given in the document of 
carriage under consideration, The problem of the content of 
documents of carriage is examined in Section Two.
2.- The Guatemala City Protocol.
The requirements of Article 3 were further altered 
by the Guatemala City Protocol. The new text opens the way 
for entirely new forms of tickets. A formal delivery of the
47/ 12 Avi. 17,191 (Sup. Ct. Montreal, 1971), rev’d in -part, 
13 Avi. 17,454 (Ct. App. Montreal, 1974).
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ticket is no longer required, nor need notice of liability
48 /limitations be given to the passenger — ' .
All these alterations are part of the ’’package deal"
49/adopted by the diplomatic Conference at Guatemala City —^  .
In exchange for much higher limits of liability — high enough 
to satisfy the travelling American public — the limits would 
be unbreakable, be it by bringing evidence of dol or wilful 
misconduct, or by establishing that no ticket had been de­
livered. All the judicial developments tending to equate 
failure to give adequate notice with failure to deliver a 
ticket would 'lose their purpose since in neither case could 
the liability limitations be any longer set aside.
Section Two. - Contents of the document of carriage .
Courts have examined three main problems in relation 
to the contents of transportation documents i (i) the exis­
tence of a statement — or notice — of the possible applica­
tion of the Convention, (ii) the indication of agreed stop­
ping places, and (iii) the description of goods which an air 
waybill must contain. It should be noted that the detailed 
technical provisions in (ii) and (iii) were deleted by the 
Hague Protocol. However, their study remains relevant since 
the original Warsaw principles still govern many international 
carriages and, in addition, the decided cases keep their value 
as illustrations of techniques of interpretation.
48/ Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention as amended at The 
Hague, 1955» and at Guatemala City, 1971.
49/ See further H. Caplan & A.W.G. Kean, "The Warsaw Conven­
tion and the Guatemala City Protocol", (1971) J. Bus. L. 210 ; 
A.W.G. Kean, "Strict Liability, Unbreakable Limits and the 
Warsaw Convention", (1970) 19 Int'l & Comp. L. Quat. 124 ;
R.H. Mankiewicz, "Warsaw Convention : the 1971 Protocol of 
Guatemala City", (1972) 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 335*
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A) A statement — or notice — of the 
application of the Convention.
We have seen above that the original Warsaw text 
provides no sanction for absence or irregularity of the 
statement in the passenger ticket. But it provides a dif­
ferent rule for the baggage check and the air waybill since 
failure to include the statement of the possible application 
of the Convention makes the liability limitations unavailable 
to the carrier . The Hague Protocol eliminated this dif­
ference. Failure to give notice in any of the transportation 
documents will thus prevent the application of the liability 
limitations contained in the amended Convention Because
of the small number of reported cases which are governed by 
the Hague Protocol, most of the cases to be examined deal 
with baggage and cargo under the unamended Convention.
The attitude of French courts.
The few decisions delivered by French courts only 
seem to require that : (i) a proper air waybill be delivered. 
Another transportation document established for administrative 
purposes will not do, even if it contains most of the infor­
mation found in an air waybill , and (ii) there must be a 
statement in the air waybill. There is no requirement as to 
how the statement must be made The purpose of these
two requirements is to ensure that the plaintiff can be 
notified of the application of the Convention. This is not 
possible if there is no air waybill, or if it does not contain 
the required statement.
50/ Article 4(4) for the baggage check, Article 9 for the 
air waybill.
51/ Article III of the Protocol.
52/ The American Casualty Cy of Reading c. Airnautic, (1964)
18 R . F. D~. A. 413 (Trib. comm, Seine, 20 December 1963) » af f1 d 
after substituting new grounds for the decision, (I965I 19 
R.F.D. A. (C. A. Paris, 19 December 1964) .
53/ Ste S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 49 
(C.A. Paris, 3 February 1971)*
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If the carrier has formally complied with the 
Convention’s requirement, i.e. if he has issued a baggage 
check or air waybill containing a statement that the Con­
vention may apply to the particular carriage, there is no 
need to consider the matter further.
Early attitudes of common law courts.
The early English case of Westminster Bank Ltd. v.54/Imperial Airways, Ltd.^ —7 adopted an approach very close to 
that of French courts. The only concern of the court was to 
see whether there had been formal compliance with the Con­
vention’s requirements. On the back of the air waybill, the 
statement read as follows :
" The general conditions of carriage of goods are 
applicable to both internal and international 
carriage. These general conditions are based upon 
the Convention of Warsaw of Oct. 12, 1929» in so 
far as concerns international carriage within the 
special meaning of the said Convention.”
The court ruled that "a statement that the carriage is sub­
ject to certain general conditions of carriage of goods, 
which general conditions are based upon the Convention, is 
not a statement that the carriage is subject to the rules 
relating to liability established by the Convention. "-55/ 
Thus, since the statement did not literally comply with 
Article 8(q), Imperial Airways could not limit its liability 
as provided in the Convention.
This attitude was abandoned in later cases. Formal 
compliance with the Convention is now not the issue. The 
question is to assess how the carrier complied with the 
requirements of the Convention. The problem appeared in 
relation to standard form contracts used for both interna­
tional and domestic carriage.
54/ 55 Lloyd’s Rep. 242 (K.B. 1936). 
55/ at p . 248.
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56/In Seth v. British Overseas Airv/ays Corporation 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
examined a statement that the carriage was subject to the 
Convention "unless such carriage is not 'international 
carriage' as defined by the Convention". This clause, 
argued the plaintiff, prevented the passenger from being 
categorically informed that his transportation was subject 
to the Convention. The court rejected the argument and 
found that the statement gave the passenger clear warning 
that the carrier claimed the right to limit its liability 
for the loss of checked baggage.
The same clause was similarly interpreted by the 
English Court of Appeal in Samuel Montagu v. Swiss Air
51/Transport in relation to cargo. Lord Denning, M.R.,
said that Article 8(q) should not be given so rigid an 
interpretation as to hamper the conduct of business 
he also relied on the American decision of Seth and empha­
sized the importance of a uniform interpretation to be given
59 /to identical clauses in international contracts .
The change in emphasis appears very clearly when 
one compares the cases of Westminster Bank and Samuel Mon­
tagu. In the former, the court dismissed as irrelevant the 
argument that the air waybill was a business document 
applicable to both internal and international carriage, and 
should therefore be construed liberally and in a commercial 
sense In the latter case, the court relied on the fact
that any interpretation other than its own would lead to 
great inconvenience in the conduct of business.
56/ 8 Avi. 17,252 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd, 8 Avi. 18,183 
Cist Cir. 1964).
12/ [1966] 1 All E.R. 814 (Ct. App. 1966).
58/ at p. 8l6. 59/ at p. 817.
60/ 55 Lloyd's Rep. 242 at p. 248.
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Announcing and following Lisi.
A third line of reasoning was inaugurated in The 
Flying Tiger Line Inc, v. The United States . The United 
States Court of Claims made the first step on the road which 
lead to the Lisi interpretation of the requirement of ade­
quate notice in Article 3 of the Convention. In The Flying 
Tiger case, the air waybill contained neither the names of 
the agreed stopping places, as required by Article 8(c) of
the Convention, nor the statement called for by Article 
62/8(q) — . The court agreed with the carrier that the parties 
were well av/are of the names of the agreed stopping places, 
and that to have inserted that information "would have been 
useless, and its omission should not affect the rights of 
the parties." -^-^But, on the question of the missing state­
ment, the court refused to consider that it had been made 
by mere reference to another document which expressly men­
tioned the application of the Warsaw Convention. The court 
stated :
" The statement called for by item (q) is given 
great importance by the provision of Article 9 
that if the carrier accepts goods without an 
agreement from the shipper that liability is 
limited, he is not entitled to the provisions 
of the Convention limiting liability. We think 
a shipper is entitled, under the Convention, 
to have his attention called, in understandable 
language, to this important waiver of what would, 
at least in this country, be his rights in the 
absence of the waiver." 64/
Thus the court drew a firm line between two items 
which must normally appear on the air waybill. Although 
the absence of both is in theory equally sanctioned by the 
unavailability of limitation of liability pursuant to
61/ 6 Avi. 17,291 (U.S. Ct. Claims 1959).
62/ In fact, there was not even a document labeled "air 
waybill" made out by the consignor. The carrier had only be 
given a Government bill of lading in the form prescribed by 
the Comptroller General.
63/ at p. 17,292. 64/ at p. 17,292.
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Article 9» no consequence was drawn from the absence of 
indication of the agreed stopping place, but failure to 
include the required statement in the air waybill was given 
its full effect.
The emphasis placed on the idea of fair warning to 
be given by the carrier foreshadowed the line of reasoning 
which was to be adopted in passenger cases. Since 1966 and
ii/the decision in Lisi v. Alitalia a number of cases
Some of them 
Other cases show
have been decided which are clearlv influenced by the Lisi66/ ---principles. They deal mainly with baggage — ' 
explicitly refer to the Lisi decision -^2/ 
their affiliation with Lisi because they revolve around the 
point of ascertaining whether the statement was legible 
The fact that one court may answer yes, and another no, is 
not significant since it depends on the particular facts
65/ 9 Avi. 18,120 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 9 Avi. 18,374 
T2d Cir. 1966).
66/ All the cases examining the point at any length deal 
with luggage. In Canada : Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Air­
lines, Ltd., 12 Avi. 17,191 (Sup. Ct. Montreal, 1971), rev*d 
in part, 13 Avi. 17,454 (Ct. App. Montreal, 1974) ; Montreal 
Trust Co. v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 Avi.17,197 
(sup. Ct. Montreal, 1971), rev'd, 13 Avi. 17,456 (Ct. App. 
Montreal, 1974). In the United States : Stolk v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France, 10 Avi. 18,247 (N.YW Sup. Ct. 1969) ; 
Parker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 731 
(Ct. App. Texas 1969)•
The two cargo cases are only short decisions denying 
motion for summary judgment : Anglo-American Hides Co. Inc. 
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 11 Avi. 17,148 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct". 1969) ; Woods, Donegan & Co. Inc, v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 10 Avi. 17,918 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19^8).
67/ Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., above n. 66 ; 
Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., above 
nü §6> ; Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, above. n .
66.
68/ Parker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., above n. 66 ; 
Anglo-American Hides Co. Inc, v. Pan American World Airways, 
Inc., above n. 66 ; Woods, Donegan &.Co, Inc, v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., above n. 66.
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of the case. The main thing is that in both instances the 
vital question is put in the same terms, i.e. did the 
shipper — or the passenger in relation to his luggage — 
have his attention drawn in understandable language to the 
limitations on the carrier’s liability ? As in passenger 
cases, the requirement of adequate notice is limited to 
monetary limitations of liability
The "constructive notice" approach.
There is yet another line of decisions in relation 
to cargo and luggage. It illustrates the influence of a 
special feature of the organization of air transportation 
in the United States. In order to operate in the United 
States, all air carriers — domestic and foreign alike —
70/must file their tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Boards— '
If a tariff is accepted by the C.A.B., it governs the 
relationship between the carrier and the passenger/shipper. 
The tariffs filed with the C.A.B. contain a number of rules 
very similar to the rules laid down in the Warsaw Convention. 
For instance, the loss of baggage or cargo must be notified 
in writing to the carrier within a definite period, as in 
Article 26 of the Convention, or the amount of liability 
is limited to a certain sum as in Article 22 of the Con­
vention. However, no tariff is allowed to include a limi­
tation on the liability of the carrier for wrongful death 
or personal injury in cases of domestic carriage . It is 
well settled that the carrier does not have to give actual 
notice of the provisions of its tariff to passengers or 
shippers. The filing of the tariff with the C.A.B. consti­
tutes "constructive notice"of its provisions to passengers
69/ Robert v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 Avi.17,73^ 
Tn .Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term 1972), aff'd, 42 A.DT2d 929 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1973)«
70/ Hereinafter referred to as C.A.B.
71/ This would violate the prohibition against such clauses 
which exists in many American States. See above p. 81-82.
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and shippers 71/
Attempts to reconcile the various approaches.
There seems to be a complete antinomy between the
"constructive notice" approach and the "adequate notice"
approach that we have previously examined. The first manner
in which the two approaches can be reconciled is to consider
that the "adequate notice" approach is applicable to Warsaw
cases, and the "constructive notice" approach to all other
73/cases. Thus, in Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air France 
— a baggage case — the New York Supreme Court rejected any 
analogy between the transportation of baggage governed by 
the Warsaw Convention and similar carriage governed by a 
filed tariff. The statement concerning the limitation of 
liability in relation to the baggage was printed in minis­
cule type and consequently did not constitute adequate 
notice. Air France argued that even if the limitation of 
liability of the Convention could not apply because of 
defective notice, the tariff provisions — filed with the 
C.A.B. — v/ould apply. The carrier argued that, by appli­
cation of the normal rules governing the applicability of 
tariff provisions, the passenger had constructive notice
72/ Herman v. Northwest Airlines, 222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955) ; 
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. I89 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); 
Goldstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18,342 (E.D. Pa 
1972) ; Schiff v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 12 Avi. 17,227 
(D.Mass. 1971) ; Mao v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 310 F. Supp.
844 (S.D. N.Y. I97ÖI ; Sechler v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
12 Avi. 18,185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) ; Aetna Insurance Co. 
v. Bor-Air Freight Co. Inc., 12 Avi. 17,725 (N.Y. City Ct. 
I972") . In Robert v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. , 12 Avi. 
17,73^ (N.Y3 Sup. Ct. App. Term 1972), the court explained: 
"the fact that this tariff rule was printed in virtually 
invisible type on the plane ticket is immaterial, since the 
filing with the board of the tariff containing that rule 
constituted constructive notice, whether or not the passen­
ger knew of the existence of the rule" at p. 17,73 *^
23/ 10 Avi. 18,247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)-
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of its tariff rules which followed the Warsaw Convention, 
particularly in relation to the limitation of liability.
This argument was rejected by the court because it would 
have negated Article 4(4) of the Convention. The rules 
normally applicable to carriage governed by tariffs were 
inapplicable when the flight was covered by the Warsaw 
Convention which, according to the court, superseded the 
tariff. Similar reasoning was used in Sofranski v. K.L.M. 
Royal Dutch Airlines 1— ' . Conversely, in Sechler v, Trans 
World Airlines , a California court refused to apply 
the adequate notice requirement developed in Warsaw cases 
to a domestic carriage of luggage and held that the air 
carrier's liability may be limited if the tariff rules 
approved by the C.A.B. are complied with, "whether or not 
the limitations are embodied in the transportation documents 
and whether or not the passengers or shippers are aware of 
the tariff." However, despite these cases, it is
submitted that there is not a complete coincidence between :
(i) Warsaw cases and cases requiring adequate notice, and
(ii) non-Warsaw cases and cases where constructive notice 
is sufficient.
The New York Supreme Court has rejected the distinc­
tion between Warsaw and non-Warsaw cases as delineating the 
scope of the adequate notice requirement in relation to 
cargo. In Crosby & Co. Inc, v. Compagnie Nationale Air 
France a shipment of horsemeat was carried from New
York to Toulouse. On arrival, the meat was in bad condition 
and the shipper claimed that the carrier was liable for the 
total value of the cargo. The carrier's defences were based
24/ 12 Avi. 17,26? (N.Y. City Ct. 1971).
25/ 12 Avi. 18,185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
26/ at p. 18,186.
77/ 12 Avi. 17,963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 42 A.D.2d 
1050 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div, 1973).
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on the Warsaw provisions, and on the terms and conditions 
of the air waybill. These terms and conditions were made 
binding by the carrier’s tariff, which had been regularly 
filed v/ith the C.A.B. Although this was a Warsaw case, the 
court did not consider that the applicable rule as to notice 
was different from that in carriage governed by tariffs :
" The rule is well established that filed tariffs 
constitute the contract of carriage between the 
parties and govern the rights and liabilities 
arising therefrom . . .
The plaintiff had constructive notice of the 
regulations and limitations in Air France’s 
tariff . . ."28/
On the basis that the conditions of carriage as set forth
on each air waybill were made binding by the tariffs, the
court ruled that "the plaintiff had constructive notice of
79/these conditions as a matter of law." -L^ /
In applying the constructive notice approach in a 
cargo case governed by the Warsaw Convention, the court 
appears to follow a long tradition in American courts of 
treating cargo cases very differently from passenger cases. 
While there is no possible limitation on liability for 
wrongful death or bodily injury, limitations of liability 
for the carriage of cargo are traditionally included in 
the contract of carriage and courts give them their full 
effect Ql/. The principles applicable in cargo cases were 
explained by the United States Supreme Court in Southeastern 
Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co :
" the carrier is entitled to base rates upon value 
and . . . its compensation should bear a reasonable
relation to the risks and responsibility assumed.
. . . The broad purpose of the Federal act is to
compel the establishment of reasonable rates and 
to provide for their uniform application . . .The 
liability in this instance is thus governed by the
28/ at 12 Avi. 17,966. 21/  at P- 17.967.
80/ Williston, On Contracts, sections 1116 and 1098.
81/ 299 U.S. 28 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1936). See also American 
Synthetic Rubber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 
422 F .2d 462 (6th Cir. 1970).
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" provisions of the applicable tariff and no 
recovery could be had in excess of the amount 
permitted by its terms."82/
Conversely, the specificity of passenger cases vis- 
a-vis all other liabilitv cases was underlined in Boryk v. 
Aerolineas Argentinas — K  which was governed by the Warsaw 
Convention. After having stated that notice of the limita­
tion of liability in the passenger ticket must not only be 
in writing, but also conspicuous, the court added :
" We decidedly do not deal here with such tertiary 
matters as the placement of baggage or lost 
articles — relatively unimportant by comparison, 
unpredictable or non-recurring from day to day, 
and which may be adequately served by oral notice 
alone. Such comparatively minor instances clearly 
are quite unlike the monumental question of the 
financial destiny of a family left virtually un- 
;" 1 ' " ' ’ rovisions absent
The reasoning of the court was particularly suited to deny 
any limitation of liability for cases of wrongful death and 
personal injury.
treated differently from passenger cases because :(i) as 
opposed to passenger cases, a comparison between the Con­
vention’s provisions and municipal law does not create the 
impression that the Convention is inequitable and that its 
scope must be restricted as far as possible, and (ii) limi­
tation of liability in relation to cargo does not appear as 
a privilege that a contracting party unilateraly secures 
for itself by way of a standard form contract. It is rather 
part of a commercial bargain which established a balance 
between the rates charged and the risks and responsibility 
assumed.
Thus, it is not surprising that cargo cases are
82/ at pp. 29-3°•
82/ 11 Avi. 18,041 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). 
84/ at p. 18,043.
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Given this background, Crosby appears simply to be 
an example of carriage of cargo governed by the Warsaw Con­
vention and considered from the viewpoint normally adopted 
in cargo cases.
The carriage of baggage does not offer a similar 
contrast to either passenger or cargo cases. On the con­
trary, it has common features with each of them. As in 
cargo cases, the public policy element prohibiting the 
limitation of damages for death and personal injury is 
lacking. Moreover, limiting liability in relation to luggage 
and cargo is common practice in domestic law cases. There­
fore, it cannot be argued that the limitation of liability 
for baggage is so unusual that the passenger’s attention 
has to be specially drawn to it. However, in relation to 
baggage as well as in relation to personal injury and 
wrongful death, it can be said that individual passengers 
on international flights need special protection because 
"for the average passenger, the exigencies of the occasion 
of taking an international flight . . . contrast sharply
with the urgent need to know, understand and reflect upon 
the full meaning and impact of the limitation provisions 
of the Warsaw Convention."
The line separating cases requiring adequate notice 
from those where constructive notice is sufficient is not 
immediately apparent. Rules developed for carriage of pas­
sengers governed by the Warsaw Convention have somewhat 
influenced the reasoning of domestic carriage cases ; con­
versely, well-settled rules of domestic carriage have 
influenced Warsaw cases it seems however that the
85/ Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 11 Avi. 18,04l (S.D. N.Y. 
1971), at p. 18,043.
86/ The interaction between the various rules in illustrated 
in Robert v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 12 Avi.17>73^ 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term 1972) which was a case of domestic 
carriage where the court used precedents decided under the 
Warsaw Convention to support its reasoning.
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latest cases support the following propositions :
- in passenger cases, the monetary limitation of liability
- and it alone — must be adequately notified. This require­
ment concerns only Warsaw cases since contractual limita­
tions on damages for death or personal injuries are prohi­
bited by American courts ;
- in baggage cases, adequate notice of the monetary limita­
tion — and it alone — must be given when the carriage is 
governed by the Warsaw Convention. But for domestic carriage, 
all limitations contained in the carrier's tariffs are deemed 
to be known by the passenger through constructive notice ;
- in cargo cases, constructive notice of the tariff's 
provisions in general, including the monetary limitation, 
is sufficient.
Comparison with other countries.
It is hard to forecast whether the same analysis 
will apply in other common law countries. The two Canadian 
cases dealing with the notice issue require "adequate 
notice" of limitation of liability in relation to passengers 
and luggage ^-/ % Whether the scope of this requirement will 
be limited to monetary limitation is uncertain. However, 
several observations can be made :
(i) liability limitations in relation to cargo are quite 
common. Their commercial nature renders courts more liberal 
in their appreciation of the enforceability of such clauses. 
Frequently, the parties will know, or be assumed to know, 
all the terms and conditions of the contract from previous 
dealings and it will not be necessary to give proper notice
87/ Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. 12 Avi. 
17,191 (Sup. Ct. Montreal,I971), rev'd in part, 13 Avi. 
17,45^ (Ct. App. Montreal, 197*0 ; Montreal Trust Co. v. 
Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 Avi. 17", 197 (Sup. Ct. 
M 0ntreal, 1971), rev'd, 13 Avi. 17.^56 (Ct. App. Montreal,
197*0 .
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in each contract — ' .
(ii) a distinction similar to the one described above, 
between cases of liability for personal injury and all 
other cases, was made in the English case of Thornton v.
Shoe Lane Parking Ltd. ^2/ The Court of Appeal held that 
the nature of an exemption clause must be taken into ac­
count in deciding what must be done to bring the clause to 
the notice of the other party 22/, The clause purported to 
exclude liability for personal injuries to customers when 
their cars were in the car park. Megaw, L.J., pointed out 
that there had not been adequate notice because the exemp­
tion clause (a) was not of the knind that one could reason­
ably expect in that particular type of contract, and (b) 
restricted statutory rights given by the Occupiers Liability 
Act 1957- It the same attitude were adopted in cases governed 
by the Warsaw Convention, the result would be similar to 
that achieved in the United States. The probability of 
obtaining a similar interpretation is increased by the 
willingness of English courts, at least in cargo cases, to 
try to interpret the Convention in accordance with that 
prevailing in the United States 2i/§
Finally, the fundamental difference betv/een common 
law courts and French courts must be underlined. French 
courts require only a formal compliance with the Convention’s 
requirements. It is only in some doctrinal writings that
88/ above pp. I3O-I3I.
82/ [1971] 2 Q.B. 163 (Ct. App. 1970).
90/ at pp. 172-173» uer Megan L.J. ; at p. 17^ per Sir 
Gordon Willmer.
91/ as was made clear in Corocraft v. Pan American Airways, 
Inc . [1968] 2 All E.R. 1059 (Q ■ B.' I9&8) , rev'd, i 1969 ! 1 
All E.R. 82 (Ct. App. 1968), reported together at [I969I 
1 Q.B. 6l6. The same attitude was adopted in Samuel Montagu 
& Co. Ltd, v. Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. [1966] 2 Q.B.
306 (Ct. App. 1966).
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ideas resembling the attitude of American courts can be 
found 22/.
25/
B) Indication of the agreed stopping places 
(Articles 3(°) and 8(c).)
The common feature of all the cases dealing with 
this requirement is the absence of any formalism. In several 
cases, the transportation documents did not expressly men­
tion the agreed stopping places but merely referred to the 
timetables of the carrier. It was held by courts in the 
United Kingdom 22/1 France 2h/1 and the United States 
that such reference complied with the Convention. It is to 
be observed that the same reasoning was applied in cargo 
cases 2&/ f where failure to comply is normally sanctioned 
by unlimited liability, and in passenger cases 22/1 where 
the irregularity of the ticket does not affect the carrier*s 
liability.
92/ It has been advocated that exclusion or limitation 
clauses in relation to liability for personal injury or 
wtongful death should be unenforceable because they would 
be contrary to the principle of integrite du corps humain 
(see above p. 88 n. 56)« This argument was, however, re­
jected by the Cour de Cassation in MachS c. Air France (1970) 
24 R.F.D.A. 311 (Cass. civ. Ire, 3 June 1970). See further 
B. Starck, "Observations sur le rlgime juridique des clauses 
de non-responsabilit§ ou limitatives de responsabilite",
D.S. 1974, Chr. 157 at p. l6l. Even if the argument were 
adopted, a striking difference in technique would subsist : 
the pragmatism of the common law as opposed to the enforce­
ment of an abstract principle by the civil law.
93/ Rotterdamsche Bank N.V. v, British Overseas Airways 
Corporation, [_1953] 1~A11 E.R. 675 (Q.B. 1953) •
94/ Caisse Regionale de Sgcurit6 Sociale pour le Sud-Est c. 
Della Roma, J.C.P. 1963.11.12997» note P. Chauveau (Cass, 
civ. soc. l6 November 1961).
95/ Kraus v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 2 Avi. 15,017 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949)."
96/ Rotterdamsche Bank, above n. 93 » Kraus, above n. 95*
97/ Caisse Regionale, above n. 9^«
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Two American courts have adopted a more drastic 
approach. They refused to draw any consequence from the 
absence of an indication of agreed stopping places on the 
air waybill, even though there was no reference to the 
carriers timetables or other document. These cases do not 
simply construe Article 8(c) in a very liberal way. They 
disregard its terms : a complete failure to comply with 
its requirement does not achieved the result normally 
required by Article 9» i.e. unlimited liability. In order'
to do that, the case of American Smelting and Refining Co.907v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. uL—/ ruled that the purpose 
of Article 8(c) it "to put the passenger or consignee on 
notice of the international character of the flight and 
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention where the places 
of departure and destination do not themselves indicate 
such facts" 22/ m since the international character of the 
flight was readily apparent on the face of the air waybill, 
the purpose of Article 8(c) was achieved. In Flying Tiger 
Line, Inc, v. The United States /, the court simply 
assumed that the plaintiff was right in arguing that the 
parties were well aware of the names of the agreed stop­
ping places and that "to have inserted it would have been 
useless, and its omission should not affect the rights of 
the parties." ^22/
C) Description of the goods in the air waybill.
The official French text of Article 8(i) requires 
that the air waybill contain :"le poids, la quantity, le 
volume ou les dimensions de la marchandise." The English
98/ 4 Avi. 17,413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff«d, 285 A.D.1119 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1954), aff«d, 4 Avi. 18,234 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1958).
99/ at 4 Avi. p. 17,4l4. Emphasis placed by the court.
100/ 6 Avi. 17,291 (U.S. Ct. Claims 1959)•
101/ at p. 17,292.
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translation used in the United States reads : "the weight, 
the quantity, the volume, or dimensions of the goods" %
But the translation contained in the Schedule of the United 
Kingdom Carriage by Air Act 1932 reads : "the weight, the 
quantity and the volume or dimensions of the goods"(emphasis 
added) -^577 The discrepancy between the official text and 
its literal translation, and the text of the Schedule gave 
rise to difficulties which were examined in Corocraft Ltd. 
v. Pan American Airways, Inc. — ^ . The air waybill contained 
the weight of a carton containing topaz jewelry, but it did 
not give its volume or dimensions. Failure to comply with 
Article 8(i) deprives the carrier of his right to exclude or 
limit his liability —Q-^ . The issue was to determine whether 
Article 8(i) had been complied with. The text of the Schedule 
requires that the weight and the quantity of the goods both 
be given and, additionally, either the volume or dimensions 
of the goods. But, looking at the official French text which 
does not have the equivalent of and between the "volume" and 
the "dimensions", it becomes doubtful whether Article 8(i) 
literally requires three items out of four, or only one out 
of four. The Court of Appeal gave the ambiguous French text 
priority over the clear English text, and held that the 
article did not require that the air waybill "should state 
every particular, no matter how useless, or irrelevant. It 
only requires those particulars to be stated so far as they 
are necessary or useful for the purpose in hand." It
followed that Article 8(i) had been complied with, and the 
liability of the carrier was limited in accordance with the 
Convention.
102/ The text is contained in a proclamation by the President 
of the United States dated October 29, 1934*
103/ An identical wording was used in the First Schedule to 
the Australian Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959- 
1973» and to the Canadian Carriage by Air Act.
104/ [1968] 2 All E.R. 1059 (Q.B. 1968), rev* d, [1969] 1 
All E.R. 82 (Ct. App. 1968).
105/ pursuant to Article 9»
106/ [1969] 1 All E.R. 82 at p. 89, per Lord Denning, M.R.
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The decision is particularly interesting for its 
emphasis on general problems of interpretation of interna­
tional conventions. In order to make the French text prevail, 
the Court of Appeal first pointed out that it was plainly 
the intention of all the parties to the Convention that the 
French text should be the only authorized text, and that it 
was also plainly the intention of the English Parliament to 
give effect to that French text by making an exact transla­
tion of it into English. But the translator did not repro­
duce the French text faithfully, with all its defects and 
ambiguities. Instead, he ’’produced certainty where there was 
ambiguity : and clarity where there was obscurity "i£Z/ ,
The intention of Parliament should be followed, and the 
French text prevail. Another reason for adopting the French 
text was that English courts have the duty to construe their 
legislation so as to be in conformity with international law 
and not in conflict with it and the Warsaw Convention itself 
gives authority to the French text, and to the French text 
alone , Finally, the court noted that the French text
also prevailed in the United States ^ 2/ ,
These reasons, however, should not hide the unusual 
approach adopted by the court. The applicable law was the 
Carriage by Air Act 1932 which contains only an English
translation of the treaty. But, despite the rule that an 
international treaty, as such, cannot be enforced in an 
English court, and that its provisions acquire force of law 
only insofar as they are enacted by Parliament, the court 
disregarded the parliamentary enactment and based its rea­
soning on the text of the Convention itself. It should be 
observed that such an attitude would have been unquestionable
107/ at p . 86.
109/ at p. 87.
110/ 22 & 23 Geo.5 o. 36.
108/ at p. 87.
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under the Carriage by Air Act 1961 which sets out the
French text in Part II of Schedule I and provides that if
there is any inconsistency between the English and the112/French texts, the text in French shall prevail --- .
As to the interpretation of the French text itself, 
the court rejected what was seen as the literal interpreta­
tion of Article 8(i) which simply required that any one
113/out of the four particulars be given — “  . After pointing
out that the weight is usually of primary importance in
commercial practice, Lord Denning, M.R., said :
" Seeing that the French text is ambiguous and 
uncertain, I should have thought that it should 
be interpreted so as to make good sense amongst 
commercial men. This is how I would interpret 
it: the sender should give the weight whenever 
that is appropriate (as it usually is). He need 
not give the volume or dimensions except when 
it is necessary or useful so to do." 114/
Comparison.
A liberal interpretation is the common feature of 
all cases dealing with the technical requirements of trans­
portation documents. Such a common attitude is rare enough 
to be emphasized. The similarity between English and Amer­
ican decisions goes much further than the general attitude 
of liberal interpretation. Having to apply a particular 
requirement, the courts examine whether that requirement 
is necessary or useful, having regard to the facts of the 
case, before enforcing any sanction for failure to comply
111/ 9 & 10 Eliz.2 c. 27.
112/ Section 1(2) of the Act.
113/ The literal meaning of Article 8(i) in French is open 
to discussion. See the report of the examination-in-chief 
and cross-examination of two French lawyers in the lower 
court [1968] 2 All E.R. 1059« For a "literal" interpreta­
tion identical to what it was assumed to be by the Court, 
of Appeal, see E. du Pontavice, Chronique de droit a£rien, 
(1969) 22 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com. p. 312, No. 4l. But see, 
contra,R. Mankieweicz, "La Convention de Varsovie et le 
Droit Compart" in (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 136.
114/ at p. 88.
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with that requirement Looking for the purpose of a
legal text is a well-known rule of interpretation in common 
law courts The danger is that, in interpreting an
international treaty, the courts of several jurisdictions 
can (i) disagree on the very utilization of the purpose as 
a means of interpretation, and (ii) disagree on what precise­
ly is the purpose of a particular provision.
The emphasis put on the commercial character of cargo 
cases influences the general attitude of the courts towards 
a greater liberalism, because of the necessary rapidity and 
informality which normally characterize commercial relation­
ships. There is also an incentive for achieving uniform 
solutions in the United States and in the United Kingdom
because of the importance of trade between these two coun- 
117/tries -- u  . This attitude is not new. It regularly appears
in the related field of maritime law ,
But one should not marvel too much over the desire
to achieve uniformity which is proclaimed in the English 
119 /decisions — 27 . English courts do not look for universal 
uniformity, but for uniformity with the analyses adopted in 
United States courts. In the same decision claiming that 
the Convention "should be given the same meaning throughout
115/ In the United States : Flying Tiger Line, Inc, v. The 
United States, 6 A v i . 17,291 (Ct. Claims 1959) ; American 
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
4 A v i . 17,413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). In the United Kingdom, 
Corocraft Ltd, v. Pan American Airways, Inc., [19681 2 All. 
E.R. 1059 (Q . B~." 19 6 8) , rev * d 7 Fl 9o 91 1 All E.R. 82 (Ct. App . 
1968).
116/ Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed. Lon­
don, 1969), p p • 45ff, 109ff.
117/ Corocraft, [1969] 1 All E.R. 82 at p. 89.
118/ This will appear for instance in relation to stevedores* 
liability, below pp. 422ff.
119/ Corocraft, [I969I 1 All E.R. 82 at pp. 88 and 89.
Samuel M ontagu & Co. Ltd, v. Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd., 
L'l962y'l All E.R. 814 (Ct. App. 1966).
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all the countries who were parties to it" 1 the Court
of Appeal discarded no less than three other decisions, one
121/ 122/ by a Swiss court ---' , and two by courts of Malaysia --^ .
Several reasons may be advanced to explain the rejection of 
these decisions. One is that there is a great deal in common 
between the law of the United States and the law of the 
United Kingdom. Because of a common historical background, 
a particular solution can be easily understood, and trans­
planted from one country to the other. This is also true 
for countries such as Australia and Canada. Another reason 
is also valid for all these countries : the courts of one 
country do not question the authority of the courts of the 
others ^2/.
120/ Corocraft. [1969] 1 All E.R. 82 at p. 87.
121/ Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Co. Ltd, v . 
Scandinavian Airlines System, 4 March 1966, Zurich High 
Court, Second Civil Chamber, referred to in Corocraft,
[1969] 1 All E.R. 82 at p. 8?.
122/ Shiro (China), Ltd, v. Thai Airways International,Ltd. 
[1967] 2 M.L.J. 91; The Borneo Co. Ltd, v. Braathens South 
American & F.E. Air Transport A.S., (1966) 26 M.L.J. 200.
123/A lack of confidence in the courts of some countries is 
not a new feature in international relations. It was apparent 
at the Warsaw Conference in 1929* It was the main reason 
for the adoption of the jurisdictional provision in Article 
28 which was devised so as to make sure that in most cases, 
it would be the courts of "civilized" countries which would 
have jurisdiction. See Ilerne Conference Internationale, 
pp. 77ff* Almost fifty years later, there is still a basic 
mistrust in the courts of some other countries, although 
these countries are not necessarily the same as in 1929.
See the first opinion of Judge Bua in Burdell v. Canadian 
Pacific Airlines, Ltd, 10 Avi. 18,151 (opinion" withdrawn.
The definitive decision appears at 11 Avi. 17,351)* See 
also L.S. Kreindler, "A plaintiff's view of Montreal",
(1967) 33 J* Air L. & Com. 528 where the author appears . 
to assume that justice can properly be done only by res­
pecting the principles of American law (at p. 530)•
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Section 3.- Penalty for non-compliance with the Convention’s 
requirements as to the documents of carriage.
Article 3(2) — for non-delivery of passenger 
tickets — Articles 4(4) and 9 — for non-delivery and 
defectiveness of the baggage check and the air waybill — 
provide that the air carrier :
" shall not be entitled to avail himself of those 
provisions of this Convention which exclude or 
limit his liability."
In the vast majority of cases, this sentence has 
been read as meaning that all the provisions of the Conven­
tion which do not exclude or limit the carrier’s liability 
remain applicable . Specifically, Articles 17, 18, and
19» which place a presumption of liability on the carrier, 
remain applicable. Since the carrier cannot rebut this
124/ A number of cases have rejected attempts by plaintiffs 
to set the whole Convention aside when there has been a 
violation of the provisions relating to the documents of 
carriage, or when there has been wilful misconduct — the 
penalty for wilful misconduct is identical to that contained 
in Articles 3(2), 4(4), and 9* See for instance :
- in the United States : Glassman v. The Flying Tiger Line, 
Inc., 9 Avi. 18,295 (N.D. Cal. 1966) ; Jaffee v. British 
Overseas Airways Corn., 10 Avi. 17,913 (N • Y* City Ct. 1968).
- in England : Westminster Bank Ltd, v. Imperial Airways, 
Ltd., 55 Lloyd’s Rep. 242 (K .B . 1935).
- in France : A.C. de Sitif c. Mazzuca, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A.
72 (C.A. Paris, 19 December 1967) ; Coroyer c. U .T,A .,
(1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 417 (T.G.I. Paris, 10 October 1969)*
- in Switzerland : Style c.^Braun, (1961) 24 R.G.A. 375i 
note J. Sundberg (Trib. Geneve, 9 December 1958).
Two isolated cases have adopted a different interpreta­
tion. In France, in The American Casualty Cy of Reading c. 
Airnautic, (1964) 18 R.F.D.A. 413 (Trib.* Comm. Seine, 20 
December 1963)» aff’d(after substituting new grounds for 
decision) (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 346 (C.A. Paris, 19 December 
1964), the court simply stated that failure to deliver a 
proper air waybill made the Convention "inapplicable", which 
seems to be in complete contradiction with the text of Ar­
ticle 9 of the Convention (19 R.F.D.A. 3^6 at p. 3^9)- In 
the United States, the case of Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, 
Inc., 9 Avi. 18,319 (3nd Cir. 1966) held that if Article 
22(l) is set aside, Article 17 cannot provide a regime by 
itself (at p. 18,323). -The plaintiff has to go back to the 
normal domestic rule, i.e. he has to establish negligence
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presumption or limit his liability, the result is absolute 
and unlimited liability .
It is not always easy to identify the provisions 
excluding or limiting liability. It is clear that Article 
22, which limits the sum for which the carrier is liable, 
Article 20, which allows the carrier to establish due 
diligence, and Article 21, which enables the carrier to 
prove the plaintiff's contributory negligence, are included 
among the provisions which exclude or limit the carrier's 
liability. A number of cases have considered whether other 
articles of the Convention were to be similarly classified.
Several early cases examined whether Article 29, 
which provides for a two-year time limitation for filing 
a suit against an air carrier, was a provision excluding 
or limiting liability. These were cases of wilful miscon­
duct, covered by Article 25 which provides the same sanc­
tion as Articles 3(2), 4(4), and 9» i.e. the unavailability
1 *2 /of the provisions which exclude or limit liability ---' . In
all but an isolated French decision — t courts in the 
United States and France refused to consider Article 29 as
124/(cont'd) on the part of the carrier. This holding seems 
heavily influenced by the reluctance of the court to make 
the carrier absolutely liable for the whole damage in the 
absence of any indication as to the cause of the accident.
125/ The following cases were particularly clear in that 
sense : Glassman v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 9 Avi.
18,295 (N .d". Cal”! 1966) ; Westminster Bank Ltd, v. Imperial 
Airways Ltd., 55 Lloyd's Rep". 242 (kVb . 193*6) ; Style c. 
Braun, (1961) 24 R.G.A. 375» note J. Sundberg (Trib"! Geneve, 
9 December 1958)*
126/ Article 25(1) provides :"The carrier shall not be 
entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this Conven­
tion which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage 
is caused by his wilful misconduct, or by such default on 
his part as, in accordance with the law of the Court seized 
of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful mis­
conduct.“
127/ Ministere Public c. Billet (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 408, 
note E. du Pontavice (C.A . Paris, 25 June 1965)» cassation 
(on other grounds) sub nom.,Cie U.T.A., dame Lagarrigue, 
(1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 81, note E. Georgiades (Cass. crim. 3 
December 1969)•
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a provision excluding or limiting liability 128/
The characterization technique was explicit in 
Bergman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. — '^ * The 
Appelate Division of the New York Supreme Court listed 
three reasons why Article 29 did not exclude or limit 
liability : (i) a statute of limitations never limits 
liability, nor does it exclude it ; such a statute renders 
the existing liability unenforceable, (ii) the internal 
evidence of the Convention indicates that, in mentioning 
a limitation on liability, the natural reference is to 
the monetary limitations, and (iii) whenever the question 
of what was meant by the language was being considered, 
the limitation referred to was understood to be the limi­
tation on liability provided for in Article 22
A similar result was achieved in Molitch v. Irish
131/International Airlines — but the reasoning was very 
different. It seems that both the lower court and the Court 
of Appeals assumed that the provisions excluding or limit­
ing liability were identical to the provisions which must,
according to the reasoning in the Lisi case, be adequately
132/notified to the passenger — 7 . The District Court found 
that the two-year limitation was one of these provisions 
which excluded or limited liability and that it has "a 
serious enough impact on a passenger*s legal rights vis-a- 
vis an air carrier to require adequate prior notice of its
128/ In the United States : Bapes v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 8 Avi. 17,355 (D. 111. 1962) ; Wanderer v. Sabena, 
19%9 U.S. Av. R. 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Jaffee v. Bri­
tish Overseas Airways Corp., 10 Avi. 17,913 (N.Y. City Ct. 
1968). In France : A.C. de Setif c. Mazzuca, (1968) 22 
R.F.D.A. 72 (C.A. Paris, 19 December 1967) ; Coroyer c.
U .T.A ., (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 417 (T.G.I. Paris, 10 October
19Ö9)'.
129/ 10 Avi. 18,363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
130/ The court was mainly referring to discussions between 
delegates at the Hague Conference in 1955 (at p. 18,364).
131/ 11 Avi. 17,396 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), rev* d, 11 Avi. 17,893 
T2d Cir. 1970) .
132/ above p. 129.
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operation." — ^  The decision v/as reversed by the Court of 
Appeals which held that the adequate notice requirement 
introduced by the Lisi decision could not be extended to 
the statute of limitations which was not a provision which 
excludes or limits liability within the meaning of Article
3(2) . 4k/
In Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines. Ltd. 
the court first opinion emphasized that the "venue provi­
sions" of Article 28 did, "in fact and realistically", 
exclude or limit the carrier*s liability because the plain­
tiffs, who were American and Illinois citizens were restric­
ted to the institution of suits in Singapore, Hong Kong or 
Canada But, a few months later, the same court with­
drew its first opinion and delivered another judgment. The 
same result was achieved by both decisions, i.e. the court 
had jurisdiction and the air carrier’s liability was unli­
mited, but the definitive judgment does not mention the 
issue of whether Article 28 excludes or limits liability.
It follows that the first opinion of the court cannot be 
regarded as authoritative.
The only case which can be relied upon in relation
187 /to Article 28 is Biggs v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane— zxy.
The court held that Article 28 was not one of the provisions 
limiting or excluding liability but did not indicate its 
reasons. It was held that even if there had been a failure 
to deliver a proper ticket to the passenger, Article 3(2) 
would not "nullify the provisions of the Convention as to 
forum jurisdiction or otherwise but simply bar the invoca­
tion by the carrier of the provisions limiting his liabili­
ty*" Since Article 28 is not affected by the application
133/ at p. 17,398. 134/ at p. 17,894.
135/ 10 Avi. 18,151 (111. Cook Co. 1968), withdrawn and 
replaced by 11 Avi. 17,351 (111. Cook Co. 1969)*
136/ at 10 Avi. 18,152 137/10 Avi. 18,354(ED NY 1969)
138/ at p. 18,356.
133/
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of Article 3(2)» it is evidently not one of the provisions
limiting or excluding liability.
Several cases dealt with Article 26(2) which provides
that in case of damage to baggage or goods,
" the person entitled to delivery must complain 
to the carrier forthwith after the discovery 
of the damage, and, at the latest, within 
three days from the date of receipt in the 
case of luggage and seven days from the date 
of receipt in the case of goods. In the case 
of delay the complaint must be made at the 
latest within fourteen days from the date on 
which the luggage or goods have been placed 
at his disposal."
Article 26(3) requires that every complaint be made in
writing, and Article 26(4) adds :
" Failing complaint within the times aforesaid, 
no action shall lie against the carrier, save 
in the case of fraud on his part." 12Q/In Sofranski v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines — 227 , 
the court held that the requirement of a timely notice 
of claim "certainly falls within the category of provi­
sions which exclude or limit liability. Accordingly, I
hold that it must be brought home to the passenger in
l40 /advance or it will be deemed abandoned." --- ' Here again,
the provisions which exclude or limit liability were 
equated to the provisions which have to be adequately 
notified.
An opposite result was obtained in Robert v. Panl4l/American World Airways, Inc. --- ' , which was a domestic
case where the court's reasoning relied heavily on prece­
dents governed by the Warsaw Convention. As in Sofranski,the 
rules which had to be adequately notified and the rules 
which excluded or limited liability were assumed to be 
identical. But, as opposed to Sofranski, the court in
139/ 12 Avi. 17,267 
l4o/ at p. 17,268. 
141/ 12 Avi. 17,73^
(N.Y. City Ct. 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971).
App. Term, 1972) .
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Robert found that there could be constructive notice of the
time limitation for the filing of the claim. Lisi, and the
subsequent cases on adequate notice, were inapplicable
because "there is a significant distinction both in concept
and practical application between limited liability and
142/time limitation questions" ---' . Thus, according to the
court, Article 26 is not a provision which limits liability 
since it does not have to be brought home to passengers.
It appears from all these cases that the penalty 
for non-compliance with the Convention's requirements as 
to the documents of carriage does not refer to Articles 26,
28, and 29, although each article could in some way be said 
to exclude or limit the carrier's liability. But the cases 
have made it clear that they are not among the provisions 
which exclude or limit liability within the meaning of 
Articles 3(2), 4(4), 9--and also Article 25 which provides 
for an identical sanction. It is interesting to observe 
that two different techniques were used by the American 
courts to achieve that result. In the first one, courts 
considered the article at issue and ascertained whether 
it excluded or limited liability within the meaning of the 
Convention. This was a simple characterization technique 
which is best illustrated in the Bergman case. The other 
technique seems to be based on an assumption of equivalence 
between : (i) the provisions which have to be adequately 
notified on the basis of the interpretation of the Convention 
given in the Lisi case, and (ii) the provisions which exclude 
or limit liability. This reasoning is particularly clear in 
relation to cases relating to Article 26. In Sofranski, 
the court deduced from the fact that Article 26 excluded 
or limited liability the consequence that its time limit 
had to be adequately notified. Conversely, in Robert, the
142/ at p. 17,735.
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the court appeared to deduce from the ruling that no ade­
quate notice was required the consequence that the time 
limitation for giving notice of the claim was not a provi­
sion excluding or limiting liability. It is submitted that 
the reasoning used in the second technique is defective 
because there is no necessary link between an article’s 
inclusion in a group of provisions limiting or excluding 
liability and the necessity of giving adequate notice of 
the article to a passenger/shipper.
The second technique used by American courts has 
never been used by other courts. This is due to the fact 
that it is closely linked to the interpretation given 
mainly by American courts to the provisions relating to 
the delivery of a document of carriage. The few French 
cases dealing with the matter simply used the characteri­
zation technique.
The situation has been considerably altered by the 
Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City Protocol. The Hague 
Protocol expressly limits the penalty for non-compliance 
with the Convention to the inapplicability of the monetary143/limitations — ^  . The Guatemala City Protocol further 
modified the provisions relating to passenger tickets and 
baggage checks. Articles II and III of the Protocol provide 
that all the rules of the Convention, including those relat­
ing to limitation of liability, will still apply in cases
of non-compliance with the requirements concerning the144 /passenger ticket and the baggage check ---' .
143/ Articbs III, IV, and VII of the Protocol.
144/ This is consistent with the "package deal" adopted by 
the Conference where the high limit of liability was seen 
as unbreakable.
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Chapter SIX. - LIABILITY FOR THE CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS .
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides that 
the carrier "is liable for damage sustained in the event 
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily 
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused 
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or 
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis­
embarking. "
Three difficulties have arisen in the construction 
of this Article :
(i) whether there must be an "accident" before the carrier 
is liable and, if so, what is the meaning of "accident" ;
(ii) what are the kinds of damage recoverable under the 
Convention ;
(iii) what is the meaning of "any of the operations of 
embarking and disembarking".
Section One. - Requirement of an accident .
Several American courts have considered this aspect 
of Article 17. In MacDonald v. Air Canada ^ , it was stated 
that the finding of an accident is the first requirement for 
invocation of the Convention, and that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove that there was an accident. The plaintiff 
was an old woman who had just arrived from an international 
flight and was waiting for her daughter in the baggage deliv­
ery and custom clearance area of the airport. For an unknown
1/ 11 Avi. 18,029 (1st Cir. 1971)
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reason, she fell and hurt herself badly. The court said that 
it seemed "as reasonable to suppose that some internal con­
dition was the cause of the fall as that the fall was the2/result of an a c c i d e n t . T h e  action could thus not succeed 
because the plaintiff had not established that there had 
been an "accident".
Reference was made to the reasoning of the MacDonald
3/decision in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport ^  . The plane on 
which the plaintiff was a passenger had been hijacked. The 
defendant air carrier argued that he was not liable for the 
resulting suffering by the plaintiff because the "cause" of 
the damage was intentional. Therefore, it was not an "acci­
dent" and the Convention was not applicable. The court 
decided that a hijacking was within the ambit of the term 
"accident" after relying heavily on the Montreal Agreement. 
This Agreement does not directly affect Article 17 of the 
Convention ; it simply increases the limit of liability in 
certain cases and takes away from carriers the possibility 
of relying on Article 20 to avoid liability The court
reasoned that since Article 17 is not altered, all its con­
ditions must be fulfilled before the regime resulting from 
the combination of the Convention and the Montreal Agreement 
can apply. The court then selected an interpretation of 
Article 17*s requirements which would be consistent with the 
liability regime existing before and after the Montreal Agree 
ment. It continued by pointing out that, according to the 
State Department and the Civil Aeronautics Board, the new 
regime is one of "absolute liability" and that nowhere is 
the word "accident" mentioned as a special condition of 
recovery for personal injury. The judgment then underlined 
that it can be infered from the proceedings leading to the
2/ at p. 18.030. •
J2/ 12 Avi. 17,637 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). The question was con­
sidered as settled by the court in a later opinion in the 
same case (13 Avi. 17,603, S.D. N.Y. 1975. at p. 17,607).
4/ above p. 104, below p. 280.
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Montreal Agreement that innocent victims of sabotage were 
to be compensated. Hijacking was not expressly considered, 
but there was no logical basis for distinguishing the two.
A final reason was one of policy : if the carrier was not 
held liable, that would run contrary to the function of the 
Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement, i.e. 
the redistribution of the costs involved in air transportation.
In Husserl, the court was obviously not prepared to 
give "accident" a technical meaning which could have prevented 
the application of the amended system of liability to factual 
situations which the court considered were to be covered by 
the new regime. It might seem at first that the court in 
Husserl simply paid lip service to the requirement of an 
"accident" and was willing to label as "accident" almost any 
situation if this could secure compensation to the victim.
It is submitted however that there is not a very great vari­
ation between the formal requirement of an "accident" in 
MacDonald and the application made of that rule in Husserl. 
Evidence of an accident in MacDonald seems to have been 
required mainly to show that the injury suffered was not due 
to "some internal condition" in the plaintiff. This is very 
different from giving a technical interpretation to the word 
"accident" which would leave a number of victims without com­
pensation each time the conditions of an "accident" would not 
be met. It is submitted that the requirement of an "accident" 
in Article 17 is directed to establishing that the injuries 
do not entirely arise from internal causes such as the con­
genital predisposition of the victim \ jf this is true, 
the analysis in Husserl is consistent with the analysis in 
MacDonald. In Husserl, the court easily accepted that a 
hijacking be labelled "accident", but the circumstances made 
it clear that the injuries complained of by the plaintiff
A similar interpretation appears in Kahn-Freund, The Law 
of Carriage, p. 719*
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were due to that "accident", i.e. to an event different 
from internal causes ^ .
For a long time, the issue of compensable damages 
seemed to be one of the minor issues raised by the Warsaw 
Convention. Only a few, isolated cases dealt with the matter. 
The likely explanation is that, in most cases, the amount 
of damages was so limited by the Convention that the small 
amount available would be utilized to compensate, or partial­
ly compensate, unquestioned damages such as the financial 
loss caused to the wife and children of a passenger by his 
death in an air crash. It is only in the few cases where 
the limit was not reached by such straightforward claims, 
and in the rather infrequent cases of unlimited liability, 
that the question arose.
The situation has changed in the last few years. 
Firstly, the Montreal Agreement was adopted in 1966 ^  and 
there is now a real possibility for a plaintiff to obtain 
damages other than the loss of financial support or loss 
of earnings if these are less than $75,000.
Secondly, new forms of injury are occurring in 
cases of aerial hijacking. In the usual air accident situa­
tion, Article 17*s requirement that the damage be sustained 
in the event of death, wounding, or other bodily injury was 
easily satisfied. This is no longer true. In the case of a 
hijacking, passengers are frequently either not physically 
harmed, or at least not seriously injured, by the hijackers 
but they may be threatened by them or may have reason to 
fear for their safety, thus suffering serious mental anguish.
In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi. 17,647
.D. N.Y. 1975)» which was another case of hijacking, the 
fact that the terrorists9 activities constituted an "acci­
dent" was not disputed (p. 17»649).
2/ See further above p. 104 on the Montreal Agreement, and below pp. 280ff.
Section 2. - Compensable damages .
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The kinds on injury for which compensation may be 
obtained under the Warsaw Convention has gained topical in­
terest because of a number of recent controversial decisions 
by courts in the United States. This section will attempt to 
examine how the issue of recoverable damages has been seen 
in the common law countries considered here and in France. 
After a rapid survey of the relevant rules of the law of 
damages in the countries involved, the various decisions 
relating to damages under the Warsaw Convention will be 
outlined. Against this background, the American decisions 
dealing with damages due to hijacking will be analyzed and 
then criticized. A comparison between the attitudes prevail­
ing in the countries examined here will then be made.
1) Brief survey of the relevant principles of the law of 
damages.
There is nothing in French law prohibiting compen­
sation for any particular kind of damage, be it mental 
injury, suffering due to the death of a member of the fam­
ily, or pain and suffering due to a physical injury. Pro­
vided the damage is certain and direct, all forms of damage 
can be compensated to their full extent ^ , This was already 
the case when the Warsaw Convention was drafted ^ ,
Although French law does not distinguish between 
various forms of damage on the basis that only some may be 
compensated, distinctions are made for analytical and didac­
tic purposes. The basic distinction is between dommage mate­
riel and dommage moral . Pommage materiel is any type of 
financial loss suffered by the plaintiff. It includes loss 
of wages as well as medical or funeral expenses ; it also
8/ The requirement that the damage be direct may prove very 
difficult to meet in some cases. See the current developments 
in (1974) 73 Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ. pp. 733ff., 776ff.
3/ H. & L. Mazeaud, A. Tunc, Trait& th£orique et pratique 
de la responsabilite civile dklictuelle et contractuelle 
(5th ed., Paris, 1957)» pp• 4l6-4l7.
10/ H., L. & J. Mazeaud, Legons de Droit civil, tome 2, 
vol. 1 (4th ed., by M. de Juglart, Paris, 1965)» pp. 350ff. ; 
J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 308ft*
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includes the loss of any benefit that the plaintiff could 
have expected to gain but was prevented from gaining by the 
occurrence of a wrongful act or by a breach of contract. 
Pommage moral includes all other forms of damage which do 
not cause a financial loss, such as the breach of the right 
to privacy, or the sufferings — bodily or otherwise — of the 
victim of an accident, or the moral damage of the family of 
the victim in case of death.
Pommage corporel is a composite from dommage mate­
riel and dommage moral. It is sometimes used as a descrip­
tion of the various forms of damages but it does not cons­
titute a class which would be subject to specific rules . 
It includes all forms of damage which may result from 
personal injury, e.g. medical expenses, loss of wages, pain 
and suffering (pretium doloris) , damage resulting from loss 
of attractiveness due to permanent scars, etc. In other 
words, dommage corporel includes financial loss (dommage ma­
teriel) together with compensation for mental and physical 
suffering (dommage moral).
By contrast, the common law places a number of 
restrictions on the kind of compensable damage, and on the 
extent to which compensation may be allowed for particular 
damages. Limitations on the kind of damage are often formu­
lated in terms of existence or inexistence of the duty of 
care . Since that duty is the basic condition of the 
existence of liability for the tort of negligence, the ruling 
that there is no duty means that the defendant cannot be held 
liable whether or not a wrong has been committed . Such
11/ Carbonnier, Proit civil, vol. 4, pp. 309-310»
12/ Fleming, Torts, p. 134.
13/ It was stated by Greer, L.J. in Bottomley v. Bannister
£l932] 1 458 (Ct. App. 1931) ! "English law does notrecognize a duty in the air, so to speak ; that is, a duty 
to undertake that no one shall suffer from one’s careless­
ness”, at p. 476. Lord Esher, in Le Lievre v. Gould [I893I
1 Q.B. 491, had said : "A man is entitled to be as negligent 
as he pleases toward the whole world if he owes no duty to 
them” at p. 497.
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limitations express judicial policies against recovery for 
certain types of injuries.
Mental distress was for many years amongst the kinds 
of injuries thus excluded . One of the main reasons was 
that nervous shock could be easily feigned. But once the cir­
cumstances of the case indicated that the claim was not coun­
terfeit, this objection fell. For instance, the risk of fraud 
was greatly lessened each time a physical impact — an objec­
tive element — accompanied the nervous shock. This is why, 
despite the general reluctance towards claims of mental dis­
tress, courts allowed recovery when mental distress was 
accompanied by physical injuries, or when mental distress 
was later evidenced by the physical injuries it had caused.
The requirement that there must be some sort of 
physical impact as a sign of the reality of the claim for 
mental distress has been progressively abandoned. In England,
rejected that requirement inthe case of Dulieu v. White
1901. Canada and Australia are in principle still under the 
authority of the Privy Council decision in Victorian Railways 
Commissioners v. Coultas which held that there must be 
physical impact for mental distress to be compensable. However, 
several Australian States or territories have now statutorily
allowed recovery in other cases XL/ In Canada, the doctrine
of the Privy Council’s decision has been gradually eroded but 
it has not yet been eliminated In the United States,
there has been in the 20th century a continuous relaxation 
of the original requirement of physical impact. But it was 
only in 1961 that the courts of New York decided that mental 
anguish alone could be compensated *^ 2/.
14/ Fleming, Torts, p. 149 ; Prosser, Torts, pp. 327ff.
15/ [1901] 2 K.B. 669 (K.B. 1901).
16/ (1888) 13 A .C. 222 (P.C. 1888).
17/ For specific examples, see Fleming, Torts, p. 150, n. 4.
18/ see The Canadian Abridgement, 2d ed., vol. 13» Damages,
Nos. 549ff.
19/ Battala v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1961).The court gave the following description of the evolution
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There is no equivalent to these developments in 
French law. This is not to say that it was necessarily easier 
to obtain compensation for mental injuries in a French court 
than it was in a common law court. If a French court thought 
that a particular claim should not be allowed, it had the 
necessary means to reject it through the general requirements 
that damage must be direct and certain before being compen­
sated. As medical science and psychology ascertained more 
convincingly the reality of mental injuries, the require­
ments of directness and certainty were more easily satisfied. 
Compensation of mental injuries was introduced gradually, 
without involving a reversal of previous principles as had 
been the case in common law courts.
Once liability is engaged in principle, its extent 
must be ascertained by common law courts. In cases of per­
sonal injuries, the general rule is that the victim will get 
compensatory damages for all the loss suffered, pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary 2 0 /  , Pecuniary loss consists of the expenditures 
necessitated by the accident and of diminution of earning 
capacity. Non-pecuniary loss covers pain and suffering due 
to the injury and any resultant loss of the ability to enjoy 
the normal activities and functions of life. Thus, recoverable 
damages in case of personal injury are quite similar to what 
they are in French law. Pecuniary loss is the equivalent of 
dommage matlriel, non-pecuniary loss is the equivalent of 
dommage moral, but it is only in French law that their combi­
nation is sometimes seen as the separate concept of dommage 
corporel in cases of death or personal injury.
In cases of wrongful death, the statutory remedy 
provided by Lord Campbell's Act or its equivalent has been 
generally read as only allowing recovery for loss of economic
19/(cont* d) of the law i "it is well to note that [the require­
ment] has been thoroughly repudiated by the English courts 
which initiated it, rejected by a majority of American juris­
dictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it, and 
diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which 
retained it." (at p. 239)*
20/ Fleming, Torts, pp. 202ff.
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or material advantages to the survivors — ' . Damages for 
injured feelings and affection, or an allowance for the grav­
ity of the injury preceding death are excluded in many juris­
dictions. Compensation is due only for the loss of support 
measured by the claimant*s reasonable expectation of pecuniary 
benefit. If the person killed was the breadwinner, damages 
may be considerable. But if the person killed did not sub­
stantially contribute to the family*s income, damages will 
be quite limited. In the case of the death of a young child, 
the parents are entitled to compensation only if, in the par­
ticular circumstances, loss of pecuniary benefit is a reason­
able expectation and not merely a speculative possibility ,
A few common law jurisdictions have modified the 
law resulting from the traditionally narrow interpretation 
of Lord Campbell's Act. But legislative reform has been 
cautious, often limiting recovery for mental distress and 
other forms of non-economic loss with fixed monetary ceil­
ings
A considerable difference exists between these common 
law rules and French law where there is no restriction on 
the type or the extent of damages which can be recovered in 
cases of wrongful death. The liberal principles applicable 
to cases of personal injuries in French law are equally 
applicable to cases of wrongful death.
2) Outline of the various decisions relating to the Warsaw 
Convention against this background.
No French case deals with the issue of determining 
what types of losses may be compensated because there is no 
such issue for a French court. In Warsaw cases, as well as in
21/ Fleming, Torts, pp. 585ff* » Prosser, Torts, pp. 905ff*
22/ Fleming, Torts, pp. 586-587 ;for the situation in the 
United States, see Prosser, Torts, pp. 908-909*
23/ Fleming, Torts, p. 590 ; for a survey of the damages 
allowable under various causes of action in the United States, 
see J.F. Smith, "Wrongful Death Actions Under General Mari­
time Law in the Light of Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet", 
(197^) 4l Tennessee L. Rev. 793» at pp. 812-823*
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domestic law cases, all types of loss can be fully compen-
24/sated, provided that they are certain and direct — -' .
25/
In the English case of Preston v. Hunting Air Trans-
>ort — ~ , the court relied on the wording of Article 17 to
reject the defendant's claim that only financial loss could
be compensated. Article 17, said the court, "does not refer
26/particularly to financial loss, it refers to damage." — ' 
Accordingly, the court awarded a sum for the loss that the 
infant plaintiffs had sustained by reason of the death of 
their mother, which had deprived them of her care at an age 
when they needed it most.
In the Canadian case of Frederick v. Ottawa Aero 
Services, Ltd.-^, the claim related to financial loss only. 
One of the questions was whether funeral expenses ought to 
be included in the financial loss. Another difficulty was 
whether insurance due to the plaintiff should be taken into 
account. The court pointed out that the Convention did not 
give any guidance on these questions. In deciding that funeral 
expenses were not recoverable, and that insurance money was 
to be taken into account, the court relied on the interpre­
tation given to the Ontario Fatal Accidents Act which, like 
Article 17, did not mention these matters.
Another Canadian case also illustrates the influence 
of the lex fori. In Surprenant v. Air Canada £0/t the daugh­
ter of the plaintiffs was killed in an air crash. The parents 
claimed heavy damages for solatium doloris, i.e. the psychic 
trauma and other painful feelings created by the death of 
their daughter. One judge rejected the claim by simply saying 
that it was a well settled point that such a loss could not 
be the object of an action. Another judge emphasized the 
silence of the Convention on the issue and said that, of
24/ See for example Sontag c. Cie Air France, (1971) 25 
R.F.D.A. 176 (T.G.I. Paris, 8 January 1971)* where the court 
itemized the various heads of damages.
2$/ [1956] 1 Q.B. 454 (Q.B. 1956). 26/ at p. 46l.
22/ (1964) 42 D .L.R.2d 122 (Ont. High Ct. 1963).
28/ [1973] Recueils de Jurisprudence, Quebec 107 (Ct. App. 
Montreal, 1972).
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necessity, the word "damage” in Article 17 had to be inter­
preted according to the law of the court seized of the case^. 
Accordingly, the parents* claim was rejected because it was 
founded on losses subjective in nature and immeasurable in 
economic terms by any criteria recognized by the law 3®/%
The above cases show a considerable difference of 
attitude. In the English case, the court used the Conven­
tion’s lack of any precise rule on the point to award damages 
in excess of pure financial loss, contrary to the usual rule 
in cases of wrongful death. However, the court did so with a 
great uneasiness, presumably because it was the first time 
it had to assess such damages. The two Canadian cases simply 
applied the lex fori, with its clear prohibition of compen­
sation for non-pecuniary loss, and its detailed rules as to 
which kind of pecuniary loss may be compensated.
Early American cases of wrongful death complemented 
the Convention by application of the lex loci delicti -^/ . 
Thus, even though moral damages such as psychic sufferings 
caused by the death of a passenger in an air crash were un­
known to the lex fori, they were recoverable in principle if 
the law in force at the place of the accident so provided.
The recourse to the conflict of laws technique appears to 
be rooted in the ruling that the Warsaw Convention does not 
create a cause of action for wrongful death but that it only 
partially regulates an existing cause of action 2^/, The con­
sequence was that a cause of action had to be found elsewhere, 
and the natural tendency of American courts was to look for 
the law of the State where the wrong had been committed which 
for years had provided the cause of action in wrongful death 
cases arising in the United States. The lex loci delicti
29/ at p. 117 per M. le Juge Deschenes 30/ at p. 127.
31/ Komlos v. Air France, 3 Avi. 17i969 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), 
rev’d on other grounds, 4 Avi. 17,281 (2d Cir. 1953) » Werk- 
ley v. K.L.M., 1953 U.S. Av. Rep. 194 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) ;
Supine v. Air France, 1951 U.S. Av. Rep. 448 (E.D. N.Y. 1951)* 
On the lex loci delicti rule, see generally "Conflict of lav/s 
as to measure or amount of damages in death actions", 92 
A .L.R.2d 1180.
32/ see below pp. 338ft.
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also regulated the measure, extent, and amount of damages 
for wrongful death. This system met with serious obstacles 
in Warsaw cases because of the alien character of some of 
the rules thus made applicable. In particular, the fact that 
moral damages could be compensated by the lex loci delicti 
presented grave difficulties. In Leroy v. Sabena -2-2/, the 
court did not allow compensation for non-pecuniary damages 
of suffering and loss of guidance because, although permis­
sible under the applicable Italian law, determining such an 
allowance would have been "purely speculating" *2^ /.
Today, the rule that questions of damages recoverable 
in a wrongful death action are to be determined by the lex 
loci delicti is no longer unanimously followed in all Amer­
ican jurisdictions • New York courts were the first to 
reject it because they considered it improper that the issue 
of recoverable damages be governed by a law selected on the 
basis of the "merely fortuitous circumstances" of the location 
of the accident *2ä/ .
This new attitude rapidly spread among other American 
courts -2^ /. its basic principles have been incorporated in 
the Restatement of the Law which provides :
" The rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state 
which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the occur­
rence and the parties . . . "
The Restatement lists as follows the contacts to be taken 
into account :
" (a) the place where the injury occurred,
12/1965 U.S. Av. Rep. 129 (2d Cir. 1965).
34/ at p. 1 5 1.
35/ see J.F. Rydstrom, "Modern status of rule that substan­
tive rights of parties to a tort action are governed by the 
law of the place of the wrong", 29 A.'L.R.3d 0O3 .
36/ Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1 963) 
at p. 480.
37/ see the description of the movement in 29 A.L.R.3d 6 0 3. 
For a recent change of the applicable rule, see Brickner v. 
Gooden, 13 Avi. 17,197 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1974)*
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" (t>) the place where the conduct causing the 
injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place 
of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according 
to their relative importance with respect to 
the particular issue." 38/
It may be presumed that, in general, no action is 
brought in a particular jurisdiction unless there is some 
relationship between the action and the jurisdiction in­
volved. If that relationship is seen as sufficient, then the 
lex fori will govern the issues involved and, in Warsaw cases, 
the question of recoverable damages.
3) Analysis of the American decisions dealing with damages 
due to hijacking.
A completely different approach was adopted in 
several recent American cases arising from claims involving 
mental anguish and following incidents of aerial hi jacking-^A 
The courts referred neither to the lex fori, nor to the lex 
loci delicti, nor to any other municipal law as having the 
most significant relationship with the cases. The courts 
did not look beyond the text of the Convention and the Montreal 
Agreement. It was as if the previous cases unequivocally 
holding that the Warsaw Convention had not created a cause 
of action had never been decided. However, in Husserl v. Swiss 
Air Transport Co. ^ ^ t another court expressly endorsed the 
line of cases establishing that the Convention did not create
38/§l45, Restatement of the Law (second), Conflict of Laws 2d 
(St Paul, Minn." 1971) .
39/ Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18,405 
(D. New Mexico, 1973) ; Trans World Airlines v. Christophel 
12 Avi. 18,135 (Ky Ct. App. 1973) ; Rosman v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. C t. App. 1974), rev’g 
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 40 A.D.2d 963» anc* Herman 
V, Trans World Airlines, 12 Avi. 17,634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 1972).
40/ 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)*
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a cause of action and determined the issue of compensable 
injuries on the basis of the law designated by conflict of 
laws principles.
These cases must be examined in detail because of 
the diversity of approaches adopted by the courts in consid­
ering claims against airlines based upon incidents of aerial 
hijacking. Two problems were faced by the courts : (i) is 
recovery for mental anguish and suffering alone possible, 
even though Article 17 is worded in terms of death, wounding, 
or bodily injury ? and (ii) to what extent can mental anguish 
be compensated when there is bodily injury at the same time ? 
A preliminary difficulty was that the only authentic text of 
the Warsaw Convention is written in French. In ascertaining 
whether mental anguish is recoverable under the Convention, 
it may be essential to know whether it has to be classified 
as "bodily injury", as translated in the text submitted to 
the United States Senate in 193^» or as "lesion corporelle", 
the term used by the French text.
Bodily injury or "lesion corporelle".
41/In Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. — ' , the 
court held that in interpreting the meaning of the terms 
employed by the Convention, the French legal meaning must 
prevail. Several reasons were advanced to support this 
decision : (i) French was the official language of the Con­
vention, (ii) the United States deposited its notice of adher 
ence to the official French version, (iii) the Statutes at 
Large contain not only the English translation but also the 
official French text, and (iv) interpretation by reference 
to one language aids the uniformity which the delegates to 
the Warsaw Conference sought to implement. The court deduced
4l/ 12 Avi. 18,405 (D. New Mex. 1973).
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from all these reasons that it was essentially confronted 
with the determination of a question of foreign law, i.e. 
whether mental anguish alone is encompassed within the term 
"lesion corporelle" as used in Article 1? of the original 
French text of the Convention.
42/In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.— ' , the 
New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument that in 
interpreting a treaty whose sole official language was French 
it was hound to apply French law :
" French legal usage must be considered in arriving 
at an accurate English translation of the French.
But when an accurate English translation is made, 
and agreed upon, as here, the inquiry as to mean­
ing does not then revert to a quest for past or 
present French law to be 'applied' for revelation 
of the proper scope of the terms." 43/
The parties had agreed that the translation of Article 17
was accurate, and the court refused to investigate further
the "precise meaning" of the terms used. The only issue was
their legal significance in the case.
A similar attitude was adopted in Husserl v. Swiss 44/Air Transport Co.— ' . This case is particularly interesting 
because the same court had favoured the use of the French 
legal meaning at an earlier stage of the proceedings , 
but later changed its views, justifying its new position as 
follows i
" It is true that this country adhered to the French 
text of the Convention, as did all of the signatories 
(although the Senate heard and voted on the English 
translation) ; but as I now view the matter, that 
fact does not mean that the French legal meaning of 
the words or the French legal interpretation is 
binding . . . The nuances of interpretation of the 
Convention were not analyzed in terms of the French 
or any other legal system. The language was merely
42/ 13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974) 
43/ at p. 17.233.
44/ 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). 
45/ 12 Avi. 17,637 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
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" intended to express the common understanding of 
the drafters in a common international language 
so that confusion would be limited and could be 
resolved to some extent by reference to the common 
meaning of one international language. The Conven­
tion is now part of the federal law of this country. 
Absent some explicit provision to the contrary, 
therefore, it should be interpreted in light and 
according to that law." 46/
It should be emphasized that the issue was not one
of translation. Both courts in Rosman and Husserl made it
clear that nobody questioned that the English text was an
accurate translation of the French text. Any discrepancy at
that level would have had to be solved in favour of the French47/text since the Convention was drawn up in French only —u .
The issue was the relevance of the French legal concepts as
a means of interpreting the Convention. The solution given
in Husserl and in Rosman is part of the general tendency of
American courts to use American law concepts in interpreting
the Convention t The only notable exception was the case
49/of Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France where the
court used French law concepts. The significant contribution 
of the Husserl and Rosman decisions is to clearly articulate 
this general attitude of the courts by providing a number of 
reasons justifying their position.
46/ at 13 Avi. 17,608
47/ Article 36 of the Warsaw Convention.
48/ For a particularly explicit stand on the matter, see Kahn 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18,032 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1973) ; Bochory v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 4 Avi. 
18,072 (W7T. Sup. Ct. 195°) » and Holzer Watch Co.~Inc. v. 
Seaboard & Western Airlines, Inc.~ 5 Avi. 17,854 (N.Y. City 
C t . 1957) at p. 17,855. American law concepts are usually applied as a matter of course, as in the cases reviewed in 
Khan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., above, in relation to the 
two-year time limitation of Article 29. For a survey of the 
cases dealing with Article 28 (the jurisdiction issue), see 
Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 12 Avi. 17,143 
(2d Cir. 1971) where the court set a limit to the extent to 
which domestic law concepts can be used.
42/ 10 Avi. 17,518 (5th Cir. 1967).
184 -
-52/
Meaning of "bodily injury" .
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. , the 
court held that mental injury alone could he compensated 
because it was covered by the phrase "bodily injury". The 
opposite conclusion was reached in Rosman v. Trans World
. It seems that the source of divergenceAirlines Inc
is the differing approach taken on the question of the cause
of action. In Rosman, the court paid only lip service to the
rule that the Warsaw Convention did not create a cause of
action and interpreted Article 17 as if that text provided
the whole liability regime applicable to the action. New
York law was denied any relevance because its application
would have redefined the score and the substance of the
<2/carrier's liability contained in the Convention 7 . From 
"a faithful reading of the terms of the Convention", based 
on the ordinary meaning of the words, the court concluded 
that a claim for damages under Article 17 must be '^predicated 
upon some objective injury to the body" ^2/t
In Husserl, the court held that mental injury was 
included in'bodily injury". It first asserted that the 
literal meaning of Article 17 did not give any real clue 
as to whether mental injuries by themselves were compensable 
But the court found that to effect the treaty's purpose of 
regulating in a uniform manner the liability of air carriers, 
"the types of injuries enumerated should be construed expan­
sively to encompass as many types of injury as are colorably 
within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental and psycho­
somatic injuries are colorably within that ambit and are, 
therefore, comprehended by Article 17 ."-5-5/ However, the main 
argument of the court was that the solutions to the problem
^4/
j£0/ 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) •
^1/ 13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).
52/ at 13 Avi. 17,235. 52/ at !3 Avi. 17.235.
j4/ at 13 Avi. 17,608-9 . J2V  at 13 Avi. 17,610.
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of recoverable injuries have to be found in the applicable 
substantive law which provides a cause of action since ,lthe 
Convention is neutral with respect to the existence of a 
cause of action and merely conditions and limits any action 
which exists under otherwise applicable law". The appli­
cable substantive law in Husserl was found to be New York 
law which provides a cause of action for mental and psycho­
somatic injuries .
If a court adopts an analysis similar to that of 
Husserl, a claim for mental injury may succeed, provided the 
applicable substantive law permits such claims. But if a 
court follows the reasoning of Rosman, mental injury alone 
cannot be compensated.
The special case of mental injury accompanied by physical 
injury.
In such cases, the issue is not to assess whether 
the conditions of the carrier's liability are satisfied 
because, ex hypothesi, there is physical injury answering 
Article l?'s requirements. The issue is to ascertain the 
extent to which mental anguish and suffering may be compen­
sated .
In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , and inI c-q  /Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , it was held that 
only the mental anguish resulting from the bodily injury 
could be compensated. In Rosman, the ruling was adopted as 
a matter of course. The reasoning was more explicit in the 
Burnett case. The court read Article 17 as an illustration 
of what appeared to the court to be a rule of universal
56/  at 13 Avi. 17,611.
57/ Such a solution had been advocated by A. Lowenfeld, in 
"Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma", 
(1973) 1 Syracuse Journ. Int'l L. & Com. 3^5*
58/  13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).
^2/ 12 Avi. 13,405 (D. New Mex. 1973)*
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acceptance :
" Certainly, mental anguish directly resulting from 
a bodily injury is damage sustained in the event 
of a bodily injury. The delegates apparently chose 
to follow this well-recognized principle of law 
allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting 
from the occurrence of a bodily injury, the emo­
tional distress being directly precipitated by the 
bodily injury itself. Therefore, plaintiffs may 
recover in this action for any such emotional 
anxiety that they can demonstrate resulted from a 
bodily injury suffered as a consequence of the 
hijacking." 60/
But this interpretation is supported neither by the wording 
of Article 17, nor by the drafting history of the provision 
which is silent on the point Article 17 does not liter­
ally require a causal link between the damage and the death, 
wounding, or other bodily injury. It only states that the 
carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of death, 
wounding, or other bodily injury.
The Berne Convention on International Rail Transport' 
was used in the Burnett case as an analogy showing why only 
mental suffering directly resulting from a bodily injury can 
be compensated. But the analogy does not provide any convinc­
ing evidence in favour of that conclusion because the Berne 
Convention is much more narrowly worded :
" Le chemin de fer est responsable des dommages 
resultant de la mort, des blessures, etc."
(emphasis added) 62/
Thus the Berne Convention requires that the damage results 
from the death, wounding or other personal injury. The Warsaw 
Convention is much less demanding since it is enough that the 
damage be sustained in the event of death, wounding, or other 
bodily injury. Therefore, if a damage occurs concurrently 
with death, wounding, or other bodily injury, the require­
ment of Article 17 is satisfied.
60/ at 12 Avi. 18,409.
6l/ see further on the drafting history of Article 17 below 
p. I90ff.
62/ In Burnett, the court used the following translation by 
Professor H.P. de Vries :"The railroad is liable for damages 
resulting from the death, wounds, etc."
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The fact that Article 17 does not limit recovery 
for mental injuries to those resulting from physical injuries 
does not mean that the whole claim for mental injury ought 
necessarily to be satisfied by every court applying the Con­
vention. Each court will assess the recoverable damages as 
is done in all other cases governed by the Warsaw Convention. 
Some courts would presumably apply the lex fori, or such law 
designated by the choice of law rule of the forum, or even 
a specific regime where the lex fori is modified to reflect 
the wording of Article 17 In France, the generality of
the terms of Article 17 is likely to be taken as revealing 
a lack of any restriction on recoverable damages and the 
whole damage could be compensated once it is established 
that it is certain and direct. In England, Australia, and 
Canada, it is possible that a court may require some sort 
of a link between the bodily injury and the mental injury 
owing to the requirement that the damage happened "in the 
event" of bodily injury. On the other hand, the liberal 
interpretation which prevailed in Preston v. Hunting Air 
Transport may also apply here. This would be more in 
line with the modern tendency to reject the requirement 
of physical impact in domestic law cases.
In the United States, both Burnett v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. — ' were under the clear influence of the traditional 
approach to problems of mental injury in American courts.
Once Article 17 had been read as excluding mental injury 
alone, it appeared almost similar to the requirement of 
physical impact which has been applied by so many American 
courts for so many years . The two courts in fact seem to
6 y  see above, p. 177. 64/ [1956] 1 Q.B . 454 (Q.B. 1956).
65/ 12 Avi. 18,405 (D. New Mex. 1973).
66/ 13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).
67/ see above p. 174.
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have applied traditional common law rules of liability for 
mental injury. The difficulty is that they claimed to give 
an interpretation based solely on the text of Article 17
4) Critique of the American decisions dealing with damages 
due to hijacking.
Until now, the American decisions dealing with 
"bodily injury" have been examined without questioning 
their assumption that the translation of "lision corporelle" 
as "bodily injury" was accurate. It is now time to look 
more deeply into the matter.
Accuracy of the translation of "llsion corporelle" as 
"bodily injury".
Doubts about the accuracy of the translation arise 
when one takes into account the respective connotations and 
implications of each expression in its own legal system. It 
cannot be said that an express mention of the word "corporel" 
automatically excludes what is "mental". "Pommage corporel" 
in French law includes physical, mental, and moral damage, 
as well as any pecuniary loss resulting from personal injury.
By contrast, the ordinary meaning of "bodily" in a common law 
context was sufficient ground for the court in Rosman to 
exclude mental injury from the scope of Article 17 •
The assertion that the translation may be inaccurate 
is supported by a comparison of the official English and 
French texts of the Guatemala City Protocol. The Protocol 
has substituted "personal injury" for "wounding or other 
bodily injury" in the English text modifying Article 17* But 
the French text has retained the expression "lision corporelle"
68/ The Court in Rosman was adamant that the local law was
not to be applied (at 13 Avi. 17*235)•
69/ It was stated in Rosman s "The inclusion of the term 
'bodily' to modify ' injury' cannot be ignored, and in its 
ordinary usage, the term 'bodily' suggests opposition to 
'mental'." (at 13 Avi. 17,234).
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The change in the English text was inconspicuously proposed 
by a drafting group of the I.C.A.O. Legal Committee in 
1970 -2^ /. The members of the drafting group considered the 
English text alone. They seem to have seen the alteration 
as a relatively minor drafting improvement. The change was 
pointed out to the Legal Committee by the Chairman of the 
drafting group but nobody commented . The same silence 
was observed in connection with the fact that the French 
text continued using "llsion corporelle".
The precise reason why the drafting group substi­
tuted "personal injury" to "wounding or bodily injury" is 
not known. It would be mere guessing to say that the change 
was made to procure a better translation of the French text 
or to improve the English text by making it less narrow. 
Whatever the reason, it seems that, in considering whether 
"lision cor-porelle" in the original Convention was rightly 
translated as "bodily injury", due consideration should be 
given to the fact that the official equivalent of "lesion 
corporelle" is "personal injury" in the Guatemala City 
Protocol. True, the same expression can be given different 
meanings in different texts and the possibility of "lision 
corporelle" having a different meaning in the original Con­
vention and in the Guatemala City Protocol must be envisaged. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the official equivalent is dif­
ferent from the unofficial translation is enough to cast 
serious doubts on the accuracy of the unofficial translation.
The only way to dispel these doubts is to ascertain 
the meaning of "lesion corporelle". Before doing so, the 
purpose of Article 17, as revealed by its drafting history 
and its language, will be examined in order to have an 
additional guide in determining its true meaning.
70/ ICAO Legal Committee(Montreal 197.0). Doc. 8878 - LC/162, 
p. 370, (LC/Working Draft No. 7^5-18).
21/ Doc. 8878 - LC/162, p. 187.
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Purpose of the requirement of "lesion corporelle".
The drafting history of a provision sometimes helps 
indicate its purpose. Unfortunately, the drafting history of 
Article 17 does not provide much information in that respect. 
Nevertheless, it has to be investigated because it was heavily 
relied upon in Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
In the draft Convention adopted by the 1925 Paris 
Conference, there was a short provision defining the carrier’s 
liability in all cases :
" Le transporteur est responsable des accidents, 
pertes, avaries et retards." 73/
It is certain that such a wide provision, covering at the
same time the carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo
would have allowed recovery for cases of mental injury. The
text was substantially altered by the CITEJA. The previously
succint article was split into three provisions, one for
damages in the case of passenger carriage, one for damages
in the case of carriage of goods, and one for damages in the74/case of delay J— ' .
In Burnett, the court interpreted the change of 
wording in a surprising manner. The court first pointed out 
that in 1925» French law held carriers liable for all forms 
of damage sustained by passengers, including moral damages. 
Then it referred to the 1925 draft, showing its similarity
72/ 12 Avi. 18,405 (D. New Mex. 1973).
73/ Article 5 of the draft contained in the Final Protocol 
of the Conference. Conference Internationale (Paris, 1925), 
p. 87.
74/ Article 21 of the CITEJA draft, as submitted to the 
delegates to the Warsaw Conference, read :
"Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu pendant 
le transport :
a) en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion 
corporelle subie par un voyageur ;
b) en cas de destruction, perte ou avarie de marchandises 
ou de bagages ;
c) en cas de retard subi par un voyageur, des marchandises 
ou des bagages."
The full text of the CITEJA draft appears in Heme Conference 
Internationale t pp. 171-172.
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to French law at that time. Then, implying that such heavy 
liability would appear shockingly extensive to other legal 
systems, the court added »
" To facilitate further study of the problem 
in order to produce a provision more readily 
acceptable to those nations whose lav/ was not 
so liberal, the Conference appointed a group 
of air law experts who would report to the 
Second International Conference in Warsaw 
in 1929." 11/
The court drew the inference that the new wording intended 
to narrow the otherwise broad scope of liability under the 
former draft and preclude recovery for mental anguish alone. 
Its final arguments was s
" Had the delegates desired otherwise, there would 
have been no reason to so substantially modify 
the proposed draft of the First Conference.1176/
It is submitted that such an interpretation of the 
legislative history of Article 17 is not warranted. When the 
Rapporteur presented the draft Convention to the 1925 Confer­
ence, he was conscious of the fact that the text v/as far from 
final and that it could be considerably improved . The
Conference recommended the creation of a committee of experts 
to deal with all questions relating to air law. Among other 
tasks, they were to improve the draft Convention on liability 
of air carriers and propose a final draft to a diplomatic 
Conference This is quite different from the court’s
assertion that the CITEJA was appointed to produce a text 
more readily acceptable to those nations whose law was not 
so liberal in compensating all forms of damages sustained by 
passengers. Secondly, when the experts changed the 1925 draft 
in order to deal separately with cases of passengers, baggage
25/ at 12 Avi. 18,408.
76/ at 12 Avi. 18,408.
77/ Conference Internationale (Paris, 1925), Report of the 
Second Committee, p. 60.
78/ Conference Internationale (Paris, 1925), Final Protocol, 
p. 90.
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and cargo, and delay, the modification was presented by the 
Rapporteur of the relevant commission as the implementation 
of a suggestion directed mainly at better drafting , There 
is no indication at all that the modification purported to 
deal with a question as important as the exclusion of partic­
ular forms of damages.
It appears from the wording of Article 17 that the 
text did not purport to regulate the type of damage which 
could be compensated. Had it done so, the drafters — who were 
mainly from civil law countries — would have certainly 
referred to the two basic categories of damages in French law, 
i.e. dommage materiel and dommage moral. It would be absurd 
to say that because dommage materiel (pecuniary loss) is not 
expressly mentioned in the Article, it cannot be compensated. 
Indeed, dommage materiel is precisely the form of damage 
which is compensated in all jurisdictions, differences in the 
computation of damages notwithstanding. Likewise, it would 
be absurd to say that because mental anguish is not expressly 
mentioned in Article 17, it cannot be compensated.
What Article 17 does is to determine the conditions 
under which an air carrier shall be liable. These conditions 
are :
(i) the event of death or wounding of a passenger, or any 
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger ;
(ii) an accident which caused the damage so sustained ;
(iii) such accident taking place on board the aircraft or 
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking.
Once these conditions are fulfilled, the carrier*s 
liability is engaged. There stops the unification of the rules 
governing air carriage achieved by the Convention. The view
79/ CITEJA, Second Session, April 1927» p. 64.
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that Article 17 does not regulate the question of recoverable 
damages but only sets the conditions necessary for a carrier 
to be liable is consistent with the reading of Article 17 
adopted in many common law cases where it was made clear 
that the question of compensable damages was not regulated 
by the Convention. As already seen, the silence of the Con­
vention was supplemented in several ways. Some courts resorted 
to the lex fori, others determined the law applicable to 
damages by application of the conflict of laws rule 
There is no French case specifically sustaining that reading 
of Article 17 but it is consistent with the whole system of 
civil liability in France. The basic regime of liability in 
French law has three elements s fault, damage, and a causal 
link between the fault and the damage. Variations on that 
regime concern mainly the "fault" element, and sometimes the 
causal link as well. But the "damage" element remains un­
touched by these variations . The Warsaw regime appears 
as another of these variations, where no evidence of fault 
is required but where a certain number of conditions must 
be satisfied before liability is engaged. Once this is done, 
the normal rules governing damages apply ; they have not been 
affected by the Convention.
Meaning of "lesion corporelle".
There is no obvious answer to the question of 
whether mental injury is included in "lesion corporelle".
This is not surprising because the drafters of the provision 
probably did not envisage the case of mental injuries occur­
ring without concurrent physical injuries. However, the 
extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances of aerial hijack­
ing raised the issue.
80/ see the outline of the various cases above p. 176.
81/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 305ff.
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In Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. which
dealt with the French text of Article 17, the District Court 
of New Mexico asserted »
" As is done in American law, French law
distinguishes sharply between bodily injury 
(lesion corporelle) and mental injury 
(lesion mentale)." 83/
However, from the brief survey of the various rules governing 
the compensation of damages, it appears that French law does 
not draw a sharp distinction between bodily injuries and 
mental injuries. The distinction is between dommage materiel 
and dommage moral. Bodily injuries, as well as mental injuries, 
can be compensated as dommage moral, i.e. non-pecuniary 
damages covering items such as pain and suffering, without 
any other distinction as to the origin of the injury. There­
fore, the first reason why the court had excluded mental 
injuries from the scope of Article 17 is untenable.
Secondly, the court found guidance in the Berne 
Convention on International Rail Transport. The early drafts 
of the Convention closely followed the Warsaw Convention and 
spoke only of bodily injury. But, later on, all possible 
doubts were removed when the text was modified in order to 
include mental injuries. The text which was adopted reads s
" Le chemin de fer est responsable des dommages 
risultant de la mort, des blessures ou de toute 
autre atteinte a l'int£griti physique ou mentale 
d'un voyageur. . ."(emphasis added) 847^
82/ 12 Avi. 18,405 (D. New Mex. 1973).
82/ at 12 Avi. 18,408.
84/ The text is difficult to translate because the "atteinte 
a 1'integrity physique ou mentale" is derived from the idea 
of "atteinte ä l1integrity de la personne humaine" which has 
no exact equivalent in common law. In French law, this means 
that the right of each human being not to have others inter­
fere with his person is recognized and protected. This right 
encompasses both the physical and mental element of human 
personality. In Burnett, the court used the following trans­
lation by Professor H.P. de Vries i"The railroad is liable 
for damages resulting from the death, wounds or any other 
infringement of the physical or mental integrity of a pas­
senger . . ."(at 13 Avi. 18,409).
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The court relied on the fact that mental injury was specifi­
cally mentioned in the Berne Convention as showing that the 
absence of mental injury in the Warsaw Convention meant ex­
clusion from its scope . It is submitted that this con­
clusion is not warranted. If it is true that the Eerne Con­
vention has removed any ambiguity by mentioning expressly 
the "atteinte a l*int£grite mentale1*, this does not necessar­
ily mean that mental injuries were not already included in 
the first draft, even though this might have been expressed 
less clearly. Moreover, any literal argument based on the 
Berne Convention is not directly relevant in construing 
Article 17. The Berne Convention speaks of "atteinte a l*in- 
t&gritS -physique ou mentale." The Warsaw Convention speaks 
of "lesion corporelle". It would be quite unwarranted to 
equate "lSsion corporelle" to "atteinte a l'intlgritg •phy­
sique" in order to contrast them both to "atteinte a l'in- 
tf?grit£ mentale." The only conclusion which can be drawn 
from comparing the Berne Convention to the Warsaw Convention 
is that the former contains better drafting, but this cannot 
clarify the ambiguities which are contained in the latter.
So far, the reasons advanced for reading Article 17 
as being inapplicable in the case of mental injury alone 
were focused on the meaning of "corporel"♦ In the same vein, 
one could argue that the French, as well as the Anglo-American 
cultural background offers the traditional contrast between 
body and mind. Qualifying an injury as "corporel" may well 
endorse that contrast and exclude mental injury. This however 
is based on the non-technical meaning of the word "corporel" 
which contrasts to its technical legal meaning in relation 
to the question of damages. But "dommage corporel" includes 
pecuniary loss as well as moral damage, and covers bodily 
injury as well as mental injury . It follows that that
85/ at 13 Avi. 18,409. 
86/ above p. 173.
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third possible ground for reading "l£sion corporelle"as 
excluding mental injury is no more convincing than the 
previous ones. In brief, the word "corporel" cannot provide 
any satisfactory answer.
A much stronger argument in favour of considering
that Article 17's conditions are not met when there is
mental injury alone is provided by the use of the word
"llsion". "Lesion" is classically defined as :
" Changement morbide quelconque survenu dans 
les organes." 87/
Another authoritative, but more recent definition is :
" Changement grave dans les caracteres anatomiques 
et histologiques d'un organe sous 1*influence 
d'une maladie, d'un accident." 88/
The two definitions emphasize the fact that an organ is
affected. Their physical connotations are obvious. This is
illustrated by constructing the expression "llsion mentale".
If one accepts the literal definitions, it would be difficult
to argue that "lesion mentale" refers to mental injury because
of the physical connotations of the word "lesion". Perhaps
"lesion mentale" could be interpreted as a poorly worded
reference to an injury to the brain. Such an interpretation
would avoid the antinomy between the terms since both would
refer to a physical object.
The word "lesion" is also used as an abstract term
in French law. The physical connotations of the literal
meaning are then absent. An example of the utilisation of
"lesion" in an abstract or figurative sense is the "lesion"
of a right, such as the right to obtain a fair price in some
contracts of sale 02/1 Another instance is the requirement
that no claim for damages may be sustained if it does not
relate to the "lesion" of a legally protected interest 29/1
87/ Dictionnaire de la langue francaise, abr£g£ du Dictionnaire 
de Littre by A. Beaujean (Gallimard Hachette).
88/ Petit Robert, Dictionnaire de la langue frangaise (soci£t£ 
du Nouveau Littre, 1970).
89/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 120ff.
90/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 307* The requirement 
was devised mainly to provide a basis for dismissing claims 
for damages made by concubines after the wrongful death of 
the man they were living with.
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There is no ambiguity as to the sense in which 
"lesion1 is used in Article 17. It cannot be argued that 
it is used abstractly, thus allowing the requirement that 
the word must have physical implications to be disregarded.
It appears from its context that Article 17 refers to the 
physical world by listing the occurrences of death, wounding, 
and "toute autre lesion corporelle" as conditions for the 
carrier’s liability under the Convention. If "lesion corpo­
relle" is to be consistent with the preceding words, "lesion'* 
must be taken in its literal sense, with its physical conno­
tations. Consequently, an interpretation of Article 17 based 
purely on the literal meaning of the words would lead to the 
conclusion that the requirement of "lision corporelle" isop/not satisfied by mental injury alone -z— .
However, the literal meaning of Article 17 would not 
necessarily be seen by French courts as a sufficient ground 
for deciding whether the conditions of an air carrier’s 
liability are met. Other relevant factors would lead to a 
more liberal interpretation of the Article. Firstly, there 
is no evidence that the drafters of the Convention wanted 
the result which would be obtained by a literal interpreta­
tion, i.e. that a carrier is not liable in cases of mental 
injury alone. It is likely that they did not envisage this 
prospect . A literal interpretation of the text would
prevent recovery for a certain kind of damage, and this atti­
tude was alien to most of the drafters of the Convention. 
Moreover, a liberal interpretation of the text would be more 
in line with the spirit of the Convention, which placed as 
light a burden as possible on the plaintiff, as a counter­
part for the limitation of the carrier’s liability .
91/ In that sense, see M. de Juglart, Traits illmentaire de 
droit a§rien (Paris, 1952), p. 33°•
92/ This was underlined in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 
where the court was interpreting "bodily injury", at 13 Avi. 
17,609.
93/ on the general principles of the Convention, see above 
Chapter 4, pp. 97ff.
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Reading "lesion corporelle" as including mental
injury would also have the important advantage of avoiding 
any discrepancy between the meaning ot the authentic English 
and French texts of the Guatemala City Protocol. Otherwise, 
the carrier would be liable in more cases on the basis of 
the English text (v/hich only requires "personal injury") 
than on the basis of the French text (which still requires
the two authentic texts cannot be solved according to the 
guideline contained in the final sentence of the Protocol 
which provides that in the case of any inconsistency between 
the authentic texts, "the text in the French language, in 
which the Warsaw Convention of 12 October 1929 was drawn up, 
shall prevail", because,here, it is the text of reference 
which is doubtful, the English text being perfectly clear.
This paradoxical situation seems to be due to the fact that, 
generally speaking, the attribution of priority to one au­
thentic text over the other is made because it is the language 
of the draft that was primarily considered . However, the 
French text was given priority in the Guatemala City Protocol, 
not because it was the primary vehicle of discussion, but 
because the original Warsaw Convention was drawn up in French 
only. By contrast, it seems that the amendments to Article 17 
were drafted in English. Thus, presumably, the intent of the 
drafters is better expressed in the English text than in the 
French text. Giving a literal interpretation to the French 
text would then be in direct contradiction to the drafters* 
intent.
directly relevant in construing the original Convention. But 
whatever interpretation of "lesion corporelle" is given in 
relation to the original Convention, it is bound to create 
a precedent which will be considered when the time comes to 
construe "lesion corporelle" in the amended Article 17.
94/ above pp. I88-I89.
95/ A. Malintoppi, "The Uniformity of Interpretation of 
International Conventions on Uniform Laws and of Standard 
Contracts", in The Sources of the Law of International 
Trade (C. Schmittof ed., London, 19&4), 127 at p. 133*
The problem of discrepancy between
It should be kept in mind that this argument is not
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In brief, no definite answer can be given to the 
question of how "lesion coroorelle" would be read by a French 
court. A literal interpretation would exclude mental injury, 
but a more liberal construction could easily include mental 
injury within "lesion corporelle". A carrier would then be 
liable for mental injury alone.
5) Comparison.
It is hard to compare the positions of the common 
lav; and of French law on the issue of compensable damages 
under Article 17. The common law countries offer several 
widely differing cases while there is no French case dealing 
specifically with the matter. However, this absence is by 
itself significant since it may be seen as expressing the 
absence of prohibition placed by French law as a matter of 
principle against recovery of certain kinds of damage. The 
same rule was naturally applied in Warsaw cases. At the 
same time, common law courts had to assess which types of 
damage could be compensated against the background of the 
numerous technical rules governing recovery, particularly 
in wrongful death cases and in cases of nervous shock or 
other mental suffering.
In relation to the specific question of recovery 
where there is mental injury alone, cases have until now 
only arisen in the United States. The Rosman decision 
adopted a strict interpretation of "bodily injury", preclud­
ing recovery for mental injury alone whilst the Husserl 
decision used a liberal construction, allowing recovery
The same split could have happened between courts 
interpreting "lesion corporelle". In Burnett, the American 
court adopted a strict interpretation of that phrase and 
held that a claim for mental injury alone could not be 
compensated 22/1 it should be noted that the court read in
26/
96/ above p. 184-185. 97/ above p. 194.
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"corporel" the connotations which are present in the word 
"bodily". But whilst a literal reading of "bodily injury" 
appears to exclude mental injury because of the meaning of 
"bodily", the exclusion of mental injury by "lSsion corpo- 
relle" would be done on the basis of the word " lesion" and 
not on the basis of the word "corporel".
A liberal construction could also be adopted by a 
court interpreting "lesion corporelle" . The reasoning used 
in the American case of Husserl in relation to "bodily 
injury" could easily be used by a French court construing 
"lesion corporelle". There is no express mention of mental 
injury in the Convention. Whatever the reason for the 
drafters' silence — perhaps the matter was overlooked — it 
can be argued that for the civil law lawyers who predominated 
amongst the drafters of the Convention the exclusion of a 
particular type of damage would have been alien. Had such an 
exclusion been desired, it certainly would have been explic­
itly stated. A French court interpreting Article 17 would 
similarly be inclined to require an express provision to 
exclude mental injury before introducing a distinction be­
tween types of damage which is a departure from the normal 
French law rules.
There is no direct indication on the attitude which
could be adopted by Australian, Canadian, or English courts.
The liberal attitude which prevailed in Preston v. Hunting98/Air Transport -z—/ is of little help here because it dealt 
only with assessing the extent of damages once the conditions 
of existence of the carrier's liability had been satisfied. 
The issue appears open and a court could decide either way.
The consequences of a strict or a liberal inter­
pretation depend on the role that a particular court attrib­
utes to Article 17* If Article 17 is seen as regulating the 
type of damage to be compensated, a literal reading will • 
prevent compensation for mental injury alone. Damages may
38/  [1956] 1 Q.B. 454 (Q.B. 1956).
201
may be obtained only when mental injury is accompanied by 
physical injury, and is shown to result from physical injury. 
With a liberal reading of Article 17» all these difficulties 
would disappear and mental injury could be readily compensated.
If Article 17 is seen as determining only the condi­
tions in which liability may be engaged, and not the question 
of compensable damages, a liberal interpretation will result 
in seeing mental injury as satisfying the conditions for the 
carrier*s liability to be engaged. The type of injury to be 
compensated will then be determined by a substantive law 
which may be either the lex fori, or the law selected by 
the conflict of laws rule of the forum. If Article 17 is 
interpreted strictly, the carrier's liability cannot be 
engaged when there is mental injury alone since the condi­
tions of existence of liability are not met. But if there 
is some physical injury, these conditions are met and the 
situation is identical to the previous one. The applicable 
substantive law will determine the compensable damages, 
including the question of whether there must be a causal 
link between the alleged mental injury and the physical 
injury.
Section 3- - The accident took place on board the aircraft, 
or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking.
Accidents taking place.on board, or when entering, or 
alighting from, the aircraft.
A situation is undoubtedly within the definition 
of Article 17 when the accident takes place when the pas­
senger is physically on board the aircraft, or when he is 
entering, or alighting from, the aircraft, these two steps
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being unquestionably part of embarking or disembarking 22/ % 
Several American decisions have made it clear that in these 
cases, there is no need to investigate the special circums­
tances surrounding the occurrence of the damage. In Scarf v . 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. =^22/1 the passenger was boarding 
a plane operated by the defendant airline. Another plane, 
operated by the same defendant, passed close by and its 
propeller blast moved the ramp which plaintiff was mounting, 
causing him injury. It was held that the claim was within 
the scope of Article 17* The fact that the accident had been 
caused by the navigation of a plane other than that on which 
the plaintiff was a passenger was dismissed as irrelevant.
In Herman v. Tra.ns World Airlines, Inc. ^22=/1 the plaintiff 
was a passenger on a plane which was hijacked and diverted 
to a desert location in Jordan where it remained for a week.
The plaintiff claimed damages for fright and distress suffered 
during that week. The court held that Article 17 had been 
complied with because the plaintiff’s damage had been sustained 
both while on board the aircraft during the flight (when the 
hijacking commenced), and while physically on board during 
the subsequent week of detention in the desert (while the 
hijacking was still in progress) 223/ %
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. 203/ -the air­
craft had been diverted by a hijacking from its normal route 
and had landed on a desert airstrip located some distance 
from Amman, Jordan. The plaintiff and other women and children 
were moved to a hotel in Amman after twenty-four hours on 
board the hijacked aircraft. If the court had adopted a 
literal construction of Article 17» whatever had happened
See for instance LeGall-Kerjean c. Pichon, D.S. 1973» J» 
note P. Chauveau (Cass, civ. 2me, 4 June 1973)«
100/ 4 Avi. 17,795 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), 4 Avi. 17,823 (S.D. N.Y. 
1955), aff»d, 4 Avi. 18,076 (2d Cir. 1956).
101/ 12 Avi. 17,304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). The point was not 
considered in the subsequent decisions of the Appellate 
Division (12 Avi. 17,634) and of the Court of Appeals (in 
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi. 17,231, 1974).
102/ at 12 Avi. 17,305-
103/ 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)-
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in the Amman hotel would have been outside the scope of the 
Convention since it would have taken place neither on board 
the aircraft, nor during any of the operations of embarking 
or disembarking. But the removal of plaintiff from the air­
craft did not trouble the court which stated i
" The drafters of the Convention undoubtedly 
assumed that the time 'on board the aircraft* 
included all of the time between embarkation 
at the origin of a flight and disembarkation 
at a scheduled destination of a flight."104/
It is risky to thus invoke the drafting history 
which is particularly confusing in relation to Article 17 }=Q^/ 
It was only at the last moment that the Warsaw delegates 
rejected the draft elaborated by CITEJA and referred the 
matter to a drafting committee without providing any guide­
line as to the precise content of the new text However,
it is true that many of the drafters assumed that the carrier 
would be liable for damages occurring between departure and 
arrival. This was particularly clear in the CITEJA draft 
which provided that the carrier would be liable from the 
moment the passenger entered the airport of departure until 
the moment he left the airport of destination. But this 
assumption was based in turn on the presumption that the 
carrier would be liable only when there was actual carriage 
by air. The same article of the CITEJA draft expressly 
provided that the period of carriage during which the carrier 
was liable was exclusive of any carriage outside the limits 
of an airport whatsoever, apart from the case of carriage by 
aircraft. The same idea was expressed by several delegates 
to the Warsaw Conference who insisted that the carrier would 
stop being liable in the case of a forced landing, especially 
outside an airport, as soon as the passenger left the air-
104/ at 17,607.
10 5/ see the lengthy and heated exchange of views in 11erne 
Conference internationale, pp. 46-57*
106/ The CITEJA draft read t"La Periode du transport . . . 
s'Utend du moment ou les voyageurs, marchandises ou bagages 
entrent dans 1'aerodrome de depart jusqu'au moment ou ils 
sortent de 1'aerodrome de destination ; eile ne couvre aucun 
transport quelconque, hors des limites d'un aerodrome, autre 
que par a6ronefs."
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craft or its immediate vicinity ^ 2/
These ideas were not expressly included in the final 
draft of Article 17, but the assumption remained that the 
liability of the carrier could exist only if damage was 
related to the carriage by air. But this appears only when 
Article 1? is read in the context of the general liability 
regime adopted by the Warsaw Convention — ^ . Article 20(1), 
which allows a carrier to be exonerated from liability if 
he proves that he or his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage, or that it was impossible to 
take such measures, was an essential part of the original 
liability regime. It was emphasized in the CITEJA report to 
the Warsaw Conference ^ 2/1 and during the Conference it­
self •^^///, that a carrier could exonerate himself from lia­
bility if he proved that the damage was due to the fault of 
a third person, be it the airport authority, or another 
carrier using the airport facilities. The situation was 
summed up during the Warsaw proceedings by the Rapporteur 
who said that there was a presumption of carriage between 
the moment of departure and the moment of arrival .
Contrary evidence could of course be given, establishing 
that the carrier could not take the measures which would 
have avoided the damage because there was no carriage at the 
particular time . Thus, Article 20(1) was seen to serve
the dual purpose of (i) rebutting the presumption of lia­
bility, and (ii) rebutting the presumption of carriage.
107/ Ileme Conference Internationale, pp. 47 (British dele­
gate )~ 49 (Hungarian delegate) .
108/ On that regime, see above p.lOlff.
109/ Heme Conference Internationale, Documents, p. 164.
110/ Ileme Conference Internationale, pp. 53 (Rapporteur) and 
56 (Rapporteur).
Ill/ Heme Conference Internationale,• p. 53*
112/ Ileme Conference Internationale, p. 53*
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However, this reading of Article 20(l) is not the 
only possible one. It can be argued that Article 20(1) does 
not rebut the presumption of carriage but applies only to 
rebut the presumption of liability during carriage. Thus, 
it would be open to the carrier to simply use the facts of 
the case to establish that the damage was not sustained 
during the period of carriage covered by Article 1?.
Ascertaining the manner in which the presumption
of carriage contained in Article 17 can be rebutted is of
particular importance when a carriage is governed by the
111/Convention together with the Montreal Agreement -- ** . The
air carriers who are parties to the Montreal Agreement have 
waived their right to avail themselves of Article 20(l).
Thus, if Article 20(l) is the only way to rebut the presump­
tion of carriage existing between embarkation and disembar­
kation, the Montreal Agreement prevents the carrier from 
rebutting this presumption. But if the presumption of car­
riage can be rebutted by other means, the carrier still has 
the possibility to establish that the damage is not within 
the scope of Article 17 because it occurred outside the period 
of carriage, although between embarkation and disembarkation.
In Husserl, the court construed Article 17 as estab­
lishing an unrebuttable presumption of carriage between 
embarkation and disembarkation. This can be justified on 
the basis that (i) the presumption of carriage created by 
Article 17 can be rebutted only through Article 20(l) and 
(ii) that Swissair, which is a party to the Montreal Agree­
ment, had waived its right to use that particular defence.lt 
follows that Swissair is liable even if the damage occurred 
in a hotel in Amman before the passengers were flown back to 
Zurich. But this cannot be justified on the basis of the 
intent of the drafters of the Convention who clearly wanted 
to establish a rebuttable presumption.
113/ On the Montreal Agreement, see above
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Should a situation similar to that of Husserl 
arise in other courts, the first problem would be whether 
to use a literal construction of Article 17. If used, 
damages occurring outside the aircraft, and outside the 
scope of operations of embarking or disembarking, would not 
be within Article 17. If» however, the court went beyond a 
literal construction of the text, the next step would be to 
determine the applicability of the Montreal Agreement v/hich 
will establish whether the carrier can use Article 20 to 
exonerate himself from liability. After that, everything 
would depend on how the court thought the presumption of 
carriage of Article 17 could be rebutted. If it is only 
through Article 20(l), the carrier would have no escape in 
a situation governed by the Montreal Agreement. If it can be 
done by other means, he could show that the damage is outside 
the scope of Article 17 because it is not related to the 
carriage by air.
Showing that damages are not related to the carriage 
by air may be difficult. It is interesting to note that, in 
Husserl, the court used this difficulty as an additional 
argument to justify imposing liability on the carrier. It 
was stated :
" it would be extremely difficult to determine 
what part of plaintiff*s alleged injuries 
was caused directly by the accident on the 
aircraft, what part was caused by events 
proximately caused by the accident, and what 
part was caused by events not proximately 
caused by the accident, by the negligence of 
the carrier, or by a breach of contract."114/
114/ at 13 Avi. 17,607.
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Accidents taking place during the operations of embarking 
or disembarking.
Several cases have considered whether particular 
accidents took place in the course of "any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking". They dealt with accidents 
that occurred within an airport. Courts in the United States 
and France have affirmed the principle that the applicabil­
ity of the Convention is not limited to the time of boarding, 
or alighting from, the aircraft Beyond that, their
reasoning differs. Several French decisions used the fact 
that passengers were escorted by the carrier*s hostesses as 
indicating that Article 17 was applicable a But, in
Machl c. Air France , the Cour de Cassation held that
element insufficient to establish that there was an operation 
of embarking or disembarking. The court required that the 
place of occurrence of the damage be "exposed to risks
*1 I O  /
inherent to air navigation and exploitation" ---' . If a
passenger is present in such an area, the applicability of 
the Convention will automatically follow. The Machl ruling 
has been followed in several subsequent decisions ^=2/, A
115/ In the United States : Bergsman v. El A1 Israel Airlines, 
10 Avi. 17,3^6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct” 1967)• In France : Machl c . Air 
France, (1963) 26 R.G.A. 275 (C.A. Paris, 28 June I963") • That 
was later the object of a cassation but it was approved on 
that particular point by the Cour de Cassation, (1966) 29 
R.G.A.E. 32, note E. du Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire, 18 January 
1966) at p. 34.
116/ Machl c. Air France, (1963) 26 R.G.A. 275 (C.A. Paris,
28 June 1963)» rev1d , (1966) 20 R.G.A.E. 32, note E. du 
Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire, 18 January 1966) ; Fratani-Bassaler 
c. Air France, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 201 (C.A. Aix-en-Provence, 
l4 November 1967)•
117/ (1966) 20 R.G.A.E. 32, note E. du Pontavice (Cass. civ. 
Ire, 18 January 1966).
118/ "expos! aux risques inhlrents a la navigation et a 1'ex­
ploitation alrienne" at p. 3^ *
119/ Machl c. Air France, (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 289 (on remand 
after cassation) (C.A . Rouen, 12 April 1967) ; Cie Air France 
c. Nicoli, (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 173» note Georgiades (C.A. Pa­
ris, 2 April I97I) ; Gastaud c. Alroport de Paris, (1972)
26 R.F.D.A. 168 (T.G.lT Paris, 11 February 1972).
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different approach was used in Forsius c. Cie Air Franc e-^ ^. 
The plaintiff fell in a corridor on the first floor of the 
airport, on her way to the plane. The court found that the 
accident had not happened in the course of any of the oper­
ations of embarking or disembarking because it had occurred
"in a place used in common by a great number of passengers,
121/customers of several different air carriers" ---' . Although
the tribunal did not use the test laid down in Mach6, there 
is no inconsistency between its reasoning and the MachS test. 
It cannot be said that a corridor within an airport is exposed 
to risks inherent to air navigation.
In the United States, different reasoning is used 
depending on whether the accident took place before boarding 
the plane, or after alighting from the plane. In dealing
with a 
Canada
disembarking passenger, the court in MacDonald v. Air
122/ said :
" it would seem that the operation of disembarking 
has terminated by the time the passenger has 
descended from the plane by the use of whatever 
mechanical means have been supplied and has reached 
a safe point inside the terminal . . . "  123/
124 /In Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,---' the court
listed the steps accomplished by the passenger between the 
time she had passed the airplane door until the accident 
which happened on a "down escalator" going to the baggage 
claim area. It was held that, when the accident occurred, 
the plaintiff had disembarked from the aircraft, and conse­
quently the Convention was inapplicable. The MacDonald test 
of having reached a safe area inside the terminal was not
120/ (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 216 (T.G.I. Paris, 19 February 1973). 
121/ at p. 217.
122/ 11 Avi. 18,029 (1st Cir. 1971).
123/ at p. 18,030.
124/ 13 Avi. 17,145 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).'
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referred to in Felismina. But, had it been used, the results
would have been similar to those achieved since the escalator
giving access to the baggage claim area is normally a safe
point inside the terminal.
The situation of an embarking passenger was treated
in a very different manner in Day v. Trans World Airlines,12 5/Inc. -- “  . In that case, the plaintiffs had been victims of
a terrorist attack perpetrated in the travel lounge of a 
Greek airport while they were lining up for a hand baggage 
check and physical search conducted by the Greek police 
prior to boarding. Besides general policy considerations 
justifying why airlines should bear the cost of airport 
violence, the court advanced technical reasons to show that, 
when the attack occurred, the passengers were in the process 
of embarking. The court dismissed as irrelevant the place 
where the plaintiffs were when the attack occurred :
" The issue as to any plaintiff is not where his 
feet were planted when the killing began but 
rather in what activity was he engaged." 126/
The court described the various operations of embarking 
which all had to be performed before entering the plane.
Of the eleven necessary steps listed, ranging from present­
ing tickets at the checking desks to walking onto the air­
craft, the court found that the passenger had completed 
five and concluded :
" any person who has accomplished as many as five 
out of the above-mentioned eleven essential acts 
without which it would be impossible to travel on 
the flight, within an uninterrupted time sequence, 
and was perforce lined up to perform the balance 
of the required acts sequentially is within the 
plain meaning of [Article 17]." 127/
125/ 13 Avi. 17,647 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
126/ at p. 17,649.
127/ at p. 17,650.
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It is on that basis that the case of disembarking passengers
was distinguished. A disembarking passenger is not "herded
in lines, and has few activities if any, which the carrier
requires him to perform at all, or in any specific sequence
as a condition of completing his journey"-^^. But it was
obvious for the court that anything having occurred during
the operations of embarking, as defined by it, was ipso
facto part of the risks inherent in air carriage and was,
129 /as such, covered by Article 17 — 27 .
After having reached its conclusion on the basis of 
the plain wording of Article 17, the court found further 
support in the drafting history of Article 17. The court 
noted that the drafters wanted to provide for situations 
where a passenger is exposed to certain risks inherent in 
aviation before he boards the plane and after he has left 
the plane^Üfie risks to which he would be subject were to 
be established by "a test based on a purposeful activity 
* embarking1 . " 232^
It is suggested that there may be risks in utilizing
the drafting history of Article 17 alone to determine what
risks were considered by the drafters to be within Article 
132/17 — • Article 17's formula was selected because any 
inherent excesses in it would have been excluded by Article 
20(l). The two articles together were seen by the drafters 
as establishing the basic liability regime of the air carrier, 
i.e. a regime where the fault of the carrier is presumed, the 
presumption being rebutted when the carrier proves through 
Article 20(l) that he was not negligent 233/ 1 Article 20(l) 
was constantly referred to in the debates on Article 17, 
because the meaning of each article is intimately linked to
128/ at p. 17,651. 129/ at p. 17,651.
130/ at p. 17,651. See in that sense Heme Conference Inter­
nationale , pp. 46-57«
131/ at p. 17,651.
132/ See for instance the difficulties discussed in relation 
to Husserl above p. 203.
133/ above p. 101.
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the contents of the other. Accordingly, in cases governed 
by the Warsaw Convention as modified in accordance with 
the Montreal Agreement which takes away the carrier's right 
to rely on Article 20(l), it seems artificial to go to the 
drafting history of Warsaw in relation to problems arising 
under Article 17. The intent of the drafters as to the scope 
of the presumption of liability they were elaborating is one 
thing. It is questionable whether the scope would have been 
identically defined had the drafters established a regime 
of absolute liability.
Comparison.
The essential difference between the American and 
French decisions is that the former applied Article 17 in 
conjunction with the Montreal Agreement while the latter 
applied Article 17 alone. The change introduced by the 
Montreal Agreement appears particularly clearly in the 
Husserl and Day cases. On the basis of the Convention alone, 
the carrier could have pleaded that he had taken all neces­
sary measures to avoid the damage, and could have been 
exonerated from liability. This was impossible because the 
Montreal Agreement applied.
A comparison of the cases assessing whether embar­
kation or disembarkation were in progress at the time of the 
accident which caused the damage does not immediately reveal 
a clear contrast. The French cases mainly focus on the phys­
ical location of the passenger within an airport, the Cour 
de Cassation emphasizing the fact that the Convention applies 
only when a passenger is present in an area subject to risks 
inherent to air navigation or air exploitation. The attitude 
of American courts in cases of disembarking passengers is in 
fact quite similar ; a safe point within an airport is cer­
tainly not subject to the risks inherent to air navigation.
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Thus, the same conclusion would have presumably been reached 
had these cases been argued in a French court.
A difference appears in relation to embarking 
passengers. The District Court in Day rejected the test of 
the physical location of the passenger to concentrate on 
assessing the purpose of the activity of the passenger at 
the time of the accident. No such change has taken place in 
France where embarking and disembarking passengers are treated 
in the same way . it is likely that the Cour de Cassation
would not characterize a transit lounge as an area subject 
to risks inherent to air navigation. There would thus be a 
discrepancy between the solutions achieved in French and in 
American courts.
The difference is not diminished by the fact that 
in both the Mache and the Day cases, reference was made to 
the risks inherent to air navigation or air carriage. The 
purpose of that reference is not the same. In the French 
analysis, one establishes whether a passenger is exposed to 
risks inherent to air carriage in order to ascertain whether 
he was embarking or disembarking whilst, in the American 
analysis, one establishes whether a passenger was embarking 
in order to show that he was exposed to risks inherent to 
air carriage, thus justifying the application of Article 17.
134/ For disembarking passengers : MachS c. Air France,
(1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 32, note E. du Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire, 
18 January 1966) ; Gastaud c. A^roport de Paris, (1972)
26 R.F.D.A. 168 (T.G.I. Paris, 11 February 1972). For an 
embarking passenger : Cie Air France c. Nicoli, (1971) 25 
R.F.D.A. 173» note E. Georgiades (C.A. Paris, 2 April 1971)»
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Chapter SEVEN. - LIABILITY FOR THE CARRIAGE OF CHECKED
BAGGAGE AND GOODS .
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the 
event of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any 
checked baggage or any goods if the occurrence which caused 
the damage took place during the carriage by air. Article 
18(2) and 18(3) define the concept of carriage by air.
Section One. - Meaning of "carriage by air".
Article 18(2) provides that "carriage by air" 
comprises "the period during which the baggage or cargo is 
in charge of the carrier, whether in an aerodrome or on 
board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside an 
aerodrome, in any place whatsoever." Thus, if there is a 
landing outside an aerodrome, Article 18*s requirements 
are satisfied when the carrier is in charge of the goods.
In other cases, the definition has two elements : (i) the 
goods are in charge of the carrier, and (ii) the goods are 
in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft.
Is the coincidence of the two elements in the definition 
necessary ?
In most cases, there is a coincidence between the 
two elements of the definition of Article 18(2) : the damage 
occurred while the goods were either in an airport or on 
board an aircraft and while they were in charge of the car­
rier. In such cases, there is undoubtedly carriage by air
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within the meaning of Article 18(2) ^ ,
The plain meaning of Article 18 clearly indicates 
that there can be "carriage by air" only when the two ele­
ments of the definition are present in a particular situa­
tion. If only one element of the definition is present, i.e. 
the carrier is not in charge of the goods even though the 
goods are in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft, or the 
carrier is in charge of the goods even though the goods 
are neither in an aerodrome nor on board an aircraft, the 
consequence ought to be that there is no carriage by air. 
However, a few isolated cases appear to have been satisfied 
that there could be carriage by air on the strength of only 
one of these elements.
1/ See for instance i
- in the United Kingdom : Westminster Bank v. Imperial 
Airways, Ltd. [l936j 2 All E.R. 890, 55 Lloyd's Rep. 242
(k .b . 1936).
- in the United States j Wing Hang Bank Ltd, v. Japan Air 
Lines Co. Ltd., 12 Avi. 17,885 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) ; Eve 
Boutique Imports, Inc, v. Seaboard Airlines, Inc., 10 Avi. 
17,703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19^8) ; Rugani v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch 
Airlines, 1954 U.S. Av. Rep. 74 (N.y7 City Ct„ 1954) ;
- in France : Syndicat d*assurances des Lloyds c. Ste A£ro- 
fret, (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 168, J.C.P. 1967.II.15261 (1st 
case), note M. de Juglart and E. du Pontavice (C.A. Paris, 
27 June 1966), aff'd, (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. 
com. 22 April 1969) ; Air Express International Agency 
(France) c. ,^te Marais & Cie, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 79 (C. A. 
Paris, 13 January 1968). It is interesting to note that
in this case the goods had been carried from the airport 
of arrival to another airport where the carrier's warehouse 
was located. The goods were within an airport, thus ful­
filling the literal requirements of Article 18. Had the 
goods been damages during the transit between airports, 
then Article 18(3) rather than 18(2) would have been 
applicable.
See also the two following French cases : St£ Vve Ter- 
rasson c. Ste Messageries Nationales, (1957) 11 R.F.D.A.
31, note E. Georgiades” (Cass. civ. com. 11 January 1958), 
aff'g Ste La Neuchateloise c. Ste Aero Cargo, (1951) 5 
R .F .D.Ä"! 44Ö (C . A . Lyon 12 November 1951) ; .St£ Nouvelle- 
des Transports Mondiaux c. Air France, (i960") l4 R.F.D.A. 
317T note E. Georgiades (C.A. Paris, 14 March i960).
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In the Lebanese case of Italia Film c. Ets Georges 
Asfour —7 , the consignee had been notified of the arrival 
of the goods at their destination but he waited for more 
than three years before collecting them. When he did, the 
goods had been returned to the consignor. The court con­
sidered that the return of the goods had taken place during 
the "carriage by air" which is "the period during which the 
carrier is in charge of the goods" ^ . The court deduced 
from its analysis the paradoxical conclusion that because 
the "carriage by air" had not ended when the goods were 
returned, the Convention was applicable and the action 
against the carrier was time-barred because more than two 
years had elapsed since the arrival of the goods at their 
destination.
4/The Indian case of Dabrai v. Air India —7 offers a 
clear contrast to that Lebanese decision. Gold had been 
transported from Karachi to Bombay. The gold arrived safely 
but it was stolen from an iron cage in the Bombay office of 
the carrier where it had been placed awaiting delivery to 
the consignee. The court decided that in the ordinary sense 
of the words, one cannot include in the expression "carriage 
by air" the mere storage of goods after they are transported 
by aircraft to the destination and are awaiting delivery. 
Once the goods have reached the destination and have been 
carried to an office where they are to remain in storage 
until called for by the consignee, it cannot be said that 
there is any continuing carriage by air. Since the carriage 
by air had come to an end, the carrier could be liable only 
as a bailee. But, as a bailee, he was free to contract him­
self out of his liability» The air waybill contained such
2/ (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 109 (Trib. Beirut, 11 February 1969). 
y  at p, 111.
4/ 42 A.I.R., N.U.C. 18 (High Court Bombay, 1953)*
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a clause which was valid insofar as it did not apply to 
the "carriage "by air" defined by the Convention , Thus, 
although the carrier was in charge of the goods, the car­
riage by air had ended because they had reached their des­
tination and were awaiting delivery in the carrier's office. 
Had the facts of the case made it absolutely clear that the 
goods were in a city office, the Dabrai case could also have 
been taken as standing for the proposition that the two ele­
ments of the definition of Article 18(2) must be present if 
there is to be "carriage by air". But the facts are not 
detailed enough to unequivocally sustain that proposition.
There is one common law case which might be read 
as not requiring that the carrier be in charge of the goods 
during the carriage by air. In the Canadian case of United 
International Stables Ltd, v. Pacific Western Airlines —' ,
plaintiffs had chartered a plane to transport several pacers 
from New Zealand to Canada. One of the pacers broke out of 
his stall during the flight and endangered the plane. The 
captain destroyed the horse. The plaintiff sued the airline. 
The airline argued in defence, inter alia, that it could be 
liable only during the period in which the horses were "in 
charge of the carrier", and that they were never in its 
charge because the plaintiff's handlers had charge of the 
horses throughout. To reject the argument, the court relied 
on contractual and tariff provisions arranging for the car­
rier to be in over-all charge of the animals. In addition, 
the court said that the purpose of Article 18(2) was
" to fix the commencement and termination of 
responsibility. It was not intended to exclude 
liability in cases in which the consignor or 
consignee assists in caring for the cargo." 2/
5/  Such a clause can have no effect when the Convention 
applies, pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention. See 
above pp. 109-111.
6/ 5 D .L.R.3d 67 (Brit. Col. Sup. Ct. 1969).
1/ at p. 77-
21? -
Thus, even if the carrier was not fully "in charge" of the 
cargo, there would nevertheless be carriage by air within 
the meaning of Article 18(2). However, this interpretation 
is not of great authority because the court had previously 
found that, according to the contract, the carrier was in 
charge of the goods. The case is more interesting when read 
in relation to the meaning of being in charge of the goods, 
as will shortly be seen.
While the cases requiring the coincidence of the 
two elements of the definition of carriage by air certainly 
comply with the plain meaning of Article 18(2), it is inte­
resting to observe that the cases which considered the fact 
that the carrier was in charge of the goods of minor impor­
tance might comply with the intent of the drafters of the 
Convention. Article 18(2) was designed to delineate the 
scope of the liability of air carriers ^ , There was no 
doubt among the delegates at the Warsaw Conference that 
there would be liability when goods were on board an air­
craft. But from when, and until when, would the carrier be 
liable on the basis of the Convention ? Two systems were 
advocated. The first one relied only upon the carrier being 
in charge of the goods. The second one relied only upon the 
presence of the goods in an airport. Finally, the delegates 
expressly adopted the criterium of the presence of the goods 
within an airport, and rejected the fact of the carrier 
being in charge of the goods as delineating the cases where 
there would be carriage by air ^ . This decision of prin­
ciple notwithstanding, the final text amalgamates the two 
systems, thus requiring the simultaneous presence of the 
two elements of the definition.
8/ CITEJA, Third session, May 1928, pp. 42ff. ; Heme Confe­
rence Internationale, pp. 46-57.
2/  Heme Conference Internationale, p. 57«
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When is a carrier in charge of the goods ?
The cases deal almost exclusively with the difficulty 
of assessing when the carrier ceases to be in charge of the 
goods It is mainly civil law courts which have consi­
dered this problem. Two early cases determined whether the 
carrier was in charge of the goods by considering whether 
the carrier could exercise actual control and supervision 
over the goods. Both cases dealt with the situation where
the goods had been handed over to the customs authorities.
11/In Favre v. Belgian State and Sabena — ' , the Brussels
Court of Appeal stated :
" . . .  from the moment when SABENA . . . has
complied with the customary obligation to 
deposit the goods with the customs authorities 
it is released from responsibility in respect 
of such goods, which cease to be under its 
control.
. . . SABENA had no right whatever of supervision 
over the goods once they had been handed over 
to the customs authorities, who were solely in 
charge of the storehouse." 12/
The same approach was implicitly adopted in the French case
of Cie Air Liban c. Cie Parisienne de Reescompte et Cie Air
France — “  . Much importance was placed on the fact that it
was not established that the theft of the goods had taken
place after the goods had been handed over to the customs 
14/authorities — ' . It seems that, had this fact been estab­
lished by the carrier, the court would have been satisfied 
that the transportation by air had ended.
10/ Most of the difficulties which might appear in relation 
to the moment when the carrier starts being in charge of the 
goods are solved on the basis of Article 11(1) of the Con­
vention which provides : "The air consignment note is prima 
facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract, of the 
receipt of the goods and of the conditions of carriage".
See Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours & Co. v. Schenkers Interna­
tional Forwarders Inc . , 12 Avi . 18,360 (N. Y. Sup. Ct". 1974) .
11/ 1950 U.S. Av. Rep. 392 (C.A. Brussels, 10 June 1950).
12/ at pp. 394-395-
13/ (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 320 (C.A. Paris, 31 May 1956).
14/ at p. 322.
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Later cases show a distinct change in attitude.
Instead of examining the facts in order to assess who is 
actually in charge of the goods, the courts assess who is 
legally in charge of the goods. In order to do that, the 
courts use the familiar concept of delivery, which marks 
the end of the carrier's duties in the general law of car­
riage, even though it is not mentioned in Article 18(2). As 
in the general law of carriage, the air carrier is seen as 
being in charge of the goods until delivery of the goods to 
the consignee or his agent has taken place. Delivery in 
that sense (acceptation de 1*envoi, or livraison) is the 
legal act by which the consignee accepts the goods. It is 
not the physical act by which the goods are placed within 
the actual control of the consignee (d^chargement, or enle­
vement) The two operations may coincide, but there may
be a lapse of time between them, because legal delivery can 
take place before or after the actual delivery .
that the damage had occurred during the transportation by 
air because the goods, which r
pretation necessarily rejected the carrier's defence that 
the goods were under the physical custody of the Customs 
Authorities. In Air Express International Agency (France) 
c. Ste Marais & Cie , the Paris Court of Appeal further 
indicated that the contract of carriage by air comes to an
15/ Clearly distinguishing livraison from the purely physi­
cal dechargement or enlevement : Carcassin c. Ste Gondrand 
Freres, D. i960.J . n o t e  R. Rodiere (C.A . Paris, 22 
December 1959) ; Defente c. Ets Gauthier, D.S. I966.J.5» 
note P. Durand (Cass. civ. com. 28 April 1965).
16/ see further Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, pp. l42ff. ; 
Ripert, Traite glementaire, p. 258.
17/ (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 168 (C.A . Paris, 27 June 1966), aff'd, 
T1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. com. 22 April 1969)•
18/ at p. 171.
19/ (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 79 (C.A. Paris, 13 January 1968).
Already, in Syndicat d*assurances des Lloyds c. 
Ste Aerofret f the Paris Court of Appeal had indicated
also under the legal custody
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end only when the consignee takes actual possession of the 
package. The same court made its reasoning much more explicit 
in Sprinks & Cie c. Air France ^ / , An ice cream confection­
ing machine was purchased in England. Air France carried it 
to Orly airport and cleared the machine through customs.
After customs, an Air France employee took it from the cus­
toms warehouse, and carried it to a quay so that it could 
be deposited on the consignee’s truck. During the last part 
of the handling, the machine was seriously damaged. Air 
France forcefully argued that its duties as an air carrier 
had already come to an end when the accident happened. The 
court rejected the argument and expounded the applicable 
principles :
" . . .  the transportation ends by the delivery of 
the cargo to its consignee or to the consignee's 
agent, or by placing the cargo at their disposal ;
. . . if that delivery . . .  is primarily a legal 
act which transfers the risk and the custody of 
the goods from the carrier to the consignee, it is 
necessarily accompanied by material acts (presenta­
tion of title, handling, displacing of the object, 
etc.) which purport to allow the consignee to 
materially take possession of the goods ; . . . 
sometimes, these acts can be out of phase and then, 
there is ground to search into the facts and cir­
cumstances of the case for the moment when there 
has been an agreement to operate the delivery 
between the carrier and the consignee — or his 
agent." 21/
It is by examining the facts of each case, and the particular 
contractual terms that the time of legal delivery must be 
assessed. In Sprinks, the court found that the custody of 
the goods had not been transferred to the consignee and, 
accordingly, held Air France liable for the damage. A 
similar attitude has since been adopted by the Beirut 
Court of Appeal .
20/ (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 405 (C.A . Paris, 2? June 1969).
21/ at p. 409.
22/ Transmediterranean Airlines c. Sleiman Bleybel, (1973) 
27 R.F.D. A. 347 (C . A . Beirut~i I6 November 1972) .
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The result achieved with the new approach is com­
pletely at odds with the findings of the previous decisions. 
The early cases based their reasoning on determining who 
was actually in charge ; they released the carrier after the 
goods had been handed to the customs authorities. The later 
cases base their reasoning on determining who is legally 
in charge. Since a carrier remains legally in charge until 
he is released by the only person who has the power to do 
so, i.e. the consignee or his agent, the physical presence 
of the goods in a customs warehouse is of no relevance. The 
carrier remains in charge throughout the customs operations 
until delivery to the consignee can be completed.
In most common law cases, the goods were in the 
carrier’s strong room or cargo room at the airport and thus 
in his physical control ^3/t These cases provide no indica­
tion as to when a carrier ceases to be in charge of the 
goods. The few cases touching on the issue do not provide
clear answers. In Alltransport Inc. v. Seaboard World Air- 24/lines — ' , the judge said that "in charge" must mean 
"actual custody and control", and that the Convention was 
concerned with physical custody and actual delivery, not 
constructive delivery. On that basis, the judge refused to 
allow the carrier to rely on the contractual conditions 
according to which delivery to the consignee was deemed 
completed when the goods were turned over to customs. This, 
for the court, did not put an end to the carrier being in 
charge of the goods. This could happen only by the physical 
handing over of the goods to the consignee.
23/ In the United Kingdom : Westminster Bank v. Imperial 
Airways, Ltd. [1936I 2 All E ~. R . 890”, 55 Lloyd”'s~Rep. 242 
(K.B. 193^)• in the United States : Eve Boutique Imports, 
Inc, v. Seaboard Airlines, Inc., 10 Avi. 17,703 (N.Y. Sup. 
1968") ; Rueani v . K . L. M . Royal Dutch Airlines, 1954 U.S.Av. 
Rep. 74 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
24/ 12 Avi. 18,163 (N.Y. City Ct. 1973)-
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It is also clear that the carrier will not stop 
being in charge of the goods when, for the performance of 
the carriage, the goods come under the actual custody of
another carrier. In Wins Hans Bank Ltd. v. Japan Air Lines,—
Co. — ^ , the plaintiff was a Hong Kong bank which had 
shipped a package of 15-5 kilos containing $U.S.250,000 
in bank notes. The consignee was a New York bank. The 
package was carried by Japan Air Lines to New York. At 
that time, the carrier did not have adequate facilities at 
the airport. Pursuant to an agreement, American Airlines 
had assumed the obligation of providing storage and of 
processing through customs all terminating freight received 
from Japan Airlines- The particular shipment was stored by 
American Airlines in its Valuable Cargo Area at the airport. 
Just before the consignee was due to take delivery of the 
package, armed robbers broke into the Valuable Cargo Area 
and stole plaintiff’s package. Although the physical control 
over the goods was exercised by American Airlines, and not 
by Japan Air Lines, the fact that the robbery had occurred 
during the ’'carriage by air" as defined by Article 18(2) 
of the Warsaw Convention was not disputed.
Similarly, in United International Stables Ltd, v. 
Pacific Western Airlines , the court made it clear that 
the carrier was legally in charge of the goods even though 
he might not have been in complete control of the consign­
ment of horses which were carried on the plane.
Since it is clear from the above cases that the 
carrier does not stop being legally in charge of the goods 
by the mere fact that the goods leave his actual control, 
it remains to ascertain when that legal control ends. There 
does not seem to be any obstacle to the application of the
2J5/ 12 Avi. 17,884 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
26/ 5 D.L.R.3d 67 (Brit. Col. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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general common law rules which determine the end of the 
transit period in cases of carriage. Not only are such 
rules consistent with the existing cases dealing with 
"carriage by air", but their application to Warsaw cases 
would explain the absence of specific difficulties in cases 
of carriage by air , At common law, the general rule is 
that the carrier’s duties end v/hen the goods have been 
tendered to the consignee, whether he has accepted them 
or not — In most cases, the carriage will simply end 
by the handing over of the goods to the consignee. But when 
the consignee refuses to accept delivery of the goods, the 
carriage may end without the goods having been handed over 
to him. For goods which are not to be delivered at the 
consignee’s premises, the guiding principles are provided 
by Chapman v. London & North Railway Co. where it was
established that transit ends when a reasonable time has 
elapsed after the arrival of the goods at the place of des­
tination.
Comparison.
Whatever the precise meaning common law courts would 
give to the requirement that the carrier be in charge of 
the goods, there is no ground to suppose that they would 
interpret it by using the concept of "delivery", which is 
not expressly mentioned in Article 18(2). It is not that 
the concept of delivery exists in one system and not in the 
other. On the contrary, it is known in both systems as a 
complex notion because of the superposition of a legal
27/ One of the reasons for the difficulties encountered by 
French courts was that, at first, the carrier ceased to be 
in charge of the goods as soon as he lost physical control. 
This analysis had to be rejected in order for the usual 
domestic rule to apply and determine the end of the car­
rier’s duties.
28/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 31^«
22/ (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 278 (Q.B. 1880). See also Williston 
On Contracts, Section 1113*
224 -
component (i.e. the agreement between contracting parties) 
on the material facts of discharging the goods and trans- 
fering them to the consignee -2^ /. Indeed, the problem of 
determining when delivery takes place and the solutions 
given to that problem are often similar in the various 
jurisdictions . Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that 
common law courts will follow French courts in determining 
the end of the period where the carrier is in charge of 
the goods by the moment when the goods are "delivered" to 
the consignee or his agent.
Several reasons support this assertion. Firstly, 
"delivery" plays a much more important role in French law 
than in common law. Most of the common law cases dealing 
with delivery elaborate the concept not as a general rule, 
but as a particular feature of the statute concerned, e.g. 
one of the various Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts which 
have embodied the Hague Rules, or a Sale of Goods Act. This 
differs from French law where the concept of livraison 
(delivery) stands on its own. Moreover, the concept of 
delivery plays a central role in the French law of car­
riage. As soon as delivery has taken place, a variety of
30/ The inherent complexity of "delivery" has created 
serious difficulties in the revision of the Uniform Law 
on the International Sales of Goods annexed to the Hague 
Convention of 1964, which is being carried out by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. See 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Year­
book,vol. 1 (1968-70), pp. 136, 170, 197 ; vol. 3 (1972TT 
pp. In that instance, delivery relates to the sale
of goods and not to a contract of carriage but the problems 
involved are essentially similar.
31/ Compare for instance : Sprinks & Cie c. Air France,
(1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 405 (C.A. Paris, 27 June I969) with 
National Packaging Corp. v. N.Y.K. Line, [1973] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ; American Hoesen Inc. v. Steamship 
"Aubade" , [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep." 423 (dV S . Carol". 1970") ; 
Automatic Tube Co. v. Adelaide Steamship (Operations^ Ltd. 
[1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 531 (Sup. Ct. West. Aust] I966) j~
The "Straat Cumnerland", [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 492 (Malaysia, 
State of Selangar, Kuala Lumpur Sessions Ct. 1973)*
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important effects automatically follow *2^ /. This is true 
in particular of the transfert des risques, i.e. if any­
thing happens to the goods before delivery, the carrier 
will bear the loss, but if it happens after delivery, the 
consignee will bear the loss. Delivery in French law assumes 
its full meaning only when it is considered within the 
framework of a contract of carriage. In the overall con­
ception of that contract, rights and duties are strictly 
distributed between the various parties involved at each 
stage of the operations. This is alien to the common law 
which has a more flexible approach in determining the res­
pective rights and duties of the parties to a contract of 
carriage -23/§
The second reason why common law courts are not 
likely to resort to the idea of delivery is the approach 
generally prevailing among them in matters of statutory 
interpretation. The case of Rambler Cvcle Co. v. F. & 0. 
Steam Navigation Co. ' provides an example of that 
approach in relation to a problem of misdelivery of goods 
after a carriage by sea. The Hague Rules define "carriage 
of goods" as "the period from the time when the goods are 
loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the 
ship" -2-2/. The court ruled that the Hague Rules governed 
the responsibilities and immunities of the carrier in 
relation to "the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, 
custody, care and discharge" of the goods, pursuant to 
Article II of the Rules. But the Hague Rules did not apply
32/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 142.
33/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 759-
34/ [1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 42 (Malaysia Fed. Ct., App. Juris. 
Singapore, 1964).
35/ Article 1(e).
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to "delivery" as well. The court stated :
" The operation of discharge is different from 
the operation of delivery. If the intention and 
object of the Hague Rules were to also provide 
for the responsibilities and liabilities, rights 
and immunities of a carrier in relation to the 
delivery of goods under a contract of carriage 
of goods by sea to which the Hague Rules apply, 
nothing v/ould have been simpler than to insert 
the word * delivery* after 'discharge' in Article ii." 36/
If the same approach is used in relation to the Warsaw 
Convention, it would follow that nothing would have been 
simpler than to refer to "delivery" in the definition of 
transportation by air. But no such reference exists.
In brief, it appears that the heart of the diver­
gence of the interpretations of common law courts and 
French courts is the fact that each system has simply 
applied to cases of carriage governed by the Warsaw Con­
vention the rules normally applicable to other cases of 
carriage. The differing constructions of Article 18(2) 
simply reflect the divergence between the principles 
applicable in the general law of carriage in each legal 
system.
Section 2. - Surface transport incidental to air 
carriage.
Article 18(3) provides s
" The period of the carriage by air does not extend 
to any carriage by land, by sea, or by river per­
formed outside an aerodrome. If, however, such a 
carriage takes place in the performance of a con­
tract for carriage by air, for the purpose of 
loading, delivery or transshipment, any damage 
is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, 
to have been the result of an event which took 
place during the carriage by air."
36/ at p. 50.
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The first sentence of the paragraph seems to be 
the logical complement of the definition of carriage by- 
air contained in Article 18(2). After having determined 
what constitutes carriage by air, the Convention indicates 
what is not to be included in the period of carriage by air, 
i.e. any carriage by land, by sea, or by river performed 
outside an airport. This is consistent with Article 31 of 
the Convention dealing with cases of combined carriage. 
Pursuant to Article 31» in the case of combined carriage 
performed partly by air and party by any other mode of 
carriage, the provisions of the Convention apply only to 
the carriage by air.
The British representative in the CITEJA was res- - 
ponsible for the last part of Article 18(3) . He ex­
plained that it may be impossible for a consignee to assess 
whether or not the loss or damage affecting the goods 
occurred during the carriage by air. In order to facilitate 
the task of plaintiffs in their action against air carriers, 
a presumption was established that the loss or damage was 
deemed to have occurred during the carriage by air, the 
carrier having the burden of proving that this is not the 
case in order to avoid the liability placed on him by the 
Convention. The CITEJA experts felt that the presumption 
ought to be restricted to cases of transportation inci­
dental to carriage by air so that the carrier is not unduly 
made answerable for the loss or damage affecting the goods 
if the carriage is partly performed by another mode of 
transportation -2^ /.
37/ CITEJA, Third Session, May 1928, pp. 42 ff. 
J8/ CITEJA, Third Session, May 1928, pp. 44-45.
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Article 18(3) has been applied in very few cases.
This might be due to the difficulty of assessing what is 
incidental to carriage by air -22/, it is only if surface 
transport can be seen as incidental to the carriage by air 
that the presumption can be applied. Otherwise, there is a 
situation of combined carriage in which a plaintiff must 
establish that the damage occurred during the carriage by 
air if he wishes to sue the air carrier. Take the example 
of goods carried from the airport of destination to their 
final destination by truck. An accident happens during the 
carriage by road. When the goods finally arrive, it is dis­
covered that they are damaged, but it is not known whether 
the damage occurred at the time of the truck's accident, or 
before the goods left the airport, i.e. during the carriage 
by air. If the carriage by road is seen as incidental to 
the carriage by air, the damage will be presumed to have 
happened during the carriage by air. But if the carriage 
by road is not incidental to the carriage by air, a plain­
tiff who sues the air carrier on the basis of the Warsaw 
Convention would have to establish first that the damage 
occurred during the carriage by air.
The cases where there might have been doubts as to
whether a particular carriage was incidental to carriage by
air did not use Article 18(3) because the parties admitted
that the damage had occurred during the transportation by 
40 /road — ' . There would have been no point for a shipper or 
a consignee to claim the benefit of Article l8(3)'s pre­
sumption that the damage had occurred during the carriage 
by air simply to have the carrier immediately rebut that 
presumption, as he is allowed to do by Article 18(3)*
39/ See further on that difficulty, H. Drion, Limitation of 
Liabilities in International Air Law (The Hague^ 195^) P .76.
4 o /  In the United States 1 Pick v. Lufthansa German Airlines. 
9 Avi. 18,077 (N.Y.City Ct. 1965). In France : Cie T.W.A. c. 
Guigui (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 333 (Cass, civ.com. 17 March 1966).
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Use of Article 18(3) in assessing what is "carriage by air".
If Article 18(3) has infrequently been relied upon 
for what appears to be its primary purpose, i.e. its pre­
sumption that a particular damage occurred during the car­
riage by air, it has been used in several cases for a rather 
different purpose. In these cases, the meaning of carriage 
by air as defined by Article 18(2) was in doubt ; the plain­
tiff then tried to use the presumption contained in Article 
18(3) to extend the notion of carriage by air so that it 
would include the occurrence of the damage. In Dabrai v.
, plaintiff sought to extend the period ofAir India
carriage by air in order to include the time when the goods 
were awaiting delivery to the consignee. There was no 
question of incidental carriage ; it was simply an attempt 
to avoid the consequences of the very narrow definition of 
carriage by air favoured by the court. The court refused 
to follow the plaintiff's argument.
In Sprinks & Cie c. Air France t the Paris Court 
of Appeal used Article 18(3) as an additional ground on 
which the air carrier was held liable for the damage which 
had occurred whilst an Air France employee was carrying the 
goods from the customs warehouse to the quay where the con­
signee was waiting for delivery. The court said that the 
damage occurred "during a surface transportation executed 
in view of delivery" and that, therefore, pursuant to the 
terms of Article 18(3)» the damage was presumed to have 
happened in the performance of the contract of carriage by 
air-r^This interpretation is rather odd. Firstly, it uses
41/ (1955) 42 A.I.R., N.U.C. 18 (High Ct. Bombay 1952). 
42/ (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 405 (C.A. Paris, 27 June 1969)■ 
43/ at p. 409.
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the presumption contained in Article 18(3) in a situation 
different from the situation envisaged in the article. In 
Sprinks, if it can be said that there was any incidental 
carriage, it took place v/ithin the airport. Article 18(3) 
is designed for incidental carriage performed outside an 
airport. Secondly, Article 18(3) which created the pre­
sumption that the damage occurred during the carriage by 
air allows the carrier to bring contrary evidence. In other 
words, the presumption disappears if it is established that 
the damage took place during the incidental carriage. Never­
theless, the court considered that the damage which, it 
v/as conceded, took place during an incidental carriage, was 
presumed to have occurred during the carriage by air. The 
presumption was designed to ease the task of plaintiffs in 
those cases when the time of occurrence of the damage is 
not known. If it is known, the particular time of occurrence 
will be either integral part of the carriage by air — within 
the meaning of Article 18(2) — or it will not be at all 
within the carriage by air. But it cannot be presumed to 
be part of the carriage by air.
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Chapter EIGHT. - LIABILITY FOR DELAY .
Article 19 provides that the carrier is liable for 
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of pas­
sengers, baggage, or goods. Three types of difficulties 
have appeared : (i) the materiality of delay, (ii) the 
meaning of "delay in the carriage by air", and (iii) the 
assessment of damages.
Section One. - The materiality of delay .
The notion of delay implies a discrepancy between 
the time when one party is entitled to expect the perform­
ance of the carrier’s duties and the time when these duties 
are actually performed. Most air carriers have sought to 
render the realization of delay impossible through their 
contractual clauses applicable to the carriage of passen­
gers ^  and the carriage of goods ^  It is stated that 
carriers are not bound by any indication of time that they 
have given for the completion of the carriage, or other 
words to that effect. The object of such clauses is to 
deny to the passenger / shipper the right to expect the 
performance of the carriage at a particular time. Since 
there is nothing with which the actual time of performance 
can be compared, no delay can appear.
1/ Passenger ticket, Conditions of Contract N .(9) ; I.A.T.A. 
Conditions, Resolution 275"b, General Conditions of Carriage 
(Passenger), Article X.
2/ Air waybill, Conditions of Contract (5) ; I.A.T.A. 
Resolution 600b.
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Such conditions must be carefully worded because 
Article 23 of the Convention declared null and void "any 
provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or 
to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this 
Convention." The conditions of carriage cannot simply pro­
vide that there will be no liability for delay ; such a 
provision, clearly relieving the carrier of the liability 
imposed by Article 19» would be null and void. The actual 
conditions of carriage do not openly contradict the terms 
of Article 19, but they deprive the article of any real 
meaning. The principle of liability for delay is respected, 
but the condition precedent to the application of the text, 
i.e. the existence of delay, is made unattainable.
Interpretation in civil law courts.
Some civil law courts have given full effect to
such a clause and plaintiffs thus failed in their action
3/because they could not prove the fact of delay . By 
contrast, it is only after having drastically curtailed 
the scope of such clauses that the majority of French 
cases have accepted the possibility of enforcing them. In 
Souillac c. Air France , a passenger was on a flight due 
to arrive at Fort-de-France, after a stop at Pointe-a-Pitre. 
After arrival at Pointe-a-Pitre, the last part of the jour­
ney was postponed until the following morning without any 
explanation from Air France. The plaintiff sued the company 
for the damage he had suffered because of that delay. Air
2 /  In France : Sti Gin£ral Air Fret c. St& TWA Trans World 
Airlines, (19561 10 R.F.D.A. 324, note E. Georgiades (Trib. 
com. Seine, 23 February 1956). In Germany : Scandinavian 
Airways System v. Wucherpfennig, (1955) 22 J. Air L. & Com. 
352. In the Netherlands : N.V. Heerfur t.v.v.d. Vellen-En 
Pelterijenhandel v. K.L.M.5 (19 6 2) I .A.T.A. Law Rep. FT 127 > 
~(C . A~, The Hague , 8 March 1962) .
4/ (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 15, note H. Matouk (T.G.I. Seine, 26 
June 1964).
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France relied on the ticket conditions attributing a purely
indicative value to the timetables. The court ruled that,
by virtue of Article 23.
" . . .  if it is admissible by reason of the 
risks specific to that mode of transportation 
that an air carrier can exonerate himself 
in advance of its liability for a minor delay, 
one cannot recognize any validity to a general 
clause of the contract of carriage tending to 
exonerate the carrier from the consequences of 
an important delay and a fortiori of a flight 
cancellation or postponment." ^/(emphasis added).
Similar reasoning had been previously adopted in Robert- 
Houdin c . St£ La Panair do Brasil ^ . Besides the argument 
that a contractual provision allowing a carrier almost un­
limited freedom to terminate, cancel, divert, postpone or 
delay any flight without notice violates the letter of 
Article 19, another argument was used by courts and commen­
tators to limit the effect of such a provision ^ . The 
raison d'etre of air transport is its rapidity. Air carriers 
cannot be allowed to escape liability when they fail to 
perform the carriage rapidly because this would eliminate 
their essential contractual duty. That argument was 
developed at length in St£ des Transports Clasquin c . St§ 
Socotra ^  ; it also appears in the Robert-Houdin case ^ , 
Thus it appears that the only effect produced by 
the provision of the Conditions of Carriage dealing with 
delay is to exonerate the carrier for cases of slight 
delay . It is not even certain that that result could
j5/ at pp. 18-19*
6/ (1961) 24 R.G.A. 285, note Sundberg (T .G .I.Seine,9 July 
i960); J.C.P. i96O.II.H83O, note M. de Juglart.
2/ see e.g. M. de Juglart, note at J.C.P. i960.II.II83O,
E. Georgiades, note at (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 324.
8/ (1949) 3 R.F.D.A. 204 (Trib. com. Seine, 17 January 1949).
3/  The same idea v/as used in Sof imex c . T . W. A . (1949) 3 
R.F.D.A. 201 (Trib. com. Seined 3o" July 1948), and in St£ 
General Air Fret c. St£ T.W.A. Trans World Airlines, (1956)
10 R.F.D.A. 32^ (Trib. com. Seine, 23 February 195"^ ) •
10/ This was expressly mentioned in Robert-Houdin and in
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be achieved if serious negligence was found against the 
carrier . In all cases v/here the delay is more than 
slight, the exonerating provisions of the Conditions of 
Carriage are not allowed to operate. The only way in which 
the carrier can be relieved of liability is to prove that 
he had taken all necessary measures to avoid the delay, or 
that it was impossible for him to take such measures, 
pursuant to Article 20(1)
Common law attitude.
Only one case dealing with this problem has been 
decided in common law jurisdictions, i.e. Bart v. British 
West Indian Airways, Ltd — “ , decided by the Guyana Court 
of Appeal. Bart, the plaintiff, had selected a winning 
combination worth more than £20,000 in a football pool 
organised by an English firm. By a series of delays, the 
package containing the football coupons did not leave 
Guyana on its scheduled flight and arrived in London too 
late to be considered. Bart claimed damages against the 
air carrier. The carrier argued, inter alia, that under the 
contractual terms there was no legally binding duty on his 
part to deliver the package on a particular date. The court
10/ (cont1d) Souillac. However, in both cases, the delay 
was held to be important and the carrier was held liable.
11/ See for instance Sofimex c. T .W.A. (above n. 9)» In 
Ste Gln^ral Air Fret c. T.W.Ä., (above n. 9)» the delay 
clause was applied by the court which pointed out that 
there was no gross negligence capable of setting the clause 
aside.
12/ It is not enough for the carrier to prove that after the 
cause of the delay had occurred, everything possible was 
done to minimize the damage. He must prove that there was 
no negligence in the occurrence of the delay itself. See 
Souillac (above, n. 4), and Robert-Houdin (above n. 6).
13/ [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239 (Guyana Ct. App. 1966). It 
should he noted that this is not an "international carriage" 
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Convention, but 
most of the provisions of the legislation for international 
carriage by air, including Article 19, were extended to non­
international carriage by several Orders-in-Council.
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rejected that argument *
" This does not mean and cannot mean that delivery 
will be permitted to take place however it 
pleases the carrier. It will then become neces­
sary to imply that the carrier must perform the 
carriage v/ithin a reasonable time having regard 
to all the circumstances of the particular 
case.'1 l4/ (emphasis added).
Comparison.
The results achieved by using the test of reasonable 
delay--as in Bart--and by allowing a carrier to avoid lia­
bility in the case of slight delay--as in the French deci- 
sions--can be quite similar in practice. It is likely 
that if a French court can see a "slight delay" in a fac­
tual situation, a common law court can consider it as 
constituting a "reasonable delay". This is not necessarily 
true however. A slight delay may, in some cases, be seen 
as quite unreasonable. The risk of discrepancy increases 
when one considers the reverse situation where a delay can 
be, at the same time, important and reasonable. In that case, 
the conditions of carriage would still protect the carrier 
in a common law court, but not in a French court.
Whatever the differences in the concrete results 
achieved by the two analyses may be, a significant differ­
ence remains in the emphasis placed by the various courts 
in their respective reasoning. In Bart, the court assessed 
whether there had been a breach of duty by using a test 
constantly utilized in common law courts, i.e. reasonable­
ness. The court considered the conduct of the carrier in 
the particular situation in order to assess whether the 
carriage had been performed within a reasonable time .
14/ per Luckoo J.A. at p. 289. Sir Kenneth Stoby, Chancellor, 
gave examples of what could be reasonable delay at p. 252.
15/ The test of reasonable delay has been applied in United 
States courts to cases not governed by the Warsaw Convention 
but performed under Conditions similar to those of the IATA 
Standard Air Waybill. See for instance Goldsant v. Slick 
Airways, Inc., (1954) U.S.Av.Rep. 179 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
French courts appear to compare the time when the carriage 
was in fact completed with the time when the parties intended 
it to be completed. If a precise time of intended completion 
can be ascertained--as in the carriage of passengers by 
scheduled airlines--a slight variation is authorized by 
virtue of the contractual clause. If no precise time is 
indicated--as in most cargo cases--the court will ascertain 
what is the normal time required to perform the particular 
carriage and may authorize a slight variation from that 
normal time . It seems that French courts interpret the 
conditions of carriage relating to delay by ascertaining 
the real intention of the parties and enforcing it, if 
necessary against the letter of the written contract. In 
doing so, they simply conform with the principle of inter­
pretation contained in Article 1156 of the Civil Code . 
Admittedly, that approach is never clearly spelt out, but 
it is consistent with the result of all the decisions. 
Moreover, the search for the real intent of the parties is 
unquestionably behind the reasoning of several decisions, 
where the court states that the essential interest of air 
carriage is in its rapidity , and that a shipper would 
never agree to pay the much higher air freight charges if 
the carriage was not rapidly performed . For the courts, 
the payment of high rates is inconsistent with the absence 
of an obligation to deliver within a short period. Thus, 
instead of looking at a situation to assess whether any delay
16/ For a similar approach in relation to carriage by road, 
see (1972) 25 Rev. Trim. Dr. Com, p. 454.
17/ Article 1156 provides :"0n doit dans les conventions 
rechercher quelle a £t5 la commune intention des parties 
contractantes plutöt que de s*arreter au sens littoral 
des termes."
18/ as in the Robert-Houdin and Souillac cases (above n. 6 
and 4).
19/ as in the Sofimex and St§ G^nSral Air Fret cases (above 
n. 9).
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which occurred was reasonable or not, and render the carrier 
liable for the unreasonable delay--as in Bart--French courts 
determine what they consider the parties agreed to and 
reject any interpretation of the Conditions of Carriage 
which would be inconsistent with the "real intent" of the 
parties.
Section 2. - "Delay in the carriage by air"
Meaning of "delay in the carriage by air".
An air carrier is liable for damage occasioned by 
"delay in the carriage by air". Several interpretations can 
be attributed to this phrase. It can mean i (i)that the 
delay must occur whilst passengers, baggage, or goods are 
airborne, or (ii)that "carriage by air" in Article 19 
must be read together with Article 18(2) which defines 
the period of liability for loss of, or damage to cargo, 
or (iii)that liability for delay exists whenever passen­
gers or goods do not arrive on time at the point of desti­
nation, irrespective of the cause ; in that case, the delay 
would end at the time when the passengers have disembarked, 
and the goods have been offloaded £0/,
No carrier has ever challenged his liability as a 
matter of principle when goods in transit were delayed, 
whether they were airborne or not at the time of the dela 
Similarly, carriers have been held liable for delay caused 
by the cancellation or the postponment of a flight % This
20/ See further on the doctrinal analysis s H. Drion, Limi­
tation of Liabilities in International Air Law (The Hague, 
195**)V No. 75 at p . 85 ; Sundberg, "Quelques aspects de 
la responsabilitS pour retard en droit aerien", (1966) 20 
R.F.D.A. 139» at pp. 159ff.
21/ See e.g. St§ Cotaufruits c. St£ Fuller Freres, (1958) 10 
R.F.D.A. 220 (Cass. civ« com. 22 February 1958) T M .D . c.
L.A.I. (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. 190 (Trib. Geneve 28 March 1957)•
22/ as was the case in Robert-Houdin (above n. 6) and in 
Souillac (above n. 4)..
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disposes of the first interpretation v/hich would restrict 
liability for delay to cases where passengers and goods 
are airborne.
A number of cases, mainly in France but also the
21/Guyana case of Bart v. British West Indian Airways,Ltd— “
have favoured the second interpretation, i.e. they have
used the definition of "carriage by air" given in Article
18(2) to ascertain whether the delay had occurred during
that period, thus making the carrier answerable for it.
In Ste Nouvelle des Transports Mondiaux c. Air France ,
the Paris Court of Appeal stated that Article 19"implicitly
and rationally" referred to Article 18 for the definition2*5/of air carriage — ^ . It must be remembered however that an 
identical holding that Article 19 must be read together with 
Article 18(2) does not mean uniformity between the various 
courts since there are marked differences as to the precise 
meaning of the definition given by Article 18(2) .
The adoption of the second interpretation necessari­
ly rejects the third interpretation. Even though the period 
of carriage by air is appreciated in different ways, it 
can continue after the goods have been offloaded--which is 
the term assigned by the third interpretation to "carriage 
by air" within the meaning of Article 19*
Special case of the carriage of passengers.
The application of Article I8(2)cs definition to 
delay cases solves the problem for the carriage of baggage 
and goods, but not for the carriage of passengers. It 
has been advocated that the delay in passenger cases 
should be ascertained by reference to Article 17, which
23/ [1967] 1 Lloyd*s Rep. 239 (Guyana Ct. App. 1966). 
24/(1960) 14 R.F.D.A. 317 (C.A. Paris, 14 March i960).
25/ at p. 319» 26/ see above pp. 223.
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defines the period of liability for the carriage of passen­
gers, or even together with Article 18(2) so that the delay 
could be appreciated in the same manner in relation to pas­
sengers and cargo 22/ 1 This second interpretation has very 
few advocates and is most unlikely to be adopted by any 
court 23/1 Thu? first interpretation is implicitly--but 
necessarily--rejected by the cases in which air carriers 
were liable for the delay caused by the cancellation or 
postponment of the flight 22/1 The period defined by 
Article 17 is limited by the operations of embarking and 
disembarking 22/1 but these operations do not take place 
when a flight is postponed or cancelled. It follows that 
the period of liability for delay exceeds the period defined 
by Article 17- This is consistent with the interpretation 
of liability in passenger cases given by the French delegate 
at the Warsaw Conference 22/1 This is also consistent with 
the distinction made by French law between delayed perform­
ance and non-performance 23/ % jn -fche event of a complete 
refusal to carry, there is a clear case of non-performance 
which is not governed by rules relating to delay cases. But 
if the refusal of impossibility to carry the passengers is 
only temporary, this constitutes a delay for which the car­
rier is liable under the terms of the Convention.
27/ On the various doctrinal interpretations, see Sundberg 
"Quelques aspects de la responsabilitS" at p. 163.
28/ Sundberg says that "it is quite illogical and it offers 
no practical advantages", at p. 163»
29/ as was the case in Robert-Houdin (above n. 6) and in 
Souillac (above n. 4).
30/ On the meaning of these words, see above pp. 207ff.
31/ The French delegate stated : "pour la responsabiliti en 
cas de retard, il Importe peu que le voyageur ait pen£tr£ 
ou non dans 1*aerodrome ; si on lui dit : 1'avion que vous 
deviez prendre ne part pas, la responsabiliti est engagSe." 
Heme Conference Internationale, p. 53«
32/ See further Sundberg, Air Charter, pp. 399ff ; "Quel­
ques aspects de la responsabilite" pp. l47ff.
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It is interesting to contrast these analyses clearly 
derived from French law with the American case of Tumarkin 
V. Pan American World Airways, I n c . The plaintiffs had 
been prevented from boarding the plane allegedly because 
they had failed to arrive at the airport 45 minutes prior 
to departure, as they were required to do by the Conditions 
of Carriage. The court refused to grant any damages because 
the plaintiffs had failed to establish a breach of contract 
on the carrier*s part. Although the Warsaw Convention was 
applied in relation to other issues in the same case, Ar­
ticle 19 was not even considered as a possible ground of 
action. Had the article been utilized, the outcome of the 
case might still have been the dismissal of the action 
against the carrier, but the onus would have been on the 
carrier to exonerate himself by proving that he had taken 
all necessary measures to avoid the damage pursuant to 
Article 20(1) of the Convention.
Section 3* - Assessment of damages .
The first requirement is to establish the existence
of compensable damage. Each country has specific rules
and, as the Convention is silent on the point, the lex fori
will determine the conditions under which damage allegedly35/due to delay may be compensated . Once the existence of
13/ 4 Avi. 18,152 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1956).
34/ above pp. 172ff.
35/ In some cases, it is evident that the damage is due to 
the delay. Such is the case in the carriage of perishable 
goods : Fuller Freres & Cie c. Successeurs de Ph. Rey,
[1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 319 (Cass, civ. com. 22 December 1955) ; 
Ste Cotaufruits c. Sti Fuller Freres, (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 220 
(Cass~i civ. com. 22 February 1956). See also Tanneries de 
Lutece c. Air France, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. yo (C.A. Paris, 
l6 November 1966).
In other cases, the link between the damage and the 
delay is more tenuous. That link was seen as insufficient 
in the Canadian case of Vassalo & Clare v. Trans Canada
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damage due to delay is proved, the carrier is presumed to 
be liable on the basis of Article 19* He can only escape 
by showing that he took the necessary measures to avoid 
the damage, or that it was impossible to take such measures, 
or that the damage was due to the contributory negligence 
of the injured person , If the Hague Protocol applies, 
the carrier can also rely on contractual clauses relieving 
him of liability for loss or damage resulting from the 
inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried . 
But, in each case, once the presumption of Article 19 
applies, the burden is on the carrier to prove that he 
should be relieved of liability
35/ (contd) Airlines, 38 D.L.R.2d 382 (Ont. High Ct. 1963) , 
and in the English case of Romulus Films Ltd, v. William 
Dempster Ltd. [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Q.B. 1952). Both 
cases were explicitly based on the principles stated in 
Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 3^1» 158 E.R. 145 (Exch. 
185^)5 See further H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honor!, Causation in 
the Law (Oxford, 1959)» PP* 28lff, and the new precisions 
given by the House of Lords in Czarnikow Ltd, v. Koufos, 
[1969] 1 A .C. 350 (H.L. 1967).
36/ Respectively Articles 20(1) and 21 of the Convention.
37/ Article 23(2) of the Convention, introduced by Article 
XII of the Hague Protocol.
38/ The point is emphasized in St! des Transports d’Armori- 
que c. St! La Langouste, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 4o4 (Cass, civ. 
com.,28 May 1974).
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Chapter NINE. - EXONERATION OF THE CARRIER .
This Chapter examines the substantive defences 
that a carrier may use to exonerate himself from liability, 
i.e. Article 20*s "necessary measures", and Article 21*s 
contributory negligence. The cases relating to Article 26 
which is confined to baggage and cargo will also be examined 
here. Although Article 26 does not provide a substantive 
defence for the carrier since it does not rebut the presump­
tion of liability for damage sustained during the carriage 
by air, it none the less directly affects the rights of the 
owner of the goods by making compliance with its requirements 
a condition precedent to the enforceability of that right.
Section One. - The "necessary measures" exonerating air
carriers.
A) Meaning of "necessary measures".
Article 20(l) provides that the carrier shall not 
be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken 
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was 
impossible for him or them to take such measures.
The scope of that provision depends on the meaning 
of "all necessary measures". It can be argued that the mere 
occurrence of the damage demonstrates that all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage have not been taken. But it 
can also be argued that if the text is to have any practical . 
application, such a literal interpretation cannot be accepted 
and the text must be read as requiring something less than 
that, e.g. the carrier has to take all reasonable measures 
to avoid the damage.
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Interpretation in United States courts.
United States courts have adopted a very restrictive
attitude in their interpretation of Article 2 0 (1 ). It is not
enough to show that the carrier has taken all reasonable
measures. American courts require that all possible measures
be taken ^ , or that the carrier did everything in its power
2/to take the necessary measures —7 . Accordingly, the carrier
cannot avoid liability when it appears that there was a
particular measure which could have avoided the damage, or
lessened the risk of its occurrence, and that this measure
0/was not taken. Thus, in Philips v. Trans World Airlines ^  , 
the carrier could not exonerate himself because the injury 
to the passenger could have been avoided had a pressurized 
cabin been provided. Similarly, in Rugani v. Royal Dutch 
Airlines , the damage to the goods could have been avoided 
had the carrier*s cargo room been properly closed, and the 
guard armed with a gun. The burden thus placed on the carrier 
was described by one court as "almost insurmountable" ^ .
1/ American Smelting and Refining Co, v, Philippine Air 
Lines, Inc., 4 Avi. 17,413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff*dT 
285 A.D. 1119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1954), aff*d, 1 
N.Y. 2d 866 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1956") . The requirement was satis­
fied but it seems that it was so mainly on the ground of 
Article 2 0 (2 ).
2/ Ritts, Ex*x V. American Overseas Airlines, (1949) U.S.Av.R. 
65 (S .D . N.Y . 1949), at p . 6 8 .
2/  (1953) U.S. Av.R. 479 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951)
4/ 4 Avi. 17,257 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954), aff*d, 309 N.Y. 810 
IN.Y. Ct. App. 1954).
5/Glassman v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 9 Avi. 18,295 
(N.D . Cal. 1 9 6 6). It is interesting to contrast these cases 
with a dictum by Judge Stecher in Feibelmann v. Compagnie 
Nationale Air France, 12 Avi. 17»575 (N* Y . City Ct. 1972) 
in which it was said that the Montreal Agreement waived 
"the defense of due care (Warsaw Convention, art. 2 0 )."
(emphasis added).
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It is only in exceptional circumstances that a 
carrier is allowed to avoid liability on the basis of 
Article 20(1). In Winsor v. United Airlines ^ , which was 
decided in I960, a plane was blown up by a bomb intentionally 
placed on board. The carrier pleaded, inter alia, Article 
20(1). The jury returned a verdict for the defendant airline. 
Although the reasons for the decision are not known, the 
case is interesting because of its facts. At the time, 
criminal attempts against aircraft were unusual and carriers 
could not be expected to foresee them and thoroughly search 
all items of luggage so that any bombs or dangerous articles 
could be discovered. The situation has dramatically changed 
since i960 ■£/. If facts similar to those in Winsor came 
before a court today, it is doubtful whether the standard 
safety procedures used to detect any arms or bombs at air­
ports would be sufficient to show that the carrier took all 
necessary measures to avoid the damage —/ . In any case, by 
virtue of the Montreal Agreement, it would only be in very
rare cases that a carrier could avail himself of the provi-
9/sions of Article 20 in a United States court ^  .
6/ (i960) U.S.Av.R. 39 (D. Colorado i960).
2_/ The change has lead to the adoption of the two following 
international Conventions j Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed" at The Hague on 16 
December 1970 (I.C.A .0. Doc. 8920), and Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation^ signed at Montreal, on 23 September 1971 (I.C.A.0.
Doc. 8966).
8/ Contradictory views on that point have been held. Contrast 
E. du Pontavice, "La piraterie a£rienne", (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 
276 at p. 3331 arguing that the safety procedures followed 
to prevent hijacking would satisfy the requirements of Ar­
ticle 20 with M. Pourcelet, note on Herman v, Trans World 
Airlines, (1973) 36 R.G.A.E. 120, at p. 122, who questions 
that interpretation. It is interesting to note that, in 
Harari-Raful v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 17,803 
(sVn ". Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1973) » far from exonerating the 
carrier, its anti-hijacking program was considered by the 
plaintiff as a possible way of establishing wilful mis­
conduct.
2/ above p. 280.
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Interpretation in other common law courts.
The early English decision of Grein v. Imperial 
Airways, Ltd. gave an interpretation which has been
subsequently followed by cases in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. In Grein, Greer L.J. said that the carrier must 
prove that he exercised "all reasonable skill and care in 
taking all necessary measures to avoid causing damage or 
proves that it was impossible to take such measures."^ 
(emphasis added). Thus, the letter of Article 20(l) is 
respected in that the carrier has to take all necessary 
measures but his duty is only that of a reasonable man in 
taking these measures. The actual requirement was further 
explained by Greer L.J. who stated that the onus was on the 
carrier "to prove that the accident could not have been 
avoided by the exercise of reasonable care" — '(emphasis 
added). He found that the carrier had in fact failed to 
exercise the measure of skill and care required of him.
The plane had crashed after a collision with a wireless 
station. The pilot was held negligent for having continued 
his flight below the height of the wireless masts : "He 
must have known that he was approaching the vicinity of the 
wireless station . . 
courses open to him.
In Chisholm v. British European Airways ± -2 J  , the 
defendant’s aircraft encountered severe weather turbulence. 
Passengers had been warned of impending turbulence and had 
been instructed to fasten their seat belts and remain in 
their seats. The plaintiff disregarded this warning and 
left her seat. She fell and injured herself. The court was 
satisfied that the carrier had taken all reasonable care in
. he chose the least prudent of several 
„ 12/
14/
10/ 1 Avi. 622 (Ct. App. 1936) 11/ at p. 631.
12/ at p. 631. 12/ at P- 633.
14/ [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 626 (Manchester Assizes, 1963).
warning the passenger, and the plaintiff's claim failed.
In United International Stables Ltd, v. Pacific 
Western Airlines the plaintiff claimed damages for
the destruction of a horse which had become unruly during 
the flight. The carrier claimed that it was only required 
to supply stalls for tranquillized horses. But the court 
said that the stalls had a number of purposes, one of which 
was to contain and restrict horses. Insufficient information 
had been obtained by the defendant before designing the 
stalls and consequently their height was inadequate for 
such a purpose. This inadequacy was held to be a direct 
cause of the loss of the horse. The court concluded :
" The evidence demonstrates that the defendant 
failed to take all reasonably necessary measures 
to avoid damage that was clearly avoidable by 
the exercise of reasonable skill and care. This 
defense must fail." 16/
Interpretation in French courts.
Several cases emphasize that Article 20 requires
that all "normal" or "reasonable" measures be taken by the
17/carrier. For example, in Preyval c. Cie Air France — u  , a
disembarking passenger fell on the aircraft's ramp. The
court noted that the ramp was "of a normal type, of an
international model, and that nothing indicates that it
had not been positioned according to its purpose", and
that the operations of disembarking were "normally attended
to by the company's employees" *^A This was sufficient to
exonerate Air France because it had taken all "necessary"
12/measures .
15/ 5 D.L.R.3d 67 (Brit. Col. Sup. Ct. 1969). 16/ at p. 76.
12/ (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 345 (Trib. com. Nice, 7 May 1973)•
18/ at p. 346.
19/ See also Fratani-Bassaler c. Air France, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 
201 (C.A. Aix-en-Provence, 14 November 1967) where the car­
rier was exonerated because it had taken "all the measures 
riormally necessary" (at p. 203). A similar view had been 
adopted in the Belgian case of Favre v. Belgian State (1950) 
U.S.Av.R. 392 (C.A. Brussels, 10 June 1950).
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Conversely, the carrier cannot avoid liability if
he has failed to take all "reasonable" measures21/Robert-Houdin c. St§ La Panair do Brasil
In
the carrier
was held liable for delay because he could not prove that 
he had taken "all reasonable and normal measures" to ensure 
the plane would leave on the day indicated to the passenger.
In Cie Air Inter c. Simon -^//, the control tower had ordered 
the pilot to wait before landing so that another plane could 
take off. The pilot complied although he knew that this 
could be dangerous because he was in a storm area. The pilot 
lost control of the plane due to the bad weather conditions. 
The court refused to exonerate the carrier from liability 
on the basis of Article 20(l) because he had not taken "all 
the measures that prudence recommended to avoid the damage"-!-^ 
Compliance with the order of the control tower was insuffi­
cient. The court emphasized that at least two other courses 
of action were open to the pilot, which would have elimi­
nated the danger of the situation. He could wait as required, 
but outside the storm area, as was done by another pilot who 
had also received an order to wait from the control tower ; 
or he could choose to land on a nearby airfield not affected 
by the storm.
All this, however, is not the end of the matter in
French courts. Contrary to common law courts which so often
resort to the test of reasonableness, French courts do not
do so, at least in the context of a contract of carriage.
The basic difficulty appears to stem from the introduction 
of the alien concept of "due diligence" in the framework
20/StS S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 49 at 
p. 53 ( C .A . Paris, 3 February 1971)«
21/ J.C.P. i960.II.H83O, note M. de Juglart (Trib. civ. 
Seine, 9 July i960).
22/ (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 198 (C.A. Paris, 19 March 1968). 
23/ at p. 200.
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of the Convention . Instead of the usual contractual
duty to deliver the goods in good condition and safely to
carry passengers to their destination, the carrier's duty
is to take all necessary (i.e. reasonable and normal)2*5/measures to do so . It is interesting to go beyond the
labels of normality and reasonableness and to examine in
more detail how French courts have applied Article 20,
Firstly, several cases make it clear that Article
20 requires evidence that the specific measures which could
have avoided the particular damage have been taken, or
that it was impossible to take such measures. In Cie La
26/ -----Jugoslavenski Aero-Transport c. Gati — ' , the court held 
that the provision of an airworthy aircraft and a competent 
crew was insufficient ; the carrier must also establish 
that measures "directly and immediately in relation to the 
accident" have been taken. Courts are concerned with
the carrier's conduct just prior to the accident. The case 
of Embs c. Air France illustrates this particular point.
A passenger had committed suicide by throwing himself out 
of the plane. When the court examined the facts to see 
whether Air France had taken all necessary measures to 
avoid the suicide, it did not consider the various precau­
tionary measures which had been taken during the flight to 
deal with that particular passenger. It considered only the 
particular sequence of events which immediately preceded 
the suicide and found that nothing could have prevented
24/ see note M. de Juglart on Cie La Jugoslavenski Agro- 
Transport c, C-ati, J.C.P. I962.II.12596, and note R. Saint- 
Alary on the same decision at D, 1962.J.707»
25/ see above pp. 103-104.
26/ J.C.P. I962.II.12596, note M. de Juglart, D. I962.J.707 
TC.A. Paris, 12 December 1961).
27/ D. 1962.J.708.
28/ (1969) 33 R.F.D.A. 325> note E.G. (T.G.I. Paris,27 June 
1969) •
29/ The same analysis was applied in Robert-Houdin c. St£
La Panair do Brasil, JCP I960.II.II83O (Trib. civ. Seine,
9 July i960).
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Such an attitude implies that the carrier will never be able 
to adduce satisfactory evidence when the circumstances of 
the accident are unknown. Since the precise sequence of 
events which preceded the accident cannot be reconstructed, 
it is impossible to prove that the specific measures which 
could reasonably be expected from the carrier have been 
taken. Accordingly, in Cie Air Liban c. Cie Parisienne de 
Riescompte , the court said that "the impossibility of 
Air Liban explaining the real circumstances of the theft 
prevent it from invoking the provisions of Article 20 in 
order to relieve itself from liability."
Once the exact circumstances of the occurrence of 
the damage are known, there still remains the problem of 
how the reasonableness or normality of the carrier*s con­
duct is to be evaluated. Several courts have expressly 
stated that the carrier must prove that his damage is due 
to conditions which are "not dependant upon his will", i.e. 
beyond his control This comes very close to requiring
the carrier to adduce evidence of cause §trangere. This is 
a shift from the requirement of reasonable measures to the 
traditional rule of exoneration for contracting parties who 
do not perform their contractual duties -2^ /. Instead of 
considering the carrier’s behaviour to assess whether he 
has taken all reasonable measures, evidence is required that 
the damage was caused by something other than the carrier’s 
acts or omissions. Even if such evidence is not explicitly 
required in all the cases, it is striking to note that the 
only instances where the carrier was in fact allowed to
20/ (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 320 (C.A. Paris, 31 May 1956), at 
pp. 322-323.
31/ Robert-Houdin c. StH La Panair do Brasil, J.C.P. i960. 
II.II83O (Trib. civ. Seine, 9 July 1960) ; Souillac c. Air 
France (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 15 (T.G.I.. Seine, 26 June 1964).
32/ above p. 83.
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relv on Article 20 were situations of force ma.ieure J -2 J % or 
fait or faute de la victime 7 , i.e. two of the main cate­
gories of cause gtrangere. Conversely, none of the cases 
where the carrier was refused the benefit of Article 20 can 
be said to belong to any of the categories of cause Stran­
ge re -^///. Therefore, it appears that in applying Article 20, 
French courts implicitly come back to the techniques of 
domestic law governing exoneration from contractual liability.
B) Special provision for the carriage 
of baggage and cargo.
In the case of carriage of baggage and cargo, the 
carrier has the opportunity of avoiding liability if he 
proves that the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage 
or negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in navi­
gation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents 
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage 
(Article 20(2).).
There is scarcely a case in which a carrier has 
used as a defence negligent pilotage or negligence in the 
handling of the aircraft or in navigation. However, in 
American Smelting and Refining Co. v, Philippine Airlines, 
Inc. ‘^ r, the carrier was exonerated for the following
22/ e.g. in Stg des Transports Clasquin c. St£ Socotra, 
(I950) 13 R • G . A . 1181, note J.L. (Trib. com. Seine, 17 
January 1949) ; Wegge c. Sabena, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 353 
(Trib. com. Bruxelles, 20 December 1965)«
3^/ e.g. Fratani-Bassaler c. Air France, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 
201 (C.A . Aix-en-Provence, l4 November 1967) ; Preyval c . 
Cie Air France, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 3^5 (Trib. com. Nice,
7 May I973) ~Embs c. Air France, (1969) 33 R.F.D.A. 325» 
note E.G. (T.G.I. Paris, 27 June 1969)*
23/ In Cie Air Inter c. Simon, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 198 (C.A. 
Paris, 19 March 1968) , the order to wait in a dangerous 
area given by the control tower could certainly not be seen 
as force ma.ieure or any other case of cause gtrangere.
26/ 4 Avi. 17,413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), affgd, 285 A .D .
1119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1954), aff*d, 1 N.Y.2d 866 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1956).
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reasons :
" The credible evidence proves that the crash
of defendants plane was caused by a combination 
of factors, including negligent piloting, faulty 
and erroneous instructions from the Kai-Tak 
Airport control tower, possible failure of the 
pilot to obey instructions from the control 
tower and/or to follow defendant's established 
landing procedures, poor weather conditions and 
a dangerous landing field and surrounding 
terrain." 37/
Article 20(2) was deleted from the Warsaw Convention 
by the Hague Protocol 20/1
C) Comparison.
The interpretation of Article 20 offers a very good 
example of the difficulties inherent in attempting to unify 
the law. We have seen earlier that the wording of Article 
20 changed from "mesures raisonnables" in earlier drafts, 
to "mesures nlcessaires" in the final draft, both attempt-
39/ing to translate the common law concept of "due diligence"-^ . 
Since there was nothing exactly equivalent to "due diligence" 
in French law, there was no precise linguistic equivalent 
for such a concept, and the final French text incorporates 
what must have been seen as the closest translation. But 
when the Convention was translated into English, a literal 
translation was given, which did not refer to "due diligence". 
For common law courts, it was as if Article 20 had set a 
specific standard for carriage by air. No reference to the 
concept of due diligence is made in common law cases dealing
37/ at 4 Avi. 17 * 415-6. The possibility of applying Article • 
20(2) was mentioned in St£ La Neuchateloise c. St£ Aero- 
Cargo , (1951) 5 R.F.D.aT 44"o (C . A . Lyon, 12 November 1951) •
But no definitive decision was given on that point.
38/ above p. 107.
39/ above pp. 101-103.
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with Article 20. This is all the more regrettable because
maritime law cases dealing with "due diligence" offer a
heartening illustration of uniform application of this
40 /concept between common law courts — . Broadly speaking,
failure to exercise "due diligence" is generally equated
with the concept of negligence . It seems reasonable
to assume that the same uniformity would have existed had
the concept of "due diligence" been explicitly referred to
in the English translation of the Convention. Instead,
there is divergence between common law courts interpreting
Article 20 with American courts giving a literal and strict
reading of Article 20 and English and Canadian courts
resorting to the test of reasonableness.
In the meantime, French courts were striving to
construe what was seen as the common law concept of "due 
42/negligence" — ' . In doing so, however, they tended to 
adopt solutions consistent with their usual analysis of 
carriers* duties as obligations de rlsultat, the non-per - 
formance of which can be excused only by establishing cause 
Itrangere.
4o/ See further Carver, Carriage by Sea, vol. 1 (British 
Shipping Laws, vol. 2), (12th ed. London, 1971)» para.257ff. 
In Riverstone Meat Co. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. [1961]
A.C. 807, the House of Lords decided that the words : 
"exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy" should 
be given the meaning judicially assigned to them by the 
courts of the United States, the United Kingdom or else­
where in their context in the Harter Act of 1893 and later 
enactments such as the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods 
Act 1904, and the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act 
1910 (per Viscount Simonds at pp. 836, 837 ; per Lord 
Merriman at p. 859 ; per Lord Radcliffe at pp. 863-864 ; 
per Lord Keith at p. 869 ; per Lord Hodson at p. 874).
4l/ Williston, On Contracts, para. 1086.
42/ above pp. 101-103.
Section 2. - Contributory negligence .
Article 21 provides :
" If the carrier proves that the damage was caused 
by or contributed to by the negligence of the 
injured person the Court may, in accordance with 
the provisions of its own law, exonerate the 
carrier wholly or partly from his liability."
For the purposes of comparing several interpretations 
of the same text, Article 21 does not offer much substance, 
since it effectuates a renvoi to the lex fori. The final 
solutions arrived at in each particular country and their 
similarities or differences are beyond the scope of this 
study. However, two questions which intervene before the 
renvoi are matters of uniform law, i.e. (i) what are the 
conditions for the renvoi to be made, and (ii) what is the 
extent of the renvoi.
Conditions of renvoi.
Pursuant to the Convention, the carrier must prove
that the damage was caused, or contributed to, by the
injured person. The fact that the onus of proof is on the
carrier has been made clear by courts in the United States 43/and France — “  . The carrier must prove two elements :
(i) negligence, and (ii) the causal role of negligence on 
the realization of the damage. What constitutes negligence, 
and in which cases such negligence is to be considered as 
the cause of the damage must be decided on the basis of the 
lex fori since the drafters of the Convention did not 
elaborate the concepts of negligence and causation. This
43/ In the United States : Feibelmann v. Compagnie Nationale 
Air France, 12 Avi. 17,575 at 17,576 (N.Y. CityCt. 1972).
In France, Cie Air France c. Nicoli (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 173 
at p. 175 (C.A. Paris, 2 April 1971)*
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might be the source of diverging solutions given to 
comparable factual situations. For instance, in relation 
to negligence, it is not at all sure that all courts would 
consider the suicide of a passenger as a case of negligence^-^. 
Similarly, it is doubtful whether failure to fasten a seat 
belt when advised to do so would amount to negligence in 
every forum . in relation to causation, the solution 
given in Rophe c. Ministere Public might be challenged 
in common law courts. It was held that contributory negli­
gence on the part of the injured person could co-exist 
with wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier. This 
implies that both were seen as concurrent causes of the 
damage, and that the wilful misconduct had not negatived 
the causal connection of the other element ^ 2/ ,  Similarly, 
it is questionable whether the findings of Wing Hang Bank 
Ltd, v. Japan Airlines, Co. would have been reached
in other jurisdictions. The shipping of $250,000 unmarked 
and unrecorded and, therefore, unrecoverable American 
dollars by air freight without paying any extra charges 
appeared to the court "to constitute carelessness of the
44/ as was done in Embs c. Air France, (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 
325, note E.G. (T.G.I. Paris, 27 June 1969)*
45/ Failure to fasten seat belt was held to be contributory 
negligence in Chutter y, K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 4 Avi. 
17»733 (S.D. N.Y. 1955)- In Helfet v. Pan American World 
Airways, Inc., 12 Avi. 17,247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), the 
issue of whether the seat belt being attached "fairly 
loosely" was contributory negligence was held to be a 
triable issue of fact. Accordingly, summary judgment was 
denied. In Chisholm v. British European Airways, [1963]
1 Lloyd*s Rep. 626 (Manehester Assizes, 1963) , Atkinson J. 
did not explicitly decide whether the failure to fasten 
seat belt and remain seated was contributory negligence but 
he put a blame on the passenger for his failure to do so 
(at p . 634).
46/ (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 95 (C.A. Paris, 20 December 1968).
47/ See further on the implications of that stand Hart & 
Honore, Causation in the Law, pp. I88ff.
48/ 12 Avi. 17,884 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
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4q /grossest sort." —2J However, whatever degree of care the 
plaintiff had failed to utilize in sending the currency 
to New York, "its negligence cannot be said to have been 
the proximate cause of its loss."
Extent of renvoi.
By providing that it is "in accordance with the 
provisions of its own law" that the court may exonerate 
the carrier wholly or partly from his liability, Article 
21 seems to indicate that the applicable law will be the 
substantive lex fori. This interpretation is consistent 
with almost all the cases applying Article 21. It is the 
only interpretation satisfying the purpose of the drafters 
of the Article, who were afraid that the Convention might 
introduce provisions contrary to the traditions of the lex 
fori. Article 21 was designed to allow the application of 
these traditions ^ L / % However, this interpretation has 
recently been questioned in Feibelmann v. Compagnie Natio­
nale Air France where the court stated :
" . . .  the accident occurred in France on a French 
airline. It is conceivable that in applying its
* own law*  as required by Article 21, this court 
may be required to apply the French lav/ of 
contributory negligence rather than that of 
New York."
There do not seem to be other cases on the extent 
of the renvoi. The emergence of the issue in the United 
States may perhaps be related to the frequency of conflict 
of law problems in American courts4-^If this were the reason 
for the interpretation of Article 21 adopted in Feibelmann, 
there would be very little chance of seeing it adopted in 
courts of other countries.
49/ at p. 17,886. 50/ at p. 17,886.
51/ above pp. 107-109.
52/  12 Avi. 17,575 (N.Y. City Ct. 1972)
53/ see below pp. 343, 351-352.
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The Guatemala City Protocol.
Article 21 remained untouched until the Guatemala 
City Protocol modified the rules of contributory negligence-*^ 
There is no longer a renvoi to the lex fori. The new text 
provides a uniform rule according to which the carrier 
shall be wholly or partly exonerated from liability to the 
extent that such negligence or wrongful act or omission 
caused or contributed to the damage.
Section 3* - Failure to give notice of claim to the carrier .
Article 26(l) provides that receipt by the person 
entitled to delivery of luggage or goods without complaint 
is prima facie evidence that they have been delivered in 
good condition and in accordance with the document of car­
riage. It is thus clear that contrary evidence may be brought 
in order to establish that the goods were not in good con­
dition, or that they were not delivered in accordance with 
the document of carriage. If such evidence cannot be brought, 
the carrier cannot be held liable because there is no proof 
of damage or loss.
- The freedom of the person entitled to delivery to 
adduce evidence contrary to the presumption contained in 
Article 26 is severely limited by Article 26(2) in the case 
of damage since no evidence of damage can be brought unless 
complaint has been made forthwith after the discovery of 
damage and, at the latest, within three days from the date 
of receipt in the case of luggage and seven days in the 
case of goods. In the case of delay, the complaint must be
54/ The Montreal Agreement does not waive Article 21 of the 
Convention as a defence for the carrier. Accordingly, the 
carrier can still assert the defence of contributory negli­
gence. Mathias v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 12 Avi. 
17,270 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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made at the latest within fourteen days from the date on 
which the luggage or goods have been placed at his disposal. 
This provision protects the carrier from belated claims 
which can be difficult to disprove because of disappearance 
of contrary evidence. Article 26(3) adds that every com­
plaint must be made in writing despatched within the times 
aforesaid.
Divergent answers have been given to the question
of whether the requirements of Article 26(2) should be
limited to cases of physical damage to the goods, or whether
they were also applicable to cases of loss or non-delivery
of the shipment. In Parke, Davis & Co. v. British Overseas
Airways Corp. ^ 7 , 185 Rhesus monkeys were missing out of
a total shipment of 900 animals. The plaintiffs failed
because no claim had been filed within seven days after
the receipt of the cargo. The New York court stated :
" There is no validity to the claim by plaintiff 
that this was a partial loss and not a damage 
claim." 56/
Thus, for the court, a partial loss of the cargo was a
"damage" to that portion of the consignment that had arrived
and notice should have been given within seven days of the
receipt of that portion. The court went even further and
said that in a case of total loss, Article 13(3) of the
Convention would seem to extent the time to file claim to
67/an additional seven days . It was not envisaged that, in 
cases of non-delivery, there could be no time limitation 
imposed on the filing of claims.
56/ 5 Avi. 17,838 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958). 56/ at p.17.839.
57/ Article 13(3) provides s
" If the carrier admits the loss of the goods, or if the 
goods have not arrived at the expiration of seven days 
after the date on which they ought to have arrived, the 
consignee is entitled to put into force against the carrier 
the rights which flow from the contract of carriage."
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The Parke, Davis case seems to be isolated. A 
contrary view was adopted in Rugani v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch 
Airlines where the court held that a contractual pro­
vision based on Article 26(2) applied to "physical damage 
to the goods rather than to the loss thereof." ^2/ This 
interpretation is in line with all the cases which have 
held that provisions in contracts of carriage requiring 
that a written claim for "damages" be made within a spe­
cified time apply only to damages occasioned by physical 
damage to the goods and thus a^v;e no application to a claim 
for loss due to non-delivery
Two Lebanese decisions have adopted the same inter­
pretation as that in Rugani and have held that the plaintiff 
did not have to give notice of his claim in case of non­
delivery or partial loss . There is no French case in 
point» The absence of French cases might be due to the 
fact that the French text uses "avaries", which was trans­
lated by "damage" in the English version. The word "avarie" 
refers to the physical damage which may affect goods during 
transportation. "Avarie" cannot be seen as including cases 
of partial loss or non-delivery. The English translation 
is less clear because the word "damage" can be interpreted 
to include non-physical damages.
JJ8/ (1954) U.S.Av.R. 74 (N.Y. City Ct. 1954).
59/ at p. 77.
60/ Brentwood Fabrics Corn, v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines. 
13 Avi. I7T426 (N.Y. City Ct. 1970). See the cases cited 
in that decision at p. 17.427» and, more generally, American 
Jurisprudence 2d, vol. l4, sec. 582.
6l/ Transmediterranean Airlines c. Black Sea, (1973) 27 
R .F.D .A. 441 (C.A. Beirut, 4 April 1973)  ^Transmediterra­
nean Airlines c. Sleiman Bleybel, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 347 
(C.A. Beirut, 16” "November 1972).
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Once it is ascertained that the goods have been 
physically damaged, the requirements of Article 26(2) and 
26(3) must be satisfied. A complaint has to be filed with 
the carrier within the times prescribed by Article 26(2).
The Convention makes no allowance for cases where the dam­
age to the goods is discovered after the prescribed times, 
save in the case of fraud by the carrier However, in
Overseas Fruit Corporation v. VARIG A i r l i n e s the court 
appeared prepared to examine the reasons why notice had not 
been given on time but did not actually do so because the 
consignee offered no explanation at all. By contrast, the 
French Act of March 2, 1957» which extended the application 
of the Warsaw regime to all cases of air carriage, expressly 
provides that if the absence of complaint within the pres­
cribed period is due to force ma.jeure, the action will not 
be barred % The validity of this legislative addition to 
the text of the Convention may be questioned.
Several cases have defined the conditions in which 
the requirements of Article 26 must be satisfied. Firstly, 
there must be a proper complaint. The carrier must be put 
on notice that a claim for damages will be directed against 
him . An ambiguous document will not suffice , Second­
ly, Article 26(3) plainly requires written notice ; accord­
ingly, it is not sufficient for the person entitled to 
delivery to claim that the carrier had knowledge of the
62/ pursuant to Article 26(4). See further below pp. 260-261. 
63/ 11 Avi. 17,322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
64/ The 1957 Act is now incorporated in the Code de 1*Avia­
tion civile. The relevant provision is Article L. 321-4(2) 
which reads, in part, after having defined what is fraud 
in Article 26(4) of the Convention : "La victime est pareil- 
lement relevee de la forclusion prevue par ce texte si eile 
a StS empechee de formuler ces protestations par un case de 
force majeure."
65/ The complaint may be validly made by the party who ul­
timately sues. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Bor-Air Freight Co, Inc.,
12 Avi. 17,725 (N.Y. CityCt. 1972).
66/ Lady Marlene Brassiere Corn, v. Irish International 
Airlines, 13 Avi. 17,428 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971).
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damage by other means . Thirdly, the carrier must be put 
on notice of the nature of the claim, and this cannot be 
done unless notice is given after receipt of the goods. It 
follows that a complaint made for non-delivery of the goods 
does not satisfy Article 26*s requirements where damage was 
discovered after the goods had finally been delivered . 
Fourthly, it seems that Article 26(2) would be satisfied as 
long as the complaint is sent to the carrier within the 
time limits, even if the complaint is received afterwards^' .
The only situation in which the person entitled to 
delivery may pursue his claim despite his failure to comply 
with the requirements of Article 26(2) and 26(3) is the 
case of fraud of the carrier, pursuant to Article 26(4). The 
Convention does not define fraud, and this silence has 
created difficulties in France. In Stl Cotaufruits c ■ Ste 
Fuller Freres& Cie the carrier had undertaken to forward
directly by air a shipment of fruit from Orange to London.
The pilot of the plane stopped for the night at Orly air­
port. On arrival in London, the shipment was spoilt and the 
shipper sued the carrier for damages without having com­
plained within the period prescribed by Article 26(2). The 
Paris Court of Appeal held that the crew had been deceitful
67/ This was made clear in several cases of domestic car­
riage where there was a tariff provision similar to Article 
26(3) of the Convention : Scheinman v. Eastern Airlines, Inc 
11 Avi. 18,047 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) ; William Haber Art 
Collection Inc, v. American Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 17,878 
(N.Y. City”Ct". 1973) ; Lordship-Simco Inc, v. Eastern Air­
lines, Inc.. 12 Avi. 17,831 "(N.Y." City Ct. 1973)".
68/ Brentwood Fabrics Coro, v, K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 
13 Avi. 17,426 (N.Y. City Ct. 1970).
69/ Fuller Freres & Cie c. Succ. Philippe Rey, (1958) 10 
R .F.'dTa". 319 (Cass. civ. com. 22 December 1955) •
20/ (1951) 5 R.F.D.A. 433 (C.A . Paris, 8 November 1951), 
aff1d, (1958) 10 R.F.D.A. 220 (Cass. civ. com. 22 February
1958) .
towards the shipper by assuring him that there would be a
direct flight to London while planning to spend the night
in Paris. This premeditated breach of contract was "fraud"
within the meaning of Article 26(4) which does not require
that the fraudulent act of the carrier continue during the
prescribed period . The Cour de Cassation affirmed the
decision and held that, as in domestic law, the carrier*s
fraud is any intentional wrongdoing (acte doiosif) committed
during the transit period as well as such acts done during
the period where complaints are allowed with the purpose of
72/hindering the making of that complaint J—  .
This was seen as overly favouring the shipper and 
the Act of March 2, 1957» rejected the interpretation of 
the Sti Cotaufruits case 23/, The Act stated that "fraud" 
in Article 26(4) only encompasses acts tending to prevent 
the consignee from complaining within the prescribed 
period 2it/1
It does not seem that similar difficulties have 
arisen in common law jurisdictions. There is no case in 
point but writers seem to agree that "fraud", in the context 
of Article 26, would be realized if a carrier concealed the 
damage from the person injured so that no complaint could 
be made within the prescribed period 25/1 It is interesting 
to note the similarity between this opinion and the defini­
tion introduced in France by the 1957 Act.
21/ (1951) 5 R.F.D.A. at pp. 434-435.
72/ (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. at p. 222.
73/ See further A. Garnault, "La loi francaise du 2 mars 
1957”» (1957) 11 R.F.D.A. 289 at p. 297.
74/ The relevant provision is now part of the Code de l*Avia 
tion civile of which Article L. 321-4(2) reads, in part :
"La fraude privue a 1*article 26(alin£a 4) de ladite conven­
tion est celle par laquelle le transporteur a dissimule ou 
tent£ de dissimuler les avaries, manc^uants ou retards, ou 
par tout autre moyen empechS ou tenth d'empecher le rlcep- 
tionnaire de formuler ses protestations dans les delais re- 
quis."
75/ MacNair, The Law of the Air (3d ed. London, 1964) p.
188 ; Shawcross & Beaumont, On Air Law, p. 455*
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Air carriers have sought to contractually extend the 
protection against belated claims provided by the Warsaw Con­
vention to cases not covered by the treaty's provisions. Re­
servations have been expressed in doctrinal writings about 
the validity of such restrictive clauses. It can certainly 
be argued that these clauses tend to relieve the carrier of 
liability and, as such, are null and void pursuant to Arti­
cle 23 of the Convention -2^ /.
However, several United States courts have considered 
such clauses as valid. The reasoning was particularly expli­
cit in Butler's Shoe Corporation v. Pan American World Air­
ways ♦ Inc. 2Z/t a shipment of boots was to be carried from 
Rio de Janeiro to New York but never arrived. The case was 
clearly outside the scope of Article 26(2) and, on the basis 
of the Convention alone, no time limitation was imposed for 
filing a claim. The tariff filed by the carrier with the 
C.A.B. provided that in the case of loss (including non­
delivery) , no action could be maintained unless a written 
notice was presented within 120 days from the date of issue 
of the air waybill. The consignee did not comply with that 
provision and argued that the tariff provision could not 
be enforced because of Article 23 of the Convention. The 
court rejected this argument for two reasons. Firstly, it 
said that Article 23 should be read in conjunction with 
Article 20(1) which, according to the court,
" evidences a recognition on the part of the treaty's 
draftsmen of the carrier's obligation to prevent or 
reduce injury to parties protected by the treaty's 
provisions. There may be a special need to notify a 
carrier in the case of lost cargo, in order to allow 
it to undertake a search. If the carrier does not 
hear about the loss until plaintiff files suit 
(which may be as late as two years from the date of
76/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 767-68.
77/ 13 Avi. 17,182 (N.D. Ga. 1974). See also Rugani v. K.L.M. 
Royal Dutch Airlines, (1954) U.S.Av.Rep. 74 (N.Y. City Ct. 195*0 at p. 7?.
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" expected arrival), then it is probable that no 
search will have been made. The longer a plaintiff 
waits to notify the carrier of a loss, the lower 
are the chances that a search for the cargo will be 
successful. Therefore, the inclusion on defendants 
tariff of a 120-day notice of claim requirement for 
lost cargo can be viewed as a reasonable attempt by 
the carrier to avoid excessive damages." 78/
Secondly, relying on the proximity of Article 22, 
which places monetary limits on carriers* liability, the 
court read Article 23 in conjunction with Article 22 and 
found that Article 23 appears to prohibit contractual provi­
sions which tend to absolutely relieve the carrier of liabi­
lity or which fix lower monetary limits on liability, rather 
than reasonable time periods in which claims for lost cargo 
must be made
The reasoning that contractual time limits on notice 
of claims are not made null and void by Article 23 of the 
Convention is supported by several cases of passenger car­
riage where the ticket required that all claims be filed in 
writing within 30 days after the occurrence of an event 
giving rise to such claims. Such clauses were held valid QO / .  
The only decision which refused to enforce a 30 days time 
limit is Glenn v. Comoania Cubana de Aviacion The court
based its ruling on the fact that the clause was not set on 
the face of the ticket. The passenger thus had no knowledge 
of it and consequently the clause could not be enforced.
28/ at 13 Avi. p. 17,184.
79/ at 13 Avi. p. 17,184. The court conceded that its reason­
ing could be wrong and that the tariff could, in fact, be 
invalid because of Article 23. This however could not better 
the consignee°s plight because the court had no jurisdiction 
over such issues which must be brought before the C.A.B.
This rule was summarized as follows in Alco-Gravure Div. of 
Publ. Corn, v. American Airlines, 6 Avi5 17,619 (D. Maryland 
1959) s"in a suit against a carrier, the tariff schedules 
must be accepted and applied by the courts in litigation 
unless and until the Board has otherwise ruled."
80/indemnity Ins. Co. V. Pan American Airways, 1 Avi. 1247 
7S.D. N.Y. 1944) ; Atlantic Fish & Oyster Co. v. Pan American 
Airways, 1950 U.S.Av.Rep. 23 (Ill.Ct. 1948) iSheldon v. Pan 
American Airways, 2 Avi. 14,566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947)•
81/ 3 Avi. 17,836 (S.D . Fla. 1952).
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This reasoning is no longer valid because it is now esta­
blished that tariffs regularly filed with the C.A.B. cons­
titute the contract of carriage between the parties and 
govern the rights and liabilities arising therefrom .
Thus, apart from one case whose ratio decidendi can
no longer be used, United States courts have accepted the
validity of contractual clauses imposing time limits on
claims in cases where the Convention was silent. This might
be due to the fact that similar clauses are widely used in
domestic air carriage in the United States and are seen
as sound business practices which do not unduly favour air 
84/carriers — ' . The only reason why such clauses would not be 
applied in Warsaw cases is the text of Article 23. But it 
seems that in most cases, the text was not even invoked. It 
remains to be seen whether the very limited scope assigned 
to Article 23 in Butler1s Shoe will be accepted in other 
cases.
The problems encountered in the application of 
Article 26 were discussed at The Hague Conference but no 
change was made which would have solved them • The only 
amendment to the text was the extension of the periods 
during which complaint must be made from 3 to 7 days for 
baggage, 7 to 14 days for cargo, and 14 to 21 days in the 
case of delay.
82/ The rule has been applied in numerous cases. See for 
recent examples, Butler*s Shoe Corp. v. Pan American World 
Airways, Inc. , 13 Avi. 17,183 (N.D. GaT! 1974) ; Blair v. 
Delta Airlines, 3 ^  F.Supp. 36Ö (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff* d, 
477 F.2d 564 C5th Cir. 1973).
83/ See for instance Robert v. Pan American World Airways, 
Inc., 12 Avi. 17,73^ (N . Y~. Sup . Ct. App. Term" 1972) .
84/ above pp. 262-263.
85/ International Conference on Private Air Law, The Hague 
1955"» ICAO Doc. 7Ö86-LC/l4o, vol. 1, Minutes , pp. 236-8, 
247-9, 398-9.
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Chapter TEN. - LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY
Article 22 limits the amount of the carrier*s 
liability. Article 22(1) limits liability to 125,000 francs 
per passenger while Article 22(3) limits liability for 
objects carried by the passenger to 5,000 francs. Article 
22(2) limits the carrier’s liability for checked baggage 
and for cargo to 250 francs per kilogramme, unless a special 
declaration of value has been made to the carrier when the 
goods were handed to him and a supplementary sum paid if 
necessary. The Hague Protocol raised the limit to 250,000 
francs for passengers, but left the other limits unchanged. 
The Guatemala City Protocol further raised the limit to 
1,500,000 francs for passengers, except in the cases of 
damage caused by delay where the limit was lowered to 
62,500 francs. In the carriage of baggage (registered bag­
gage, and objects carried by the passenger), liability 
was limited to 15,000 for each passenger. In the carriage 
of cargo, the limit remains at 250 francs per kilogramme. 
Both the Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City Protocol 
contain detailed provisions concerning court costs and 
lawyers* fees which were primarily designed to solve 
problems arising in the United States.
The application of Article 22 involves a number of 
difficulties. Some relate to the currency used to fix the 
liability limits (Section One). Others are due to the level 
of the limit in passenger cases (Section Two). Others relate 
to various aspects of the limitation of liability in the 
carriage of cargo (Section Three).
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Section One. - Difficulties relating to the currency
used to fix the liability limits.
Definition of the currency used in the Convention.
Article 22(4) of the original Convention provides :
" The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer 
to the French franc consisting of 65 i milligrams 
gold of millesimal fineness 900. These sums may 
be converted into any national currency in round 
figures."
The Hague Protocol added a new paragraph 22(5) which reads :
" Conversion of the sums into national currencies 
other than gold shall, in case of judicial pro­
ceedings, be made according to the gold value 
of such currencies at the date of the judgment."
The Guatemala City Protocol retains the same provision in
its Article 22(4).
The currency defined by the Warsaw Convention cor­
responds to the franc Poincarg, i.e. a currency defined by 
a French Act of 25 June 1928. The franc Poincar£ was aban­
doned as a currency in France in 1937» but it has been 
retained by the two Protocols amending the Warsaw Convention. 
However, all discussion on amended levels of limitations at 
the Diplomatic Conferences of The Hague and Guatemala City, 
as well as at meetings of the ICAO Legal Committee, were in 
terms of U.S. dollars ; compromises were reached on dollar 
figures, and then converted into Poincari francs.
The Warsaw system was relatively simple to operate 
as long as gold was the unquestioned basis of the inter­
national monetary system, and the standard by which all 
currencies were expressed. The limits set in Poincari francs 
could be assessed in gold terms pursuant to the definition 
contained in Article 22(4) of the Convention, and then con­
verted into the appropriate national currency by reference 
to the gold equivalent of that particular currency.
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Uncertainties due to the changes in the international 
monetary system.
The relationship between national currencies and 
gold was altered by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
A system was adopted in which the par value of currencies 
was to be expressed "in terms of gold as a common denomi­
nator or in terms of the United States dollar of the weight
and fineness in effect on July 1, 1 9 4 4 " The International
2/Monetary Fund —^-created by the same Conference— was given 
an important role in the organisation of the international 
monetary system. At the heart of the Articles of Agreement 
of the I.M.F. lay an obligation on each member country to 
maintain the value of its currency within a margin of one 
per cent of its par value ^ . The par value could be changed 
only on the proposal of the member and with the concurrence 
of the I.M.F. In practice, the United States maintained its 
par value by standing ready to buy and sell gold freely at 
the par value ; other countries maintained their obligation 
by ensuring that transactions in their currencies took place 
within one per cent of their par value in terms of the U.S. 
dollar. The U.S. dollar thus played a key role ; it provided 
the essential link between the pattern of currency par 
values expressed in terms of gold and the pattern of market 
values for currencies. The "gold exchange standard", as the 
system was called, depended on the United States freely 
buying and selling gold at its par value. Most countries 
communicated the par value of their currency to the I.M.F. 
and a reasonably comprehensive system was established.
1/ Article IV(l)(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund.
2/ Hereinafter referred to as I.M.F. On the I.M.F. in 
general, see J.E.S. Fawcett, "The International Monetary 
Fund and International Law", (1964) 40 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 
32.
_2/ Article IV(3) of the Articles of Agreement of the I.M.F.
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In recent years, two fundamental changes have deeply 
modified the international monetary system in relation to 
the value and the role of gold ^ . First, in March 1968, a 
"two-tier" system for the price of gold was established.
It separated transactions in gold done for monetary purposes 
by central banks from other transactions. Central banks were 
to use the official price of gold in U.S. dollars for their 
transactions. But, on the free market, the price of gold 
would be allowed to vary from the official price. There 
would be no sales of gold from official stocks to the free 
market at the official price of $35 an ounce. This arrange­
ment removed much of the pressure which had been building 
up on the United States because of their obligation to free­
ly buy and sell gold at the official price. For three years, 
there was not a very great difference between the official 
price of gold and its value on the free market. However, 
from May 1971» there have been dramatic increases and fluc­
tuations in the free market price of gold ^
4/ See further on the background and the numerous difficul­
ties created by the turmoil in the international monetary 
system : T.M.C. Asser, "Golden Limitations of Liability 
in International Transport Conventions and the Currency 
Crisis", (1974) 5 J* Mar. L. & Com. 645 ; L. Focsaneanu,
"Le droit international monitaire a la recherche d’un 
* syteme*." (1973) 100 J. Dr. Int'l 644 ; J. Gold, "The 
composition of a country1s reserves in international law" 
(1971) 5 J- World Tr. L. 477 » P* Heller, "The Warsaw Con­
vention and the 'Two-tier* Gold Market" (1973) 7 J* World. 
Tr. L. 126 ; "The Value of the Gold Franc— a Different Point 
of View" (1974) 6 J. Mar. L. & Com. 73 * International Law 
Association, Report by the Committee on International Mone­
tary Law, Report of the New Delhi Conference 1974 ; A. 
Mendelsohn, "The value of the Poincare Gold Franc in Limita­
tion of Liability Conventions" (1973- )^ 5 J- Mar. L. & Com. 125.
j5/ In June 1974, the price on the London market was $157.75 
an ounce (London Times, 12 June 1974). In December 1974, 
the price on the Paris market reached $188 an ounce (New 
York Times, 21 December 1974). In August 1975» the price 
had come down to about $162 on the New York and London 
markets, and $166 on the Paris market (New York Times, 19 
August 1975).
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Outline of the main possibilities for converting Poincar£ 
francs into a particular currency.
1.- On the basis of the price of gold on the free market.
The possibility of using the free market price of 
gold assumes major importance in relation to the Guatemala 
City Protocol where the sums involved are much greater than 
in the previous instruments. The delegates at the Diplomatic 
Conference of Guatemala City thought they had fixed a limit 
equivalent to U.S. $100,000. But, in November 1972» on the 
basis of the free market price of gold, the limit was about 
$175>000 ^ • In August 1975» on the same basis, the limit 
was about $400,000 ^ .
It has been argued that since gold was taken as the 
value of reference by the drafters of the Convention, its 
price on the free market is the only true expression of its 
real value in today’s world because the official price of 
gold is artificial and, for that reason, should not be used 
in relation to a gold value clause ^ . But how and when is 
the value of gold to be assessed ? Which market will be 
selected ? On a given market, will it be the morning pricing, 
the afternoon pricing, or the closing price on a particular 
day ?
Besides these practical difficulties, there is one 
substantial argument against the use of the free market 
price of gold. It is submitted that the purpose of Article 
22 would not be served by using this price because it is 
clear from the proceedings of the Warsaw Conference that the 
delegates wanted to avoid the situation that the limits of
6/ Heller, "The Warsaw Convention", (1973) 7 J. World Tr. L. 
p. 129.
2/ on the basis of the price of gold given by the New York 
Times of August 19» 1975» i.e. $161.95 an ounce on the New 
York market.
8/ Heller, "The Warsaw Convention", (1973) 7 J» World Tr. L. 
at p. 126 ; "The value of the Gold Franc", (1974) 6 J. Mar.
L. & Com. 73*
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liability, expressed in French francs, could be altered by 
a mere change in the definition of the currency, which could 
be unilaterally decided by the French Government for reasons 
totally unrelated to air carriers* liability ^ . Accordingly, 
they referred to the French franc, as it had just been offi­
cially defined, i.e. 65i milligrams gold of millesimal fine­
ness 900. In other words, their purpose was to protect the 
compromise they had reached from uncontrolled variations 
which would have emptied it of all substance. This purpose 
would be thwarted by using the free market price of gold 
with its wide uncontrolled fluctuations. In addition, at 
the subsequent diplomatic conferences of The Hague and 
Guatemala City, the extreme care with which the limits were 
set at particular levels would have been meaningless had 
the delegates not assumed that they were elaborating a 
stable regime of limitations of liability.
2.- On the basis of the par value of the currency involved.
When a particular country has defined the par value 
of its currency in gold, it is simple to convert Poincar£ 
francs into that currency. It only requires the calculation 
of the amount of gold contained in the sum expressed in 
Poincari francs and the subsequent valuation of that amount 
of gold on the basis of the par value of the relevant 
currency.
It becomes a little more complex when the par value 
of a currency is determined in U.S. dollars "of the weight 
and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944" . When the amount
of gold contained in the sum expressed in Poincar§ francs 
is known, one has to calculate the price of that gold in 
U.S. dollars at the 1944 price, i.e. $35 an ounce. The result 
can then be evaluated in terms of the relevant currency on 
the basis of its par value with the 1944 dollar.
2/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 61. See further 
above p. 110.
10/ Article IV(l)(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the
I.M.F.
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The advantages of using the par value of the par­
ticular currency involved are reliability and stability, 
because the par value can be altered only by a formal 
devaluation or reevaluation. But, in today*s international 
monetary system, such a definition seems meaningless. The 
market value of most currencies is fixed on exchange markets 
where it is assessed on the basis of floating exchange rates.
3.- On the basis of the price of gold used for transactions 
between central banks. 10-a/
The third main basis on which PoincarS francs may 
be converted into a national currency is the official price 
of gold generally used for transactions between central 
banks, i.e. $42.22 an ounce (after the two devaluations of 
the U.S. dollar). One must first ascertain the amount of 
gold contained in the sum expressed in Poincari francs, then 
one evaluates that amount in U.S. dollars on the basis of 
$42.22 an ounce and, finally, the conversion into the re­
quired currency may be made by application of the exchange 
rate between the U.S. dollar and the currency involved, as 
established in the exchange markets.
If the conversion of Poincari francs is made on such 
a basis, two important causes of uncertainty may intervene :
(i) the official price of gold is simply an expression of 
the par value of the U.S. dollar. Provided the I.M.F. 
concurs in the decision, the United States, as any other 
country, can alter the par value of its currency ; two de­
valuations have already occurred, others could take place ;
(ii) the main source of uncertainty is the floating rate of 
exchange which is now applied to many currencies in the 
world. The relative value of a particular currency vis-a-vis 
the U.S. dollar may vary greatly from day to day ; this in
10-a/ Since the time of writing, it was announced that the 
price of gold for transactions between central banks was to 
be liberalized. This is subject to ratification in January 
1976. If it is ratified, the third basis of calculation of 
Poincare francs will be eliminated.
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turn implies that the limit of air carriers' liability may 
be subject to considerable fluctuations.
Reliance on the market rate of exchange rather than 
the par value is a way to introduce the real monetary world 
into the question of conversion of Poincar£ francs into a 
particular currency. However, the par value (or gold value) 
of the U.S. dollar now has no more or less validity than the 
par value of any other currency, since there is no longer 
any agreed technique for assessing whether or not a particu­
lar par value is being maintained. Moreover, the price of 
$42.22 an ounce can no longer claim a universal acceptance, 
even in its limited role. Countries engaging in official 
transactions where gold reserves are used as collateral for 
loans tend to negotiate a price for gold that bears no 
relationship with that price . Similarly, in January 
1975» the French Government ceased to value its gold hold­
ings on the basis of $42.22 an ounce. It decided to use 
instead a valuation based on the average market price for 
gold over the preceedings three months, from which is subs- 
tracted a "margin of safety" .
Solutions adopted in practice.
There is no uniform approach. However, reference to 
the price of gold on the free market has been implicitly, 
but necessarily rejected in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France . Beyond that, each country provides
11/ See for instance the agreement between West Germany and 
Italy announced on August 31» 1974, whereby Germany extends 
a $2 billion credit to Italy. Italy pledged a portion of her 
gold reserves as collateral, the gold being valued at 80 per 
cent of the free market price for gold during the preceding 
eight weeks. New York Times, September 2, 1974.
12/ New York Times, 21 December 1974 and 11 January 1975 ;
Le Monde, 31 December 1974.
13/ In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected the free market price of gold in Hornlinie A.G. c. 
Stl Nationale des Pltroles d1Aquitaine, N.J. 1972, 269 
(April l6 , 1972), which is analyzed by T.M.C. Asser,"Golden 
Limitations of Liability", (1974) 5 J» Mar. L. & Com. 645 
at pp. 652ff. The court used the par value of the currency.
273 -
its own answer. In the United States, the C.A.B. has deter­
mined the liability limits in U.S. dollars by using the of­
ficial price of gold ^ / , The conversion is made on the 
basis of the par value of the dollar.
In the United Kingdom, the sterling equivalent; to 
the Poincar£ francs used in the Convention are fixed by 
statutory instruments which take into account variations in 
the value of the pound sterling and are not at all concerned 
with variations of the price of gold on the free market.
The conversion is made on the basis of the "proposed valua­
tion of gold at U.S. $42.22 per fine ounce", and the sterl­
ing equivalents are made to vary according to "the current 
market rates for sterling in terms of the U.S. dollar"-^/. 
Therefore, the conversion is made according to the third 
method described above, and the frequent necessity to issue 
new orders indicating the sterling equivalents to the limits 
in PoincarS francs reflects the uncertainties of this method 
when it is applied to a currency which is subject to wide 
fluctuations .
14/ At the original price of $35 an ounce, the limit of 
125»000 (unamended Convention) was equivalent to about 
$8,300 ; the limit of 250,000 francs (after amendment by 
The Hague Protocol) was equivalent to about $16,600. In 
1974, after two devaluations which have caused the price 
of gold to rise to $42.22 an ounce, the applicable limits 
were rounded respectively to $10,000 and $20,000. See 
Public Law 93*110. The equivalence of the limits set at 
The Hague are important even though the United States is 
not a party to the Hague Protocol because US courts may 
have to apply the Hague limits if the carriage is governed 
by the Hague Protocol, i.e. if the points of departure and 
destination are located in countries which have ratified 
the Protocol.
15/ Explanatory note to the Carriage by Air (Sterling 
Equivalents) Order 1973. S. I." 1973/1189 *
16/ Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order 1974, S.I. 
1974/528 / Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order 1973. 
S.I. I973/ H 89 ; Carriage by Air 1 Sterling Equivalents! Order
1968, s.i. 1968/1313^
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France does not have an official valuation of
Poincar§ francs. In Association A^ronautique du Centre
Inter-Club de Saint-Cyr Beynes c. Thi£rache , the court
stated that it had only one means to assess the value in
gold of the French franc in 19?0--the date on the final
judgment on the issue of liability--in order to evaluate
in French currency the amount of gold contained in 125.000
Poincar£ francs. That means was the communique of the Finance
Minister announcing the new par value of the franc after the
devaluation of 10 August 19^9* The court pointed out that
that definition was the only one available and that, of
necessity, it must be applied in all decisions, contracts,
and calculations where there is a reference to the gold
18/value of the French franc — ' . The court thus used the par 
value of the French franc, without considering the applica­
bility of any other method to convert Poincar& francs into 
national currency.
Comparison.
In the difficult question of the conversion of 
Poincar£ francs into national currencies, the following 
points emerge :
(i) The conversion is quite simple in the countries which 
have an official equivalent between Poincar£ francs and 
their own currency. Courts in those countries just adopt 
that official equivalent. It is immaterial that the basis 
on which the equivalence was established would not necessa­
rily have been selected in another country. Indeed, such a 
country-by-country approach in determining the actual limit,
17/ (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 212 (T.G.I. Paris, 10 February 1973).
18/"Attendu que cette definition du franc frangais par rap­
port a l1or etant la seule actuellement prlcisee doit etre 
retenue et s'impose dans les decisions, contrats et calculs 
faisant r§f§rence a la valeur or du franc francais" at p.
214.
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in contrast to a general level of limitation fixed by 
international agreement, is found in the carriage of goods 
by sea, governed by the 1924 Brussels Convention -^/. Such 
a unilateral approach is not really surprising when one 
considers that it agrees with : (a) the prerogative cons­
tantly asserted by States that, in the last resort, they 
alone can make the final decision as to the value of their 
currency and (b) the idea that the precise limits of
liability in a particular country must correspond to its 
social needs and must be accepted by its community. It may 
be that only national determination of the precise actual 
limits can achieve these aims.
There is an obvious danger that all uniformity on 
liability limitations could disappear if individual coun­
tries determined the precise amount of the limitation ex­
pressed in terms of their currency. The danger is certain, 
but it is not overwhelming as long as the framework for the 
limitation, as agreed at an international level, continues 
to be respected. It may even be argued that some degree of 
flexibility is the only way to secure the widest possible 
acceptance of the terms of the international agreement.
(ii) The free market price of gold was implicitly rejected 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as 
the basis of conversion of Poincar! francs. Because it 
would have been totally unreliable and uncontrolled, it is 
submitted that conversion on such a basis would have vio­
lated the purpose of the limitations on air carriers* 
liability
19/ F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money (3rd ed. 1971) at 
p. 142. It must be underlined that in the 1924 Brussels 
Convention, the possibility of fixing limits country by 
country was built in the Convention (Article IX).
20/ Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, pp. 485ff.
21/ This is in accord with a Resolution adopted by the Legal 
Committee of ICAO in relation to the conversion of Poincar^ 
francs to national currencies in the Warsaw and Rome Conven­
tions. ICAO Doc. 9122 LC/172, Part II, Appendix B, p. 45.
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The diversity between the solutions retained by the
various countries reflects the turmoil affecting the whole
22/international monetary system — ' . One can only regret that 
these difficulties did not become apparent until after the 
adoption of the 1971 Guatemala City Protocol which perpet­
uates the previous system with its inherent problems. It is 
submitted that any system adopted in replacement should be 
such that the extent of the carrier*s liability must be 
stable so that the carrier knows his obligations and can 
organise his business on that basis. At the same time, pas­
sengers and shippers would know in advance whether they will 
require additional insurance. The new system should also be 
based on easily ascertainable and uniformly recognized data. 
There is opinion in favour of the use of Special Drawing
Rights (SDR) based on a basket of currencies, as the unit
21/in which limitations of liability should be expressed— “  . 
This proposal appears to satisfy some of the requirements 
outlined above. But the SDR system emanates from the I.M.F. 
and some countries which are parties to the Warsaw Conven­
tion but not members of the I.M.F. may express strong reser­
vations. Moreover, any definite proposal based on SDRs may 
be premature when SDRs in general appear to be in a proba­
tionary period as the basis of the international monetary 
system ' . It does not seem possible that a system special 
to Air Law Conventions may succeed if the general system, 
based upon similar premises, collapses. In other words, it 
appears impossible to elaborate a fully satisfactory solu­
tion to the problem of monetary limitation of air carriers* 
liability as long as the currency crisis has not received 
a global solution.
22/ For a brief account of the successive crises, see J.G.S. 
"Termination of 1968 Gold Transactions Arrangements" (1974) 
48 A.L.J. 47 ; "Deferment of process of general revision of 
international monetary law" (1974) 48 A.L.J. 217.
23/ Asser, "Golden Limitations of Liability", (1974) 5 
J. Mar. L. & Com. 645 at pp. 668-669.
24/ It is only since July 1, 1974, that the I.M.F. has used 
a basket of currencies-to express the value of SDRs.
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Section 2.- Limitation of liability in passenger cases .
Opposition to the low limits of liability.
In the original Convention,. the limitation was set 
at a very low level--a little over U.S. $8,000.-^-^ The 
limit introduced by the Hague Protocol--about $16,500—  is 
also low in terms of today's standards of living. The posi­
tion was further aggravated in the United States, not only 
because of its very high average income, but also because 
it did not ratify the Hague Protocol. This led to strenuous 
opposition to the Convention which culminated in 1965 with
the United States Government announcing that it intended
26/to denounce the Convention — ' .
The same critical approach to the limit of liability 
in passenger cases appeared before the American courts where 
plaintiffs argued that the limit should be set aside because 
it was contrary to public policy in wrongful death actions-^-'f 
or even unconstitutional None of these attempts were
ultimately successful although the constitutionality argument 
nearly succeeded in Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,
25/ This was to take into account : (i) the favour made to 
the passenger/shipper who did not have to prove negligence, 
(ii) the risk that passengers and shippers were deemed to 
assume by using an aircraft. Travelling by air in 1929 was 
a dangerous operation, and (iii) the need to protect an 
infant industry. See further above Chapter Four.
26/ For a detailed account of the United States position, 
see A.F. Lowenfeld & A.J. Mendelsohn, "The United States and 
the Warsaw Convention", (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497.
27/ The public policy argument was used by plaintiffs in 
Kelley v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 9 Avi. 17*512 
(E .D . N .Y . 1965)^  and in Garcia v. Pan American Airways,
Inc. , 1 Avi. 1280 (N.Y. Sup“." C t . 1944) .
28/See generally on the issue of constitutionality D.M. 
Haskell, "The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitution Re­
visited", (1973) 39 J* Air L. & Com. 483.
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Ltd. where Judge Bua of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, found that :
" the provisions of the Warsaw Convention Treaty 
which would restrict damages in this case to 
approximately $8,300 are unconstitutional and 
therefore not enforceable because they violate 
the due process and equal protection clauses of 
the United States Constitution. The Court finds 
that such provisions are arbitrary, irresponsible, 
capricious and indefensible as applied to this 
case, in that such provisions would attempt to 
impose a damage limitation of considerably less 
than the undisputed pecuniary losses and damages 
involved in this case. Such unjustifiable, prefer­
ential treatment of airlines is unconstitutional.
. . . The Court considers that there is no basis 
for this unequal and discriminatory treatment of 
common carrier airlines, engaged in international 
travel, and that there is no legal or rational 
basis for this dicriminatory treatment." 30/
Before an order was entered pursuant to this opinion, a 
motion for rehearing was granted and a new opinion filed in 
which the court simply referred to the plaintiff*s lengthy 
arguments on the constitutionality issue and said that they 
had been found "persuasive". However, since the court had 
earlier found that there was no "international transporta­
tion" as defined by Article 1 of the Convention--which meant 
that the Convention was not applicable--the court felt 
"constrained to forego ruling on any arguments regarding 
the Convention*s constitutionality."
American opposition to the limitation of liability 
on the ground of public policy has been criticized as being 
inconsistent with the fact that several American States 
have statutory limitations on liability applicable in all 
cases of wrongful death ^ / . The argument would be compelling
29/ The first opinion appears at 10 Avi. 18,151. The final 
decision is at 11 Avi. 17,351 (111. 1969)•
30/  at 10 Avi. 18,160-1. 21/ at 11 Avi. 17.35^.
32/ J. Constantinoff, "La revision de la Convention de Var- 
sovie et la responsabilitS du transporteur airien", (1970) 
24 R.F.D.A. 393 at p. 397.
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if there was only one definition of public policy for the
whole of the United States. Such is not the case. Matters
of public policy widely vary from state to state as is
evidenced by the fact that, while some states limit damages
in cases of wrongful death -2-2/, others have express consti-
34 /tutional prohibitions against such limits .
"Special contract" between carrier and passenger. The 
Montreal Agreement.
Both the Convention and the Hague Protocol allow 
the conclusion of a special contract by which the carrier 
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liabili­
ty . This provision has not been used to any extent in 
individual contracts. In Warren v. The Flying Tiger Line, 
Inc. an attempt was made to classify an insurance
33/ The number of states which have limitations on damages 
for wrongful death has diminished to six. For a list of 
these states, see L. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law (re­
vised ed., New York, 1971) para. 13.03 [_2j. For a recent 
example of a limitation on damages in a wrongful death ac­
tion, see Richey v.- Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., 12 Avi. 
18,166 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1973) where the Oklahoma Superior 
Court applied the Missouri limitation of $25,000.
34/ See the list of these states in Kreindler, Aviation 
Accident Law, para. 13*03 [2"]. It may be noted that in 
Kilberg; v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 (N.Y. Ct.
App. I901)~, the New York Court of Appeals refused to enforce 
such limitations as a matter of public policy. On the various 
difficulties created by that decision, see Lowenfeld & 
Mendelsohn, "The Warsaw Convention", (1967) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
pp. 52$ff, It should be observed however that if public 
policy has sometimes been strong enough to prevent the 
application of the law of a sister state, it has not been 
sufficient to counter the application of the Warsaw Conven­
tion, as an international treaty which is part of the law 
of the land. Judicial feelings against Warsaw limits v/ere 
mostly expressed obiter.
35/ Article 22(1) in fine.
36/ 9 Avi. 17,621 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev* d(on other grounds)
9 Avi. 17,848 (9th Cir. 1965)*
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contract subscribed to by the operator of an aircraft for 
the benefit of the passengers as the "special contract" 
referred to in Article 22(1). This failed because the con­
tract of insurance was not between the passenger and the 
carrier 22/
The Montreal Agreement was a more successful attempt 
to achieve such a "special contract". It was designed to 
answer the objections raised in the United States against 
the low limits set by the Warsaw Convention 20/ % The Agree­
ment was signed by most of the important world airlines. It 
affects only the cases of international transportation which, 
according to the contract of carriage, include a place in 
the United States as a point of origin, a point of destina­
tion, or an agreed stopping place. In relation to these 
cases, the carriers who signed the Agreement accepted that 
the limitation on their liability be raised to $75,000 
inclusive of legal fees and costs, or $58,000 exclusive of 
legal fees and costs. The carriers participated in the scheme 
because, had they not done so, the United States would have 
completely withdrawn from the Warsaw system, exposing them 
to claims subject to no limitation of liability.
The carriers parties to the Agreement undertook to 
include in their conditions of carriage the text of a provi­
sion formulated for that purpose in the Agreement. They 
also undertook to give proper notice of the applicable limi­
tations to each passenger affected by the Agreement. The 
existence of a "special contract", which is made to result 
from these two steps, can be easily seen in the context of 
the American law applicable to the relationship between air
22/  at 9 Avi. 17,626-7.
38/ On the Montreal Agreement in general, see above pp. 55>
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carriers and passengers or shippers. It is the rule in the 
United States that such a relationship is entirely governed 
by the tariffs of air carriers embodying the conditions of 
carriage once these tariffs have been filed with the Civil 
Aeronautics Board 2 2 / 1 Thus, inclusion of the new limitations 
into tariffs is the normal procedure to alter the applicable 
contractual conditions, be it by a "special contract" or 
otherwise. The additional requirement of a proper notice in 
the Montreal Agreement is in line with the interpretation
40 /of Article 3 of "the Warsaw Convention in United States court-s-.
The analysis of the relationship existing under the 
Warsaw Convention combined with the Montreal Agreement as 
the special contract referred to by Article 22(1) was explic­
itly endorsed in the United States in Sheris v. The Sheris 
41/Company •— ' . In relation to other common law jurisdictions, 
there does not seem to be any obstacles to the enforcement 
of the new limitation on the basis of a special contract 
between air carriers and passengers. On the contrary, commu­
nication of special conditions of a contract to customers
by way of a proper notice is the traditional requirement
42/of the common law in enforcing standard form contracts — ' .
That requirement is carefully complied with when the Mont­
real Agreement's conditions are respected ^2 /
In France, objections have been raised as to the 
overall validity of the Montreal Agreement which is seen 
as a tacit amendment to an international treaty and, there­
fore, on that basis, its validity is qpen to doubt .
39/ above p . 146. 40/ above pp. 127ff.
41/ 12 Avi. 17,394 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1972).
42/ above pp. I3O-I3I.
43/ S. 2 of the Montreal Agreement gives very detailed ins­
tructions on the manner in which notice of the conditions 
is to be given to the passenger.
44/ R.H. Mankiewicz, "Le Statut de 1'arrangement de Montreal 
"(Mai 1966) et la decision du Civil Aeronautics Board du 13 
mai 1966 concernant la responsabilit£ de certains transpor­
ter's airiens a l'£gard de leurs passagers." (1967) 21 
R.F.D.A. 38^ ; M. Tancelin, "La crise de la Convention de 
Varsovie", (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 133 at p. 143.
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Further, it has been advocated that the wording of the Con­
vention calls for an agreement negotiated on an individual 
basis between carrier and passenger. This would in fact be 
similar to what happens in relation to cargo, where a partic­
ular limit, suited to the needs of the parties, can be set 
for each shipment. But the mechanism of the Montreal Agree­
ment is very different since it provides for a blanket 
undertaking to be applied to all passengers whose voyages 
happen to touch the United States at one point . However, 
it does not seem that the generality of the alleged "special 
contract" could prevent the application of the higher limit 
because it is incorporated in each individual ticket received 
by the passengers.
A stronger criticism relates to the very existence
46/of a "special contract" in French law — ' . There can be a
contract only if the parties have consented. There is no
strict equivalent to the common law ticket cases according
to which a clause is enforceable if it has been properly
notified, or to the United States rule that the tariffs filed
with the C.A.B. constitute the terms of the contract. In
France, the search for the parties* intent may well take
proper notice of a clause into account, as an indication
that the contracting parties concerned did in fact know its
terms, but this is not automatically so. The facts may make
it clear that, although notice of a clause was given, the
contracting party was not really aware of its existence,
could not consent, and is thus not bound. However, it is
true that courts do not usually require specific consent
to each contractual provision included in the contractual 
47/document — u  . But what is involved here is not merely one
45/ Mankiewicz, "L*arrangement de Montreal", p. 394.
46/ Mankiewicz, "L*arrangement de Montreal", p. 394.
47/ G. Berlioz, Le contrat d*adhesion, (Paris, 1973) at 
pp. 56ff.
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among many other clauses of a particular contract. It is an 
additional agreement complementing the primary contract, 
and, strictly speaking, the passenger should agree to its 
terms. However, it is unlikely that this argument will be 
submitted to a French court. The passenger greatly benefits 
from the increased limit and so is unlikely to plead that 
it should be inapplicable. If an air carrier who has signed 
the Montreal Agreement were to plead its inapplicability, 
he would be in breach of its undertaking with the C.A.B. 
that he will abide by its terms. This would endanger his 
position in the American market.
The Guatemala City Protocol.
The Guatemala City Protocol raises the limit of 
liability in cases of death and personal injury of a pas­
senger to 1 ,5 0 0 , 0 0 Poincar£ francs. This figure was chosen 
by the Diplomatic Conference in 1971 as the closest equiva­
lent to U.S. $100,000. This was adopted subject to periodical 48 /revision — ' . The limit on liability in cases of delay was 
lowered to 6 2 , 5 0 0 Poincar§ francs, being then equivalent to 
U.S. $4,150. Pursuant to Article 24(2), the new limits 
constitute maximum limits which cannot be set aside by a 
special agreement between carrier and passenger. They are 
unbreakable and may not be exceeded, whatever the circums­
tances which gave rise to the liability.
The new figures were a compromise between a number 
of conflicting opinions on the appropriate level of liabil­
ity. They certainly would not match some awards of damages 
made in some United States courts ^/. In order to avoid
48/ New Article 42 of the Convention (Art. XV of the Protocol).
49/ One of the highest amounts was awarded in Berner c .
British Commonwealth Pacific Airways, Ltd., 8 Avi. 17,781 
(S.D. N.Y. 1 9 6 3) where damages were evaluated at $924,396, 
or more than one hundred times the amount of the Warsaw 
Convention. The decision was later reversed by the Second- 
Circuit in 196 5 (9 Avi. 17,681).
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hardship on plaintiffs in such circumstances, the Protocol 
enables any participating State to establish a system to 
supplement the compensation payable under the Convention in 
respect of death or personal injury of passengers .
Section 3*- Limitation of liability in the 
carriage of baggage and cargo.
Article 22(2) provides :
" In the carriage of registered luggage and of goods, 
the liability of the carrier is limited to a sum 
of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor 
has made, at the time when the package was handed 
over to the carrier, a special declaration of the 
value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum 
if the case so requires. In that case the carrier 
will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the 
declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is 
greater than the actual value to the consignor at 
delivery."
Generally, the application of Article 22(2) provides 
little difficulty. However, there are a few problems in 
relation to the special declaration of value.
The actual declaration of value.
The first problem is to identify what constitutes 
a special declaration of value for the purposes of Article 
22(2), for frequently the value of the goods will be in­
serted into the air waybill for other purposes. The question 
arises whether such a valuation is adequate for the purposes 
of the Article. The solution adopted is the same in both 
legal systems.
50/ See Article 35A of the Convention, inserted by Article 
XIV of the Guatemala City Protocol.
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It is clear that the value declared for customs or
insurance purposes is not to be taken as constituting a
special declaration of value ^ 1 / t Furthermore, the mere fact
that the carrier is aware of the value of the goods will
<2/also not be sufficient 7 . The declaration must be speci­
fically made for the purposes of raising the liability of 
the carrier. Normally, this will entails insertion of the 
value of the goods in the air waybill as a special declara­
tion. However, in Orlove v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , 
the shipper recovered the full value of his shipment even 
though no special declaration of value appeared on the air 
waybill. The court emphasized the fact that the absence of 
the declaration was due to a clerical error by the carrier’s 
agent who had been informed of the value of the goods for 
the purposes of the limitation of liability, and that the 
shipper was willing to pay a higher freight charge to 
ensure additional protection for his goods
Difference between declared value and actual value.
Article 22(2) allows the carrier to prove that the 
declared value exceeds the actual value to the consignor at 
delivery and, consequently, to pay only the actual value of
51/ In England : Westminster Bank Ltd, v. Imperial Airways, 
Ltd. , 55 Lloyd’s Rep. 242 (K.B. 1936 ) ; in Switzerland :
Cie d*assurances Alpina c. Cie Trans World Airlines, (1963) 
17 R .F.D .A . 234 (C. Just. civ. Geneve, 16 March 1962); in 
the United States : L.& C. Mayers Company Inc, v. K.L.M. 
Royal Dutch Airlines" 3 Avi. *17,929 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) •
•52/ The mere fact that the carrier knew the value of the 
goods is irrelevant, as was made clear in relation to dia­
monds (in Cie d’assurances Alpina, above n. 51)1 gold 
bullion (in Westminster Bank, above n. 51)» or banknotes 
(in Wing Hang Bank Ltd, v. Japan Airlines Co. Ltd, 12 Avi.
17,884 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).)
53/ 5 Avi. 17,621 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), aff’d, 5 Avi. 18,103 
(2d Cir. 1958).
54/ A similar decision was reached in similar circumstances 
in the non-Warsaw case of Dover Farms, Inc, v. American Air­
lines , Inc., 11 Avi. 17,693 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1970). 
Compare Thomas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi, 17,428 
(3d Cir, 1972) where there was insufficient evidence to show
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the goods . However, difficulties have arisen when the 
declared value is lower than the damage to the goods.
In the United States, plaintiffs have claimed that 
the particular damage they had suffered was outside the 
scope of the contract. Accordingly, they argued that the 
damages to he awarded should not he limited hy contractual 
provisions. This argument has been rejected in several
cases . The recent decision of Croshy & Co. Inc, v .,
Compagnie Nationale Air France * L A J makes it quite clear 
that the limitations "apply to all claims, i.e. the plain­
tiff cannot escape these limitations hy suggesting that its 
claim does not fall into the category covered hy Air France’s 
tariff" % The decision is based on the idea— fundamental 
to the law of carriage of goods in the United States--that 
a carrier is entitled to base his rates upon value and that
his liability should hear a reasonable relation to the risks
59/and responsibilities assumed .
54/ (cont* d) that the omission of a declared value from the 
airbill resulted from mutual mistake.
55/ The Convention clearly places the onus of proof upon the 
carrier. However, the I.A.T.A. Conditions of Contract for 
the carriage of goods require that "all claims shall be sub­
ject to proof of value" (I.A.T.A. Resolution 600b, Condition 
4(c).) This in effect amounts to placing on the plaintiff 
the burden of establishing that the shipment did have a 
value as high as the amount declared. In K.L.M. c . Zahra 
Kachour, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 190 (Cass. Liban, 26 March 
I970), the Lebanese Cour de Cassation refused to allow 
these conditions of carriage to upset the system created by 
Article 22(2) and the shipper recovered the full amount of 
the value declared to the carrier, without having first to 
prove that her actual damage corresponded to that sum.
56/ Geliert v. United Airlines. Inc., 12 Avi. 17,762 (loth 
Cir. 1973) * Blair v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 344 F.Supp.360 
(S.D. Fla. 1972) ; Bruce Glenn Inc, v. Emery Air Freight 
Coro. 9 Avi. 18,000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1965)• Courts 
make no distinction whether a particular case is governed 
or not by the Warsaw Convention, or whether the limit results 
from a tariff or a declaration of value.
$?/ 12 Avi. 17,963 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1973). at p. 17,967.
59/ See above p. 82.The same attitude appears in other cases 
where United States courts placed great emphasis on the pay­
ment of a supplementary sum by the consignor to the carrier. 
See for instance Orlove v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 5 Avi.
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There is no air law case in point in the other 
common law countries. The domestic law of the United Kingdom 
is uncertain § 0/  , If the declared value of Article 22(2) is 
viewed as a liquidated damages clause, it seems that the 
consignor cannot recover more than that sum '. But if the 
declared value is viewed as a penalty, there is considerable 
doubt whether the plaintiff may ignore the penalty and sue 
for the whole damage , It seems that the nature of the 
declared value is more akin to a clause of liquidated dam­
ages. The essential purpose of a penal clause is to prevent 
a party from breaching contractual terms by fear that the 
whole penalty might apply. Usually, it far exceeds the ac­
tual damage caused by the breach of the contract. This is 
inconsistent with the right granted by Article 22 to air 
carriers to prove that the declared value exceeds the actual 
value so that the liability will not exceed the actual loss.
If Article 22's declared value is a liquidated damages clause, 
it follows that the value declared cannot be ignored to allow 
plaintiff to recover his whole loss.
An entirely different argument was developed in 
several civil law cases. The argument presupposes the exis­
tence of dol, or wilful misconduct, or some other fault 
referred to in Article 25 of the Convention , with the 
consequence that the carrier is prevented from relying on 
provisions excluding or limiting his liability. It was 
argued that the declaration of value was a limitation of
52/ (cont'd) 17,621 (S.D. N.Y. 1957), aff*d, 5 Avi. 18,103 
(2d Cir. 1958) ; L. & C. Mayers Co. v. K.L.M. 3 Avi.17,929 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 195l) ; Pick v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
9 Avi. 18,077 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965).
60/ A.H. Hudson, "Penalties limiting damages", (197^) 90 
L. Q. R. 31.
6l/ Diestal v. Stevenson, [1906] 2 K.B. 3^5
62/ See the discussion of the cases in Hudson, "Penalties 
limiting damages", (197^) 90 L.Q.R. pp. 31ff.
63/ See below Chapter 11.
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liability on which the carrier should not be allowed to rely 
so that if the actual value is in excess of the declared 
value, the plaintiff ought to recover the full value of the 
goods. In Cie d1assurances Alpina c. Cie Trans World Air-
a Swiss court was prepared to grant full recoverylines
to a plaintiff but could not do so because wilful misconduct 
on the part of the carrier was not satisfactorily established-^ 
But in S.A. Ass. Rotterdam & C.A. Amsterdamse Bank Belgie 
c . S.A . Sabena — ' , a Belgian court refused to accept the 
plaintiff’s claim and held that once the carrier’s liabi­
lity has been "extended" up to the value freely determined 
by the consignor, that limit could not be set aside by 
virtue of Article 25 *
It is submitted that it is unlikely that the reason­
ing in S.A. Ass. Rotterdam will be generally adopted in other 
civil law courts. Firstly, the declaration of value is not 
an "extension" of liability which would constitute a legal 
category sui generis. In a civil law context, the declara­
tion of value appears as one example of contractual limi­
tation of liability based upon the provisions of Article 22(2). 
Secondly, it is considered that because of that characteriza­
tion, most civil law systems would prevent the carrier from 
using the declaration of value as a defence in the case of 
dpi. In cases of dpi, Article 25 provides that the carrier 
cannot avail himself "of the provisions of this Convention 
which exclude or limit liability". A declaration of value 
does not directly belong to this group of provisions, but 
its very existence, as well as its regime, are established
64/ (1963) 17 R.F.D.A. 234 (C.Just.civ.,Geneve 16 March 1962).
65/ A similar approach was adopted by the Beirut Court of 
Appeal in K.L.M. c. Zahra Kachour, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 223 
at p. 227 '(C. A . Beirut 17 July 1969)* The issue was not dis­
cussed by the Lebanese Cour de Cassation in the same case 
(1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 190 (Cass. Liban 26 March 1970).
66/ (1969) 4 Sur. Tr. L. 1174 (Trib. com. Bruxelles, 19 
April 1969)•
67/at p. 1177»
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by Article 22(2). That article, per se, certainly belongs 
to the provisions which exclude or limit liability. Its 
disappearance in cases of wilful misconduct means that a 
declaration of value has to stand alone. Its validity and 
enforceability become entirely dependent on general prin­
ciples of the law of contract, one of which being that a 
party guilty of dol cannot rely upon contractual limitation
declaration of value being a contractual limitation of 
liability, it cannot be enforced in cases of dpi.
Comparison.
The results achieved in the two systems diverge 
since, in certain cases, civil law courts are prepared to 
allow a shipper to recover damages in excess of the decla­
ration of value while common law courts appear unwilling to 
do so. These results are clearly based on reasonings rooted 
in the domestic law background. In United States courts, 
great importance is given to the payment of an additional 
sum by the shipper ; this represents the necessary consi­
deration for the carrier*s promise to pay damages higher 
than the normal 250 francs per kilogramme. But once the 
parties have made their bargain, they cannot disregarded 
later on, even on the basis that, at the time of the decla­
ration of value, the particular damage complained of had 
not been contemplated so that the risk involved was not 
covered by the bargain. By contrast, several civil law 
courts were more easily convinced that damages higher than 
the amount of the declared value could be awarded, provided 
that the carrier had committed acts which could be charac­
terized as dpi. Their conclusion was inevitable once it was 
accepted that the declaration of value was in fact a limi­
tation of liability.
of liability for ordre public the
68/ above p. 112.
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But it is not only in the solutions that the influence 
of the municipal law background appears. It is also manifest 
in the very formulation of the problems. American lawyers 
have thought in terms of enforcement of a freely struck 
bargain ; civil lawyers have thought in terms of the enforce­
ability of a contractual limitation in the case of dol. How 
a question, as formulated in one legal system, would be 
treated in the other legal system is open to speculation.
It does not seem that the argument developed in American 
courts could arise in a French court. It assumed the exis­
tence of a clear distinction between heads of damages which, 
in common law, is based on the fact that for centuries only 
some specified heads of damages were recoverable and that, 
still today, not all forms of damages can be compensated.
Such an approach is alien to French law, where distinctions 
are made for analytical purposes only, without any prohibi­
tion of compensation attached to particular heads to damage-^f 
The attitude of a common law court to a plaintiff 
who claimed damages in excess of the declared value in the 
case of wilful misconduct is not immediately apparent. The 
essential basis of the reasoning of civil law courts is that 
enforcement of a limitation of liability in cases of dol 
would be contrary to ordre public. There is no such general 
principle in the common law -2^ /. The only basis on which a 
declaration of value could be held inapplicable in the case 
of wilful misconduct would be through interpretation of the 
contractual clause limiting the carrier*s liability, A court 
would have to examine whether the wording of the clause 
covered cases of wilful misconduct. It is thus possible that 
a common law court would award damages in excess of the 
declared value in a case of wilful misconduct. Similar results 
would thus appear in a common law court and in a French court. 
But this result would be based on entirely different reason­
ings .
69/ above pp. I72-I73. _70/ above pp. 114-119.
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Chapter ELEVEN. - UNLIMITED LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
BASED ON ARTICLE 25 .
Introduction.
Before examining the complex problems related to the 
application of Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, a few 
preliminary remarks are necessary. Firstly, this thesis does 
not scrutinize each case in order to assess whether the 
final outcome of limited or unlimited liability was rightly 
reached. To do this, one would have to compare what the court 
did with what the court should have done. This assumes that 
the norm to be applied is defined with certainty and can be 
used as a reliable yardstick. That assumption cannot be sus­
tained. From the outset, the norms applicable in courts of 
the civil law and of the common law were not uniform, since 
the concepts of dol and wilful misconduct were different ^ . 
This study is not concerned with the defense of a particular 
concept, be it dol or wilful misconduct, as it may appear 
in one particular country, or as it should ideally appear.
On the other hand, even if the norm to be applied were for­
mulated in a similar manner in all jurisdictions, this 
would not be sufficient to provide the necessary yardstick 
to assess the correctness of the application of the text.
This insufficiency has already been illustrated by the nu­
merous examples of fundamental differences in the applica­
tions of the Convention, which is a text of uniform law.
It is precisely one of the objects of this thesis to attempt 
to discover and compare what are the norms which are actually 
applied by the various courts under the cover of a uniform 
law convention.
1/ above pp. 123-124.
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Secondly, the appreciation of the facts has a 
paramount importance in a finding of dol or wilful misconduct, 
and so it seems rather pointless to analyze a judgment in 
order to see whether the refined requirements of a legal 
definition are met by raw facts which not only may be inter­
preted differently from court to court but also may vary 
widely from case to case. It has been stated that :
" it is of little sense to analyse the formulas 
devised by courts as if every letter had its 
special significance and try to distil some very 
precise definition. That would be like designing 
a chemist’s balance for weighing potatoes. . ."2/
Moreover, there can be no exhaustive study of facts from 
the text of judgments. The conciseness of some French judg­
ments, for instance, would make the task impossible. More - 
importantly, in every case, the facts appear with the co­
louring of the presentation given to them by the parties
acting within the framework of the rules of evidence which
3/may vary greatly from court to court
Thirdly, it is useful to keep in mind that many of 
the common law cases applying Article 25 are jury cases. A 
real understanding of the cases implies a knowledge of the 
jury's function . Its traditional task is to weigh the 
evidence as to the facts alleged to give rise to liability. 
But it also falls within the jury's province to "translate 
the metaphysical standard of the reasonable and prudent man 
into a concrete standard applicable to the particular case"^ 
In a number of common law jurisdictions, the jury system in
2/ Drion, Limitation of Liabilities, p. 210, No. 180. A 
remark to the same effect has been made by B.A. Hepple &
P. O'Higgins, Individual Employment Law (London, 1971),
pp. 120-121 (point 10)~, about the related concept of "serious
misconduct" in the field of the law of employment.
2 /  Drion, Limitation of Liabilities, p. 210, No. 180.
4/ See generally Fleming, Torts, pp. 250ff ; Prosser, Torts, 
pp. 205ff.
2 /  Fleming, Torts, p. 250.
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civil cases is no longer the general rule . But the prin­
ciples which had developed in the framework of the jury 
system have basically remained untouched. One of these 
principles is that, generally speaking, it will not be 
possible for an appeal court to re-hear the facts of a 
case. The appeal court can only determine whether, in the 
light of the facts found in first instance, the conclusion 
was, in law, open to the trial court. There is no institu­
tion similar to the jury in French law for civil cases. 
Questions of fact and questions of law are fully examined 
by courts of first instance and courts of appeal, while 
the Cour de Cassation has jurisdiction on questions of 
law only. In addition, the distinction between questions
of fact and questions of law is a further source of dif-
7/ferences between French courts and common law courts *i-/ .
The first section examines the interpretation of 
the original text of Article 25. The difficulties linked 
to the application of the original text prompted its 
revision in 1955 by the Hague Protocol. At the same time, 
there was, on a national level, an evolution towards a 
more uniform definition of the conditions of unlimited 
liability. The second section examines the movement toward 
that uniform definition. The last section deals with the 
difficulties which appeared in the application of that 
definition.
6/ For the situation in England, see R.M. Jackson, Machinery 
of Justice in England (5th ed. Cambridge, 1967) » Devlin, 
Trial by Jury (8th Hamlyn Lectures). For the situation in 
the various Australian jurisdictions, see the Australian 
Digest, 2d ed., "Jury".
2/ See below p.333. See also Fleming, Torts, pp. 250ff ; 
Prosser, Torts, pp. 205ff. ; David & Brierley, Major Legal 
Systems, p. 79*
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Section One. - Interpretation of the unamended Article 25.
Article 25 of the unamended Convention provides 
that a carrier cannot avail himself of the provisions which 
exclude or limit his liability
" if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct 
or by such default on his part as, in accordance 
with the lav/ of the Court seized of the case; is 
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct."
The official French text requires that "le dommage provient 
de son dol ou d'une faute qui, d'apres la loi du tribunal 
saisi, est consid^ree comme äquivalente au dol." The same 
result follows if the damage is caused in similar condi­
tions by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope 
of his employment.
It was seen earlier that the drafters of the Conven­
tion used the two different concepts of "dol" and "wilful 
misconduct" to indicate in which situations the carrier 
ought to be prevented from limiting or excluding his lia­
bility ^ . It was clear from the start that these concepts 
had different meanings and it was easily foreseeable that 
divergences would soon appear between cases applying the 
English text--based on the concept of "wilful misconduct"-- 
and cases applying the French text--based on the concept 
of "dol".
Characterization of dol in French law.
Traditionally, dol in the execution of a contract
9/is defined as a wrong intentionally committed . On such a
8/ above pp. 123-124.
3/ "acte illicite intentionnel" as expressed in the CITEJA 
draft examined by the Warsaw Conference in 1929* The defi­
nitions vary. It is very strict in classical doctrine :Colin 
& Capitant, Traite de Droit civil (by Julliot de La Moran- 
diere, Paris" 1959) . vol. 2~j No . 1100 ; Planiol, Ripert & 
Boulanger, Traite el£mentaire de droit civil (Paris, 1955), 
vol. 2, No. 795* The definition is also very strict in M. 
Litvine, Droit aerien (Eruxelles, 1970), p. 274. In is less 
strict in H. & L. Mazeaud, Traite thlorique et pratique,
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basis, there is no doubt that if a pilot steals a bar of 
gold carried on his plane, he is guilty of dol But
there are cases where the answer is not so easy because it 
is not clear whether the agent must have the intent to cause 
the precise damage which has resulted from his action or 
whether it is enough that he deliberately breached his con­
tractual duties, thus creating the situation which caused 
the damage , The Cour de Cassation appears to have 
endorsed the second interpretation. In St§ des Comidiens 
Francais c . Giraud — ' , the court stated that there was 
dol when a contracting party "deliberately refuses to 
perform his contractual duties, even if that refusal is 
not dictated by the intent to harm the other contracting 
party" . In other words, a deliberate breach of duty
is enough to constitute dol, and there is no further
14/requirement such as the intent to cause harm — ' .
2 / (cont8 d) vol. 1, No. 670 ; Planiol & Ripert, Traite 
pratique de droit civil, vol. 6,Des obligations by P.
Esrnein (Paris, 1952), No. 513«
10/ Cie Swissair c. Cie La Concorde, (1961) 15 R.F.D.A. 202, 
TTrib. F£d. Suisse, 22 September 1959)«
11/ See on the point the contrasting views of M. Briere de 
l*Isle, "La faute intentionnelle, a propos de 1*assurance 
de la responsabilit£ civile professionnelle", D.S. 1973»
Chr. p. 259 ; J. Ghestin, "La faute intentionnelle du no- 
taire dans 1*execution de ses obligations contractuelles 
et 1*assurance responsabilite", D.S. 1974, Chr. p. 31 ;
D. Nguyen Thanh-Bourgeais, "Contribution a l'§tude de la 
faute contractuelle : la faute dolosive et sa place ac- 
tuelle dans la gamme des fautes" (1973) 72 Rev. Trim. Dr. 
Civ. 496.
12/ D.S. 1969*J«601, note J. Mazeaud (Cass. civ. Ire, 4 
February 1969)•
13/ "Vu 1*article 1150 c.civ. --Attendu que le dlbiteur corn- 
met une faute dolosive lorsque, de propos deliber£, il se 
refuse a ex£cuter ses obligations contractuelles, meme si 
ce refus n'est pas dicte par 1*intention de nuire a son co- 
contractant."
14/ See also in that sense Pinget c. Barbier, D.S. 1974.J. 
90, note J. Ghestin (Cass. civ. Ire, 24 October 1973)«
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Is there a fault equivalent to dol ?
The majority of cases dealing with the unamended
Article 25 do not deal with cases of dol proper, hut with
the default which, in accordance with the law of the court
seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to dpi.
It is an accepted rule of lav/ in several civil law countries
that faute lourde—  gross negligence--should be treated as
dol on the basis of the maxim Culpa lata dolo aequiparatur^ /
which has been integrated into the law of these countries.
Due to numerous ambiguities in the drafting history of
Article 25 $ the applicability of the maxim to air law
cases was initially questioned. But,after some hesitation,
the problem was solved in all civil law jurisdictions in
17 /favour of the application of the normal domestic rule — u  . 
Accordingly, if the maxim is part of the lex fori, the air 
carrier will face unlimited liability in case of faute 
lourde as well as in case of dol proper But if the
15/ i.e. "gross negligence is equivalent to dol". It should 
be noted that dol and faute lourde are treated as equivalent 
for the sole purpose of the inapplicability of the limita­
tion on liability. See further below
16/ above pp. 121-124.
17/ It is for each country to determine whether faute lourde 
is equivalent to dol. For the situation in Belgium, see 
Litvine, Droit aerien, p. 280. In France, some doubts about 
whether faute lourde should be treated as equivalent to dol 
for the purpose of the Warsaw Convention were implicit in 
Gallais c. Ste Aero-Maritime, (19577 8 R.F.D.A. 184 (Trib. 
civ. Seine, 28 April 1954). But the decision is isolated ; 
the equivalence is ascertained in Cie Air France c. Nordisk 
Transport, (1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 105 (C.A. Paris, 28 February 
1953) and Hennessv c. Air France, (19577 8 R.F.D.A. 45 (C.A. 
Paris, 25 February 1954).
18/ Besides Cie Air France c. Nordisk Transport and Hennessv 
c. Air France (above n. 1777 see Del Vina c. Cie Air France, 
(19571 8 R.F.D.A. 191 (Trib. civ. Seine, 2 July 1954), CaTs- 
se Parisienne de Reescomrte c. Air France, (1956)10 R.F.D.A. 
320 (C.A. Paris, 31 May-1956). In Switzerland, Deutsche 
Lufthansa A.G. c. Basler Transport A.G. (1971) 6 Eur. Tr. L. 
l47 (Trib. Fed. Suisse, 14 November 1967)* In Lebanon s Cie 
Middle East Airlines c. La Baloise Transports, (1972) 26 
R.F.D.A.~186 (Cass. Liban 20 January 1971)» In the Belgian 
Congo : Cie Sabena c. Moutafis, (1959) 13 R.F.D.A. 178 
(C.A. Leopoldville, 16 March 1959)»
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maxim is not part of the lex fori, liability will be 
unlimited only in the case of dol ,
What is "faute lourde" ?
Once it is established that there exists a fault
equivalent to dol in the lex fori, it remains to ascertain
what that equivalent is. What amounts to faute lourde in
French law ? At the Warsaw Conference, the uncertainties of
the notion of faute lourde caused some reservations to be
expressed on whether such a vague notion should be intro-
20 /duced in a uniform legal regime of liability^1^ . Suffice it 21/here — ' to give two definitions of faute lourde taken from
22/ ----------Hennessv c. Air France — / . The court of first instance
emphasized that faute lourde was to be appreciated in
abstracto, by comparison with the conduct of a reasonable
man placed in the same circumstances. The court said t
" faute lourde can be reduced neither to culpa in 
concreto, nor to professional negligence, nor to 
a breach of criminal law ; its domain is the 
enormity which denounces either incapacity or 
wanton carelessness ; it is recklessness, inabil­
ity, blindness as well as conscious temerity."23/
The Court of Appeal took a similar attitude and held that
the plaintiff must establish "a particularly serious
negligence, carelessness, or temerity."
19/ In Belgium s Collet c. Sabena, (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. 4ll 
note E.G. (T.G.I. Bruxelles, 17 April 1958) ; Ficher c. Cie 
La Sabena (1950) 4 R.F.D.A. 411 (Trib. Ire inst. Bruxelles,
6 May 1950). See also Delaby c. Sotramat (1969) 32 R.G.A.E.
66, note R. Nys (C.A. Bruxelles, 12 January 1965} where the 
court required evidence of an intentional wrong before con­
sidering the question of unlimited liability.
20/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 4l (per M. Ripert).
21/ The relevance of the definition of faute lourde for air 
law cases has almost disappeared in French law since the 
1957 Act. See further below pp. 303“3°6.
22/ (1952) 6 R.F.D.A. 199 (Trib. civ. Seine, 24 April 1952), 
aff1d, (195*0 8 R.F.D.A. 45, with conclusions by Avocat Ge­
neral Dupin and note P. Chauveau (C.A .Paris,25 February 195*0*
23/ at 6 R.F.D.A. p. 223. The same definition was given in 
Del Vina c. Cie Air France, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 191 (Trib. civ. 
Seine, 2 July 1954). *
24/ at 8 R.F.D.A. p. 65.
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But even though "it is not indispensable to prove 
that the agent acted deliberately, disregarding the prob­
able consequences of his actions" \ it remains true that 
the burden of establishing faute lourde rests on the plain­
tiff. Accordingly, there can be no case of faute lourde 
when the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the 
damage are unknown % & / 1
Characterization of wilful misconduct by common law courts.
When the British delegate to the 1929 Warsaw Con­
ference proposed that the concept of wilful misconduct be 
used in the English translation of Article 25» he thus
defined it s "acts committed deliberately or acts of care-
27/lessness without any regard for the consequences. ^  The 
definition has since been refined through a number of 
judicial formulations. In Horabin v. British Overseas Air­
ways Corporation , the only English case dealing with 
the unamended Article 25» the jury was directed as follows :
" To be guilty of wilful misconduct the person 
concerned must appreciate that he is acting 
wrongfully, or is wrongfully omitting to act 
and yet persists in so acting or omitting to 
act regardless of the consequences, or acts or 
omits to act with reckless indifference as to 
what the result may be." 29/
2£/ at 8 R.F.D.A. p. 65.
26/ Such was the conclusion in the Hennessv case. A similar 
result had been obtained in Cie Air France c. Nordisk Trans­
port , (1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 105 (C.A. Pari s', 2 8 February ;953)•
27/ Heme Conference Internationale, p. 40.
28/ [1952] 2 All E.R. 1016. (Q.B. 1952).
29/ at p. 1022. For a similar attitude in a case of domestic 
air carriage in Australia, see Royal Aero-Club of Victoria 
v. The Commonwealth, 92 C.L.R. 230 (High Court "of Australia,195^ 7 •
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In Grey v, American Airlines Inc. 1 the Court 
of Appeals stated :
" There is no dispute as to what constitutes 
wilful misconduct. The instructions required 
proof of a ’conscious intent to do or omit 
doing an act from which harm results to 
another, or an intentional omission of a 
manifest duty. There must be a realization 
of the probability of injury from the conduct, 
and a disregard of the probable consequences 
of such conduct." 31/
One of the latest American definitions of wilful misconduct 
is contained in Wing Hang Bank Ltd, v, Japan Air Lines Co,-^  
where the court, endorsing a long line of authority, held s
" Willful misconduct within the meaning of that 
Convention is defined as the willful performance 
of an act that is likely to result in damage or 
willful action with a reckless disregard of the 
probable consequences." 33/
This definition does not emphasize as clearly as the previous 
one the requirement that the agent must have the knowledge 
of the likeliness of the damage, or of the probability of 
the consequences he recklessly disregards. That this 
requirement is part of the concept of wilful misconduct was 
curtly stated by the appeal court in Berner v. British
30/ 4 Avi. 17,811 (2d Cir. 1955).
31/ at p. 17,813. The following cases adopted a similar 
attitude s Rashap, Adm’r. v, American Airlines, Inc.,(1955) 
U.S.Av.Rep. 593 Ts .dT N.Y."19557 V Coultas v. K.L.M. Air­
lines, (1961) U.S.Av. Rep. 199 (S.D. N.Y3 I96I) ; Goepp v. 
American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 3 Avi. 18,057 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1952), aff»d ,^ 305 N.Y. 830 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1953) ; Outlook Store Inc, v. Cardinal Air Services, 11 Avi. 
17,848 (N.Y. City Ct. 19707^
2 2/ 12 Avi. 17,884 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).
33/ at p. 17,886. The following cases were decided on the 
same basis : KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Tuller, 7 Avi. 
17,544 (D.C. Cir. 196iTi cert. denied/ 368 U.S. 921 (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, 
Inc. 3 Avi. 17,440 (2d-Ci"r"i 1951), cert, denied, 3^1 U.S.
951 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1951) ; American Airlines v. Ulen, 2 Avi. 
14,990 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Ritts Extr’x v, American Overseas 
Airlines, (1949) U.S. Av, , Rep." 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1949").
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Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd \
" the court below was in error in concluding that 
the Second Circuit does not require knowledge 
that damage would probably result." 35/
Is there a fault equivalent to wilful misconduct ?
There is no common law case using the second branch 
of Article 25, i.e. a fault which "in accordance with the 
law of the Court seized of the case, is considered to be 
equivalent to wilful misconduct." The reason seems to be 
simply that the lex fori does not consider that there is 
anything equivalent to wilful misconduct. On the contrary, 
English and American courts have emphasized the specific 
character of wilful misconduct, which is entirely different 
from negligence and goes far beyond it, however gross or 
culpable the negligence might have been -2^ /.
But is is not the specific character of the notion 
of wilful misconduct which can explain the difference be­
tween common law courts and French courts. No civil law 
lawyer questions the fact that dol is a specific concept 
essentially different from negligence, however gross -22/.
The "equivalence" intervenes in relation to the respective
effects of dol and faute lourde on the effectiveness of--------  ---  ------ - ------- .
clauses limiting or excluding liability / . The wording of 
Article 25 assumes that the presence of dol will render such 
clauses inoperative. The only question is whether the lex 
fori knows of another fault which would have an equivalent
J V  9 Avi. 17,681 (2d Cir. 1965) 25/  at P- 17.685.
36/ In the United Kingdom, Horabin v. British Overseas Air­
ways Corp. [1952] 2 All E.R~ 1016 (q .B. 1952). In the United. 
States, Coultas v. K.L.M. Airlines, (1961) U.S.Av.Rep. 199 
(S.D. N.Yh 1961) ; Rashao, Adm’r v. American Airlines, Inc. 
(1955) U.S.Av.Rep. 593 (S.D." N.Y. 1955) ; Ritts E'trx v ~  
American Overseas Airlines, (19^9) U.S.Av.Rep^ 6"5_(S.D. ■
N.Y. 19^9)*
37/ Litvine, Droit aerien, pp. 272ff. ; D. Lureau, La respon-
sabilite du transporteur agrien (Paris, 1961), pp. l45ff.
. •s 38/ Lureau, La responsabiiitg du transporteur agrien, p. 146, 
No. 260 ; Drion, Limitation of Liabilities, p. 198, No. 171.
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effect. That question becomes meaningless in a common lav/ 
environment where the assumption on which Article 25 is 
based does not correspond to an actual legal rule. A finding 
of wilful misconduct does not necessarily make inoperative 
a clause limiting or excluding liability 32/1 Therefore, it 
would be pointless to look for another kind of fault which 
would be equivalent when the required equivalence relates 
to effects which are not attached to the original notion of 
wilful misconduct.
Comparison of the interpretations of the unamended Article 2 5.
Even though the definition of v/ilful misconduct is
wider than the definition of dol, since it may include cases
--- 40/where no intentional wrong has been committed — • , plaintiffs 
in many civil law courts were in a better situation than 
those in common law courts. The reason is that most civil 
law courts v/idened the scope of Article 25 by the use of 
the notion of faute lourde, whilst no similar move was made 
to resort to "gross negligence" in common law courts. The 
divergence appears all the more clearly when it is realized 
that faute lourde and gross negligence are almost identical
477notions — ' .
39/ above pp. Il4ff.
40/ In Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, (1949) U.S.Av. 
Rep. 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), it was said in the charge to the 
jury : "wilful misconduct, although it may mean intentional^ 
is not limited to that." at p. 68.
4l/ Compare the definitions of faute lourde given above in 
the text with the following definition of gross negligence 
given in Black's Law Dictionary (revised 4th ed.) : "The 
intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless 
disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or 
property of another ; such a gross want of care and regard 
for the rights of others as to justify the presumption of 
willfulness and wantonness."
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Section 2. - Towards a common definition of the 
conditions of unlimited liability.
The Hague Protocol.
The evils of "conceptualistic thinking" which had
been predominant in the drafting of Article 25 soon became 42/apparent — ' . The use of concepts such as dol or v/ilful
misconduct almost necessarily created a lack of uniformity
between the different courts. It was generally considered
that, instead of referring to concepts, an amended version
ought to spell out the precise conditions in which the
liability of air carriers was to be unlimited -^ 2/. This
was achieved by Article XIII of the Hague Protocol. The
plaintiff is now required to prove :
" that the damage resulted from an act or omission 
of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with 
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result."
A consensus appeared early in the proceedings of the Hague 
Conference on the substantial conditions for unlimited lia­
bility Delegates from both civil law and common law
42/ above pp. 123-124.
43/ See, inter alia, Annex B to the Resolution concerning 
the revision of the Warsaw Convention adopted by the ICAO 
Legal Committee, 9th session, Rio de Janeiro 19531 Minutes. 
Doc. 745O-LC/136 (xxix-xxx).
44/ A different definition of the conditions of unlimited 
liability had been elaborated by the ICAO Legal Committee 
at its 1953 Rio de Janeiro meeting. Article XIII of the Rio 
draft required a deliberate act or omission done with intent 
to cause damage (ICAO Doc. 7450-LC/136, vol. 1, p. xxiii). 
The Rio draft had been adopted only by a bare majority of 
the Legal Committee. At the Hague Conference, there was such 
strong opposition to the Rio draft that it soon became clear 
that the draft had no chance of being finally adopted. At 
the same time, a proposal elaborated in 1954 by an ICAO 
Legal Sub-Committee was endorsed by .a number of Governments, 
and this constituted the main basis of discussion for the 
rest of the Conference . See Doc. 7686-LC/140, vol. 1, pp. 
l65ff.
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countries clearly realized that the basis of their agreement 
was very close to the interpretation of "wilful misconduct" 
given by common law courts construing Article 25 of the 
original Convention . Delegates from civil law countries 
acknowledged that the new definition would change the situa­
tion existing in their countries . For the courts which 
considered faute lourde as equivalent to dol, the Protocol 
would diminish the number of cases of unlimited liability 
because only cases of extremely gross negligence would 
satisfy the definition. For the courts which rejected the 
equivalence of any fault with dol, the Protocol would 
increase the number of cases of unlimited liability because 
the new definition was wider than the concept of dol. But, 
despite the general agreement on the substance of the text, 
the final wording was adopted only after lengthy discussions 
during which several important objections were voiced and 
remained unanswered
The definition contained in the French Act of March 2, 1957.
The Act of March 2, 1957» was adopted in order to 
unify the law applicable to all cases of air carriage, 
domestic as well as international, and to give the courts 
some guidelines for the interpretation of the Warsaw Con­
vention. Before this Act, French courts had adopted an 
interpretation very favourable to plaintiffs on several 
important questions of air carriers* liability . A reaction
45/ See the comments of the Italian delegate (doc. 7686-LC/ 
140, vol. 1, p. 168) and of the U.S. delegate (p. 197)*
46/ see e.g. the comments of the Swiss delegate (p. 170), 
the German delegate (p. 171)» and the French delegate (pp. 
176 and 199)o
42/ This is particularly clear in relation to the manner in 
which the knowledge of the probability of damage is to be 
assessed, objectively or subjectively. See Doc. 7684-LC/140, 
vol. 1, pp. 196 to 206. See further below pp. 3°9ff*
48/ For instance, French courts had allowed plaintiffs to 
rely on faute lourde, as well as on dol, to obtain unlimited 
damages on the basis of Article 25 of the Convention (see 
above p.297). The most controversial decision was Vivioz c .
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came with the adoption of the 1957 Act by the French Parle- 49 /ment — ^  . The Act provides that all air carriage is to be 
governed by the provisions of the Convention, or of any 
Convention modifying the Warsaw Convention and applicable 
in France, even though the carriage is not international 
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Convention, had 
the Hague Protocol of 1955 come into force reasonably soon 
after its adoption, the problem of the definition of the 
conditions for unlimited liability would have been solved 
in France for all cases of air carriage for the 1957 Act 
provides that any modification of the Convention would be 
substituted for the original Convention provisions as soon 
as the Protocol comes into force in France.
As far as French courts were concerned, the 1957 
Act achieved a result similar to that which the Hague 
Protocol would have done. It did so by defining the concept 
of fault equivalent to dol referred to in the unamended
48/ (cont' d ) c . Cie Air France, D. 1959*J«101, note Savatier, 
"(Cass. civ. 2me, 29 January 1959)» where the relatives of 
a deceased passenger had been allowed to set aside the con­
tractual limitations of the carrier's liability and to sue 
the carrier in tort, on the basis of domestic rules of 
strict liability and for an unlimited amount.
49/ It was considered that the courts must be prevented 
from adopting interpretations of the unamended Convention, 
and of the rules governing air carriers' liability in gene­
ral, which were too harsh for the carriers. One of the 
reasons advanced was that such interpretations placed French 
carriers--sued mainly in French courts--at a financial 
disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors from common law 
countries. The Protocol would have restored the balance 
through its definition of the conditions of unlimited 
liability. But, in 1957» nobody could foresee when it 
would come into force. (It did so in 1963)« See further 
on the bad feelings created by the judicial interpreta­
tions of the rules governing air carriers' liability :
P. Chauveau, "Reflexions sur 1'arret de Bordeaux", in 
(1955) 9 R.F.D.A. 154 ; A. Garnault, "La loi frangaise 
du 2 mars 1957"» (1957) H  R.F.D.A. 289.
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Article 25 *
" For the application of Article 25 of said 
convention, the fault considered to be 
equivalent to dol is faute inexcusable.
Faute inexcusable is the deliberate fault 
which implies knowledge of the probability 
of damage and its reckless acceptance 
without valid reason." 50/
This definition calls for several observations :
(i) There are obvious similarities between it and the 
definition of the Hague Protocol referring to an act or 
omission "done with intent to cause damage or recklessly 
and with knowledge that damage would probably result".
Faute inexcusable is also much closer to the common law 
definitions of wilful misconduct than the previous notion 
of faute lourde. Gross negligence is no longer sufficient 
to set the limitation of liability aside. This removes one 
of the most obvious causes of divergence between common 
law and French courts.
(ii) Commentators have discussed the differences in wording 
between the 1957 Act and the Hague Protocol t it is true 
that an identical wording would have had the advantage of 
simplicity. But the reality of the practical consequences 
of the difference is hard to assess. There is not even 
unanimity among commentators as to which wording is more 
severe for air carriers \ Here again, it seems almost 
futile to try to evaluate the actual impact that a fine 
difference in definition could have on the issue of limi­
tation of liability in various cases, especially when the
50/ The 1957 Act has been integrated into the Code de l1Avia­
tion civile of which Article L.321-4 reads : "Pour 1*appli­
cation de 1*article 25 de ladite convention, la faute consi­
der^ comme äquipollente au dol est la faute inexcusable.
Est inexcusable la faute deliblrie qui implique la conscience 
de la probability du dommage et son acceptation tem£rairo 
sans raison valable."
51/ See E. du Pontavice, comments in (1 9 6 5) 18 Rev.Trim.Dr. 
Com. 952, No. 13 ; P* de La Pradelle, note in (i9 6 0) 23 R.G.A. 
379 at p. 392 ; W. Coulet, "Faute lourde et faute inexcusable" 
(I9 6 0) 23 R.G.A. 315 at p. 321 ; G. Cas, note in (1 9 6 3) 26 
R.G.A. 185 at p. 202.
52/ The majority of writers consider that the 1957 Act is
- 306 -
very sense of the difference is not absolutely clear. It is 
not surprising that the Cour de Cassation has treated the 
two wordings as equivalent and interchangeable 52/ a
The important point to be underlined is that the 
1957 Act has closed the gap which existed between the posi­
tion of French courts and common law courts in relation to 
the interpretation of Article 25 of the unamended Convention. 
There is now a basically common definition of the conditions 
for unlimited liability in the countries examined in this 
thesis since a substantial rapprochement towards the common 
law attitude has been made by French law either through the 
Hague Protocol or, for the cases to which the Protocol does 
not apply, through the 1957 Act. It is the application of 
that common definition that will be examined in the follow­
ing section.
Section 3* - Application of the common definition of the 
conditions for unlimited liability .
General remarks.
The common law notion of wilful misconduct, the 
definition of the new Article 25 introduced by the Hague 
Protocol, and the unamended text of Article 25 as interpreted 
by the 1957 Act in France provide for two distinct cases of 
unlimited liability : (i) an act or omission done with intent 
to cause damage, and (ii) an act or omission done recklessly 
and with knowledge that damage would probably result. The 
wording adopted here is borrowed from the Hague Protocol as 
it has been shown above that its definition is very close
52/ (cont1d) more severe than the Hague Protocol on the plain­
tiff. But see J.G. Verplaetse, "From Warsaw to the French 
Cour de Cassation : Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention"r 
(1970) 36 J. Air L. & Com. 50 at p. 5 *^
53/ Diop c. Cie Air France, (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 6l, note G. 
de La Pradelle, JCP 1969-11.15704, note M. de Juglart & E. 
du Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire, 24 June 1968).
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to the common law concept of wilful misconduct ' and is
equivalent to the wording used in the 1957 French Act ^5/,
The same general principles of evidence in both 
civil and common law jurisdictions apply to the two situations 
listed in Article 25, although the actual cases deal with 
the second situation only. Firstly, the burden of establish­
ing compliance with Article 25’s requirements rests upon the 
plaintiff , Secondly, ascertaining the existence of the 
fault referred to in Article 25 is not sufficient. The plain­
tiff must also establish that that fault has caused the
57/damage complained of ^ L/ . Suffice it here to mention that 
requirement. Appreciation of the causal role of a particular 
fact in the realization of harm is a thorny problem in all 
jurisdictions , It is solved on the basis of the lex fori.
54/ above p. 303. 55/ above pp. 305-306.
56/ In the United States : Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc . , 9 Avi. 18,319 (3rd Cir”! 1966) ; American Airlines ~v. 
Ulen, 2 Avi. 14,990 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Pekelis v. Transcon­
tinental & Western Air, Inc., 3 Avi• 177440 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Ritts Ex'' trx v. American Overseas Airlines, (1949) U.S.Av.
RejT §5 (S. D . N. Y. 1949) ; Goepp v. American Overseas Air­
lines , Inc., 3 Avi. 18,057 (n7y . Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
In France, Cie Air France c. Nordisk Transport, (1953) 7 
R.F.D.A. 105 (C.A. Paris, 28 February 1953) S Canale c ■ Air 
France, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 171 (T.G.I. Ajaccio, 25 November 
1971) » Seghers c . Air France, (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 25, note 
P. de La Pradelle (T.G.I. Seine, 29 January 1965) ; Del 
Vina c. Cie Air France, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 191 (Trib.civ.
"Seine, 2 July 1954). A similar requirement exists in Belgium: 
Delaby c. Sotramat, (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 66, note R. Nys (C.A. 
Bruxelles, 12 January 1954).
57/ In the United States : Pekelis v. Transcontinental & 
Western Air, Inc., 3 Avi. 177440 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Coultas 
v. K.L.M. Airlines, (I96I) U.S.Av.Rep. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 196I) ; 
Rashap, Adm'r v. American Airlines, Inc., (1955) U.S.Av.Rep. 
593 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) ; Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, 
Inc., 3 Avi. 18,057 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 19527. In France, 
St6 Mat Transports c. Cie Air France, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 337 
(C.A. Paris, 7 June I966) ; Caisse Parisienne de Reescompte 
c . Air France, (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 320 (C.A. Paris, Jl may 
1954) ; Cie Air France c. Nordisk Transport, (1953)7 R.F.D.A. 
105 (C.A" Paris, 28 February 1953)•
58/ It seems that the following observations by Hart and 
HonorS, in Causation in the Law (Oxford, 1959), p. 39, could 
apply in many cases coming from both civil and common law
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It is essentially in relation to the second case 
of unlimited liability that difficult problems have arisen 
and, more specifically, in relation to the assessment of 
the intent to act with knowledge that damage would probably 
result. However, Article 25 requires two complementary 
elements in the second case of unlimited liability : not 
only must the agent be conscious of the dangers involved, 
but he must commit a "reckless" act.
The interpretation of what constitutes a reckless 
act is a question of fact which will be assessed by courts 
and jurys. It is irrelevant for our purposes to try to 
compare such assessments of unique sets of circumstances. 
However, the "reckless" element of Article 25*s definition 
presents a difficulty different from the mere characteriza­
tion of what is "reckless". Can a reckless act or omission 
be constituted by a series of minor wrongful acts or omis­
sions ? Is each act or omission to be considered individ­
ually with the object of characterizing one of them as a 
reckless act ? Or is the whole behaviour to be considered 
with the idea that if no particular act or omission can be 
so characterized, their accumulation can satisfy Article 
25*s requirements ? An English court has stated that it is 
not possible to add up a number of acts or omissions and to 
consider the whole as wilful misconduct On the contrary,
58/ (cont'd) systems : "A voluntary human action intended 
to bring about what in fact happens, and in the manner in 
which it happens, has a special place in causal inquiries ; 
not so much because this, if present among a set of condi­
tions required for the production of the effect, is often 
treated as the cause (though this is true), but because, 
when the question is how far back a cause shall be traced 
through a number of intervening causes, such a voluntary 
action very often is regarded both as a limit and also as 
still the cause even though other later abnormal occurrences 
are recognized as causes". See also pp. 129ff. of the same 
book, and A.M. Honore, International Encyclopedia of Compa­
rative Law, vol. XI (Torts), Chapter 7 (Causation).
59/ Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., [1952] 2 
All E.R. 1016 (Q.B~. 1952).
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an American court — ' and several French courts — ' have 
admitted the possibility that Article 25's conditions can 
be satisfied by the accumulation of minor acts or omissions.
Assessment of the existence of the knowledge that damage 
will probably result.
Over the past ten years, and mainly in France, a 
controversy has developed as to whether the test to be 
applied in assessing whether the agent had knowledge that 
damage would probably result is subjective or objective.
The issue is made very difficult because of the various 
meanings given to these expressions in legal writings and 
in judicial decisions. Firstly, there is consensus on a 
few basic principles which appear to be equally valid in 
common law and French courts. That consensus is particularly 
clear in cases of negligence, or faute non-intentionnelle, 
and relates to the manner in which courts assess the exis­
tence of negligence and faute non-intentionnelle. Common 
law writers usually speak in terms of "standard” and French 
writers in terms of "appreciation in abstracto". But it 
seems that they all refer to the same technique of assess­
ment by application of an objective test, by contrast with 
a subjective test or "appreciation in concreto".
An objective test, or appreciation in abstracto, is 
used when the agent*s behaviour is assessed through a com­
parison with the behaviour of a reasonable man, placed in 
similar circumstances , A subjective test, or apprecia­
tion in concreto is used when the agent's behaviour is
60/ Reiner v. Alitalia Airlines, 9 Avi. 18,228 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 19667.
6l/ Rioult c. Mutuelle d'Assurances agriennes, (1962) 25 
R.G.A-! 398 (C.A . Caen, 17 January 1962), cassation, (1964)
27 R.G.A.E. 74 (Cass. civ. 2me, 5 March 1964); Petit c. 
Pgrissel, (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 292 (C.A. Aix-en-Provence, 29 
September 1970) ; Hennessy c. Air France, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A.
45 (C.A. Paris, 25 February 1954).
62/ Fleming, Torts, pp. 106ff. ; Prosser, Torts, pp. 149 ff. ; 
N. De jean de La Bätie, Appreciation in abstracto et apprlcia- 
tion in concreto en droit civil frangais (Paris, 1965)» pp. 
Iff.
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assessed in itself ; the agent is not required to do what 
a reasonable man would have done. He can claim the benefit
of any peculiarities affecting him which diminish his abil­
ities, e.g. his cowardice or his mediocre intelligence may 
be pleaded to excuse his unreasonable conduct It should
be noted that the objective assessment of negligent conduct 
is based on a tradition which is much stronger in common 
law than in French law. The standard of the reasonable man
was expounded bv Tindal C.J. in the 1837 case of Vaughan v. 
64/Menlove — ' . But it is only recently that the objective 
assessment of negligence has gained a wide acceptance in 
both practice and theory in France ^ /  •
It has been underlined by writers in both legal 
systems that the contrast between an objective assessment 
and a subjective assessment is relative. In most cases, an 
objective test simply means that the test is more objective 
than subjective. There are subjective elements which are 
taken into consideration . This happens when the "reason- 
e same or similar circumstances 
. Fleming remarks that "the latitude of that
able man" is placed under th
as the agent
63/ Dejean de La Bätie, Appreciation in abstracto, pp. Jff.
64/ (1837) 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468 Instead, therefore, of saying 
that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with 
the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable 
as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather 
to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to 
caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe ."p. 475 •
65/ For a survey of authors favouring a subjective test, see 
Dejean de La Bätie, Appreciation in abstracto, p p . 22ff. One 
of the reasons for the persistence of the subjective test is 
the principle of "unity" of penal fault and civil fault, as 
proclaimed since 1912 by the Cour de Cassation. See further 
on the practical scope of that principle, A. Pirovano, Faute 
civile et faute penale (Paris, 1966), p p . 7ff*
66/ A. Pirovano, Faute civile et faute pinale, p. 139*
67/ For De jean de La Batie, this does not alter the essential 
character of the objective assessment which does not purport 
to set aside all the particularities of the situation consid­
ered in order to reason in abstract terms. An objective 
assessment disregards the elements which are peculiar to the 
agent involved, but these do not include the circumstances
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expression in effect makes some allowance not only for 
external facts, but also for many of the personal character­
istics of the actor himself."^§/ The reverse is also true » 
there is no purely subjective assessment of particular con­
duct, if only because of the impossibility of scrutinizing 
the agent’s mind. In most cases, when the agent’s state of 
mind has to be proved, the only evidence available is the 
observable conduct of the agent and the surrounding circums­
tances. Prosser concludes that in such conditions,"an objec-69/tive standard must of necessity in practice be applied."—^7
The question of objective or subjective assessment
of the conditions set out in Article 25 of the Convention
was mentioned several times during the diplomatic Conference
at The Hague in 1955 . The delegates from the United
States and Australia in particular insisted that the text
of the Protocol was ambiguous since it did not indicate
whether the knowledge was "actual knowledge"-^/, or "imputed
knowledge” , or, in other words, whether the actor not only
"did, in fact, know that damage would probably result, but
72/also should have known that damage would probably result"-1— 7 
No satisfactory answer was given to these questions. The 
matter of the type of evidence which ought to be required 
in order to establish the knowledge of the agent was also 
mentioned at the Hague Conference. It was quickly dismissed 
as being entirely within the province of the lex fori -2-2/.
67/ (cont8d) "exterior to the agent" which characterize the 
particular situation. Appreciation in abstracto, p. 3*
68/ Fleming, Torts, p. 108. 69/ Prosser, Torts, p. I85.
70/ During the first reading of the draft Article and in 
the discussion of the report of a special working group on 
Article 25, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/l40, vol. 1, pp. 196ff., and 
284ff.
71/ Intervention of the Australian delegate, pp. 284-285.
72/ Intervention of the United States delegate at p. 204.
73/ Interventions of the delegates from France and Israel, 
p. 285.
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A) Interpretation by French courts.
The assessment of the agent*s knowledge of the 
dangers involved has been considered in many French cases.
It is not always easy to classify these cases. French law 
is not based on the principle of binding precedents, and a 
court of appeal, or a court of first instance, may disregard 
what it considers to be an erroneous interpretation given 
by the Cour de Cassation. However, one can distinguish two 
main currents. The first one starts immediately after the 
adoption of the 1957 Act and favours a very strict inter­
pretation of the conditions of unlimited liability. The 
second starts with the 1964 Cour de Cassation decision in 
Rioult c. Mutuelle d*assurances aeriennes and favours
a more liberal attitude.
1•“ Strict interpretation of the conditions for unlimited 
liability.
Immediately after the adoption of the 1957 Act, 
several cases laid down requirements which placed a very 
heavy burden on the plaintiffs. These cases show that the 
courts were fully aware of Parliament’s intention consider­
ably to restrict the number of instances of unlimited 
7 5 /liability -L-z/ . Some courts even emphasized that the facts 
of the particular cases revealed the presence of a faute 
lourde but, if that was sufficient before the 1957 Act, it 
now fell short of the requirements of faute inexcusable
74/ (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 74, notes M. de Juglart and P. de 
La Pradelle (Cass. civ. 2me, 5 March 1964).
75/ above pp. 303“3°4.
76/ Maydeck c . El A l , (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 119, note G. Cas 
(T.G.I. Seine, 18 October 1963), aff°d, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 
232 (C.A. Paris, 22 March 1965). The point was made parti­
cularly clearly by the court of first instance. See also 
Lamberth c. Guiron, (1963) 26 R.G.A. 185, note G. Cas (C.A. 
Paris, 7 June 1962). That decision was to be reversed, 
(1966) 26 R.G.A.E. 377» note M. de Juglart (Cass. civ. 2me, 
9 June 1966).
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The restrictive attitude adopted by the courts 
manifested itself in several ways. Firstly, a subjective 
test was applied by all the courts. Accordingly, there is 
no reference to what a reasonable man would have done. For 
example, in Lamberth c. Guiron-^ f  the Paris Court of Appeal 
focused its enquiry on the pilot himself, and net on a 
comparison with what a reasonable pilot placed in similar 
circumstances would have done 20/ ,  Secondly, in other cases, 
some very strict requirements were spelt out. For example, 
it has been held that the liability limitation was appli­
cable because there had been no deliberate breach of dutv
79/on the part of the pilot J-z/ ; several other cases have 
required direct evidence that the agent had actual knowledge 
of the dangers involved 00/ ,  Under such conditions, it is 
not surprising that no faute inexcusable was found in any 
of these cases ,
77/ (1963) 26 R.G.A. 185, note G. Cas (C.A. Paris, 7 June 
1962) at p. 190. See below how the decision was reversed by 
the Cour de Cassation.
78/ Such a comparison is at the Roman law origin of objec­
tive assessment. See De jean de La Bätie, Appreciation in 
abstracto, p. 4.
79/ Maydeck c. El Al, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 232 (C.A. Paris,
22 March 1965) at p. 233.
80/ Rioult c. Mutuelle d*assurances a^riennes, J.C.P. 1961.
IT.12214, note M. de Juglart (T.G.I. Caen, 24 January 1961), 
rev'd on other grounds, J.C.P. 1962.II.12679» note M. de 
Juglart (~C. A • Caen, 17 January 1962). See below in the text 
the decision of cassation; Emery c. SABENA, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 
457 (C.A. Paris, 24 March 1965j--see below in the text the 
decision of cassation ; Camelin c. Ministere Public, (1961)
15 R.F.D.A. 375 (C7A . Nimes", 3 November 196l) ; Malbec c . 
Duranc, J.C.P. 1962.11.12932 (2d case), note M. de Juglart 
""(T .G. I. Clermont-Ferrand, 9 February 1962) ; Cie La Riunione 
Adriatica di Sicurta c. Cie Air France, (I965I 19” R.F.D.A.
112 (Trib. com. Seine, 3° January 1963) ; Gilmore c . Air 
France, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 88 (T.G.I. Seine, 25 November
1966)".
8l/ This had been forecast when the 1957 Act was adopted :
"La faute lourde de la navigation alrienne demeurera in- 
trouvable", P. de La Pradelle, "La loi du 2 mars 1957"»
(1957) 20 R.G.A. 246.
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2.- A more liberal attitude.
Four decisions of the Cour de Cassation illustrate 
the more liberal attitude which now prevails.
Rioult c. Mutuelle d*assurances a£riennes 82/
The change of attitude was introduced in 1964 by 
the Second Chamber of the Cour de Cassation in Rioult. The 
lower court had ruled that it was not established that the 
pilot had knowledge of the dangers involved in the course 
of action he adopted. That ruling was quashed on the ground 
that the court below had not drawn the proper consequences 
from the established facts. The Cour de Cassation stated :
" . . .  after having noted the negligence of the 
pilot who, although he had been warned of the 
risk of bad weather on the region, had not used 
the means to find out the dangerous state of the 
atmospheric conditions existing in the direction 
of the place of destination, his recklessness in 
facing them once he himself had perceived the 
signs and tested them, as well as the carelessness 
resulting from his obstinacy in pursueing the trip, 
despite the numerous possibilities he then had to 
suspend it, the trial judges could not avoid char­
acterizing such behaviour as faute inexcusable."83/
In this case, the Cour de Cassation clearly rejected 
any requirement going beyond the facts which had been estab­
lished. Therefore, plaintiffs did not have to adduce direct 
evidence of the agent*s actual knowledge of the dangers 
involved. The facts spoke for themselves. But there is no 
clear indication as to whether the court applied an objec­
tive test (i.e. given such circumstances, would a reasonable 
pilot have known the dangers involved ?) or a subjective test
82/ J.C.P. I96I.II.I2214, note M. de Juglart (T.G.I. Caen,
2ir January 1961), rev* d, J.C.P. 1962.11.12679» note M. de 
Juglart (C.A. Caen, 17 January 1962), cassation, J.C.P.1964. 
II.I3696, note M. de Juglart, (1964)-27 R.G.A.E. 74, notes 
M. de Juglart and P. de La Pradelle (Cass. civ. 2me, 5 March 
1964).
83/ (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 74 at p. 76.
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satisfied by indirect evidence (i.e. given such circumstances, 
was the particular -pilot concerned more likely than not to 
be conscious of the dangers involved ?).
Lamberth c. Guiron
In 1966, the Second Chamber of the Cour de Cassation 
revealed its attitude more clearly in Lamberth. Several 
tourists were in a helicopter flying above the Mer de Glace 
in the Mont Blanc. The pilot departed from his normal route 
and flew under the cables of an aerial railway. The helicop­
ter crashed into the lowest of these cables, killing all on 
board. After having described the conduct of the pilot, the 
court emphasized that "it was impossible for him not to 
realize" that he was near a very dangerous installation 
with which, in fact, he collided shortly afterwards. The 
court concluded :
" . . .  these facts established the serious 
negligence committed by [the pilot^ J by going 
into such a dangerous area, the recklessness 
of his action, and the knowledge, which he 
could not help but have, of the risks to which 
he deliberately and unnecessarily exposed his 
passengers." 85/
Thus the Cour de Cassation drew from the pilot’s 
behaviour the inference that he had knowledge of the dan­
gers involved. In other words, the court used a subjective 
test together with rather lenient evidentiary requirements. 
That leniency appears particularly clearly when contrasted 
with the ruling of the court below which, also applying a 
subjective test, had required specific evidence that the 
pilot was conscious of the dangers of the situation 0^ /,
84/ (1963) 26 R.G.A. 185, note G. Cas (C.A. Paris, 7 June 
1962), cassation, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 377» note M. de Juglart 
(Cass. civ. 2me, 9 June 1966), on remand, (1968) 31 R.G.A.E. 
68 (C.A. Dijon, 31 January 1968), aff’d , (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 
290 (Cass. civ. Ire, 2 March 1971).
85/ (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 377 p. 378.
86/ (1963) 26 R.G.A. 185 (C.A. Paris, 7 June 1962).
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The subsequent proceedings in Lamberth show how 
easy it is to go from a subjective test with lenient evi­
dentiary requirements to an objective test. After quashing 
the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal, the Cour de 
Cassation remanded the case for trial to the Dijon Court 
of Appeal. The Dijon Court started by adopting the wording 
of the Cour de Cassation quoted above but then said that, 
even though there was no evidence that the pilot knew that 
one cable was lower than the others, this absence of evi­
dence was irrelevant because :
M an aerial railway installation is made of a 
combination of elements the presence of which 
must be foreseen even if they are not perfectly 
visible." 87/
Thus, while the Cour de Cassation had been satisfied 
that there was enough evidence to establish the pilot's 
knowledge of the risks he was taking, the Dijon court said 
that there was no direct evidence but dismissed that as 
irrelevant. Therefore, the Dijon court applied an objective 
test, saying in substance that a reasonable man would have 
foreseen the presence of the cable ; consequently, the 
absence of proof of the actual state of mind of the pilot 
could not assist the defendant carrier.
The case came back before the Cour de Cassation in 
1971» this time before the First Chamber . The carrier 
unsuccessfully pleaded that the Dijon court had wrongfully 
found a faute inexcusable. The validity of the objective 
test used by the Dijon court was not examined by the Cour 
de Cassation which merely endorsed the attitude previously 
adopted by the Second Chamber, i.e. it favoured a subjective 
test with lenient evidentiary requirements 0%/, Since the 
decision of the Dijon court was sufficiently justified on 
this ground, the court did not have to consider the objec­
tive test.
87/ (1968) 31 R.G.A.E. 68 (C.A. Dijon, 31 January 1968)p.73* 
88/ (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 290 (Cass. civ. Ire, 2 March 1971). 
89/ at p. 292.
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Emery c . Sabena -z—' .
In this case, the First Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation explicitly rejected the use of a subjective test. 
The lower court had required the plaintiff to adduce evidence 
that the pilot had had actual knowledge of the dangers in­
volved and, in the absence of such evidence, the carrier had 
been allowed to limit his liability. As in Rioult, the court 
listed a number of examples of recklessness on the part of 
the crew and quashed the ruling of the court below. The 
wording was much more explicit than in Rioult. The court 
stated s
" . . .  by ruling as it did, the court of appeal, 
relying on a subjective assessment of the errors 
committed by the crew, has not drawn from the 
facts established by it the consequences they 
entailed . . . "  (emphasis added)
This time, the grounds for quashing the decision 
are not ambiguous : the court of appeal is censured because 
it used a subjective test. It follows that knowledge on the 
part of the agent must be assessed objectively, by reference 
to a reasonable man placed in similar circumstances.
The Orleans Court of Appeal, to which the case was 
remanded for trial, was particularly explicit in its uti­
lization of the objective test ^1/t it referred to what a 
reasonable man would have done, as well as to the conduct 
of other crews who, while flying in the same area, had acted 
reasonably and avoided the taking of any risk.
90/ (i9 6 0) 23 R.G.A. 379» note P. de La Pradelle (T.G.I. 
Seine, 25 March i9 6 0), aff’d, (1 9 6 5) 28 R.G.A.E. 3 3 1, note 
A. Cossa, (1 9 6 5) 19 R.F.D.A. 457 (C.A. Paris, 24 March 1 9 6 5)» 
cassation, (1 9 6 9) 32 R.G.A.E. 444, J.C.P. 1968.11.15350, 
with contrary conclusions by Avocat G&ngral Lindon (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 5 December 1 9 6 7)•
91/ (1 9 6 9) 32 R.G.A.E. 4 3 8, note P. de La Pradelle (C.A. 
Orleans, 24 April 1 9 6 9) at p. 442.
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Diop c. Cie Air France 22J t
Different reasoning was adopted by the First Chamber 
of the Cour de Cassation in 1968. The pilot of an aircraft 
had repeatedly attempted to land in bad weather conditions. 
During one of these attempts, the plane crashed. The court 
clearly used a subjective test to assess whether the pilot 
had acted recklessly and with knowledge that damage would 
probably result. The focus of inquiry was not a reasonable 
pilot placed in the same conditions, but the particular 
pilot involved. The court examined his conduct, analyzed 
a statement he had made to the control tower prior to the 
crash and emphasized that the pilot had acted with a 
characteristic recklessness which had previously caused 
him to be demoted by his employer. The court stated :
” . . .  it was impossible for the pilot not to 
be conscious of the probable risks to which 
he was exposing himself and the occupants of 
the aircraft.” 93/
In this case, the evidentiary requirements of the 
subjective test were easily satisfied since in addition to 
the inferences drawn from the reckless conduct of the pilot, 
there was his statement which, in the court*s opinion, indi­
cated that the pilot had knowledge of the risks he was about 
to take.
To sum up on the attitude adopted by the Cour de 
Cassation in these four cases, it is now established that 
there is no need to adduce direct evidence that the agent 
knew the dangers involved in the course of the action he a- 
dopted. This can be established by inference from the facts 
of the case. In all the cases in which the Cour de Cassation 
held that Article 2 5*s requirements were satisfied, it was 
established that the agent had created a potentially danger­
ous situation, through serious negligence, or a series of
%2/ (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 42 (T.G.I. Seine, 6 November 19 6 4), 
rev* d, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 4 9, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Paris,
15 February 1966), aff1d, (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 6l, note G. de 
La Pradelle, J.C.P. 1969.II•15 704, note M. de Juglart and 
E. du Pontavice, D.S. I968.J.569 (Cass. Ire civ. 24 June 1968).
93/ D.S. 1968.J.569 at p. 5 7 0.
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seriously negligent acts.
However, it is not quite clear whether the assess­
ment of the knowledge is to be made on an objective basis 
stricto sensu, i.e. by a comparison with the state of mind 
of a reasonable pilot placed in the same circumstances, or 
on a subjective basis, i.e. what was in the pilot's mind 
when he acted as he did ? The fact that in several cases it 
was impossible to prove the actual state of mind of the 
agent does not mean that the subjective test was not applied. 
As already seen ^ / , the essential feature of a subjective 
test is that it concentrates on the particular person in­
volved, investigating whether that person, with his qualities 
and defects, could be seen as having had the knowledge of 
the dangers involved. There is no reference to what a 
reasonable man would have known in similar circumstances. 
Whether the evidence is direct or circumstancial does not 
alter the form of the enquiry. It seems that the Cour de 
Cassation alternates between approaches. In any case, al­
though in theory the two attitudes are essentially different, 
the differences should not be overemphasized when it comes 
to the results achieved in practice by each of them. If a 
particular agent adopts a course of action which is poten­
tially very dangerous, both tests will usually be satisfied, 
mainly when there is a paucity of evidence. In most cases, 
if it can be said that a reasonable man would have had the 
required knowledge, it is likely that one would also find 
that, given the circumstances, the particular actor could 
not fail to have knowledge of the dangers involved.
9V above pp. 309-310.
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Other decisions.
Some decisions by inferior courts which have found 
that the conditions for unlimited liability are met explic­
itly refer to an objective test . Others apply a subjec­
tive test which can be satisfied when the facts allow the 
inference that the pilot had knowledge of the dangers
involved, that "it was impossible for him not to have it..96/
There are also some cases which use the two tests together,
97/treating them as identical -^L/ . These cases show how easily 
one can pass from one approach to the other. In all these 
cases, the court relied on the presence of serious negli­
gence, or a series of negligent acts, in order to establish 
that the agent had the requisite knowledge.
The reasoning adopted by the Paris Court of Appeal 
in its recent decision Moinot es qualit£s c. Cie Air France-^ 7 
is unusually explicit. The court of first instance had 
relied on a statement made by the pilot prior to the acci­
dent to satisfy itself that the crew had not been conscious 
of the dangers involved ; accordingly, the court had found 
that the requirements of Article 25 were not met -2^/. This 
was a clear case of subjective assessment of the negligent
95/ Rophe c. Ministere Public, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 95» note 
E. Georgiades (C.A. Paris, 20 December 1968) ; Billet [Mi­
nistere Public c.] (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 408, note E. du Pon- 
tavice (C.A. Paris, 25 June 1965)» rev'd on other grounds, 
(1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 81 (Cass. crim. 3 December 1969)•
96/ Sontag c. Cie Air France, (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 176 (T.G.I. 
Paris, 8 January 1971) ; X.X.X. c. U.T.A., (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 
178, note P. de La Pradelle (T.G.I. Seine, 17 March 1967).
97/ Petit c. Perissel, (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 292, note E. du 
Pontavice (CIA. Äix-en-Provence, 29 September 1970) ; Lam- 
berth c . Guiron, (1968) 31 R.G.A.E.68 (C.A. Dijon, 31 
January 1968) .
98/ (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 188, conclusions by Avocat GSngral 
Cabannes and note E. Georgiades (C.A. Parish 26 Mai 1973)*
99/ Ciolkowski c. Cie Air France, (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 186 
(T.G.I. Paris, 12 February 1971)•
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conduct. The Paris Court of Appeal reversed the decision on 
the basis that the fault
" must be objectively assessed ; therefore, it 
is proper in the case at bar to inquire as to 
whether . . . the crew, by acting as it did, 
ought to have had knowledge of its recklessness 
and of the possibility of the damage." 100/
That case is particularly interesting because it is 
one of these borderline cases where there is a clear differ­
ence in the results achieved by an objective or a subjective 
test. The crucial element in the case was the presence of 
some direct evidence as to the state of mind of the crew.
That evidence had convinced the court of first instance 
that the crew had no knowledge of the dangers involved. By 
contrast, in the objective assessment favoured by the Court 
of Appeal, the focus is placed on what a reasonable crew 
ought to have done and thought in similar circumstances. Any 
evidence as to the state of mind of the particular crew is 
irrelevant.
In the cases where Article 25*s requirements were 
not met, there are a number of decisions in which the plain­
tiff failed because he had not established the presence of 
an act or omission "done recklessly". Since the first require­
ment of Article 25*s fault was not met, there was no point 
in examining further whether any act had been done with 
knowledge that damage would probably result .
100/ (19?4) 28 R.F.D.A. 188 at p. 198.
101/ In this category, there are cases where no fault at 
all could be attributed to the agent, e.g. Truchetet c. Stl 
Hgli Union, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 437 (T.G.I. Paris, 19 October 
1973) ; Canale c. Air France, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 171 (T.G.I. 
Ajaccio, 25~November 1971)> and cases where the agent was 
guilty of ordinary negligence, not serious enough to be char­
acterized as recklessness, e.g. Syndicat d1assurances des 
Lloyds c. Ste Agrofret, (I969T 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. 
com. 22 April 1969) ~ Caisse primaire d1assurance maladie 
de la region parisienne c. Launay, (1973) 27 R .F.D.A. 199 
( Cass. c 1 v". Ire, 26 February 1973) • There are also cases 
where a reckless act by the agent is only one of several 
hypotheses which could possibly explain the occurrence of 
the damage, e.g. Seghers c. Air France, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A.
352 (T.G.I. Seine, 29 January 1965) ; Leparc c. Air France,
(1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 129» note G. Cas (T.G.I. Seine, 10 April 1964.)
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There are a number of cases which refused to consider 
that Article 25*s requirements were met specifically on the 
ground that the agent had no knowledge of the probability 
of the damage. Some decisions apply an objective test. For 
instance, a court said that the agent’s action was not 
serious enough to allow foreseeability of the damage ,
Another court considered that the pilot could have right­
fully ignored the danger because of the most unusual atmos­
pheric conditions coupled with the direction given by the 
control tower to stay in the storm area ^02/. Other decisions 
apply a subjective test, relying heavily on the personality 
of the agent, emphasizing for instance the fact that the 
agent was a very good pilot, or that he had had a long ex­
perience without any trouble, or even that he was a good 
father 10k/,
General remarks on the French interpretation of Article 25•
After having examined the cases in which Article 25 
has been applied, one cannot help being struck by all the 
sources of possible confusion which the matter offers. First­
ly, cases where there is no evidence of a reckless act have 
sometimes been treated as cases where there is no knowledge 
that damage would probably result. This is manifest in the
102/ See the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal in Syndi- 
cat d*assurances des Lloyds c. Ste Agrofret, (1967) 30R.G.A.R 
l68, afT~rd/ (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass.civ. com. 22 April 
1969)• Is this not merely saying that there is no reckless 
act at all ?
103/ Cie Air Inter c. Simon, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 198 (C.A. 
Paris, 19 March 1968).
104/ Eernardot c. Maillot , (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 431 (C.A.
Besaneon, 10 October 1973) ; Drapeau c. Ollivier, (1972)
26 R.F.D.A. 301, note E. Georgiades (T.G.I. La Roche sur 
Yon, 20 June 1972).
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wording of some decisions — ^  , and in several comments 
made by legal writers , where the particular case was
viewed in terms of the agent's knowledge of the dangers in­
volved when, in fact, it seems that the key factor was simply 
the absence of a reckless act that could be attributed to 
the defendant. The failure properly to distinguish the two 
sorts of cases may be explained by the fact that because so 
much emphasis has been placed on the knowledge element, the 
primary requirement of the reckless act may tend to be ab­
sorbed by it. But if this can explain the failure to distin­
guish betv/een the various cases, it cannot justify it.
Secondly, there is some confusion as to what exactly 
is appreciation in abstracto or in concreto. One thing is 
certain : the objective test is not purely "abstract" ; it 
required the reasonable man to borrow a number of features 
from the particular agent involved. But when does the placing 
of the reasonable man in similar circumstances stop ? When 
does the consideration of subjective elements start ? The 
difficulty in properly characterizing what is done in a 
particular case may easily lead to the same decision being 
viewed as having applied a "subjective" test, or a proper 
"objective" test, placing the reasonable man in the necessary 
environment.
Thirdly, there has been some confusion between the 
new interpretation given to Article 25 and the notion of 
faute lourde. It has been argued that the pattern of "objec- 
tivisation" in the application of Article 25 amounted to 
reducing the definition contained in the Hague Protocol and
105/ e.g. the decision of the Paris Court of Appeal in Syn- 
dicat d'assurances des Lloyds c. Ste Agrofret, (1967) 30 
R.G.A.E. lg8 (C.A . Paris, 27 June 1963), affrd, (1969) 23 
R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. com. 22 April 1969)•
106/ See for instance E. Georgiades commenting Truchetet c . 
Stfe HSli Union, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 437 at p. 44l ; R.H. 
Mankiewicz, commenting Lacroix Baartmans, Callens & Van 
Tichelen S.A. c. Swiss Air, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 75•
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the 1957 Act to faute lourde, which is unquestionably 
assessed on a purely objective basis 0^2/ . If this were so, 
there v/ould be a danger of introducing into questions of 
unlimited liability for air carriers a laxity similar to 
what has often been denounced in relation to faute lourde : 
provided the consequences are serious enough, almost any 
fault could be characterized as faute lourde. But it does 
not seem that there is such a danger. The specific require­
ment that the agent had knowledge that damage would probably 
result keeps its usefulness even in the most objective mode 
of assessment of that knowledge. The very requirement of 
that knowledge can be seen as a warning given to judges 
that the danger not only has to be serious, but that it has 
to be serious enough to make it unreasonable to ignore it.
The double requirement that the conduct was reckless, and 
that no reasonable man could have ignored the dangers in­
volved should at least limit the instances of unlimited 
liability to the most serious cases of faute lourde.
Fourthly, there is considerable hesitation between 
an objective test proper and a subjective test applied with 
relaxed evidentiary requirements. The first decisions applied 
a subjective test and required direct evidence of the agent*s 
state of mind. In Rioult the Cour de Cassation indi­
cated that this was not necessary. But what was the precise 
scope of the disappearance of the direct evidence require­
ment ? Was the reasoning to be : given the facts, is it 
more likely than not that the particular agent had knowledge 
of the dangers (subjective test with indirect evidence) ? 
or was the reasoning to be : given these facts, would a 
reasonable man have had knowledge of the dangers (objective 
test) ? Concededly, the results may well be similar with 
both reasonings. The likelihood of the damage in the subjec­
tive test has to be appreciated on the basis of what is 
normally foreseeable. At the same time, the reasonable man
107/ See note G. de La Pradelle on Diop c. Cie Air France. 
TT969) 32 R.G.A.E. p. 65.
108/ (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 74 (Cass. civ. 2me, 5 March 1964).
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will also be deemed to have had knowledge of what is normal­
ly foreseeable once a course of action is adopted ^ 2/, But 
the practical results may differ if there is some direct 
evidence of the agent’s state of mind which was contrary to 
what was normally foreseeable ,
In fact, it does not seem that one single mode of 
assessment can be strictly applied. That is certainly impos­
sible for the subjective test. The general pattern of cases 
over the last ten years unequivocally shows that, besides 
the analysis of the agent’s mind, great importance is also 
given to the actual or "objective" facts of the case. As 
to the objective test, there are often a number of factors 
taken into consideration which are quite specific to the 
agent himself ^=4
A possible key to the difficulties experienced by 
French courts is provided by considering the matter from a 
different angle. Instead of looking at what constitutes 
"inexcusable" conduct, one can look at the reasons why the 
agent's conduct was excused or not excused. This shows how 
far a court is prepared to go in order to excuse the agent's 
ignorance. The term "ignorance" is used because most of the 
problems arise when the agent has had no subjective know­
ledge of the dangers involved, or else when there was no 
direct evidence of such knowledge.
10-9/ This adopts the notion of foreseeability described in 
Hart & Honore, Causation in the Law, at p. 233. Quoting Haynes 
v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B. 146 (Ct. App. 193*0 at p. 156, per 
Greer L.J., the authors write : "It is usually agreed that 
'it is not necessary to show that this particular accident 
and this particular damage were probable ; it is sufficient 
if the accident is of a class that might well be anticipated 
as one of the reasonable and probable results of the wrong­
ful act.' This view, though undoubtedly law, does not in it­
self provide any means of determining the class of harm or 
accident which must be foreseeable ; but that class can be 
determined by reference to the generalizations which one would 
have recourse to in describing conduct as negligent."
110/ as was the case in Moinot es qualitgs c. Cie Air France, 
TT974) 28 R.F.D.A. 188 (C.A. Paris, 26 May 1973).
Ill/ The mixed character of the agent’s knowledge also ap­
pears in French workers' compensation lav/. Where a worker
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By asking how far a court is prepared to go in 
order to excuse the agent's ignorance, one gets a result 
which is of necessity heavily dependent on the facts of 
each case. But if the shift in the approach cannot provide 
a clear principle which could apply to all cases, it at 
least makes it clear that the solution in each case does 
not depend purely on the application of a legal technique 
(appreciation in abstracto or in concreto)♦ In the last 
analysis, the solution appears to depend on social policy 
considerations reflecting the conditions required by 
society at a particular time to carry out an activity such 
as carriage by air. Conduct that might have been justified 
in 1940 may appear inexcusable to a court today. Likewise, 
conduct that might be excusable for the pilot of a private 
plane may be totally inexcusable for the pilot of a commer­
cial jet liner.
It is beyond the scope of this study to expand on 
such considerations. Suffice it here to mention them. The 
mere acknowledgement of the existence of such elements in 
the judicial process may serve the useful purpose of avoid­
ing the attempt to explain all the problems in terms of 
pure legal technique.
Finally, it might be of some comfort to realize 
that the difficulties experienced in applying Article 25 
of the Warsaw Convention are related to an ethical question 
which has been a point of argument for centuries, i.e. when 
can it be said that a man "voluntarily" acts so that he can
111/ (cont'd) in injured by the "faute inexcusable" of his 
employer, an increased compensation is payable. The courts 
have adopted an "objective" test to assess whether the em­
ployer has committed a faute inexcusable, but the "reason­
able employer" borrows an unusually high number of features 
from the particular employer involved. See Villa c . Cie des 
Assurances Generales [arret Provini], J.C.P. 1941.II.1705, 
note Mihura, D.C. 1941.117, note Rouast (Cass. Ch. Reunies, 
15 July 1941). See further Dejean de La BAtie, Appreciation 
in abstracto, p. 124.
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112/be held fully liable ---' ? Although the answers to these
questions need not necessarily be the same in a moral and
legal sense, it is interesting to note the similarities in
the formulation of the questions and the failure, from
113/Aristotle onwards, to give a definitive answer -- “ .
B) Interpretation by common law courts.
The common law courts have not been involved in a 
controversy similar to that in French courts. It is only 
in the case of Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Air­
lines, Ltd. -fcha-t; -the mode of assessment of the agent's
knowledge of the probability of the damage was specifically 
considered. The District Court ruled that to establish wil­
ful misconduct, "the test is an objective one", and that it 
was enough if a pilot
" . . .  realizes or, from facts which he knows, 
should realize that there is a strong possi­
bility that harm may result, even though he 
hopes or even expects that his conduct will 
prove harmless.
The circumstances must be such that the 
risk created is unreasonable." 115/
112/ Aristotle establishes a careful distinction between 
acting by reason of ignorance--which is not voluntary-- 
and acting in ignorance. To act in ignorance does not ex­
cuse a man. The drunken man may commit murder in ignorance, 
but owing to drink, and the penalty not only does not dis­
appear because of ignorance, but is often increased. It 
may be said that the agent is held responsible for his 
ignorance. Ethica Nicomachea, Book III, 1110° 18 - lllla 20, 
1113 30-33-
113/ See for instance the lengthy public controversy between 
Jesuits and Jansenists in France in the 17th century. Some 
of the arguments are set out in Pascal, Les Provinciales, 
Fourth Letter (Gamier, Paris, 1965)» pp~ 62ff.
114/8 Avi. 17,781 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 9 Avi. 17,681 
(2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 983 (U.S. Sup. Cf. 1966).
115/ at 8 Avi. 17,805.
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The decision was reversed, but the Court of Appeals based 
its reversal on the concept of wilful misconduct itself, 
and not on how the existence of its constitutive elements 
ought to be assessed : the court below was criticized, not 
for having recommended an objective test, but for not having 
made the existence of the knowledge that damage would proba-
-i i 2  /
bly result a necessary element of wilful misconduct ---' .
Apart from the unsuccessful attempt in Berner to 
have an objective test applied, it seems that all common 
lav/ cases have adopted a subjective test which can be satis­
fied through indirect evidence. There are explicit statements 
in that sense in a number of cases decided in the United 
States and in England. In Horabin v. British Overseas Airways117/Corporation — u  , Barry J. said in his direction to the jury :
" In the present case, there is no direct evidence 
of the state of mind or the intentions of the 
various persons said to have committed acts of 
wilful misconduct . . . You are not, however, 
confined to direct evidence. You are entitled to 
look at the whole of the facts and to draw an 
inference from those facts as to the state of 
mind and the intentions of the person who does 
some particular act." 118/
In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air ^ = 2 / t the agent*s 
knowledge of the probability of harm was implied from the 
surrounding circumstances :
" Wilful misconduct . . . may be intentional 
performance of an act in such a manner as to 
imply reckless disregard of the probable 
consequences of the performance of the act."120/
116/ at 9 Avi. 17,685. See above pp. 299-30°•
117/ [1952] 2 All E.R. 1016 (Q.B. 1952).
118/ at p. 1021.
119/ 3 Avi. 17,440 (2d Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 341 U.S. 
951 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1951)•
120/ at 3 Avi. 17,441.
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The charge to the jury was more explicit in Ritts v. American 
Overseas Airlines :
" You may find that the death of the decedent was 
caused by the wilful misconduct or by acts or 
omissions equivalent to wilful misconduct of the 
defendant not only from direct evidence but also 
by fair inference from the facts proved."122/
The adoption of a subjective test which can be satis­
fied through indirect evidence is also implicit in the cases 
where wilful misconduct is established by circumstancial evi­
dence since such evidence can provide no certainty as to the
123/state of mind of the agent involved -- “  .
It should be observed that there can be indirect 
evidence of the agent's state of mind only when the facts 
themselves are sufficiently established. The onus to do so 
is on the plaintiff. In Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.-^^ 
the cause of the accident was not known. The plaintiff claimed 
that wilful misconduct could have been the cause of the acci­
dent. The court stated that where the search is for the 
cause of the accident, the judgment of a court must be deter­
mined from the evidence, and not on a mere possibility, even
12 3/if such possibility be disclosed by the evidence -- “  . But
121/ (19^9) U.S.Av.Rep. 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
122/ at p . 69. A similar attitude was adopted in Berguido v . 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 Avi. 18,319 (3rd Cir. 1964) 1 K.L.M. 
Royal Dutch Airlines v. fuller, 7 Avi. 17,544 (D.C. Cir. I96I) ; 
Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, (1965) 1 U.S.Av.Rep.129 (S.D. N.Y. 1964;, aff'd and rem'TT 9 Avi. 17,488 (2d Cir. 
1965) ; Reiner v. Alitalia Airlines, 9 Avi. 18,228 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1966*5 ; 0utlook Store, Inc, v. Cardinal Air Services,
11 Avi. 17,848" (N.Y. City Ct. 1970).
123/ See for instance Grey v. American Airlines, Inc.4 Avi. 
17,572 (S.D. N.Y. 1955)4 aff'd," 4 Avi. 17,811 (2d Cir. 1955) ; 
Coultas v. K.L.M. Airlines, (1961) U.S.Av.Rep. 199 (S.D. N.Y. 
1961) ; Rashap v. American Airlines, Inc., (1955) U.S.Av.Rep. 
593 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
124/ 9 Avi. 18,310 (3rd Cir. 1964). .
125/ at p. 18,321. A similar requirement of sufficient evi­
dence of facts appears in Goepp v. American Airlines, Inc.
3 Avi. 18,057 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div.~1952)," aff1d , 305 
N.Y. 830 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1953).
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the requirement that the plaintiff establish the facts with
sufficient certainty is far from asking him to reconstruct
in detail what happened. He is only required to provide
enough information so that his claim is not based merely on
a hypothesis which could explain the occurrence of the
damage. His claim must be founded on what probably happened.
Whilst it was almost unanimously assumed by the
common law courts that the existence of wilful misconduct
is to be ascertained through a subjective test which can be
satisfied with indirect evidence, considerable attention was
paid to the rules of procedure and evidence involved in
cases of wilful misconduct which are mainly jury cases. At
the center of the difficulties is the relationship between
126 /judge and jury ---' . The United States Supreme Court in
127 /Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. -- u  gave the following
definition of the role of the jury 1
" It is the jury, not the court, which is the 
fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory 
evidence and inferences, judges the credibility 
of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and 
draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts.
The very essence of its function is to select 
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions 
that which it considers most reasonable."
It follows from that definition that it is immaterial that
the trial judge would have drawn other inferences from the
evidence. Similarly, a court of appeal is not free to reverse
the finding of a jury. It can do so only "when there is a
complete absence of probative facts"
Cases of wilful misconduct offer numerous examples
illustrating these principles. For instance, in Berner v.
126/ See further Fleming, Torts, pp. 251ff.
127/ 321 U.S. 29 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1944) at p. 35.
128/ as was stated in Lavender v. Kurn, 32? U.S. 645 (U.S. 
Sup. Ct. 1946) at p. 653*
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British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.^-*^, the jury 
had found that there was no wilful misconduct. Despite that 
finding, the trial court held that wilful misconduct was es­
tablished as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed 
the judgment on the basis that there was evidence from which 
the jury could draw inferences as to the absence of wilful 
misconduct. The court stated :
" Once the case went to the jury, its verdict 
should not have been upset if reasonable men 
could find in defendant's favor, as they 
certainly could here." 130/
The same respect for the findings of the jury appears
131/in K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines v. fuller — where the court 
of appeal refused to upset the jury's finding of wilful mis­
conduct by saying :
" We hold that as to each of the categories of 
alleged wilful misconduct of KLM there was 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably find that KLM was guilty of wilful 
misconduct as that term has been interpreted 
by this court under the Warsaw Convention."
Only one case dealing with the Warsaw Convention
has been found where an appeal court upheld a trial judge's
setting aside of the jury's verdict. In Grey v. American 
132/Airlines, Inc.— 7 , the trial judge had set aside a verdict 
of wilful misconduct. The Second Circuit stated :
M The trial judge had a right to reject the 
finding of wilful misconduct only if, on 
no possible view of the evidence, could no 
reasonable man reach that conclusion." 133/
129/ 8 Avi. l?,78l (S.D. N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 9 Avi. 17.681
l2d Cir. 1965).
130/ at 9 Avi. 17,685.
131/ 7 Avi. 17,5^4 (D .C. Cir. 1961) at p. 17,549- A similar
attitude was adopted in Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
9 Avi. 18,319 (3^ Cir. 1964) ; American Airlines Inc. v~T~ 
Ulen, 2 Avi. 14,990 (D.C. Cir. I969) ; Reiner v. Alitalia. 
Airlines, 9 Avi. 18,228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)'.
132/ 4 Avi. 17,572 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 4 Avi. 17,811
T*2d Cir. 1955) .
133/ at 4 Avi. 17,813.
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After reviewing the evidence, the court affirmed the decision 
of the trial judge because no evidence could be found in the 
case to warrant the jury's finding of wilful misconduct.
C) Comparison
Whatever the label used to characterize the reason­
ing adopted in French and common law courts, all courts 
appear to accept indirect evidence of the agent's knowledge 
that damage would probably result. But while most common 
law courts seem to have naturally adopted a subjective test, 
albeit one that can be satisfied by indirect evidence, the 
issue of the choice between an objective and a subjective 
test is still not resolved in French courts where it has 
developed into a major controversy. It is interesting to 
examine why a similar question was approached in such a 
different manner.
Before doing so, it should be noted that this 
comparison will not attempt to contrast characterizations 
of various factual situations in order to show that what 
was seen as wilful misconduct in one jurisdiction was not 
seen, or would not have been seen, as such in another. 
Differences at that level are not really significant because 
when circumstancial evidence is admitted, the seriousness 
of the situation created by the agent plays a crucial role. 
This is so with a subjective assessment, where the serious­
ness of the situation will be operative in inferring that 
the agent had the required knowledge. This is also the case 
with an objective assessment where one ascertains whether 
a reasonable man, placed in the same conditions, would have 
had that knowledge. The assessment of the seriousness of a 
particular situation is not a question of law. It is a 
question of fact, to be dealt with by the trier of fact,
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the juges du fond. Even within one country, it is impossible
to ensure that identical facts are assessed in an identical
manner by different courts or jurys. This is a fortiori true
when one considers several countries, in which answers will
naturally vary from individual to individual, court to court,
134/and jury to jury — ' .
The difference in the attitudes adopted by French 
and common law courts in relation to the assessment that 
the agent had knowledge that damage would probably result 
from his conduct reflects a number of basic differences 
between the common law and French law.
The first difference explains why the problem 
crystallized only in French courts. It has been seen above 
that it is only relatively recently in France that an objec­
tive test has gained wide acceptance in matters of negligence 
and in other cases of tortious liability % There are
still proponents of a subjective test for these questions. 
Given a provision such as that contained in Article 25 of 
the Warsaw Convention, referring to the knowledge of the 
agent, the proponents of the subjective assessment were 
bound to see there a requirement consistent with their prefer­
ences. But the proponents of an objective assessment claimed 
that there was no reason why it could not be applied to 
cases such as the fault described in Article 25 of the Con­
vention. In a common law environment, the requirement that 
the agent had knowledge of the dangers involved simply 
appeared as different from the usual application of the 
standard of behaviour in matters of tortious liability. But
134/ In the same accident litigated in American courts, one 
jury found wilful misconduct in Goepp v. American Overseas 
Airlines, Inc. (3 Avi. 18,057» N . Y . Sup.” App. Div. 1952), 
but the verdict was set aside on appeal because of lack of 
evidence as to wilful misconduct and proximate cause of the 
accident. In Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc.(1949) 
U.S.Av.Rep. 65 (S.D. N .Y . 1949), another jury found that the 
carrier and his employees had taken all reasonable measures 
to avoid the accident.
135/ above p. 31°•
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this was only another rule. In any case, all the subjectivity 
contained in the knowledge requirement has to be limited by 
practical considerations of evidence 13^/1 All this was ac­
cepted as a matter of course by common law courts. No basis 
existed on which the matter could give rise to a controversy 
similar to the French one . jn France, the quarrel over
Article 25 was part of a broader debate on the appreciation 
of the faute element in matters of civil liability.
Even if the issue had arisen in common law courts, 
it could not have expanded as it did in French courts. The 
question is seen as a question of fact in common law courts, 
but as a question of law in French courts. The consequence 
in the common law is to place the matter entirely within the 
province of the jury. Accordingly, the answer as to the exis­
tence of the knowledge of the agent will have a Yes/No form, 
and no specific reasons will be given. In French courts, the 
manner in which the facts are assessed is a question of law,, 
with the consequence that the Cour de Cassation can exercise 
control over it.
In both systems, the distinction between fact and 
law is determined by historical growth and judicial policy^-^-/ 
In common law cases, the distinction between questions of 
fact and questions of law in relation to Article 25 of the 
Warsaw Convention is simply the result of the rules appli­
cable in all cases of negligence. One of the most important 
benefits of the presence of a jury in a common law case of 
negligence is to provide the necessary flexibility which 
will allow the law to be just in any given situation. It has 
been found impossible to prescribe definite rules in advance
136/ Prosser, Torts, pp. I84ff.
137/ A very similar controversy exists, but it relates to 
criminal law cases. See C. Howard, "Strict Responsibility 
in the High Court of Australia", (i960) 76 L.Q.R. 5^7 ;
P. Brett. "Strict Responsibility : Possible Solutions",
(197^) 37 Mod. L. R. 417.
138/ Fleming, Torts, p. 250 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 205 ; David 
& Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 79*
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139 /for every combination of circumstances which may arise — ^  .
Thus the jury fixes the particular standard of conduct of
what a reasonable man would have sone under the circumstances.
In so doing, the function of the jury "differs from that of
the judge only in that it cannot be reduced to anything ap-140 /proaching a definite rule" ---' . It follows that the jury's
evaluation has authority only for the particular case before141/it ---' . It cannot be used as a precedent in similar factual
situations.
In France, the advantage of flexibility has been 
considered insufficient to compensate for the corresponding 
disadvantage, namely the lack of uniformity. It is a general 
feature of French law that the Cour de Cassation exercises 
its control not only over the fact that a rule is applied 
by the courts below, but also over the manner in which it 
is interpreted and applied. It has been pointed out that 
when a factual situation appears to be sufficiently typical, 
and therefore likely to arise frequently, there is the assur­
ance that by one technique or another, it will be covered 
by some legal rule indicating to those concerned what their 
position is, and how they are expected to behave 1 pn
such cases, the Cour de Cassation will supervise the manner 
in which the legal rule involved is applied by the court 
below and, if necessary, censure that court and impose its 
own interpretation. "Every time a decision of the Cour de 
Cassation may have a general effect and serve as a guide 
for the solution of difficulties in the future, by reason
of the character of the decision, it considers that itl4q/must provide the judges with directions." -- “  This ensures
139/ Fleming, Torts, p. 253 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 207. 
l4o/ Prosser, Torts, p. 207. 
l4l/ Fleming, Torts, p. 250.
142/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 79*
143/ G. Marty, La distinction du fait et du droit, (1929)1 
pp. 345-346. The translation appears in David & Brierley, 
Major Legal Systems, p. 79 at n. 56.
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some degree of uniformity between the results achieved in 
similar situations. This is precisely what happened in 
relation to Article 25. The Cour de Cassation intervened to 
tell the juges du fond (courts of first instance and courts 
of appeal) that there was no need to require direct evidence 
and that they had been wrong in refusing to find evidence 
of the required knowledge in the facts of the case.
It is somewhat paradoxical that through the distinc­
tion between "law" and "facts" in each legal system,one can 
see almost a reversal of the classical contrast between 
common law and civil law systems on the authority of decided 
cases. Traditionally the common law is associated with the
respect of precedents and civil law with the absence of 
144/precedents ---' . In this particular area, the intervention
of the jury means that there can be no precedent in common 
law cases whereas the French Cour de Cassation has provided 
the juges du fond with a series of guidelines which consti­
tute the closest possible equivalent to judicial precedents 
in a French law context.
The contrast is also striking between the attitude 
of French law and that of the common law. French courts 
and writers focus their attention on the reasoning which 
allows the court to go from the known facts to the unknown 
element of the state of mind of the agent. In last analysis, 
the existing controversy in France is whether, in so doing, 
a court should apply a subjective or an objective test.
Thus it is the process of thought which is scrutinized and, 
if need be, censured. The common law, for its part, is not 
concerned in assessing how, by which type of reasoning, the 
jury achieves its decision. The emphasis is placed on rules 
of evidence and procedure directed at ensuring that sufficient
144/ On the real role played by decided cases in civil law 
systems, see David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, pp. 79- 
80, 103ff.
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evidence exists to warrant the jury*s findings. The essen­
tial question is whether a reasonable man could possibly 
have drawn a particular inference from the facts. Once this 
is established, the jury is entirely free to assess the 
evidence and provide the final answer as to whether the 
agent acted with knowledge of the probability of the damage. 
The only interference with the jury's entire liberty to 
assess the facts is that sometimes United States jurys are 
directed to take that view of the evidence most favourable 
to plaintiffs and to give them the benefit of all inferences14«;/which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence — M  . This 
is far from the rigourous examination of the process of 
thought leading to a given conclusion which prevails in 
France.
The emphasis placed by the common law courts on
questions of procedure and evidence in relation to wilful
misconduct simply reflects a fundamental feature of the 
146/common law ---' . For centuries, final decisions in judicial
cases v/ere made by jurys. The aim of the English lawyer was 
then successfully to complete the trial so that the case 
could be sent to the jury. This meant avoiding the multitude 
of procedural pitfalls during the course of the trial. The 
substantive decision would be made by the jury, on the merits 
of each case. Since jurors were often illiterate and impres­
sionable, it would have been pointless to embark on learned 
arguments on the substantive law to be applied. Instead, 
English lawyers concentrated on strictly regulating matters 
such as admissibility of evidence so that reasonable verdicts
145/ The principle was affirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90 at p. 94 (1930). It 
has been applied in K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines v. fuller,
7 Avi. 17,544 (D.C. Cir. I96I) at p. 17,546 ;' GreFT  ^
American Airlines, Inc., 4 Avi. 17,811 (2d Cir. 19*55) at 
p. 17,813.
146/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 298.
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147 /could be reached by jurys — u . Today, the situation is 
different and substantive law plays a very important role.
A fault in procedure is no longer fatal and courts will 
usually grant leave to amend. But even though the rules of 
procedure and evidence have lost the paramount importance 
they once had, they are still part of a whole structure of 
rules according to which it is natural to pay a great deal 
of attention to the rules of adjective law.
The approach was totally different in France ^0/.
The careful distinction existing in Roman times between the 
prudents--who alone were the jurisconsults enjoying high 
social rank and dignity-- and the oratores, i.e. the practi­
tioners, always somewhat looked down upon, was adopted and 
reinforced by French lawyers. Substantive law, the province 
of the jurisconsults, was given precedence over adjective 
law. Today, in France, substantive law has remained relative­
ly much more important than adjective law.
Against this background, it appears natural that the 
common law cases assessing the existence of the agent1s 
knowledge are mainly focused on the question of whether there 
was sufficient evidence in the facts of the case to warrant 
the jury’s findings. It also seems natural that French cases 
would pay attention to the precise substantive rule to be 
applied, given the fact that the choice between an objective 
and a subjective test is seen as a question of substantive 
law to be determined on rational grounds. Article 25 simply 
offers a new field in which the problems which traditionally 
appear in each legal system can find new developments.
147/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 299* 
148/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 298.
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CHAPTER TWELVE. - DOES THE WARSAW CONVENTION
CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION ?
In order to bring suit against a defendant, it is 
necessary to establish a cause of action. The search for a 
cause of action has caused difficulties in common law 
countries in relation to the Warsaw Convention. This Chapter 
deals with the reasons for these difficulties and the ap­
proaches used to resolve them and constrasts the situation 
in France where no such problems have arisen.
The problem raised by the question of whether the 
Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action can be formu­
lated as follows s does the Convention create a specific 
right of action, independently of any underlying contractual 
or tortious situation ? or does it only provide a set of 
rules which will in part replace the appropriate domestic 
rules normally applicable to an action existing independent­
ly of the Convention ?
Section One. - The situation in the United States .
The Warsaw Convention
" does not create a right of action for wrongful 
death. The Convention creates a presumption of 
liability from the happening of the accident."
This statement, made in 1952 in Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France ^ , has since been endorsed in many subsequent
1/ 3 Avi. 17.989 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), revfd on other grounds,
"5 Avi. 17,281 (2d Cir. 1953)« The reasoning of the District 
Court in Komlos was endorsed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in the later case of Noel v. Linea Aero- 
postal Venezolana, 5 Avi. 17,5^ (2d Cir~ 1957) • Ön the 
whole question of the creation of a cause of action by the 
Convention, see G.N. Calkins Jr. "The cause of action under 
the Warsaw Convention", (1959) 26 J. Air L. & Com. p. 217 
(part I) and p. 323 (part II).
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cases 2/ Its scope has been extended to cases other than
wrongful death such as an action for personal injuries 
and loss of personal effects ^ , and to several actions 
for personal injuries ^ . One would think the issue was 
completely settled but for several recent cases in which 
the question of compensable damages under the Convention 
was examined as if the Convention provided an autonomous 
regime, without any reference to any independent cause of 
action supposedly founded in domestic law ^ . This view, 
however, was criticized in a later case where the court
reviewed the question and concluded :
" the Convention is neutral with respect to the 
existence of a cause of action and merely 
conditions and limits any action which exists 
under otherwise applicable law." 6/
2/ Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 11 Avi.
17,38I (S.D. N.Y. 1969) ; Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 9 Avi. 17,871 (W.D. Pa”. I965) ; Spencer v, Northwest 
Orient Airlines, Inc. , 7 Avi. 17,820 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) ~  
Winsor Adm'r v. United Airlines, Inc., 5 Avi. 17,509 (E.D. 
N.Y.1967"} ; Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 5^i • 
17,63^ (S.D. N .Y. 1957) ; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezo­
lana, 5 Avi. 17,125, af f * d , 5 Avi. 17,544 ( 2d Cir. 1957), 
cert, denied, 355 U.S. 907 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Kahn v . 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18,032 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1973) S Sheris v. The Sheris Co., 12 Avi. 17,394 (Va. Sup. 
Ct. 1972")^ The only case where a contrary view was express­
ly adopted is Salamon v, K.L.M., 3 Avi. 17,768 (N.Y. Sup.
ct. 1951).
3./ Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. , 7 Avi.
17,820 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
4/ Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. 
N .Y: 1975) ; Notarian v, Trans World Airlines, Inc., 9 Avi.
17,871 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ; Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
12 Avi. 18,032 (N.Y. Sup. C t . 1973).
5/ Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18,045 
(D. New Mex. 1973) ; Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App.'197*0. See above
6/ Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 13 Avi. 17>603 
(S.D. N.Y. 1975) at p. 17,611.
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Justification of the conclusion that the Warsaw Convention 
does not create a cause of action.
It was stated in Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air
Lines, Ltd. ^  i
" It is quite apparent from the language of the 
Convention that its authors explicitly re­
frained from legislating on certain matters 
traditionally considered vital to the creation 
of a new right of action."
The conviction of the court that no new right of action 
had teen created ty the Convention was based on the reasons 
which had already convinced the court in the Komlos case, i.e 
the Convention did not prescribe who could bring the suit, 
or who had a right or interest in the suit. The rules set 
up by the Convention could not stand on their own, and any 
court which would attempt to apply only these rules would 
find itself "in a no man's land of undeveloped law" ^ ,
The language of the Convention was analyzed in 
detail in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. ^ I n  particular, 
Article 24 which provides that in the cases covered by Arti­
cles I?, 18» and 191"any action for damages, however founded, 
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set 
out in this Convention" was seen as indicating that no cause 
of action was created by the Convention. The court said :
" If the drafters had intended Articles 17, 18, 
and 19 to create independent causes of action, 
they probably would have referred to causes 
'arising under' those articles rather than 
'covered by* them. The phrase 'however founded* 
likewise implies that the foundation of the 
causes of action is not in the articles.
Furthermore, if the causes were created by the 
Convention, they would not be 'subject to' the 
limits and conditions ; but rather those limits 
and conditions would be integral parts of the 
causes of action themselves." 10/
2/ 11 Avi. 17,381 (S.D. N.Y. 1969) at p. 17,387.
8/ at p. 17,387, quoting from Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F.Supp. 
24 (N.D. Miss. I960) at p. 28.
2/ 13 Avi. 17,603 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
10/ at p. 17,610.
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Beyond these explicit reasons justifying the 
judicial attitude in the United States, it is important 
to observe that it is in wrongful death cases that this 
reasoning was first expounded. In these cases, the require­
ment of a specific basis on which a suit may be brought is 
vital because, at common law, death gives rise to no cause 
of action . This was clearly established by Lord Ellen-
borough in 1808 when he declared that "in a civil court, 
the death of a human being could not be complained of as 
an injury" . The decision was followed in England and 
in the United States. The very harsh results for the rela­
tives of the deceased, who could not be compensated for
damage caused by the death, led to statutory changes in the 
law. In England, the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846 , tradi­
tionally referred to as Lord Campbell’s Act, created a new 
cause of action for the benefit of certain designated rela­
tives of the deceased ^ / , it is only on this statutory basis 
that the persons specifically designated in the Act could sue 
for wrongful death. In the United States, federal and state 
statutes similarly provided remedy for wrongful death .
11/ See generally Fleming, Torts, pp. 580ff. ; Prosser,
Torts, pp. 901ff.
12/ Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.493» 170 E.R.1033 (Nisi Prius 1808) 
13/ 9 & 10 Viet., c . 93-
14/ The relatives protected by the Act are the wife, husband, 
parents, grandparents, step-parents, children, grand-children 
and step-children.
15/ For the various statutes provided in each state of the 
United States, see S.M. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, 
(Rochester N.Y. 1966). One federal statute which has often 
been used in aviation cases is the Death on the High Seas Act 
which provides a cause of action when death occurs beyond the 
jurisdiction of any particular state. Another federal statute 
which has been used only recently as the basis for an action 
for wrongful death is the 1958 Federal Aviation Act. See 
Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 12 Avi. 17,900 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
The only exception to the rule that rights of action for 
wrongful death are granted by statute is found in the Law of 
Admiralty, as was established in Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, 298 U.S. 375 (U.S. Sup. CtT 1970). See also Hornsly v. 
Fishmeal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970). See further J. 
George & C. Moore, "Wrongful Death and Survival Actions Under
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When the United States became a party to the Warsaw 
Convention, that treaty directly became the law of the land 
without any enacting legislation . When wrongful death 
cases arose, the natural reaction was to ascertain whether 
the Convention could provide the necessary basis on which 
an action could be brought. The answer was negative. The 
specific language of the statutes remedying the common law 
was nowhere to be found.
Although the reasons justifying the conclusion that 
there was no cause of action had been elaborated in relation 
to wrongful death cases, they were worded in such a way that 
they were easily applied to other cases. However, one may 
wonder whether this reasoning, which had been prompted by 
the special case of wrongful death actions, would have 
developed in a similar manner in cases of personal injury 
or of damage to goods. There, the common law provides a 
cause of action and, consequently, there is no tendency to 
require the precisely defined statutory assistance which has 
come to be associated with a wrongful death action. If exa­
mined at first in relation to personal injury cases, the 
Warsaw Convention might not have been found wanting. This 
is supported by the recent cases of Burnett v. Trans World 
Airlines % and Rosman v. Trans World Airlines where
actions for personal injuries were treated as if the cause 
of action was provided by Article 17 of the Convention alone.
Consequences of the conclusion that the Warsaw Convention 
does not create a cause of action.
Once it was established that the Warsaw Convention 
did not provide a cause of action, it was imperative to
15/(cont*d) the General Maritime Law : Pre-Harrisburg Through 
Post-Moragne", (1972) 4 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1.
16/ above p. 4l.
YjJ 12 Avi. 18,405 (D. New Mex. 1973).
18/ 13 Avi. 17,231 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).
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find another basis on which wrongful death cases could be 
brought. More generally, it was important to find which law 
would determine who could bring the suit, who had a right 
or interest in the suit, and what damages could be recovered.
(i) in conflict of law cases.
The problem of choice of law is Warsaw cases was 
formulated as in domestic cases. The only difference was 
that the applicable law could not only be the law of one 
or more states, or federal law, but also the law of a 
foreign state. At the time most of the Warsaw cases consid­
ered here were decided, the only applicable rule in a matter 
of wrongful death was the lex loci delicti. Since there was 
no right of action created by the Convention, the success 
of the plaintiff was subject to the existence and content 
of a right of action granted by the law of the place where 
the wrong had been committed. If there was no cause of ac­
tion granted by the lex loci delicti, no action was possible-^ 
When the lex loci delicti granted a cause of action, it also 
provided all the answers to any choice of law question.
The preferred rule is now to select the law which
20/has the most significant relationship with the case — ' .
For United States citizens who have concluded the contract 
of carriage by air in the United States, the likelihood of 
the application of foreign law is now minimal since, in 
such cases, it would be difficult to see how a foreign law 
could have the most significant relationship with the case.
The risk of being deprived of the right to sue because a 
foreign law does not provide a cause of action is thus 
greatly reduced.
19/ As was the case in Werkley v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Air­
lines, (1953) U.S.Av.Rep." 194 Ts .D. N.Y. 19*52).
20/ above pp. 179-180.
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(ii) in jurisdiction problems.
Many of the difficulties which often occur in
relation to jurisdiction in the United States would have
been solved had the Warsaw Convention been seen as creating
a cause of action. According to Article III, s.2, of the
Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends
to all cases arising under a treaty of the United States.
When this is the situation, federal courts have original
jurisdiction over the case and if the action is commenced
in a state court instead of a federal court, it may later
be removed to a federal court. This, however, is not the
situation for cases governed by the Warsaw Convention. In
21/Zousmer v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines it was held that
the case did not "arise under" a treaty of the United States
because, at most, the Convention created the standards and
presumptions of liability by which the conduct of the air
carrier is to be judged "in a proner local action brought
to recover damages for wrongful death", (emphasis added)-^^
The holding that the Warsaw Convention does not
create a cause of action has the effect of subjecting
Warsaw cases to all the uncertainties affecting the question
of jurisdiction in the United States where the issue can
become quite complex because of the federal structure of the
country £2/, In relation to Warsaw cases, one of the biggest
difficulties is the applicability of the Law of Admiralty
24 /to aviation cases — ' . But despite the possible importance 
of a decision on jurisdiction upon the final outcome of a
21/ 11 Avi. 17,381 (S.D. N.Y. 1969)
22/ at p. 17,387.
23/ see generally C.W. Bunn, Jurisdiction and Practice of 
the Courts of the United States"! (5th ed. St. Paul+ Minn. 
19 9^)•
24/ See in particular Executive Jet Aviation Inc, v. City 
of Cleveland, Ohio, 12 Avi~ 17.646 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1972) 
where the issue was examined at length.
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case ^ , the question of jurisdiction will not be studied 
here because it does not relate to the interpretation of 
the Convention itself but is a question of municipal law of 
the United States.
Section 2. - The situation in Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom.
In none of these countries have there been cases 
dealing with the creation of a cause of action by the Warsaw 
Convention. In investigating the reason for this absence, 
it is necessary to distinguish between wrongful death cases 
and all the other cases.
Wrongful death cases.
Most of the difficulties in relation to these cases 
in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada have been 
removed by the legislation which implements the Convention. 
For instance, Section 12(2) of the Australian Civil Aviation 
(Carriers' Liability) Act 1959-1973 provides that ". . .the 
liability under the Convention is in substitution for any 
civil liability of the carrier under any other law in res­
pect of the death of the passenger or in respect of the 
injury that has resulted in the death of the passenger."
There is a similar provision in the Canadian Carriage by 
Air Act Both the Australian and the Canadian Acts
followed the now repealed Carriage by Air Act 1932 of the
27/United Kingdom — u  . Such provisions remove any doubt as to
25/ For instance, Admiralty cases are decided without a 
jury. This may be detrimental to plaintiffs in relation to 
the assessment of damages.
26/ Section 2(5) of the Carriage by Air Act, Revised Statutes 
of Canada 1970» C-14.
27/ Section 4 of the Act provided s "Any liability imposed 
by Article seventeen of the said First Schedule [i.e. the 
Warsaw Convention] on a carrier in respect of the death of 
a passenger shall be in substitution for any liability of
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the existence of a cause of action. It can be argued that 
each national statute merely gave effect to a cause of ac­
tion already existing in the Convention itself . But 
the existence of a special cause of action after the legis­
lation came into force cannot be doubted. If the cause of
action did not exist before, it certainly did afterwards. 
Since the "Warsaw” cause of action replaces any civil 
liability under any other law, there is no need to look
further for an appropriate cause of action in a Warsaw
29/ case —^  .
The situation changed in the United Kingdom with
the coming into force of the Carriage by Air Act 1961
Section 3 of the Act provides :
" Fatal Accidents. - References in section one of 
the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, as it applies in 
England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, to 
a wrongful act, neglect or default shall include 
references to any occurrence which gives rise to 
a liability under Article 17 of the First Schedule 
to this Act."
This provision shows that the approach has been completely 
reversed vis-a-vis the 1932 Act. Previously, it was the 
liability under the Convention which was substituted for 
any other form of liability. The new provision extends the 
scope of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (i.e. Lord Campbell*s 
Act) so that it will provide a cause of action for any
27/ (cont * d) the carrier in respect of the death of that 
passenger either under any statute or at common law, and 
the provisions set out in the Second Schedule to this Act 
shall have effect with respect to the manner in which it 
may be enforced."
28/ See for instance Shawcross & Beaumont, On Air Law, vol.l, 
pp. 364-365.
29/ See for instance the Canadian case of Surprenant v. Air 
Canada [1973] Rec. Jurisp. Quebec 106 (Ct. App. Montreal 
1972) where the only basis of the action was the Carriage 
by Air Act (per Mr. le Juge en Chef Tremblay, at p~l 110) .
Mr. le Juge Deschenes went so far as to say that the Act 
"parait bien soustraire au Code civil le recours des appe- 
lants pour le soumettre tout entier aux dispositions perti­
nentes des annexes de la Loi." (at p. 114).
30/ 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27.
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occurrence which gives rise to the carrier* s liability.
Thus it is now impossible to argue that it is the Convention 
which provides a cause of action in cases of wrongful death. 
However, it does not seem that any practical consequences 
will result from that change in attitude because the Act 
still provides an assured cause of action. There is no 
need for the quest for a cause of action similar to that 
which occurred in the United States in wrongful death cases.
Cases other than wrongful death.
Apart from one provision in the Australian Act 
relating to personal injury suffered by the passenger^/, 
there is no statutory provision indicating whether a right 
of action is given by the Convention itself or by the normal 
rules of municipal law. Despite that fact, no difficulties 
have arisen. This seems to be due to the fact that the exis­
tence of a cause of action is a pressing issue only in 
wrongful death cases because the common law does not provide 
a cause of action for them. But in all the other cases which 
can arise within the scope of the Convention, there is al­
ways a cause of action, be it based on tort, contract, or 
12/bailment . The problem which existed in all common law 
countries in wrongful death cases and received a statutory 
solution in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and 
a judicial solution in the United States, does not exist 
in cases other than wrongful death.
The issues of choice of law and jurisdiction which 
had caused the creation of the cause of action by the Warsaw 
Convention to be considered in the United States courts in
31/ Section 13 of the Act provides s "Subject to the next 
succeeding section, the liability of a carrier under the 
Convention in respect of personal injury suffered by a pas­
senger, not being injury that has resulted in the death of 
the passenger, is in substitution for any civil liability of 
the carrier under any other law in respect of the injury."
32/ See below Chapter 13.
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cases other than wrongful death did not arise in Australia,
Canada, or the United Kingdom. This is only natural for the
United Kingdom which is not a federal state with competing
state and federal laws. The situation in Australia and
Canada, which are federal states, needs to be considered
so that differences with the United States can be explained.
In Australia, there are no choice of law difficulties
because the Civil Aviation (Carriers* Liability) Act 1959-
1973 provides a substantive solution to the possible problems
which could arise in Warsaw actions, such as who can bring
an action in liability -2^ /, or whether the proceeds of an
insurance policy should be taken into account by way of
reduction of the damages ' , etc. There can be no choice
between the substantive rule provided by the Act and a
particular state law because the Civil Aviation Act is a
Commonwealth Act which overrides any inconsistent state law
3 3 /pursuant to Section 109 of the Australian Constitution . . 
Similarly, any jurisdictional difficulty in Warsaw cases was 
eradicated by the Act. There would have been a risk of con­
flict because, according to the Judiciary Act 1903-1969» the 
High Court of Australia--a federal jurisdiction--has original 
and exclusive jurisdiction in matters arising directly under 
a treaty. On the basis of a reasoning such as that in 
Zousmer , state courts could have decided that they had 
jurisdiction because the matter did not arise directly 
under a treaty. But Section 19 of the Civil Aviation Act
33/ Section 12(6) of the Act.
34/ Section 15 of the Act provides that such proceeds may 
not be taken into account.
35/ Section 109 of the Constitution provides : "When a law 
of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, 
the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."
36/ above p. 3^0 .
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provides j
" For the purposes of section thirty eight of the 
Judiciary Act 1903-1955* an action under the 
Convention shall be deemed not to be a matter 
arising under a treaty."
Since the federal court does not have exclusive jurisdiction, 
state courts keep their power to adjudicate Warsaw claims, 
in accordance with the normal rules of jurisdiction combined 
with Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. There is thus no 
difficulty because there is no need to exactly delineate the 
respective jurisdictions of state and federal courts.
In Canada, the Carriage by Air Act -^^is a federal 
statute which provides a number of substantive answers 
needed in Warsaw cases. If there is no special provision 
for a particular problem, the normal rules of choice of law 
are applied and, specifically, the rule that in case of
concurrent provincial and federal legislation, "the Dominion 
legislation must prevail" As to jurisdiction, there is
an essential difference between Canada and the United States, 
i.e. the Canadian judicial system does not have a "signifi­
cant vertical division . . . corresponding to the division 
between the se; * * ims of state and federal courts
an essentially unified judicial system with a federal struc­
in a provincial legislature or in the federal parliament.
The consequence of this unity is the absence of delineation 
disputes between the various courts.
37/ R.S. c. 45 ; R.s.c. 1970 C-l4.
38/ In Surprenant v. Air Canada, [1973] Rec. Jurisp. Quebec 
106 (Ct.App. Montreal 1972), Mr le Juge Deschenes dealt 
with a question of choice of law in a matter not specifical­
ly governed by the Act, i.e. the nature of the Warsaw action. 
But the existence of the cause of action was not questioned 
(see p . 118).
39/ Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. A.G. of Canada, 
[1907] A.C. £5 (P.c] I906) at p. 68 per Lord Dunedin.
4o/ W.R. Lederman, The Courts and the Canadian Constitution, 
"(Toronto, 1964) at p . 5-
4l/ Lederman, Courts and Canadian Constitution, p. 3«
in the United In fact, Canada manages to combine
ture — ' . Its courts apply the law, whether it originated
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Section 3. - The situation in France .
The "cause of action" in the sense previously used
for common law countries rarely presents itself as an issue
in France. It is only in exceptional circumstances that a
plaintiff will not be able to get compensation because he
does not have a cause of action . In carriage by air,
the cause of action will in most cases be provided by the
contract of carriage which can provide a basis for any
action, be it wrongful death, personal injury, delay or43/damage to baggage or cargo — “  . If, for whatever reason, a 
plaintiff could not rely on the contract of carriage, he 
could turn to Articles 1382ff. of the Civil Code which 
provide the basis for all tortious liability. No more here 
than in contractual cases is there a distinction between 
the various heads of damages — ' .
It seems that most of the delegates at the Warsaw 
Conference saw the situation as it was in France. There 
was no need to create a cause of action since every plain­
tiff appeared to have one, based either in contract or in 
tort.
Section 4. - Comparison .
The main difference between the answers given to the 
question of whether the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of 
action is not so much in the answers themselves but rather
42/ An example is an unmarried woman suing for damages for 
the wrongful death of the man with whom she was cohabiting. 
It has been held by some courts that such a person could 
not sue on the basis of Article 1382 C.C. because she did 
not have "un interet juridiquement prot£g£". See further 
Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 307, p. 316 ; Starck, 
Obligations, pp. 68ff.
43/ See below p.35&n the contractual nature of the action 
in liability.
44/ above pp. 172-173.-
-  351 -
in the manner in which they were reached. In both the 
United States and France, the answer is negative but there 
is hardly anything in common between the reasonings used 
in each country. The answer is not so clear in Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom. But if the Convention is 
read in conjunction with its enactment in municipal law, 
there is no doubt that a cause of action is provided. But, 
despite a differing answer, the terms of the problems were 
similar to those in the United States.
It is submitted that the difficulties in common law 
countries are due to the fact that the drafters of the 
Convention, who were mainly civil law lawyers, did not even 
see that the question of the existence of the cause of ac- „ 
tion could arise. For them, the cause of action would evi­
dently be found either in contract or in tort. They were 
not familiar with the common law difficulties in relation 
to wrongful death cases, and they implicitly assumed that 
the basic organisation of their own legal system was equally 
valid in other countries. It is significant that the United 
Kingdom, which participated in the drafting of the Warsaw 
Convention, immediately dealt with the problem of the exis­
tence of a cause of action in the legislation enacting the 
Convention. This indicates that there was an obvious need 
for some adjustment to be made in order to ensure a smooth 
working of the Convention in a common law environment.
In the United States, because there was no statutory 
implementation of the Convention, the courts had to examine 
the Convention itself to see whether it created the cause of 
action without which no action for wrongful death was to be 
allowed. Once a negative answer was given to this question, 
it became essential to find a law which would provide a right 
of action. Furthermore, due to the highly complex structure
-  352 -
of political and judicial jurisdictions which is specific 
to the United States, the issue of the cause of action 
■became relevant in a number of situations which were certain 
ly not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention. In these 
conditions, it is not surprising that the American position 
stands alone.
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Chapter THIRTEEN. - NATURE OF THE ACTION CONTEMPLATED
BY THE CONVENTION.
The widely differing attitudes adopted by the courts
of the countries considered here in ascertaining the nature
of an action governed by the Warsaw Convention reflect the
differences existing in the distinction between tort and
contract in relation to a particular action. In common law
countries, the distinction is often considered as a moot
question, without much practical importance ; there is
little judicial or academic interest in it —^This might be
due to the fact that the law has developed in such a way
as to remove most of the substantial differences between an
2/action in contract and an action in tort —/ . Frequently,
cases are on the borderline between tort and contract, but
3/little effort is made to characterize them . By contrast,
1/ By this it is meant that distinction between tort and 
contract is not topical. Two famous studies have been made, 
in England by Sir Percy H. Winfield, The Province of the 
Law of Tort (Cambridge 1931) esp. pp. 40-91» and in the 
United States by W.L. Prosser, "The Borderland of Tort and 
Contract", in Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (Ann 
Harbor 1953) > PP*^  380-452. More recently, articles have been 
published on the subject by A.G. Guest, Tort or Contract?", 
(1961) 3 Uni. Malaya L. R. 191 ; W.D.C. Poulton, Tort or 
Contract", (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 3^6 ; L. Collins, "Interaction 
between contract and tort in the conflict of laws", (1967) 
l6 Int*l & Comp. L. Q. 103*
2/ In 1931» in The Province of the Law of Tort, Winfield 
listed a number of differences existing betwen tortious and 
contractual actions (pp. 40ff.). In 195^» in "Borderland", 
Prosser also listed a number of advantages and disadvantages 
which can exist in a given situation because of the tortious 
or contractual nature of the action. See further Poulton, 
"Tort or Contract',' at p. 3^6 and R. Stevens, "Hedley Byrne 
v. Heller : Judicial creativity and doctrinal possibility", 
(1964) 27 Mod. L. R. 126 at p. l6l, particularly n. 72.
_2/ For examples and exceptions, see Collins,"Interaction 
between contract and tort" at p. 104. See however A. Hill, 
"Breach of Contract as a Tort", (197*0 74 Colum. L. Rev.
40, criticizing any attempt to treat damages for innocent 
misrepresentation as a tort.
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in French law, there is a clear cut distinction between
ytortious and contractual liability Even though some of
the most important differences between the two categories 
have been removed during the last decades ^ % there are 
still a number of consequences flowing from the character­
ization of an action ^ , But even if all the remaining prac­
tical differences disappeared, it is likely that courts and 
academic writers would continue to use this system of clas­
sification of actions which has prevailed in France for so 
7/many years . In French law, the distinction seems to be 
one of "those elements which give law its characteristic 
features and which assure its permanency, despite all the 
changes made in the legal norms" ^ .
Besides the theoretical interest of the question 
from a comparative point of view, ascertaining the nature 
of an action brought under the Convention has important 
practical consequences in determining the proper parties 
to the action, as will be seen in the following pages.
4/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 4l9ff. ; Starck. 
Obligations, pp. 652ff.
One of the advantages of a contractual action was that, 
in many cases, the plaintiff did not have to prove fault on 
the defendant’s part but he had to do so in a tortious ac­
tion.. The developments of strict liability in tort in the 
193°*s made that difference disappear in a vast number of 
cases.
6/ Starck, Obligations, pp. 65^ff.
2_/ The approach adopted by Starck is sumptomatic. The basis 
of the distinction is that a contract creates between the 
parties a situation which does not exist between non-con­
tracting parties and also creates specific obligations. The 
consequence is that contractual and tortious liabilities 
cannot be reduced to one category only. This is at the root 
of all the rules on this subject. Starck, Obligations, p. 
65^. There have been only a few, totally unsuccessful, 
attempts at the end of the 19th century and the beginning 
of the 20th century to challenge the impossibility of con­
sidering both liabilities in one category : Grandmoulin,
De l'unite des responsabilites (these Rennes, 1892) ; 
Planiol, "Etudes sur la responsabiliti civile", Rev. crit. 
lSgisl. et jurisp. 1905» PP- 283ff.
8/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 11.
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Section One. - Indications provided by the Convention itself.
The Convention does not clearly state that the 
action against an air carrier is of a contractual, or of a 
tortious or delictual nature. However, there is enough 
evidence to say that the Convention deals predominantly 
with a contractual action, without excluding the possibility 
of an action based on something other than the contract of 
carriage.
The Convention deals predominantly with a contractual action.
A number of the Convention’s provisions expressly 
refer to the contract of carriage, e.g. Articles 1(2), 3(2), 
231 or to the parties to the contract of carriage, e.g. 
Article 32. This shows that the drafters of the Convention 
sought to regulate an essentially contractual relationship.
Because of the importance of the French legal tradi­
tion in the drafting of the Convention, a further argument 
in favour of the contractual nature of the action is the 
similarity between the liability regime established by the 
Convention and the contractual regime of liability for 
domestic carriers in France ^ . The only area in which the 
contractual nature of the air carrier's liability is not 
quite clear is unlimited liability under Article 25. Unlim­
ited liability in cases of dol or faute lourde is sometimes 
seen as having a tortious nature but, more often, it is 
analyzed as an aggravated liability which retains its con­
tractual nature. The very rule that the liability limita­
tions are set aside is itself considered as a rule of 
contractual liability .
2/  as has been underlined by G.N. Calkins, "The cause of• 
action under the Warsaw Convention", (1959) 26 J. Air L.
& Com. p. 223.
10/ See further on all these questions Carbonnier, Droit 
civil, vol. 4, pp0 264ff ; Starck, Obligations, pp. 636ft.
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The Convention does not exclusively deal with a contractual 
action.
Article 24 of the Convention provides :
" (l) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 
any action for damages, however founded, can only 
be brought subject to the conditions and limits 
set out in this Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by Article 1?, the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, 
without prejudice to the questions as to who are 
the persons who have the right to bring suit and 
what are their respective rights.”
The phrase "however founded" in Article 24(1) shows that 
the drafters of the Convention were aware that an action 
might be brought on several possible grounds. The possi­
bility of an action other than contractual is much stronger 
in the cases covered by Article 17 since Article 24(2) 
provides that in such cases, the questions of who are the 
persons who have the right to bring suit, and what are 
their respective rights, are not affected by the provisions 
of the Convention. A contractual action can be brought only 
by a person v/ho can rely on the contract. If the lex fori 
allows an action to be brought by a third party who does 
not rely on the contract of carriage, such an action cannot 
be anything but tortious.
Section 2. - Nature of the action in French courts.
There is no hesitation when the contracting parties 
themselves bring an action under the terms of the Convention. 
Difficulties arise in cases of death, when the action is 
brought by the relatives of the passenger, and in cases where 
the parties want to have their action considered outside the 
scope of the Convention by bringing their action before 
criminal courts, through the mechanism of the action civile.
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The simple situation t the contracting parties bring their 
action under the terms of the Convention.
In such cases, the answer is straightforward i the
action is contractual . The case of Syndicat d* assurances
12/des Lloyds c. St§ A^rofret — ' is particularly revealing. 
Before the court of first instance and the court of appeal, 
the plaintiffs had argued their case against the carriers 
on the sole basis of the provisions of the Warsaw Conven­
tion, and particularly Article 25. The Cour de Cassation 
considered that, by doing so, the plaintiffs had exclusively 
founded their claim on the contract of carriage concluded 
between the consignor and the two air carriers involved 
In other words, the Warsaw action is so clearly of a con­
tractual nature that the parties do not have to expressly 
state that they rely on the contract as the basis of their 
action. It is enough that the Convention be relied upon to 
indicate that the action is contractual.
The ruling that the action brought against the air 
carrier is contractual is a natural conclusion in France 
where actions in liability against carriers in general can­
not be anything but contractual when they are brought by
13/
passengers or shippers claiming breach of contract 14/ The
11/ See for instance Balavoine c. Fillioux, (1966) 29 
R.G.A.E. l66, note M. de Juglart (Cass. crim. 17 May 1966).
The same analysis prevails in Switzerland : Jacquet c. Club 
Neuchatelois d1aviation, (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. "52 (Trib. Fed. 
suisse, 12 March 1957) ; Style c. Braun, (1961) 24 R.G.A.
375» note J. Sundberg (Trib. Geneve, 9 December 1958).
12/ (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 168 (C.A . Paris, 27 June 1966), aff'd,
T1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. com. 22 April 1969).
13/ at (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 399.
14/ No doubt was ever voiced in relation to the carriage of 
goods because of the express provision of Art. 103 of the 
Commercial Code. It is only in I9II that the Cour de Cassa­
tion gave a contractual action to passengers in cases of 
personal injury or death. See Cie Generale Transatlantique 
c . Zbidi Hamida Ben Mahmoud (Cass. civ. 21 November I9II) •"
The same ruling was given in Chemin de fer du midi c. Meste- 
lan (Cass. civ. 27 January 1913) and in Chemin de fer d1Or­
leans c . Donat (Cass. civ. 21 April 1913TI the" three deci- 
sions being published in D. 1913*1*249. For a more recent 
example, see Cumia c. Charles, J.C.P. 1967•II.15156 (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 25 April-"1967) .
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p a r t i e s  a r e  s t r i c t l y  f o r b i d d e n  t o  bo rrow  from a  t o r t i o u s  
a c t i o n  an y  f e a t u r e  which m ig h t  be more a d v a n t a g e o u s  t o  
them .  T h i s  i s  t h e  " n o - o p t i o n "  r u l e  which  p l a y s  an  i m p o r t a n t  
r o l e  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  f ramework o f  c i v i l  l i a b i l i t y  i n  F r a n c e —
The l i a b i l i t y  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a p a s s e n g e r s  d e a t h .
D e s p i t e  t h e  g e n e r a l i t y  o f  t h e  t e r m s  o f  A r t i c l e  24, 
which  makes t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t io n  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
a l l  a c t i o n s ,  "how ever  f o u n d e d " ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e s  o f  p a s s e n g e r s ,  
h i s  a y a n t s - d r o i t , a t t e m p t e d  t o  e s c a p e  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n ’ s 
l i m i t a t i o n s  by means o f  an  a rgum en t  which  had b e e n  s u c c e s s ­
f u l  i n  d o m e s t i c  law The b a s i s  o f  t h e  a rgum en t  i s  t h a t
t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  imposed by t h e  C o n v e n t io n  a r e  a t t a c h e d  t o  
t h e  c o n t r a c t u a l  a c t i o n  o f  t h e  p a s s e n g e r  and a p p l y  o n ly  i f
t h e  a c t i o n  bv h i s  a v a n t s - d r o i t  i s  fo u n d ed  on t h a t  c o n t r a c t ,—
t h r o u g h  t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  p o u r  a u t r u i  — 1u  which i s  i m p l i e d
1 5 /  C a r b o n n i e r ,  D r o i t  c i v i l , v o l .  4 ,  p p .  4 2 2 -4 2 3 ,  426 ; 
S t a r c k ,  O b l i g a t i o n s , p"! 6 6 7 . The " n o - o p t i o n "  r u l e  h a s  b e en  
f o r c e f u l l y  r e a s s e r t e d  by t h e  Cour de C a s s a t i o n  i n  Le B ihan  
c .  S t§  Le S u l l y  d ' A u t e u i l , B u l l .  c i v .  I ,  No. 87 ( C a s s .  c i v .  
I r e , 9 March 1 9 7 0 ) ,  where  i t  was s t a t e d  : " A t t e n d u  que l o r s -  
que s o n t  r £ u n i e s ,  comme en l ' e s p e c e ,  l e s  c o n d i t i o n s  q u i  don-  
n e n t  a l a  r e s p o n s a b i l i t S  une n a t u r e  c o n t r a c t u e l l e , l a  v i c t i m e  
ne p e u t  se  p r e v a l o i r ,  quand meme e i l e  y a u r a i t  i n t e r e t ,  de s  
r e g i e s  de l a  r e s p o n s a b i l i t e  d l l i c t u e l l e ." See a l s o  Bouquet  
c . D e l p y , B u l l .  c i v .  I I ,  No. 118 ( C a s s .  c i v .  2me, 9 A p r i l  
1 9 7 0 ) .
1 6 /  T r a n s p o r t s  m a r i t i m e s  de l ' E t a t  c . B r o s s e t t e  f Le L am o r i - 
c i e r e l  D. 1951»J»717> n o t e  G. R i p e r t  ( C a s s ,  c i v . com. 19 
Ju n e  1951)•  The r e a s o n i n g  was r e a f f i r m e d  i n  Cie  d e s  m e s s a ­
g e r i e s  m a r i t i m e s  c .  Le R o t e r f  f Le C h a m p o l l io n  j , D. 1959-J*  
281, n o t e  R. R o d i e r e , and i n  V iv io z  c .  A i r  F r a n c e , D. 1959 
J . 1 0 1 ,  n o t e  S a v a t i e r  ( C a s s .  c i v .  2me, 23 J a n u a r y  1959)« The 
r u l i n g  h a s  b een  s t a t u t o r i l y  r e v e r s e d  i n  c a s e s  o f  a i r  c a r r i a g e  
by an  A c t  o f  March 2 , 1957» and i n  c a s e s  o f  m a r i t i m e  c a r r i a g e  
by an  A c t  o f  June  1 8 , 1 9 6 6 . The a y a n t s - d r o i t  o f  t h e  p a s s e n -  ' 
g e r  can  no l o n g e r  a v o i d  l i a b i l i t y  l i m i t a t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
t h e  c o n t r a c t  o f  c a r r i a g e .
1 7 /  S t i p u l a t i o n  p o u r  a u t r u i  i s  a mechanism which a l l o w s  a 
p e r s o n  t o  r e l y  on t h e  t e r m s  o f  a c o n t r a c t  t o  which he i s  n o t  
a p a r t y ,  g i v i n g  him a d i r e c t  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o m i s o r  t o  
e n f o r c e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  p r o m is e .  The mechanism i s  b a se d  
on A r t i c l e  1121 o f  t h e  C i v i l  Code ; i t  h a s  b een  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
d e v e l o p e d  by c o u r t s  and w r i t e r s .  See g e n e r a l l y  C a r b o n n i e r ,  
D r o i t  c i v i l , vob4,  p p .  I 8 7 f f .  ; S t a r c k ,  O b l i g a t i o n s , p p . 5S4ff .
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in contracts of carriage in French law Pursuant to
this doctrine, the relatives of a passenger can bring an
action in damages against the carrier based on the contract
of carriage. This means that they will be able to obtain
19 /damages without having to prove negligence . But the
ayants-droit may renounce the benefit of that stipulation
and bring a delictual action based on the violation of
their personal rights. The advantages of renouncing the
stipulation pour autrui are considerable if the contract
contains limitation or exclusion clauses which then become
inapplicable because the ordre public character of rules of
delictual liability makes such clauses null and void ^0/,
21/In Hennessy c. Air France — ' , the plaintiffs stated 
that they had renounced the stipulation pour autrui and were 
bringing their action independently of the contract of car­
riage. They argued that their action in delictual liability 
could not be affected by any of the contractual limitations 
imposed by the Warsaw Convention and, accordingly, claimed 
unlimited damages. The Paris Court of Appeal dismissed this 
claim. It is interesting to observe that, instead of using 
the broad wording of Article 24 which appears to cover con­
tractual as well as delictual actions, the court stated 
that the Convention had established a liability regime which
18/ Chemin de fer de Paris a Origans c . Noblet (Cass. civ. 
b December 1932), and Falduti c . Chemin de fer Paris - Lyon 
Mediterranee (Cass, civü 24 May 1933) » both at D.P. 1933 • I. 
137» note L. Josserand. Later cases simply assume the exis­
tence of such an implied term. See for instance Munier es 
qualites c. Divry (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 76 (Trib. civ. Seine,
27 November 1953”) •
19/ In French law, the carrier of passengers undertakes safe­
ly to carry his passengers to their destination. Death or 
personal injury are by themselves evidence of a breach of the 
carrier*s duty. There is no need to prove negligence. See 
above pp. 82-83.
20/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, pp. 409-410, 415.
21/ (1952) 6 R.F.D.A. 199 (Trib. civ. Seine, 24 April 1952), 
aff* d, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 45, with conclusions by Avocat Ge­
neral Dupin and note P. Chauveau (C.A. Paris, 25 February 
1954).
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excluded any action based on other principles — ' . The court 
seemed to imply that the action regulated by the Convention 
was contractual and that the exclusive character of the ac­
tion meant that the plaintiffs could not elect to sue on a 
delictual basis, as could be done in domestic law. The court 
added that, in any case, the action was based on the faulty 
performance of the contract, which meant that the action was 
contractual and so could not avoid the limitation of liabil­
ity which were contained in the contract ^2/,
Liability actions brought in a criminal court : the action 
civile .
When the act or omission which caused the damage is 
an offence punishable by criminal law, criminal courts have 
jurisdiction to award damages in compensation for the conse­
quences of the crime If a plaintiff wants to bring an
action civile to obtain damages from the offender in a 
criminal court, he must first join the prosecution and 
participate in the criminal action through a constitution 
de partie civile. His action civile will then benefit from 
the criminal procedure which is generally speedier than 
civil procedure, and in which the burden of proof is on the 
public prosecutor.
Over recent years, courts and writers have differed 
on whether the action civile is affected bv the Warsaw 
Convention — *J . For years, the issue was worded as follows :
22/ (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. pp. 63-64 23/ at p. 64.
24/ Pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. See generally P. Bouzat & J. Pinatel, Traite de 
Droit P£nal et de Criminologie (Paris, 1963)» vol. 2, pp. 
1183ff. ; R. Merle & A. Vitu, TraitS de Droit Criminel 
(Paris, 196?), pp. 8?6ff. ; G. Stefani & G. Levasseur, Droit 
p£nal g£n£ral et procedure p£nale (5th ed., Paris, 1971)» 
pp. 121ff.
25/ The reasoning is identical in cases of domestic carriage 
for which Art. L.322-3(2) of the Code de 1*Aviation civile 
provides : " La responsabilit£ du transporteur par air ne 
peut etre recherchie que dans les conditions et limites
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does Article 24 cover the action civile when referring to 
"any action, however founded", or does it relate only to 
the two normal types of civil liability, i.e. delictual and 
contractual, leaving aside the action civile, which would 
remain governed by its specific rules ? To that question, 
the Cour de Cassation initially gave a clear answer. In 
Balavoine c . Fillioux t it was held that the Warsaw Con­
vention provisions "which govern the contractual action" of 
the victim and his ayants-droit "are not related to the 
exercise of the action civile before a criminal court" . 
Accordingly, there was no obstacle to the application of 
the three-year time limit provided by the code of criminal 
procedure instead of the two years provided by Article 29 
of the Convention.
That decision was the object of controversies among 
legal writers £0/, Several courts of appeal refused to 
follow the reasoning of the Cour de Cassation and held that 
there was a unique regime for all actions in liability 
against air carriers, including the action civile .
2 5/ (cont * d) pr£vues ci-dessus, quelles que soient les per- 
sonnes qui la mettent en cause et quel que soit le titre 
auquel elles pr£tendent agir". This provision was designed 
to serve a purpose identical to that of Article 24 of the 
Convention. Among the cases which are studied in the text, 
only the Billet case is a strict Warsaw carriage case. But 
in all other cases considered, express reference is made to 
the Warsaw Convention, the provisions of which were made 
applicable to domestic law in 1957*
26/ D.S. 1966.J.518 ; (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 166, note M. de 
Juglart (Cass. crim. 17 May 1966).
27/ at D.S. 1966.J.p. 519.
28/ See for instance, in support of the interpretation of the 
Cour de Cassation, E. du Pontavice, "Limites d'application de 
la Convention de Varsovie face au droit penal interne",(1966) 
29 R.G.A.E. 333ff. ; M. de Juglart & E. du Pontavice, comments 
at J.C.P. 1970.II.16353• Criticizing the reasoning, see for 
instance P. Chauveau, comments at D.S. I966.J.519 ; R« Rodiere 
(commenting a decision at an earlier stage of the proceedings 
where the same reasoning had been adopted), J.C.P. 1964.11. 
13962 and D.S. I965.J.306.
29/ Chainard c. A.C. de Bourgogne, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 82 
(C.A. Dijon 21 December'1967) ; A.C. de Sgtif c. Mazzuca, 
U 968) 22 R.F.D.A. 72 (C.A. Paris, 19 December 1967).
- 362 -
A few years later, the Cour de Cassation adopted a 
more ambiguous position in the Billet case % on the one 
hand, the court stated that even if the Convention is silent 
on criminal proceedings v/hich might follow and air crash, 
as well as on an action civile brought in a criminal court, 
it remained true that Article 24 forbids any liability 
action, however founded, outside the conditions and limits 
of the Convention. This seems to satisfy the advocates of 
the inapplicability of the rules peculiar to the action 
civile in an action against an air carrier. On the other 
hand, the court emphasized the fact that the carrier had 
been brought before the criminal court as vicariously liable 
for the aircraft pilot, and that he had not been considered 
"as a carrier having, as such, specific responsibilities".
It was thus possible to argue that, had the plaintiff relied 
on an offence committed by the carrier himself to bring the 
action civile, the outcome of the case might have been very 
different, with the rules of criminal law and criminal 
procedure pre-empting any other rule, including the Warsaw 
Convention provisions.
31/Finally, in Rousseau c. Stempel 7 , the Cour de 
Cassation dissipated all doubts. It briefly described the 
specific rules governing the action in liability against 
air carriers and underlined the substantive and procedural 
differences between this action and the action civile, which 
remains exclusively governed by the rules of criminal 
procedure. Then relying on Article 24 of the Convention, and 
its equivalent in municipal law, the court said that no
30/ Billet fMinistere Public c.1, (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 257, 
note E. du Pontavice (Trib. corr. Versailles, 11 July 1964), 
rev*d, (1 9 6 5) 28 R.G.A.E. 408, note E. du Pontavice (C.A. 
Paris, 25 June 1 9 6 5)* cassation sub nom Cie U.T.A. & Laga- 
rigue, J.C.P. 1970.II.16353> note M. de Juglart & E. du Pon­
tavice, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 81, note E. Georgiades (Cass, 
crim. 3 December 1 9 6 9)•
31/ (1975) 29 R.F.D.A. 181 (Cass. crim. 9 January 1975). The 
reasoning has been inaugurated by the Chambery Court of 
Appeal in Soltner c. Kaci, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 289 (C.A. Cham 
bery, 28 March 1974).
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action apart from that regulated by the Convention could be 
exercised. Accordingly, the action civile was not available 
to the plaintiffs who were thus limited to the special ac­
tion against air carriers over which the criminal courts 
had no jurisdiction.
Thus, the controversy has now ended. The court has 
reasserted its opinion that the action civile is outside 
the scope of the Warsaw Convention and cannot be governed 
by anything but its own specific rules. But this does not 
benefit the plaintiffs because the action civile has been 
placed beyond their reach. It is no longer possible to sue 
air carriers in liability before criminal courts 
only thing a plaintiff may do is to join in a criminal 
action against an air carrier, but he will not be allowed 
to ask for damages. That is now in the exclusive juris­
diction of the civil courts.
To sum up, when the action is brought by contracting 
parties themselves, or by the ayants-droit of a deceased 
passenger, the action governed by the Warsaw Convention is 
seen as exclusively contractual, the various ways in which 
the contractual nature of the action may be altered in 
domestic law being prohibited.
Section 3* - Nature of the action in common law countries.
By a striking contrast with the situation in France, 
the legal categories in the common law are not always pre­
cisely defined and they are not exclusive of one another.
In common law countries, there can be considerable uncer­
tainty when it comes to distinguishing between tort and
32/ The distinction between the right to join the criminal 
action through the constitution de partie civile, and the 
right to ask for damages through the action civile has been 
established by several recent decisions of the Cour de Cas­
sation. See C.P.C.A.M. - R.P. c. LainS, D.S. 1974.J.666 
(Cass. crim. 28 March 1974) ; Pateyron, Bull. crim. 1973»
No. 238, p. 568 (Cass. crim. 24 May 1973)*
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contract. Carriage is a typical example of an area located 
in the "borderland of tort and contract" 23/ m The reason for 
this situation appears to be mainly historical. In the early 
common law, the carrier of goods had the duty to carry the 
goods safely and to deliver them intact. He was liable for 
the loss of the goods and for any damage caused to them.
He was so liable because he was a bailee, i.e. because he 
was in possession of another person’s goods 2l±/1 It was 
only in 1689 that it was first intimated that a carrier 
might be liable in contract 23/, and in 1759 that the right 
to sue the carrier in contract was recognized 23/ % While it 
was gradually accepted that carriage of goods could be 
analyzed in contractual terms, the pre-existing relation­
ship of bailment was not affected. Contracts of carriage and 
bailment have coexisted since the middle of the 18th century 
and it is now settled that a person whose goods are lost or
damaged in transit can sue either for breach of contract,
87/for tort, or for bailment -iL/ . In cases dealing with the 
carriage of passengers, a claim for damages can frequently 
be framed in contract or in tort. The passenger/carrier 
relationship is one of those situations where the law places 
upon one party--the carrier— a duty of such a character that 
a tort will arise if this duty is broken 23/ a This duty 
exists side by side with any contractual undertaking the 
carrier may assume 22/1
33/ Prosser, "The Borderland of Tort and Contract", in 
Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (Ann Harbor, 1953)» 
pp. 38O-4 5 2.
34/ See further Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 193PP*
35/ Boson v. Sandford, 3 Salk. 203, 91 E.R. 777 (K.B. 1 6 8 9).
j[6/ Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. K.B. 281, 95 E.R. 619 (K.B. 1750).
37/ See generally Chitty, Contracts, vol. 2, p. 270 ; Kahn- 
Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 194-5 ; Prosser, Torts, p. 
6l4 ; see also American Jurisprudence 2d, vol. 14, Carriers,
§ 59^» p. 114 ; Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 1, Actions,
§ 49, pp. Ill6ff.
38/ above pp. 11-12. See also below the discussion in rela­
tion to the United States and the other common law countries.
39/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 450-451 ? Sundberg,
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Once it is ascertained that a particular plaintiff 
can have several actions of a different nature against a 
carrier, it remains to determine whether he can freely 
choose between these actions, or whether there are rules 
restricting his choice. The answer to this question in the 
United States is not quite as clear as that in the other 
common law countries examined.
A) United States.
Determining the nature of an action is an exercise
which tends to receive little attention from legal writers
and, in the United States, the topic offers none of the
40 /controversies found in France — ' . The vast majority of 
American cases treat actions governed by the Warsaw Con­
vention exactly in the same manner as other cases. It is 
difficult to lay down any general rule for the United States 
Prosser has thus summarized the general situation \ it
seems that a completely free choice will be granted to the 
plaintiff where the relevant difference between the two 
actions bears on a point of procedure only. When the point 
at issue is one of substance, actions relating to property 
damage or pecuniary interests will also permit a free choice 
But when the claim is one for personal injury or wrongful 
death, "the decision usually has been that the gravamen of 
the action is the misconduct and the damage, and that it is 
essentially one of tort, which the plaintiff cannot alter 
by his pleadings . . . Actually the courts appear to have 
preserved a great deal of flexibility, and to have been
39/ (cont1d) Air Charter, p. 166 ; Prosser, Torts, pp. 616- 
0I7 » American Jurisprudence 2d, vol. 1, Actions, § 36,p.570 
Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 1, Actions, § 49, pp. 1119ff.
40/ Prosser, "Borderland", p. 433.
4l/ Prosser, "Borderland", pp. 434ff. ; Torts, pp. 6l8ff.
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influenced in their decisions by their attitude towards
42/the rule of law in question." — '
In relation to Warsaw actions, the question of the
nature of the action has arisen mainly in wrongful death
cases. Most decisions appear simply to assume that a wrong-
43/ful death claim cannot be anything but tortious — “  . There
seems to be a necessary link between the use of a wrongful
death statute and the tortious nature of the action relying
44/on the statute — ' . It is only in Komlos v. Compagnie Natio-
nale Air France its/ that the reasoning was more explicit :
" The gravamen of the action is the negligence 
of the defendant which wrongfully caused the 
death of Emery Komlos . . . The VJarsaw Con­
vention does not change the basic rule that 
the contract of carriage is not the gravamen 
of the action for wrongful death." 46/
The only decision which stands out against these
47/principles is Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France — u
where the action was seen as contractual. It should be
observed that this decision has remained an isolated example
of how French law concepts could be used in interpreting48 /the Convention — ' . On that basis, it was only natural that
the conclusions of the court coincided with the results
49/obtained in French courts .
42/ Prosser, Torts, p. 621. The Corpus Juris Secumdum 
similarly states that ordinarily, a passenger has a choice 
between contract and tort in suing for a breach of duty by 
the carrier, be it contract duty or duty implied by law in 
addition to the contract duty, "the gist of the complaint 
determining the nature of the action as brought". (Vol.l, 
Actions § 49(5).)
43/ See for instance Winsor v. United Airlines, (i960) U.S. 
Av.Rep. 39 (D. Col. I960I ; Sheris v. The Sheris Co. 12 Avi. 
17,394 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1972).
44/ Salamon v. K.L.M. , 3 Avi. 17,768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
45/ 3 Avi. 17,969 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), rev*d on other grounds, 
4 Avi. 17,281 (2d Cir. 1953).
46/ The court endorsed (at 3 Avi. 17,973) 'the ruling given 
by Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, 2 Avi. 15,062 (2d Cir.1949)
47/  10 Avi. 17, 518 (5th Cir. 1967).
48/ above p. I83. 49/ above pp. 356-360.
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In the few personal injury cases which mention the
nature of the action, the choice made by the plaintiff of
a tortious action was not questioned . These cases offer
no ground for quarelling the statement made in a recent case
of domestic air carriage where the court said : "Personal
<1 /injury is preeminently a tort claim."
There does not seem to be any decision dealing with 
cases other than wrongful death or personal injury where 
the nature of the action attracted any attention. This is 
to be expected if it is true that, as a rule, courts accept 
the free choice of the plaintiff. No room is left for ar­
gument .
B) Other common law countries.
The rule that a plaintiff may freely elect to sue 
on any basis which is available to him was already consid­
ered as well established by 1895 • More recently, Lord
Radcliffe in Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. Ltd.^-^ 
stated :
" It is a familiar position in our law that the 
same wrongful act may be made the subject of 
an action either in contract or in tort at the 
election of the claimant, and, although the 
course chosen may produce certain incidental 
consequences which would not have followed 
had the other course been adopted, it is a 
mistake to regard the two kinds of liability 
as themselves necessarily exclusive of each 
other." 54/
50/ See for instance Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
9 Avi. 17,871 (W.D. Pa. 1965! ; Spencer v. Northwest Orient 
Airlines Inc.. 7 Avi. 17,820 (S.DlN.Y. I962).
51/ Hark v. Antilles Airboats Inc., 12 Avi. 17,844 (D. Virgin 
Islands 1973) at p. 17,847•
52/ Kelly v. Metropolitan Ry., [1895] 1 Q*B. 9 ^  (Ct. App.I895T] esp. p. 946.
i3/ [1957] A.c. 555 (h.l. 1956).
54/ at p. 587* The same attitude was adopted in Matthews v . 
Kuwait Bechtel Corn. [1959] 2 Q.B. 57 (Ct. App. 1959)* Con­
trast the dissenting opinion of Ld Denning in the Court of 
Appeal decision in Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co.
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This freedom of choice is not hampered by rules 
linking the nature of certain claims (e.g. wrongful death 
or personal injury) to one form of action. It is only for 
limited purposes that one form of action will be preferred. 
For instance, in a conflict of laws situation, the liability 
of a carrier for his passengers' safety appears delictual 
rather than contractual '.
The same freedom prevails in relation to Warsaw
cases, even though there are factors which could have
produced a different result. Because the Warsaw Convention
uses concepts such as wilful misconduct and contributory
negligence, which normally belong to the law of torts, the
impression is created that actions based on the Convention6^/are tortious . But this view is inconsistent with several 
cases where plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions framed 
in contract. Indeed, it was said in Grein v. Imperial Air­
ways that the provision of the 1932 Carriage by Air Act
which substitutes any liability imposed by Article 17 of 
the Convention for any other liability of the carrier in 
respect of the death of his passengers applies to cases 
"of liability arising out of a contract for international 
carriage" 0^/ similarly, the action for wrongful death in 
Preston v. Hunting Air Transport Ltd4^was framed in contract. 
Cases of carriage of cargo also offer numerous examples of 
actions framed in contract %
54/ (cont1d) Ltd. [1956] 2 Q.B. 180 at p. 188. See also his 
opinion in Savers v. Int'l Drilling Co. N.V., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 
■117-6 at pp. 1180-1181 (Ct. App. 1971).
55/ A.V. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (7th ed.) pp. 83I-832.
56/ This is presumably why the United Kingdom delegate to the 
1957 meeting of the ICAO Legal Committee declared that "He 
had been brought up in English law and had thought of the 
Warsaw Convention primarily as regulating liability in tort 
or delict of the carrier'.' ICAO Doc..7921-LC/143-1» p. 14.
57/ 1 Avi. 622 (Ct. App. 1936). 58/ at p. 629.
^2/ [1956] 1 Q.B. 454 (Q.B. 1956).
60/ See for instance Corocraft v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 
171968] 2 All E.R. 10 59- "(Q.B. 1968), rev'd, [1969] 1 All E.R. 
82 (Ct. App. 1968) ; Romulus Films Ltd, v. William Dempster 
Ltd. [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535 (Q.B. 1952).
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However, the fact that several actions governed by 
the Warsaw Convention have been framed in contract does not 
mean that this is the only possible ground. In Bart v .
British West Indian Airways, Ltd. , an action for late 
arrival of a shipment was framed in contract but principles 
of the law of tort and of the law of bailment were also 
applied by the court. The Preston case may be the best ex­
ample that an action is not necessarily limited to its own 
rules and may borrow features from other areas of the law : 
although the action was contractual, the court allowed dam­
ages for the infant plaintiffs* loss of care by their mother 
who had died in an air crash % This is contrary to the 
usual reluctance shown by English courts towards awarding 
damages for non-pecuniary loss in actions based on a breach 
of contract .
The 1961 Carriage by Air Act included within the
scope of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 "any occurrence which
gives rise to a liability under Article 17"of the Convention.64/But, by contrast with the United States — ' , such a refer­
ence does not necessarily point to the tortious nature of 
the action. The Grein case seems to have established that, 
although Lord Campbell*s Act was primarily designed for 
tortious actions, it is wide enough to cover contractual 
actions as well ^ / .
6l/ [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 239 (Guyana Ct. App. 1966) .
62/ [1956] 1 Q.B. 454 at p. 462.
63/ Chitty, Contracts (23rd ed.) para. l46l ; Mayne & 
McGregor, Damages (12th ed.) para 355-356.
64/ above p. 366.
65/ 1 Avi. 622 at pp. 63I-632 (per Greer L.J.) ; pp. 638- 
"639 (per Greene L.J.).
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Section 4. - Comparison .
French courts have clearly established that actions 
governed by the Warsaw Convention are contractual and, as 
such, exclude the application of any rule which does not 
belong to the law of contract. This does not exist in 
common law countries, where the existence of a contractual 
action is not exclusive of an action based on tort or on 
bailment, or of the application of rules which normally 
belong to such actions. In England, a plaintiff seems to 
be able to select among the various possible grounds of 
action the one which best suits his purposes. In the United 
States, this freedom exists in cases where pecuniary 
interests are at stake. When the action relates to wrongful 
death or personal injury, it tends to be framed in tort.
But whether there is a free choice or whether some claims 
are seen as attracting a particular form of action, it 
remains true that the nature of the action in the common 
law countries does not play the primordial role that it 
plays in French law. Even when actions have to be framed 
in tort in the United States, it is only a consequence of 
the substance of the claim. Several reasons explain the 
different approaches adopted by common law and French courts.
General differences in the attitudes towards the relation­
ship between contract and tort.
(i) the distinction between tort and contract is seen in 
a very different light.
In French law, it is a common--though not always 
easy--exercise to distribute the various rights and duties 
arising out of a particular situation between the categories 
of tort and contract. Any violation of what is considered
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as a duty created by contract is contractual ; all the rest 
is delictual '. Between two contracting parties, there 
can be a combination of the two sorts of duties giving rise 
to two sorts of action, one in tort and one in contract. 
They may be exercised together, but each will keep its 
individuality. A purely tortious action may also be brought 
by one contracting party against the other if the damage 
complained of is not due to the breach of a particular 
contractual obligation . A careful analysis will always 
allow a particular claim to be identified as being of a 
contractual or delictual nature.
In common law, by contrast, there is a frequent 
interpenetration of the legal categories of tort and con­
tract. Numerous examples can be found. One of them is the 
very existence of a borderland between tort and contract. 
The whole area of carriage of passengers and goods is
located in that borderland. Another example is the reason-
68 /ing adopted in the case of Hedlev Byrne v. Heller — 'which 
was decided on a tortious basis but which has nonetheless 
considerable implications in the law of contract ^2 /, A 
last example of the absence of strict demarcation between 
tort and contract is that a duty which exists in tort may
66/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 421 ; Mazeaud & de 
Juglart, Lecons de Droit civil, II, vol. 1 , No. 391- For a 
more reserved analysis, see G. Marty & P. Raynaud, Droit 
civil, II, vol. 1 (Paris,1962) No. 366 ; Starck, Obliga­
tions , pp. 657ff.
67/ In Automoteur "Eleda”, D.M.F. 1973» 403» note P. Lureau 
"{Cass. civ. com. 20 March 1973)» a contract of carriage of 
goods was considered an impossible basis for an action for 
wrongful death. There was no obligation de s£curit£ in the 
contract. See comments by G. Durry in (1973) 72 Rev. Trim. 
Dr. civ. pp. 570-571*
68/ [1964] A .C. 465 (H.L. 1 9 6 3).
69/ See further R. Stevens, "Medley Byrne v. Heller : Judi­
cial creativity and doctrinal possibility", (1964) 27 Mod. 
L. Rev. 121.
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be increased,
contract
modified, or negated by the terms of a
(ii) explanation of the difference in 'attitudes towards 
the distinction between contract and tort.
It is submitted that the explanation lies in the
greater strictness of the law of contract in the common
law. In both civil and common law, there can be a contractual
action only when two conditions are fulfilled : (a) there
is an enforceable contract, and (b) there is a breach of
a contractual term. The enforceability of a contract in
common law can be challenged when any one of the numerous
rules relating to consideration are not complied with. This
allows challenges to be brought in a number of situations
otherwise complying with the law of contract. There are no
similar formal and rigid requirements in French law despite
the affinities existing between consideration and cause in
71/the French law of contract J— ' .
As to the existence of a breach of a contractual 
term, the common law is usually quite reluctant to accept 
the existence of implied terms in a contract 2 /^. in other 
words, only when there has been a breach of an express term, 
or of a term known to be implied in the kind of contract 
considered, will there be contractual liability. Otherwise, 
the court will not easily accept the existence of an implied 
term, the violation of which has precisely caused the damage 
complained of by the plaintiff. French courts are much less
70/ If a plaintiff sues in tort, he cannot disregard the 
exemption clauses contained in the contract : Hall v. Brook- 
lands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 K.B. 205 (Ct. Appl 1932) at 
p. 213 per Scrutton L.J. See also Elder, Dempster & Co v, 
Paterson, Zochonis & Co. [19241 A.Ci 522 (H .L. 1922) at p . 
533 Tper Viscount Cave), p. 548 (per Viscount Finlay) and 
p. 564 (per Ld Sumner).
71/ For a classical comparison of cause and consideration, 
see R. David, "Cause et Consideration", Melanges Maury 
(Paris, i960), vol. 2, p. 111.
72/ It was considered possible in The Moorcock, (1889) 14 
P.D. 64 (Ct. App. I889) to imply a term which the parties 
had not expressly included in the contract. But since then,
-  373 -
reluctant to do so. It gives French law a greater flexibility 
which allows more situations to be adequately covered by 
contractual remedies when new technical or commercial devel­
opments take place. The more rigid common law of contract 
cannot provide similar remedies to plaintiffs. Something 
had to be done to satisfy a fundamental need of basic justice 
and fairness. This appears to be the reason why plaintiffs 
were not prevented from suing on alternative grounds, be it 
the law of tort or the law of bailment.
Particular differences as to the possibility of excluding 
the rules of delictual liability.
French courts hold that any attempt to exclude or
limit in advance delictual liability is contrary to ordre
public -^-^and is, as such, null and void pursuant to Article
,------  74/6 of the Civil Code 1— ' . This being the case, had a con­
tracting party been allowed to opt out of a contractual 
action and permitted to bring a delictual action, he could 
have evaded any previous contractual undertaking under which 
the liability of the other contracting party might be limited 
or excluded. Contractual clauses would have been deprived of 
any meaning. So, the "no-option" rule was the only way to 
ensure that a contractual term as important as the limi­
tation of liability would be effectively enforced. It was
72/ (cont * d) numerous cases have emphasized the caution with 
which courts must proceed in doing so. See for instance 
Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co. (Ramsbottom) [19181 1 K.B. 
593 (Ct. Arp. 1918) ; Shirlawv. Southern Foundries (1926) 
Ltd. [1939] 2 K.B. 206 (Ct. App. 1939)• See further, Cheshire 
& Fifoot, Contract, pp. 172ff.
73/ See S.N.C.F. c. Cie La Pr^servatrice, D. 1956.J.17» note 
Esmein (Cass. civ. 2me, 17 February 1955)* This is true main­
ly in relation to cases of proved negligence,i.e . cases based 
on Articles 1382-3 of the Civil Code. For the necessary qua­
lifications to be made in cases of strict liability, see 
Starck, Obligations, pp. 332ff.
2]±/ Article 6 of the Civil Code provides : *’0n ne peut dero- 
ger, par des conventions particulieres, aux lois qui Inte­
ressent 1'ordre public, et les bonnes moeurs."
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the only way to ensure that the principle of freedom of 
contract remained in force
There is no similar rule prohibiting the exclusion 
of the rules of tortious liability in general in common 
law . Prosser has indicated that i "Valid terms of the 
contract itself which limit the amount of damages for which 
the defendant will be liable, or require notice of a claim 
within a time limit, or the like, are quite generally held 
to apply even though the action is in tort. Passengers, 
shippers and consignees of goods . . . are held to be bound 
by such terms, upon the ground either that the action is 
essentially "founded upon1 the contract, or that the tort 
duty itself has been modified by the agreement."
One can only speculate on the reason why the rules 
of delictual liability, in toto, are considered as part of 
ordre public in France and not in common law countries. The 
very concept of ordre public in French law is hard to cir­
cumscribe. It has been said that the general idea behind it 
is the supremacy of society over the individual. Ordre public
75/ Starck, Obligations, p. 666.
76/ See Chapter 3 above for particular instances where 
public policy has been called in aid in striking down 
certain exemption clauses.
77/ Prosser, "Borderland", pp. 445-446. Fleming notes that 
in some cases American courts have considered disclaimers 
of liability by those who provide a public service, e.g. 
common carriers, to be contrary to public policy. But he 
points out that "British courts, however, have been more 
timid. The prevailing view regards it nowadays as proper 
only for Parliament to outlaw exemption clauses on grounds 
of public policy, a power that has been widely exercised 
in the case of carriers (including in Australia, even 
private vehicles), hire-purchase, and industrial safety 
legislation. The courts themselves, on the other hand, have 
resigned themselves to the more modest task of "construction* 
alone. Thus, however well-intentioned, their role in con­
sumer protection is bound to be random, interstitial and of 
no more than temporary effec.t--a challenge merely to the 
next round of better drafting by the supplier" in Torts, 
pp. 240-241, footnotes omitted. See also Kahn-Freund, The 
Law of Carriage, Chapter 8.
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would express the nation*s willingness to live despite 
menacing individual initiatives using the principle of 
freedom of contract. Ordre public would he the mechanism 
by which the State represses the particular agreements 
which endanger its vital interests -^A General acceptance 
of these ideas in France might come from centuries of 
bureaucratic centralism. There is no similar tradition 
of the State having pre-eminence over individual freedom 
in Britain and other common law countries. This difference 
clearly reveals itself in the horror expressed in 1884 
by the English sociologist Herbert Spencer when he gives 
numerous examples of state intervention and of the "tyranny 
of organization" in France -l-^A
78/ Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 108.
79/ H. Spencer, The Man versus the State (Watts & Co. Ltd. 
London, 1950). See particularly the chapter entitled "The 
coming slavery", pp. 23ff.
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Chapter FOURTEEN . - THE WARSAW PLAINTIFF .
The question as to who is entitled to bring a suit 
under the Warsaw Convention presents different problems 
depending upon whether the action involves the carriage of 
passengers or the carriage of cargo.
A) Passenger cases.
The question of who can bring an action under 
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention ^ i s  expressly excluded 
from the Convention by Article 24 which provides that in 
those cases, any action for damages, however founded, can 
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set 
out in this Convention, "without prejudice to the questions 
as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit 
and what are their respective rights." Since the Convention 
does not provide the substantive rule to be applied, the 
court seized of a particular case must determine that rule.
It can either be the substantive rule of the lex fori ^ % 
or it can be designated by the choice of law rule of the
1/ Article 17 provides that "the carrier is liable for 
damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of 
a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas­
senger . . . "
2/ The countries which have enacted the Convention by 
special legislation usually have substantive rules specific 
to Warsaw cases. For instance, in Australia, s. 12(5; of the 
Civil Aviation (Carriers0 Liability) Act 1959-1973 lists as 
proper plaintiffs to a Warsaw action in case of death of a 
passenger s the personal representative of the passenger, 
the wife or husband, step-parents, grandparents, brothers, 
sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, children, step-children 
and grandchildren of the passengers and, in ascertaining the 
members of the passenger9s family, an illegitimate person or 
an adopted person shall be treated as being, or as having 
been, the legitimate child of his mother and reputed father 
or, as the case may be, of his adoptors.
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lex fori . These questions are outside the scope of this 
study since any discrepancy between the various solutions 
is due to a renvoi by the Convention itself, not to a 
difference of interpretation of a uniform text.
B) Cargo cases.
The carriage of cargo presents a different situation. 
Between its point of departure and its point of destination, 
cargo is often handled by a number of different persons 
exercising various rights over it. Many intermediaries may 
intervene, such as freight forwarders, or custom brokers.
For convenience sake, they may even be described as con­
signor or consignee in the air waybill, although they will 
act as intermediaries only. Moreover, in most cases, the 
carriage itself is but a necessary condition to the complete 
performance of another contract, e.g. a sale. By virtue of 
such a contract, rights over the shipment may vary during 
the carriage. In such cases, a court will have to assess who 
is a proper plaintiff. Is it only the persons named as 
consignor and consignee in the air waybill, or can it be 
someone else, whose interest in the claim may be far greater 
than that of the named consignor or consignee ? Finally, 
most cargo is covered by insurance. If the underwriter 
indemnifies the cargo owner for the loss which has been 
suffered, can the underwriter bring suit against the carrier?
j/ This is the United States solution. See for instance 
Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 3 Avi. 17,9^9 
(S. I)"! NTy". 1952) ; Supine v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 
(1951) U.S. Av.Rep.~W8 (E.D. N.Y.“l95U- See further on 
the applicable conflict of laws rule above pp. 179-180.
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The original Warsaw text remains silent on who is 
entitled to sue in relation to damage to a passenger*s 
luggage. It is only in cases of carriage performed by sev­
eral successive air carriers that Article 30(3) provides 
that the passenger can sue either the first, or the last 
carrier, or the carrier who performed the carriage during 
which the destruction, loss, damage or delay took place.
One can see no reason why a passenger would be allowed to 
sue in cases of successive carriage and not in other cases. 
Thus, it seems that the drafters of the Convention simply 
assumed that the passenger would be the natural plaintiff. 
But the silence of the Convention in cases other than suc­
cessive carriage make it a question to be determined by the 
lex fori. This is confirmed by Article IX of the Guatemala 
City Protocol which inserts a new Article 24 in the Conven­
tion and makes a renvoi to the lex fori in the carriage of4/passengers as well as m  the carriage of luggage -/ .
Lack of specific Convention provisions as to who can sue in cargo cases.
Despite the factual complexity of cargo cases, the 
Convention neither makes a renvoi of the question to the 
lex fori, nor does it expressly regulate the identity of 
the parties to a suit against the carrier in general. It is 
only for cases of carriage to be performed by various 
successive carriers that Article 30(3) provides :
" As regards luggage or goods, the passenger or con­
signor will have a right of action against the first 
carrier, and the passenger or consignee who is en­
titled to delivery will have a right of action 
against the last carrier, and further, each may take 
action against the carrier who performed the carriage 
during which the destruction, loss, damage or delay 
took place. These carriers will be jointly and sev­
erally liable to the passenger or to the consignor 
or consignee."
4/ This article provides that in "the carriage of passengers 
and baggage any action for damage, however founded, . . . 
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set 
out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as 
to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and 
what are their respective rights . . ."
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This article is interesting in that it distributes the right 
of action against the various carriers between the consignor 
and the consignee, thus lifting any doubt that may arise in 
cases of successive carriage. But there is no specific answer 
for all other cases of carriage of goods. However, Article 14 
of the Convention provides that "the consignor and the con­
signee can respectively enforce all the rights given them 
by Article 12 [governing the consignor's right of stoppage 
in transit] and 13 [describing the consignee's rights once 
the goods have reached the place of destination], each in 
his own name, whether he is acting in his own interest or 
in the interest of another, provided that he carries out 
the obligations imposed by the contract." It is noted that 
the United States translation of the Convention entitles 
Article 14 "suit for use of another". It is submitted that 
such a title is misleading, for several reasons indicate 
that Article 14 does not purport to designate the parties 
to an action in liability against a carrier.
Firstly, Article 14 limits itself to the rights 
derived from Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention, i.e. the 
consignor's right of stoppage in transit, and the consignee's 
right to demand that the goods and documents of carriage be 
handed over to him. It does not relate to the right, based 
on Article 18(1) of the Convention, to obtain damages in 
the event of destruction or loss of, or damage to, the goods.
Secondly, it has long been recognized that the Con­
vention follows the pattern, traditional in many continental 
countries, of distributing the rights over the goods between 
consignor and consignee ^  . The reason for this is that it 
is extremely difficult for the carrier to know who has the 
right over the goods at any particular time in the course
Jä/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, p. 759*
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of transit —7 . This depends upon the commercial transaction 
existing between consignor and consignee, such as a sale or 
a lease. It is in order to facilitate the carrier’s task 
that the respective rights of the consignor and consignee 
are spelt out. The carrier will thus be able to ascertain 
until when he has to follow the consignor’s instructions, 
and from when the consignee becomes the only person who can 
give him directions in relation to the goods. The only lia­
bility a carrier can have in this respect arises when he
executes the order of a person whom he knew was not entitled
7/to give that order -L/ . The question of liability for damage 
to the goods, or loss of the goods, is altogether different. 
This analysis is borne out by the very structure of the Con­
vention. Article 14 is located in the Chapter dealing with 
"Documents of Carriage" and does not appear to have anything 
to do with the provisions of the following Chapter which 
deals with "Liability of the Carrier" ^
Thirdly, the very limited scope of Article 14 is 
further indicated by the text of Article 15 which provides, 
in part,
" (l) Articles 12, 13 and 14 do not affect either 
the relations of the consignor or the consignee 
with each other or the mutual relations of third 
parties whose rights are derived either from the 
consignor or the consignee."
Article 15 clearly indicates that the Convention does not 
regulate anything but the execution of the contract of car­
riage. It has nothing to do with the right of ownership over 
the goods which is determined by the relationship between 
the consignor and the consignee. In other words, Articles
6/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 140.
2/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. l4l.
8/  The distinction between the physical execution of the- con­
tract and the questions of liability is traditional in France. 
In Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, the former is examined at 
pp. l40-l4l, and the latter pp. l64ff. The particular ques­
tion of who can sue the carrier is studied at p. 225.
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12 to 14 simply provide the carrier with a set of guidelines 
as to who can direct him in relation to the goods.
The silence of the Convention has been seen as indi­
cating that its framers were of the opinion that only the 
persons envisaged by the Convention have a right to claim 
compensation . It is submitted however that the silence 
of the Convention is more likely due to the fact that the 
drafters of the Convention, who were mainly from civil law 
countries, did not envisage that difficulties could arise 
because they assumed that the solutions provided by their 
own legal system were equally applicable to Warsaw cases. 
This will appear in the following pages, where cases ascer­
taining who can sue the carrier in liability are examined.
Cargo cases in French courts.
In France, rules similar to domestic law rules have 
constantly been applied in determining who has the right to 
bring an action. Thus, the principle is that only the con­
signor and the consignee can sue the carrier because they 
are the only persons who have rights under the contract of 
carriage The contract is made by the carrier and the
consignor ; the consignee has a direct right of action under 
the contract by means of a stipulation pour autrui inserted 
into the contract by the consignor . No third party to 
the contract of carriage can sue
Consignor and consignee are allowed to sue because 
they are in a contractual relationship with the carrier ;
2/ Drion, Limitation of Liabilities, p. 135*
10/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 225*
11/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, pp. 225-226.
12/ Sprinks & Cie c. Air France, (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 405 
Tc.A . Paris, 27 June 1969) ; Air Express International Agen­
cy (France) c . Stg Marais & Cie, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 79 
(C.A. Paris, I3 January 1968).
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the fact that they are described as consignor and consignee 
in the air waybill is but a mere indication of that fact.
The contractual relationship can also exist with someone 
other than the named consignor and consignee. This will be 
the case when a person is represented by the consignor or 
consignee, or when a person is a subrogee of the consignor 
or consignee. Such a person is allowed to directly sue the 
carrier even though its name does not appear on the air way­
bill. For instance, in Cie La Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta
12/c. Cie Air France the air waybill indicated as the con­
signee of a shipment of gold a person whom the carrier knew 
to be the agent of a bank. When the bank itself sued for 
partial loss of the shipment, the court allowed its action 
against the carrier on the basis that the Warsaw Convention 
"does not exclude the application of the normal rules of 
agency" ^/. However, in order for the destinataire riel 
to be allowed to sue or exercise any right instead of the 
destinataire apparent, a satisfactory relationship between 
the two persons must be established, be it an agency, or 
the assignment of the right to obtain delivery -^/. This is 
essential in order that there be the required contractual 
link between the carrier and the party who sues although 
the latter has not been named in the air waybill.
In relation to subrogation, there are a number of 
cases which unanimously agree on the right of the subrogee 
--usually an insurance company--to sue the carrier .
13/ (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 112 (Trib. com. Seine, 3° January 1963).
14/ at p. 114. See also the Lebanese case of Cheker.ji c. 
Lebanese International Airways, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 218"(C.A.
Beirut, 10 March 1967).
15/ The absence of a valid assignment of right was the source 
of the plaintiff*s difficulties in Tanneries de Lutece c. Air 
France, (1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 70 (C.A. Paris, 16 November i960).
16/ Stg S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 49 (C.A. 
Parish 3 February 1971)  ^Sprinks & Cie c. Air France, (1969)
23 R.F.D.A. 405 (C.A. Parish 27 June I969) P Air Express In­
ternational Agency (France) c. Ste Marais & Cie, (1968) 22 
R.F.D.A. 79 (C.A. Paris, I3 January 1968) ; The American 
Casualty of Reading c. Agence de Voyages Monit, (196.5) 19
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This right could not be seriously questioned in a French 
legal environment since the subrogee simply exercises the 
contractual right of either the consignor or the consignee.
Cargo cases in common lav/ courts.
Most of the common law cases have restricted the 
right to sue the carrier to the consignor and the consignee 
named in the air waybill. This was done on two different 
grounds. Some courts read Articles 12 to 15 of the Conven­
tion as giving the right of action to the consignor and 
consignee only, Article 14 being emphasized as showing that 
nobody else could sue. On that basis, the right of action 
was denied by a United States court to a plaintiff who had- 
a proprietary interest in the goods shipped because he was 
not the named consignee . The court discounted as irrel­
evant the fact that the named consignee was the plaintiff* s 
custom broker, i.e. his agent. The same reasoning was adopted 
by a Guyana court in Bart v. British West Indian Airways 
Ltd. -^^where the alleged undisclosed principal of the
16/ (cont*d) R.F.D.A. 3^6 (C.A. Paris, 19 December 1964) ; 
Cie la Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta c. Air France, (1965)
10 R.fTd .A. 112 (Trib. com. Seine, 30 January 1963)> where 
an insurance company was allowed to sue on the basis of its 
subrogation to the rights of a "real" consignee whose name 
did not appear in the air waybill.
17/ Manhattan Novelty Corn, v. Seaboard & Western Airlines 
Inc .~ 5 Avi . 17,229 (N. Y. Sup. CiT. 1957) • The case was 
followed by Pilgrim v. National Union Fire, 6 Avi. 17,733 
(N.Y. City Ct~. 1959) • These cases have been criticized in 
"Transporting Goods by Air", (i960) 69 Yale L. J. 993 at 
pp. 1010-1011. See also Shawcross & Beaumont, On Air Law, 
at pp. 459-460 where Articles 12 to 14 are considered in 
terms of the rights of the consignor and consignee to demand 
possession of the goods from the carrier during or at the 
end of the carriage and that these rights to demande posses­
sion may be enforced. A footnote mere^ states that in the 
Pilgrim case it was held that the Warsaw Convention vests 
the right of action against the carrier in the consignor and 
the consignee and no other person.
18/ [1967] 1 Lloyd*s Rep. 239 (Guyana Ct. App. 1966).
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consignor was prevented from suing the carrier. A South 
African court also found that an insurance company could 
not rely on the fact that it was cessionary of the consi­
gnee's rights in order to bring an action against the air 
carrier -^/.
A different reasoning was adopted in Holzer Watch 
Co. Inc, v. Seaboard & Western Airlines Inc. where the
court also restricted the right of suit to those named in 
the air waybill. This was justified, said the court, 
because :
" It is reasonable that the carrier be subject 
to suit only by those whom it knowingly 
dealt with." 21/
The idea of notice was also used in Parke, Davis & Co. v,
B .0.A .C. to justify the conclusion that, as long as a
party is named in the air waybill, it does not really matter 
that he is not explicitly designated as the consignee. In 
that case, the consignee was a custom broker. Immediately 
after his name, the words "a/c Parke, Davis & Company, 
Detroit, Michigan" appeared on the air waybill. Parke, Davis 
& Co. brought the action against the air carrier. The defen­
dant argued that only the custom broker, i.e. the nominal 
consignee, had the right to sue. The defendant relied on the 
American cases referred to above, in which the right of ac­
tion was in effect limited to parties named in the air way­
bill. But the court distinguished these cases because, in 
none of them, was the carrier "on notice that the plaintiff 
. . . was the real party in interest" . Here, the air
19/ Pan American World Airways Inc, v, S.A. Fire & Accident 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [ 1965 1 3 App. Div. 15Ö (South Africa App. 
Div. 1965)• Although South Africa is not a Common law coun­
try strictly speaking, its legal system has a number of 
features in common with common law jurisdictions. The deci­
sion itself heavily relies on some of the American cases 
discussed above.
20/ 5 Avi. 17,854 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957). 21/ at p. 17,855-
22/ 5 Avi. 17,838 (N.Y. City Ct.1958) . 12/ at p. 17,839.
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waybill gave the defendants notice that Parke, Davis & Co. 
was the "real party in interest" and, consequently, the 
plaintiff was allowed to bring his action against the car­
rier.
Eve Boutique Imports Inc, v. Seaboard World Airlines
2 4 / ~Inc. — ' is another case where plaintiffs who were not named
in the air waybill were allowed to sue the carrier. The 
consignee had insured the goods and the insurance company 
had paid for the loss which had occurred during the carriage. 
The court squarely held that "the insurance company is en­
titled to assert its right as a subrogee. The case can
be reconciled only with those of the above cases turning on 
the idea of notice. The purpose of the requirement that the 
carrier be on notice of the name of the possible plaintiffs 
may be relevant in assessing the rights of the parties. But 
subrogation does not change anything in that assessment.
The rights of the subrogee are precisely the rights trans- . 
mitted to him by a party named in the air waybill. He is not 
a new, or additional, party in an action against the air 
carrier ; he merely acts in lieu of a party who had the right 
to sue.
Comparison.
There is an obvious disparity between the various 
results. In France, the proper plaintiff to an action gov­
erned by the Warsaw Convention is determined according to 
the general scheme of domestic law where only the parties 
.who can rely on the contract of carriage can sue the carrier. 
The identity of these parties is determined by the express 
terms of the contract, as well as by the theorie generale
24/ 10 Avi. 17,703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) 
2$/ at p. 17,704.
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des obligations, particularly the rules relating to repre­
sentation and subrogation. There was no attempt to determine 
the identity of the parties through Articles 12 to 15 of 
the Convention. These provisions were given in the Convention 
the limited role similar provisions usually play in domestic 
law, i.e. they only regulate the rights over the goods in 
transit so that the carrier knows whose directions he has 
to follow.
In French law, the right to give directions to the 
carrier as regards to goods in transit is different from 
the right of ownership over the goods which is determined 
by the terms of the contract between consignor and consignee 
and does not have to be considered as such by the carrier.
The carrier1s only concern is to ascertain who has the mal- 
trise commerciale over the goods during transit, and that 
is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage, and 
the carriage documents, which are the only elements on which 
the carrier can safely rely to make a decision. In most cases, 
the maitrise commerciale of the goods is attributed to the 
person who holds the documents of carriage. It may happen 
that ownership and maitrise commerciale of the goods coin­
cide, but it is irrelevant from the carrier*s point of view. 
When it comes to suing the carrier for loss or damages to 
the goods, the issue is no longer to ascertain whose direc­
tions the carrier must follow, but to determine who can claim 
damages for faulty performance of the contract of carriage. 
Since the Convention is silent on the point--apart from the 
case of successive carriage--the usual domestic law solution 
is applied by French courts.
Most of the common law cases which have considered 
the matter have adopted a very restrictive attitude by limit­
ing the right of suit against the carrier to the consignor
- 38?
and consignee named in the air waybill. This conclusion was 
largely based on Articles 12 to 14 of the Convention. The 
reasons why these Articles were considered to govern the 
right to sue the carrier for loss of, or damage to, the 
goods, and not simply the right to control the disposition 
of the goods, is not clearly stated in the cases.
It may be that the courts were influenced by their 
common law background just as the French courts were influ­
enced by their civil law background. On the one hand, the 
right to control the disposition of the goods in transit in 
common law countries is usually seen as a prerogative of 
the person who has substantive rights in the goods. Gener­
ally, at common law, the owner of the goods can direct the26/carrier as to the disposition of the goods — ' . The right
of an unpaid seller to stop the goods in transit is an ex-
27/ception to this principle — 1u  . On the other hand, at common
26/ "The carrier's duty is to deliver at the place to which 
the goods are consigned, but if the owner changes the car­
rier's instructions while the goods are in transit, the car­
rier must comply with this order, provided he has satisfied 
himself that the person designating a new place of delivery 
is, in fact, the owner of the goods at the moment when the 
order is given." Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 303“ 
304. See also P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods (4th ed., Lon­
don, 1971), p. 251. In the United States, "the owner of goods 
delivered to a carrier for transportation, whether such owner 
is the consignor or the consignee, has the right to have the 
goods diverted to another destination at any intermediate 
point through which they pass before reaching their original 
destination, provided reasonable evidence of ownership is 
given to the carrier." American Jurisprudence 2d, vol. 13, 
Carriers, § 393* This principle is often altered by statu­
tory provisions, especially when the goods are carried under 
a negotiable bill of lading. The right to have the goods 
diverted then belongs to the holder of the bill of lading.
See further American Jurisprudence 2d, vol. 13» Carriers,
§ 394 ; Williston On Contracts, Sect. 1124ff.
27/ Atiyah, Sale of Goods, pp. 251-258 ; Kahn-Freund, The 
Law of Carriage, pp~. 304-306 ; American Jurisprudence 2d, 
vol. 67, Sales, §§"577-580.
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law, ownership entitles a person to sue the carrier for 
loss of, or damage to, the goods even though no contract 
of carriage exists between the owner and the carrier 20/ m 
Thus it was reasonable for the courts to consider detailed 
provisions which gave exclusive powers over the disposition 
of the goods--powers traditionally linked with ownership-- 
to consequently also intend to regulate the right of suit 
against the carrier in cases of loss of, or damage to, 
those goods.
It was perhaps for reasons such as these that the 
courts were influenced in interpreting the Convention as 
vesting the right of suit only in the consignor and the 
consignee even though this might deprive the owner of the 
goods or other persons having substantial interests in 
the claim of their right of suit 22/ %
28/ Kahn-Freund, The Law of Carriage, pp. 194-195» See also 
American Jurisprudence 26~, vol. 14, Carriers, §§ 6 02-605» 
f 602 states that "the real owner of the goods which have 
been damaged or lost during the course of transportation, 
whether he is the consignor, the consignee, a bailor of 
the consignee, or an undisclosed principal, may sue for 
such loss or damage on proof of title."
29/ In Manhattan Novelty, the judge said that the Convention’s 
provisions were intended to be exclusive and underlined that 
"the plaintiff has no right of action, even though he has a proprietary interest in uhe goods" at 5 Avi. T7TZJ0 (emphasis
added).
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Chapter FIFTEEN. - THE WARSAW DEFENDANT .
It is easy to identify the defendant to a Warsaw 
action when a passenger or a shipper goes to an airline’s 
office and makes a contract of carriage which will he per­
formed by that airline. In any action relating to damage 
suffered during the carriage by air, the defendant will 
obviously be the particular carrier involved. But, in many 
cases, there will be more than two parties to the transac­
tion. Some of these cases have been specifically contem­
plated and provided for by the drafters of the Convention, 
i.e. the cases of successive and combined carriage. They 
will be considered in Section One.
Other situations were not envisaged by the Warsaw 
Convention and difficult problems arose. For instance, 
passengers often use the services of a travel agent who 
makes all necessary arrangements with the air carrier ; 
shippers often entrust their goods to a freight forwarder 
who arranges the transportation of the goods with an air 
carrier. There is also the special case of the charterer, 
who provides the means of air carriage to passengers and 
shippers. Finally, almost all airlines are parties to 
interline agreements whereby one airline can sell tickets 
on behalf of another, which will actually perform the car­
riage. In all these cases, courts must determine to whom 
the provisions of the Convention will apply s the travel 
agent, the freight forwarder, the charterer, the airline 
which sold the ticket on the one hand, or, on the other 
hand, the operator of the aircraft ? The divergence in the 
answers given to that question prompted the adoption in 1961
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of the Guadalajara Convention, "Supplementary to the Warsaw 
Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating 
to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person 
Other than the Contracting Carrier". Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and France have ratified the Convention and, 
in these countries, the only question is to see how the 
Guadalajara Convention solves the problem of the applica­
bility of the Warsaw Convention. This will be considered 
in Section 2.
The United States has not ratified the Guadalajara 
Convention. Section 3 will briefly describe how the munic­
ipal law of that country can solve the difficulties of 
ascertaining who is the Warsaw carrier.
Finally, Section 4 will consider the applicability 
of the provisions of the Convention to actions brought 
personally against servants or agents of the carrier.
Section One. - Situations expressly covered
by the Warsaw Convention.
Article 3° sets out the conditions under which an 
action may be brought against an air carrier in the case of 
carriage to be performed by various successive carriers and 
Article 31 deals with cases of combined carriage.
A) Successive carriage.
The meaning of 'successive carriage' has been already 
examined in relation to the definition of 'international 
carriage' for the purposes of Article 1(2) of the Convention-^ 
The situation covered by Article 3° is a factual, chronolo­
gical partition of a single service as contemplated by the
1/ above pp. 3°-3^*
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contracting parties 2/
Successive carriage situations are expressly ex­
cluded from the scope of the Guadalajara Convention ^ .
This emphasizes the importance of the distinction between 
a successive carrier and an actual carrier. There are vital 
differences between their respective liability regimes. For 
instance, a successive carrier may be held fully liable for 
damage which occurred during a carriage performed by another 
successive carrier. But an actual carrier cannot be liable 
in excess of the limits set in Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention for the acts or omissions of the contracting4/carrier — ' . The conditions under which each of them can be 
brought to court as a defendant to a Warsaw action also 
differ as shall be seen in the following pages.
Successive carriage of passengers.
Article 3°(2) provides :
" In the case of carriage of this nature, the 
passenger or his representative can take 
action only against the carrier who performed 
the carriage during which the accident or the 
delay occurred, save in the case where, by 
express agreement, the first carrier has 
assumed liability for the whole journey."
It is quite easy in most cases of transportation of
passengers to know precisely when and where the accident or
the delay occurred. Thus, the carrier who will be liable
can be easily identified in a chain of successive carriers.
In the vast majority of cases, he will be the only possible
defendant, in the absence of any express agreement to the
contrary by the first carrier.
2/ Shawcross & Beaumont, On Air Law, p. 410 ; Sundberg, Air 
Charter, p. 267.
j/ Article 1(c) of the Guadalajara Convention.
4/ Article 111(2) of the Guadalajara Convention.
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The only problem which has arisen in national courts 
deals with ascertaining whether the first carrier has assumed 
liability for the whole journey. If he has, he can be made 
a defendant to an action relating to an accident or a delay 
which occurred after completion of the part of the carriage 
he performed. But if he has not, he will be liable only for 
the part of the journey he has actually performed. It is a 
question of fact in each case ^ '.
Successive carriage of baggage and cargo.
Article 30(3) the Warsaw Convention gives a 
right of action against the first carrier to the passenger 
or consignor, and a right of action against the last carrier 
to the passenger or consignee who is entitled to delivery. 
Moreover, the carrier who performed the carriage during which 
the damage took place may be sued by either the passenger, 
or the consignor, or the consignee.
There are cases illustrating the possibility of an 
action against the first carrier ^ , or the last carrier , 
as the case may be, even when it is evident that the damage 
did not occur while the goods or luggage were actually car­
ried by the first or the last carrier. These cases simply 
apply the language of the provision.
See for instance Orent v. Sabena, 8 Avi. 17,273 (S.D. N.Y. 
1962). In fact, in that case, the "first carrier" was a con­
tracting carrier and the "second carrier" was the performing 
carrier. Atlantic Fish & Oyster Co. v. Pan American Airways 
Inc. (1950") U . S . Av .Rep . 23 (111. Cook Co . C t . 194Ö"] ; Tumar- 
kin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 4 Avi. 18,152 
(Super. C t . N ."J~. 1956) ; Riedeger v, Trans World Airlines,
6 Avi. 17,315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
6/ Caisse Parisienne de R^escompte c. Air France, (1955) 9 
R.F.D.Ai 439 )Trib. civ. Seine, l4 January 1955) , af f ’ d , 
(1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 320 (C.A . Paris, 31 May 1956).
2/  Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corporation, 8 Avi.
18,183 (ist Cir. 1964). See also Rotterdamsche Bank N.V. 
v. British Overseas Airways Corporation, L1953 J 1 All E.R.
675 (Q.B. 1953)4
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A French case recently gave an interesting example
of the determination of the identity of the first carrier
8/when the air waybill is ambiguous . Sixteen parcels were 
to be carried from Paris to Panama. S.A.S. organised the 
carriage for the consignor and arranged for the goods to 
be carried first to Zurich by Swissair, and then onwards 
by other airlines. S.A.S. itself was scheduled to perform 
the second part of the carriage. On the air waybill, S.A.S. 
was designated as "the first carrier". The court had to 
decide whether the action ought to be brought against 
S.A.S., the designated first carrier, or against Swissair, 
which had performed what was chronologically the first part 
of the carriage, in accordance with the air waybill itself. 
The court held that "although the first carrier is in fact 
Swissair, the contracting carrier, the one whom the parties 
in the air waybill have designated as the ’first carrier* 
whom the consignor can sue pursuant to Article 3°(3) is 
S.A.S." ^ . This case illustrates the tendency of French 
courts to look at actions brought under the Warsaw Conven­
tion as essentially contractual and therefore determined
by the intent of the parties rather than by what actually 
happened.
B) Combined carriage
Combined carriage is dealt with in Article 31 of the
8/ Ste S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 49 
XC.A. Paris, 3 February 1971).
2/ at p. 51 10/ above pp. 356-363.
11/ The question of combined transport is receiving detailed 
attention from a number of international organizations such 
as UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment) , ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America), ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), CMI 
(International Maritime Committee). For a brief account of 
these activities, see "Current Activities of International 
Organizations related to the Harmonization of Unification 
of International Trade Law", Report of the Secretary-General, 
(A/CN.9/IO6). For a discussion of some of the problems in­
volved, see generally S. Mankabady, "Some Legal Aspects of 
the Carriage of Goods by Container", (1974) 23 Int’l & Comp. 
L.Q. 317.
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Convention. Where the carriage is to be performed partly 
by air and partly by another mode of carriage, the provisions 
of the Convention apply only to the carriage by air, provided 
that the carriage is "international" within the meaning of 
Article 1(2) of the Convention Article 31 is not usually
difficult to apply because, in most cases, it is easy to 
ascertain when one form of carriage begins and when another 
one ends. If a shipper cannot establish that the damage 
occurred during the carriage by air, the carrier will not 
be liable on the basis of the Convention. It is only in 
cases of carriage incidental to air transportation that 
Article 18(3) creates a presumption that the damage did 
occur during the transportation by air .
The defendant to an action brought under the Warsaw 
Convention can be the air carrier alone, and no other car­
rier can be sued pursuant to the Convention, or rely on its 
provisions limiting liability. However, Article 31(2) en­
titles the parties to insert in the air waybill conditions 
regulating modes of transportation other than air carriage, 
provided the provisions of the Convention are observed as 
regards the carriage by air Thus, the parties may
agree to have the whole carriage governed by conditions 
similar to those imposed by the Warsaw Convention, but they 
would apply by virtue of the contract, and not by virtue of 
the Convention itself.
In Pick v. Lufthansa , a truck carrying a ship­
ment of fur to an airport was hijacked. One important issue 
in the case was the applicability of the Convention. The
12/ above pp. 26-36.
13/ on Article 18(3)» see further above pp. 226-228.
14/ Article 31(2) provides : "Nothing in this Convention 
shall prevent the parties in the case of combined carriage 
from inserting in the document of air carriage conditions 
relating to other modes of carriage, provided that the pro­
visions of this Convention are observed as regards the car­
riage by air."
15/ 9 Avi. 18,077 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965).
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shipper claimed that the carriage by air had not begun, but 
that the air carrier was the principal of the truck driver 
and, on that basis, responsible for the full value of the 
goods stolen. The carrier submitted two alternative defences, 
one claiming that the international carriage by air had 
begun, and that his liability was limited by Article 22, the 
other claiming that the contract contained a limitation 
similar to that imposed by the treaty, covering all the 
forms of carriage necessary to transport the goods to their 
final destination. Thus, his liability was in any case 
limited, even though the treaty was not be applicable to 
the pre-airport ground losses. The court held that "the 
Warsaw Convention, operating as a treaty, does not limit 
the value of the shipper’s recovery below its actual proved 
value" -^/ because the damage did not occur during the car­
riage by air. However, the Warsaw limits were applicable 
as contractual limits because the parties had taken advan­
tage of Article 31(2) by inserting in the document of air 
carriage conditions covering the whole voyage, including 
the ground transportation en route to the airport
In the Pick case, the issue of combined carriage did 
not have any bearing on the identity of the defendant because 
the air carrier was found to be the principal of the truck 
driver who performed the ground transportation. Thus, be it 
on the basis of an extended notion of air carriage, or on 
the basis of agency for ground carriage, Lufthansa was liable 
In other circumstances, however, the ruling of the New York 
court would have been of vital importance in determining the 
proper defendant ; had Lufthansa not been the principal of 
the truck driver, it would not have been liable for the 
theft of the goods
16/ at p. 18,080. 12/ at p. 18,080.
18/ provided this was not seen as "incidental carriage" 
governed by Article 18(3) of the Convention. See above
pp. 226-228.
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Section 2. - Solutions provided by the Guadalajara Convention.
A) General scheme of the Convention.
The Convention, "Supplementary to the Warsaw Con­
vention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other 
than the Contracting Carrier, signed at Guadalajara on 18 
September 1961", applies to cases of carriage governed by 
the Warsaw Convention in its original form, or by the War­
saw Convention as amended at The Hague in 1955 •
When an international carriage by air is performed 
by a person who is not a party to the agreement for carriage, 
the Guadalajara Convention makes both the contracting car­
rier and the actual carrier subject to the rules of the 
Warsaw Convention, in its original or amended form, the 
contracting carrier being responsible for the whole of the 
carriage contemplated in the agreement, the actual carrier 
being responsible only for the carriage which he performs-^/. 
In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, 
Article VII of the Convention gives the plaintiff the right 
to bring an action for damages against either the actual 
carrier, or the contracting carrier, or against both together 
or separately, at the option of the plaintiff — //.
19/ An amendment to the Guadalajara Convention will be nec­
essary when the Guatemala City comes into force if the Con­
vention is to apply to cases of carriage governed by the 
VJarsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague Protocol, as 
amended by the Guatemala City Protocol.
20/ Article II of the Convention.
21/ Article VII provides that when the action is brought 
against only one of the carriers, "that carrier shall have 
the right to require the other carrier to be joined in the 
proceedings, the procedure and effects being governed by 
the law of the court seized of the case."
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Article III of the Convention provides that the
contracting carrier is liable for the acts and omissions
of the actual carrier and his servants and agents as if
these acts and omissions were his own. The same applies
for the actual carrier vis-a-vis the contracting carrier
and his servants and agents. But, whilst the contracting
carrier may be held fully liable for the actual carrier or
his servants and agents, e.g. when the conditions of Article22/25 of the Warsaw Convention are satisfied — t the actual 
carrier can be held liable for the contracting carrier and 
his servants and agents only within the limits set in 
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.
A number of provisions of the Guadalajara Convention 
purport to avoid the difficulties created by the plurality 
of Warsaw carriers. For instance, Article IV indicates to 
whom any complaint to be made or order to be given under 
the Warsaw Convention to the carrier shall be addressed ; 
Article VI regulates the amount of damages which can be 
recovered against each defendant so that the aggregate 
amount does not exceed the highest amount which could be 
recovered against either the contracting carrier or the ac­
tual carrier ; Article VIII increases the number of possible 
fora where an action may be brought by adding the court 
having jurisdiction at the place where the actual carrier 
is ordinarily resident or has his principal place of busi­
ness to the fora which are listed in Article 28 of the 
Warsaw Convention.
In assessing whether an intermediary such as a 
travel agent, a freight forwarder, or a charterer can be 
held liable on the basis of the Warsaw Convention, the only 
inquiry to be made when the Guadalajara Convention applies
22/ See Chapter 11 above.
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is whether these intermediaries--by definition not perform­
ing the carriage--can be seen as "contracting carriers". If 
they satisfy the definition of "contracting carrier" given 
by the Guadalajara Convention, they will be liable for the 
whole carriage. If not, they might still incur some liability, 
but this would be on grounds altogether different from the 
contract of carriage, and the Warsaw Convention would not 
apply to the action.
Article 1(b) of the official English text gives 
the following definition of the contracting carrier :
" . . .  a person who as a principal makes an 
agreement for carriage governed by the Warsaw 
Convention with a passenger or consignor or 
with a person acting on behalf of the passen­
ger or consignor."
The French text appears at first to be less explicit than 
the English text because it does not explicitly require 
that the agreement for carriage be made by the contracting 
carrier acting as a principal -^-2/. it provides :
" *transporteur contractuel* signifie une per- 
sonne partie a un contrat de transport regi 
par la Convention de Varsovie et conclu avec 
un passager ou un expiditeur ou avec une per- 
sonne agissant pour le compte du passager ou 
de 1'expiditeur."
In other words, the French text does not seem to require 
that the contracting carrier hold himself out as a principal. 
It is enough if he is considered as a partie to the agree­
ment for carriage. But, in fact, the difference only affects 
the wording and not the legal substance of the provision. 
Requiring that the contracting carrier be a partie to the 
contract of carriage is to require--at least in a French law 
environment--that the contracting carrier act in his own 
name. An agent, or mandataire, who acts on behalf of someone
23/ The difference is underlined in M. Pourcelet, "Transpor­
teur contractuel et transporteur de fait dans la Convention 
de Guadalajara", (I962-63) 9 McGill L. J. 317 at p. 321.
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else, is not considered as a partie to the contract which 
will exist between his principal, or mandant, and a third 
party. Seen in that context, making an agreement for car­
riage as a principal is synonymous to being a partie a un 
contrat de transport
The application of the definition of contracting 
carrier raises specific difficulties in France and in the 
common law countries where the Guadalajara Convention 
applies. They will be considered separately.
B) France
In order that an intermediary be seen as a contract­
ing carrier, he must be partie a un contrat de transport. 
This involves : (i) that he must contract in his own name, 
and (ii) that the contract concluded by him with a passen­
ger or a shipper is a contrat de transport. Each aspect 
will be examined in turn0
(i) the intermediary contracts in his own name.
This requirement eliminates all the persons who 
have contracted with the passenger / shipper as agent for 
an air carrier. This will be the case in the vast majority 
of situations where contracts of carriage are concluded by 
intermediaries on behalf of air carriers. In such cases, 
an intermediary cannot be held liable for the faulty per­
formance of the carriage.
24/ The French delegate to the Guadalajara Conference made 
it clear that the substantive meaning of the two texts was 
identical. The difference in wording is due to the fact that 
a word by word translation of the English wording would have 
been meaningless in French law. Doc. 8301-LC/149-1, p. 263.
25/ For a study of the impact of the principles of the Gua­
dalajara Convention on the situation in France, see E. Geor- 
giades, "Quelques reflexions sur 1*affretement des a&ronefs 
et le Projet de la Convention de Tokyo", (1959) 13 R.F.D.A.
113 ; M. Pourcelet, "Transporteur contractuel et transporteur 
de fait dans la Convention de Guadalajara", (1962-63) 9 McGill 
L. J. 317» See also 0. Riese, "Le projet de la Commission 
Juridique de l'O.A.C.I. sur 1*affretement, la location, et la
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The rules governing representation in French law, 
and particularly the provisions relating to the contract 
of mandat, will determine whether in fact the intermediary
contracted in his own name or as the agent of an air car-
. 26/rier — ' .
It is frequent in charter situations that doubts 
arise whether the intermediary— the charterer--is the agent 
of the performing carrier and can as such avoid liability 
for the faulty performance of the contract, or whether he 
is in fact partie to the contract of carriage, and as such 
liable for the faulty performance of the contract — ^ , The 
decided cases do not directly deal with the application of 
the Guadalajara Convention because they relate to situations 
anterior to the coming into force of the Convention. However, 
they are interesting because some held the charterer liable 
as partie to the contract of carriage whilst others consid­
ered that the operator of the plane was the carrier respon­
sible for the faulty performance of the contract.
In Lamberth c . Guiron , a helicopter had been 
chartered for an excursion in the Alps. The passengers only 
knew the charterer, who ran an air transport business in 
his own name. The charterer organized all the advertising 
for the tour and issued the tickets under his name. The
25/ (cont1d) banalisation des a&ronefs dans le transport in­
ternational" , (1959) 13 R.F.D.A. 1.
26/ See generally on these rules Starck, Obligations, pp. 
384ff.
27/ The legal problems created by air charter have been 
extensively studied by K. Gronfors, Air Charter and the 
Warsaw Convention, (The Hague, 1956) ; J. Sundberg, Air 
Charter (Stockholm, 1961). See also E. du Pontavice, "Le 
Statut juridique des aff retement s a&riens dits ’Charters'* ." 
(1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 241.
28/ (1963) 26 R.G.A. 185, note G. Cas (C.A. Paris, 7 June 
1962), cassation, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 377» note M. de Juglart, 
(Cass. civ. 2me, 9 June 1966), on remand, (1968) 31 R.G.A.E. 
68 (C.A. Dijon, 31 January 1968), aff’d , (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 
290 (Cass. civ. Ire, 2 March 1971).
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passengers did not knov/ that the helicopter would be oper­
ated by someone other than the person they knew. The char­
terer was seen by the various courts involved in the case 
as the air carrier liable on the basis of the Warsaw Con­
vention because he had contracted in his own name and had 
undertaken to properly execute the duties of a carrier 22/1 
In the Swiss case of Style c . Braun 20/1 the ^e_ 
fendant v/as the representative of Braathens, a Norwegian 
air carrier. He was asked by a shipper to carry some goods 
but instead of Braathens performing the contract, Braun 
chartered some cargo space on an aircraft operated by an­
other carrier. He issued the air waybill on Braathens forms, 
but the name of the Norwegian company was crossed out.
Braun specified on the air waybill that he acted "as agent 
only". When the shipper sued him for the value of the goods 
which had been lost during the carriage, he claimed that 
he was not liable because he was the agent of the air car­
rier. The defendant's claim failed and he was held person­
ally responsible because there was no proper agency rela­
tionship which could protect him : (i) the words "as agent 
only" had been included in the air waybill two days before 
the charterer had received any authority from his alleged 
principal, and (ii) the shipper had asked the charterer, 
and no one else, to carry the goods, and he had never been 
told about a carrier other than Braathens performing the 
carriage. This case illustrates how important it is that 
there be an agency relationship between the charterer and 
the performing carrier at the time the charterer contracts 
with a passenger/shipper if the charterer is not to be held
29/ In 1971» the Cour de Cassation quoted with approval the 
following statement made by the court below doit etre con­
sider? comme Stant le transporteur aerien au sens de la Con­
vention de Varsovie . . .celui qui a conclu le contrat de
transport em son propre nom et s'est engagl a en ex^cuter 
correctement les obligations." That person, in the partic­
ular case, was the charterer. For a similar attitude, see 
Jacquet c. Club Neuchätelois d'Aviation, (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. 
S~2 (Trib. Fed. suisse, 12 March 1957)*
30/ (1961) 24 R.G.A. 375* note J. Sundberg (Trib. Geneve,
9 December 1958).
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liable as a contracting carrier.
In many charter cases, however, there is no diffi­
culty because the performing carrier completely assumes 
the quality of a single carrier, mainly by issuing the 
documents of carriage in his name . This creates a direct 
link between the operator of the plane and the passenger or
shipper and makes it clear that the charterer is not partie
32/ -----to the contract .
31/ E. du Pontavice, "Le Statut juridique des affretements 
aeriens dits ’C h a r t e r s ' (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 24l at p. 253* 
The operator was seen as the carrier contractually liable 
in Tresor Public c. Air Laos, (1961) 15 R.F.D.A. 276 (C.A. 
Paris, 17 June i960) There are several other charter cases 
which cannot be used as precedents in construing the Guada­
lajara Convention because the ruling was made on the basis 
of the specific rules applicable to commissionnaires de trans 
port (on these rules, see further below pp. 4o6-407)• See 
for instance Sti Cotaufruits c . Sti Fuller Freres et Sti Air 
Algirie, (1951*5 5 rTf .D.A. 437 (Trib. comT Seine, 19 January
1950) , aff’d, (1951) 5 R.F.D.A. 433 (C.A. Paris, 8 November
1951) * aff' d, (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 220, note E. Georgiades 
(Cass. civ. com. 22 February 1956) ; Sti la Neuchäteloise c. 
Sti Aero-Cargo. (1951) 5 R.F.D.A. 440 (C.A. Lyon, 12 Novem­
ber 195T),~aff'd sub nom., Sti Vve Terrasson c. Ste Message- 
ries Nationales, (1957) 11 R.F.D.A. 31» note E. Georgiades 
TCass. civ. com. 11 June 1956) ; American Casualty Cy of 
Reading c. Airnautic, (1964) 18 R.F.D.A. 413 (Trib. com. Sei­
ne , 20 December 1963)* aff1d, (1965) 19 R.F.D.A. 3^6 (C.A. 
Paris, 19 December 1964).
32/ New difficulties might arise with the development of 
new forms of charter where the charterer plays a central 
role in organizing the whole operation. See the exchange of 
Notes betv/een the United Kingdom and the United States con­
cerning the procedures for the implementation and enforce­
ment of rules for advance booking charter flights,Washington, 
30 March 1973* The Agreement entered into force on March 3C, 
1973 (Treaty Series No. 60 (1973) Cmnd 5316). Similar agree­
ments exist between the United States and a number of other 
European countries. In the Advanced Booking Charter, or 
Travel Group Charter, the "organizer", i.e. the charterer, 
is supposed to make appropriate contractual arrangements 
with air carriers, to bring charter opportunities to the 
attention of the travelling public by all appropriate means, 
and finally to ensure that the charter participants receive 
the agreed transportation services. The importance of the 
role thus played by the organizer might lead some courts to 
give him the quality of partie to the contract of carriage.
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(ii) the contract is a contrat de transport.
This requirement is particularly important in 
relation to travel agents and commissionnaires de transport 
(freight forwarders) *2^ /. The difficulties experienced in 
France appear to be due largely to the use of the technique 
of contrat type which entails a strict classification of 
contractual relationships into categories in which the res­
pective rights and duties of the contracting parties are 
defined -2^ /, As seen earlier, that is done by determining 
the essential performance of the particular contract involved, 
thus allowing it to be characterized as belonging to the 
category of the contrat type which has the same essential 
performance.
Travel agents.
The traditional role of travel agents was to arrange 
bookings for transportation and accomodation, to provide 
tickets, etc. That relationship was classically analyzed as 
a contract of mandat where the travel agents--the mandatai- 
re--undertook to conclude all contracts with carriers, hotels, 
etc. to satisfy the needs of the customer--the mandant--and 
on behalf of the customer. This analysis applies without 
difficulty when the travel agent is sued for a failure to 
properly perform his traditional role-^^. When the travel 
agent is thus seen as partie to a contract of mandat with
33/ On the specific problems of these two intermediaries, 
see E. Georgiades, "Les responsabilit£s du commissionnaire 
de transport et de l*agence de voyage dans le transport 
a§rien", (1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 16 ; A. Rabut, "Le contrat de 
commission de transport de choses et le transport aSrien", 
(1952) 6 R.F.D.A. 254 ; R. Rodiere, "La responsabilite 
des agences de voyage", D. 1958. Chr. 24l.
34/ Above pp. 10-11.
35/ See for instance : Cie Air France c. Lamour and Cie In­
ternational e des Wagons-Lits c. Air France, both decided by 
Cass. civu Ire, 10 November 1971» (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 44 ; 
S.A.R.L. X... c. T... de J.. . , D .S.1970.J.326, note P. Cou- 
vrat (Cass, civ. Ire, 15 December 1969) ; Cie Internationale 
des Wagons-Lits et Grands Express Europeens c . Duchiron,
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the passenger, it is clear that he cannot qualify as the 
contracting carrier of the Guadalajara Convention.
Today, a travel agent may assume responsibilities
much wider than in his traditional role . Customers often
go to a travel agency with only a vague idea of where they
want to go, and how to get there. A tremendous initiative
is left to the travel agent. As the activities of the travel
agent changed, the traditional view of his legal status as
a mandataire of the customer came under increasing criticism,
mainly on the basis that the actual relationship between the
parties could not fit into the frame of the contract of man- 
37?dat . The alleged principal, i.e. the customer, was in a 
number of cases incapable of directing his alleged agent.
In order to take into account the initiative shown by the 
travel agent, courts have sometimes qualified his relation­
ship with the customer of contract of carriage -2^ /. These 
cases were decided before the Guadalajara Convention came
35/ (cont1d)(1961) 24 R.G.A. 80, note G. Cas (Cass. civ. Ire, 
5 January 1961) ; St£ Kuoni c. Lemaistre, J.C.P.1973*II• 
17,478, note R. Rodiere (C.A. Angers, 3 April 1973) ; Bedeau 
c. Touring Club de France, (1969T 23 R.F.D.A. 321, note E. 
Georgiades (T.G.I. Paris, 26 March 1969)•
36/ On the changing role of the travel agent, see W. Vander- 
perren, "Report on a Draft International Convention on Travel 
Agents", (1968) 3 Eur. Tr. L. 9^8. The new activities of the 
travel agent in the United States are described in P.S.Quinn, 
"The U.S. Travel Agent and the Status of his Legal Liability" 
(1968) 3 Eur. Tr. L. 1086 ; P.C. Wohlmuth, "The Liability of 
Travel Agents : a Study in the Selection of Appropriate 
Legal Principles" (i960) 40 Temple L. Q. 29* The classical 
French law view of the travel agent would be completely ina­
dequate to cope with similar situations in France.
37/See for instance R. Rodiere, "La responsabilitS des agen- 
ces de voyage", D.1958. Chr. 24l ; W. Vanderperren, Report 
on a Draft International Convention on Travel Agents" (1968)
3 Eur. Tr. L. 93^ (esp. at p. 968) ; Notes by G. Cas, (196I) 
24 R.G.A. 82, by P. Couvrat, D.S. I97O.J.326 ; D.S. 1971.J. 
449.
38/ St& des voyages FRAM c. Martinolle, Bull. civ. I, No.
247 (Cass/ civ'. Ire, 26 April i960) ~ S.A.R.L. Transtours 
c . Desnoyers, (1961) 24 R.G.A. 75» note G. Cas (ist case)
(Cass. civ. com. 11 May i960) ; St§ Michelson & Cie c. Pil- 
leboue, (1953) 7 R.F.D..A. 99 (C.A. Paris, 11 December 1952), 
cassation, (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 217, note E. Georgiades (Cass.
-  405 -
into force. But, should the same reasoning be applied to 
cases governed by the Guadalajara Convention, there is no 
doubt that the travel agent would be a contracting carrier 
since he would be partie a un contrat de transport.
However, considering the travel agent as a carrier 
does not do justice to the variety of activities he may 
have in his new role. This is why another analysis seems 
to have now found favour in the courts. The relationship 
between the travel agent and his customer is seen as a 
contrat d1entreprise, the duties of a travel agent as an 
entrepreneur being to organize the trip for the customer, 
including such things as transportation, accomodation, and 
excursions The consequence of this new analysis is to 
disqualify the travel agent as a contracting carrier under 
the Guadalajara Convention definition, because, although 
he contracts in his own name with the customer, he is partie 
a un contrat d*entreprise, and not partie a un contrat de 
transport.
Commissionnaires de transport.
It is frequent that a commissionnaire de transport 
acts partly as a carrier and partly as a forwarder, per­
forming one part of the transport, and arranging for other 
carriers to perform the rest —^ . In relation to the trans­
portation he performs, he is considered as the carrier and
38/ (cont1d)civ. Ire, 28 February 1956) ; Agence Francaise 
de Tourisme c. Suchet, D. 1952.J.586 (C.A. Lyon, 23 July 
T952) ; Agence Lubin~c. Mac Carron, S. 1926.2.58 (C.A. Lyon, 
20 May 1926) ; ~Vi" Bian Rosa c. Cie Francaise de Tourisme, 
Gaz.Pal. i960.1.227 ("Trib. com". Seine , 22 January i960).
39/ Zarraluqui c. Le Tourisme Francais, (1968) 3 Eur.Tr.L. 
801 (cTa . Paris, 23 May 1961) ; Club MediterranSe c . Le Con­
tinent , (1968) 3 Eur.Tr.L. 883 (T. G . I. Seine, 16 November 
1962) ; Lachau Puynesge c. St6 Daro Voyages, (1968) 3 Eur. 
Tr.L.890 (Trib. inst. Paris, l6 July 1964) ; Guillou c . Voya 
ges Kuoni, (1968) 3 Eur. Tr. L 0 893 (Trib. com. Nice, 2 July 
1965)• The Cour de Cassation approved the characterization 
of contrat d1entreprise in Ste Croisieres et tourisme c. Vas 
seur, D .S~. 1971.J .449” (Cass. civ. Ire, 27 October I970) .
4o/ Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 232.
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liable as such. Difficulties arise only when he acts in his 
quality of commissionnaire. It has been a long standing con­
troversy in Franch lav/ to properly characterize the con­
tractual relationship betv/een the commissionnaire and the 
shipper — ' . Is it a contract of carriage ? Or is it an 
essentially different relationship which cannot be subsumed 
under the category of contracts of carriage ?
No cases have yet assessed whether a commissionnaire 
was a partie a un contrat de transport for the purposes of 
the application of the definition of a contracting carrier 
in the Guadalajara Convention. If the contrat de commission 
is assimilated to the contrat de transport, the commission­
naire will be the contracting carrier. But if the contrat 
de commission is seen as essentially different from the 
contrat de transport, the commissionnaire will not satisfy 
the requirements of the definition of contracting carrier.
It should be added however that a special feature 
of French domestic law would compensate for any disadvantage 
resulting from not having a contracting carrier and an ac­
tual carrier as possible defendants, if a court decides 
that a commissionnaire cannot be seen as partie a un contrat 
de transport. Pursuant to Article 99 of the Commercial Code, 
the commissionnaire is liable to the shipper for any act or 
omission of the actual carrier if the consignment suffers
4l/ There are a number of conflicting cases which are dis­
cussed in Bailly, "La commission de transport", in Le con­
trat de commission (Etudes de droit commercial sous la di­
rection de J. Hamel), Paris, 1949 ; E. Georgiades, "Les res­
ponsibility du commissionnaire de transport et de l'agence 
de voyage dans le transport aerien", (1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 16 ; 
M. Pourcelet. "Transporteur contractuel et transporteur de 
fait dans la Convention de Guadalajara", (1962-63) 9 McGill 
L.J. 317 at p. 326 ; A. Rabut, "Le contrat de commission de 
transport de choses et le transport aerien", (1952) 6 R.F. 
D.A. 254. How confused the issue can be is illustrated in 
St§ La Neuchateloise c. Ste Aero-Cargo, (1951) 5 R.F.D.A.
440 (C.A. Lyon, 12 November 1951)" where the court, after 
having established that the intermediary was a commission­
naire , stated that "au regard de 1'expSditeur, le commis­
sionnaire est transporteur pour le voyage tout entier et 
responsable comme tel" (at p. 444). The decision was later
affirmed sub nom St£ Vve Terrasson c. Ste* Messageries Natio­
nales (1957) 11 R .F .d5Ä. 31 (Cass. clv, com. 11 June 195?)•
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42/any loss, damage, or delay . He cannot avoid this lia­
bility by giving evidence that he personally has committed 
no breach of his duties ^/. Consequently, in a Warsaw case, 
even if the commissionnaire is not liable as contracting 
carrier on the basis of the Guadalajara Convention, he still 
can be sued for any loss or damage which has affected- the 
goods during air transportation. His liability as a commis­
sionnaire would be assessed on the basis of the principles 
determining the existence and extent of the actual carrier’s 
liability
C) Australia, Canada, United Kingdom.
The requirement that an intermediary be party to 
an agreement for carriage does not present the same diffi­
culty to the common law as it does in France because there 
is no tendency to classify relationships into particular 
categories and to deduce from that classification conse­
quences as to the respective contractual rights and duties 
of the parties. The rights and duties of each party are
42/ The provisions of the Commercial Code relating to in­
land carriage are made applicable to the carriage by air 
by Article L. 321.1 of the Code de l'Aviation civile.
4-3/ Chemin de fer de l'Est c. Brierre, D.P. 1894.1.488,
TCass. Req. 8 July 189^) ; Compagnie de Lyon c. Gancel, D.P. 
1872.1.224 (Cass. civ. 9 July 1872).
44/ It has not always been clear that the commissionnaire 
could benefit from all the provisions, statutory or contrac­
tual, applicable to the carrier's liability. See for ins­
tance St6 Nouvelle des Transports Mondiaux c. Air France, 
(i960) 14 R.F.D.A. 317> note E . Georgiades (C.A. Paris, 14 
March 1963) where the carrier was allowed to limit his lia­
bility on the basis of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention 
while the commissionnaire was held liable for all the foresee 
able damage suffered by the owner of the goods. But it is 
now established that the commissionnaire may benefit from 
any statutory or contractual provision available to the car­
rier himself. See S.N.C.F, c. Cie de Navigation mixte, D.M.F. 
1962, 722, note R . Rodiere (Cass. civTcom. 18 June 1962).
See Rodiere, Manuel des Transports, p. 246. This was recently 
applied in a Warsaw case where the commissionnaire de trans­
port was allowed to rely on the 2 year time limitation pro­
vided by Article 29 of the Convention » St§ Kelton-Timex c . 
Ste Kirman, (1974) 28 RFDA 413 (Trib.com.Pontoise,14 May 1974)
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simply assessed according to the terms of the contract ^ / . 
The fact that the duties of a travel agent may have changed 
over the years did not create the need to give a new charac­
terization to his relationship with the customer because the 
contract which binds the travel agent and his client did not 
need to be characterized in the first place.
Whether an intermediary acts as a principal, i.e. 
on his own behalf, or as an agent for someone else, is also 
in each case a matter of interpretation of the contract 
between the intermediary involved and the traveller or ship­
per , it should be noted that the use of the word 
"agent" in a contract is not conclusive evidence of the 
actuality of an agency relationship in the particular tran­
saction involved The existence of such a relationship
would automatically disqualify the agent from being a "con­
tracting carrier" under the Guadalajara Convention.
The question of the existence or otherwise of 
agency is dependent upon the detailed factual circumstances 
of each case. This question has rarely arisen in the context 
of the Warsaw system, probably because in most cases it will 
be clear whether the intermediary is a principal or not. 
Nevertheless, the isolated cases that have considered the 
matter are sufficient to illustrate the pragmatic approach 
of the common law.
4.5/ For an example of such an approach in a contract for car­
riage of cargo, see Thomas National Transport Ltd, v. May & 
Baker Ltd. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 3^7 (High Ct. Australia,
19 66) where it was emphasized that Thomas National Transport 
had undertaken to carry the goods from the respondent’s 
premises in Melbourne to various consignees in other States. 
One of the issues of the case was to ascertain what was in­
volved in that undertaking. For an example in the case of a 
travel agent, see Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd. [1972] W.L.R.
954 (Ct. App. I972I where the travel agent was held liable 
for the breach of contractual undertakings contained in his 
brochure that there would be entertainment and facilities of 
enjoyment which were absent when the plaintiff arrived at 
the holiday center.
46/ Chitty, Contracts, vol. 2, paragraphs 13-16. See also 
Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract, pp. 543ff * G.H.L. Fridman, The 
Law of Agency, 2d ed.,(London, 1966).
47/ Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract, p. 547 ; Chitty, Contracts, 
vol. 2, paragraph 14.
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In many cases, the relationship between the parties 
involved is clear and it will be easy to determine who acts 
as principal and who acts as agent. An air carrier who 
issues a ticket indicating that it will perform the carriage 
clearly acts as a principal. On the other hand, a travel 
agent who undertakes to provide tickets for transportation 
on a particular flight clearly acts as the agent of the 
air carrier which will perform the flight. When an air car­
rier issues a ticket indicating that another carrier will 
perform the carriage, the first carrier also acts as agent 
of that other carrier .
There will be cases where the answer is not so 
simple. For example, in a charter situation, the relation­
ship between the charterer and the operator of the plane 
may completely differ depending on the type of charter 
agreement selected by the parties . Moreover, within 
each type, the parties can vary the standard rights and 
duties in order to suit their particular needs. Such cases 
would require that the particular relationship involved be 
scrutinized in order to ascertain who acts as principal and 
who acts as agent. In Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork Ltd, and
48/ I.A.T.A. runs a sophisticated system of cooperation 
between a great number of airlines whereby each participat­
ing airline may sell transportation over the routes of the 
others (I.A.T.A. Resolutions 850 j and 850 k). The capacity 
of the issuing airline is defined as follows : "on issuing 
or completing tickets . . . for transportation over the 
routes of other parties hereto, the issuing airline shall 
be deemed to act only as Agent of the carrying airline(s)." 
(Attachment A, Article VI(l) of Resolutions 850 j and 85(k ).
49/ The three basic categories of charters have been outlined 
as follows in Block c. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 10 
Avi. 17,518 (5th Cir. T96?) V"(l) Ina 'bare-hull', 'hire', 
or 8 lease* charter, the owner (airline) merely supplies a 
plane, without a crew, to a charterer who may use it where 
and when he pleases ; the charterer furnishes the crew and 
pays the expenses of operating the aircraft.
(2j In a ‘time-charter* the airline provides the charterer 
with an equipped plane and crew for a specific period of 
time to use as the charterer wishes.
(3) In a 'voyage charter" the owner charters his fully 
equipped plane and crew for a predetermined voyage. In a
-  410 -
British-American Air Services the plaintiff had
contracted with Airwork Ltd., the proprietors of an aero­
drome, for hire of an aircraft for the carriage of the 
plaintiff and some guests. In order to fulfill their con­
tract, the first defendants, who owned no aircraft, con­
tracted with the second defendants to perform the carriage. 
The court examined the contract between the plaintiff and 
the first defendants, and the surrounding circumstances, 
and concluded that the first defendants were contracting 
as principals and not as agents of the second defendants-^A 
Similarly, serious doubts may arise when a carriage 
is performed by a number of air carriers who may, or may not, 
be acting as agent for each other and who may, or may not, 
be the principals of intermediaries handling the bookings 
and other flights arrangements for passengers. Such a 
complex situation was examined in Stratton v. Trans-Canada 
Air Lines Ltd. where the court closely examined the
facts of the case in the light of the various agency rela­
tionships existing between the parties involved and found 
that the intermediary had not acted as agent for the various 
airlines scheduled to perform the carriage, but as the pas­
senger’s agent -^/. Had any doubts arisen in that case as 
to the identity of the Warsaw carrier, they would have been 
dispelled by that finding because there was no way in which 
the intermediary could be seen as a "contracting carrier" 
since, as the passenger’s agent, he was contracting with a 
carrier. It was impossible to see him contracting as a car­
rier, be it as principal or as agent.
49/ (cont* d) voyage charter. . .the owner controls and ope­
rates the aircraft. In effect, the middleman is eliminated, 
except for purposes of negotiating the charter" at p.17,522.
50/  [1937] 1 All E .R . 108 (K.B. 1936)
51/ at pp. 109-110.
52/ 32 D.L.R.2d 736 (Brit. Col. Ct. App. 1962).
32/  at p. 743.
411 -
Finally, the paramount importance of the facts of 
each case in assessing, whether an intermediary acts as 
principal or as agent is perhaps best illustrated by the 
case of the freight forwarder who, according to the terms 
of each particular contract, may be seen as contracting 
in his own name, or for someone else
Section 3« - The United States .
The United States is not a Party to the Hague Pro­
tocol nor to the Guadalajara Convention. The determination 
of the proper defendant to an action based on the Warsaw 
Convention can therefore be made only on the basis of its 
provisions and of the particular legal status of each of 
the intermediaries involved.
Travel agents.
There is no instance where a travel agent was held 
liable as a carrier for personal injuries or death suffered 
during the transportation by air. The reason appears to be 
that claims arising from injuries or wrongful death have 
always been considered under the law of torts , which 
means- that the only possible defendants would be the persons 
whose fault or negligence could have caused the damages suf­
fered by the passenger during the transportation. The typical 
defendant would thus be the air carrier, whose liability 
would be governed by the Warsaw Convention. Other defendants, 
such as the manufacturer of the plane, or airport authorities, 
may also be sued for negligence ; their liability would be 
assessed on the basis of the lex fori.
54/ See generally D.J. Hill, Freight Forwarders (London,1972) 
Nos. 66ff., 266ff. For an example of a freight forwarder 
being liable as principal, see Colverd & Co. Ltd, v. Anglo 
Overseas Transport Co. Ltd. [l9"6lj 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 352 (Q.B. 
1961)5 For an example o"f~ a freight forwarder being liable 
as agent, see Harris Ltd, v. Continental Express Ltd. [1961] 
1 Lloyd's Rep. 251 (Q.B. I96I).
55/ A.F. Lowenfeld, Aviation Law (New York, 1972), VI-5,
1 .31* See further above pp. 365-367«
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For cases other than personal injury or wrongful
death, e.g. delay cases, there is a prio: ' r a
obvious defendant in such actions would be the air carrier. 
It is only in exceptional circumstances that a passenger 
could sue the travel agent for breach of the contract of 
carriage. Should a passenger attempt to do so, it seems 
that the only way in which he could succeed would be on the 
basis of the undisclosed principal doctrine which, in some 
cases, allows a contracting party to sue the agent when 
there has been a breach of duty by the principal -5-Z/. The 
relevant principles have thus been expounded by the New York 
Supreme Court in a case involving a travel agent :
" . . .An agent is liable as a principal if the 
fact of the agency is not known by the customer, 
i.e. the third party with whom he deals . . .
Even though he knows of the agency, the customer 
may hold the agent as a principal if the identity 
of the principal is not made known or is not 
known to him at or before the making of the con­
tract. . . Where the customer knows of the agency, 
however, and knows the principal, the agent cannot 
be held liable in the absence of special agreement 
therefor . . ." 58/
Several cases offer examples of situations where the 
passenger did not know the identity of the principal who 
would perform the contract of carriage. For instance, in 
Antar v. Trans World Airlines , the passenger did not 
know who the carrier would be and said that this was not 
important to him "as long as he [didl not go to Cuba". In 
such a situation, it appears theoretically possible to sue
56/ See above p. 367.
57/ Restament Agency 2d, §4, §§320ff.
58/ Unger v. Travel Arrangements Inc., 25 A.D.2d 40 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. App.^Div. 1966).
_5V 11 Avi. 17,603 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970), revqd, 11 Avi. 
17,892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term, 1970). See also E.A. Mac- 
quade Travel Agency v. Domeck, 190 So.2d 3 (Dis. Ct. App. 
Fla. 1966). Compare Unger v. Travel Arrangements Inc., 25 
A .D.2d 40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
passenger could not sue on the contract The
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the travel agent for breach of the contract of carriage.
But, in fact, it is hard to see why a travel agent would 
be sued to be held liable for a failure in the performance 
of a contract of carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention. 
The vast majority of air carriers offer a better chance of 
solvency than most travel agents and, also, such a suit 
against a travel agent would be technically much more dif­
ficult than a suit against the carrier. Not only would the 
plaintiff have to ascertain a breach of contract--as in the 
action against the air carrier--but he would also have to 
establish that the facts of the case satisfy all the require­
ments for the application of the complex rules of the undis­
closed principal doctrine ,
Charter situations.
Charter cases have been considered in several cases 
by courts in the United States. One of the first issues was 
the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to cases where 
the plane had been chartered by the United States Govern­
ment. The difficulty arose because the United States has 
declared at the time of its accession to the Convention that 
the Convention would not apply to international carriage by 
air "performed directly by the State" , It was considered 
by several courts that carriage performed by chartered 
planes was not performed by the United States, but for the 
United States and that, consequently, the Warsaw Convention
60/ One preliminary difficulty would be to assess who is the 
agent of whom in the particular case. If the travel agent is 
not the carrier*s agent, he cannot be held liable for a 
breach of contract by someone who is not his principal. On 
the difficulty of sorting out the possible agency relation­
ships, see Simpson v. Cie Nationale Air France, 10 Avi.18,025 
(111. Ct. AppTl9ö8) , r e v ' d , ~ 10 AviT 18,434~'( 111. Sup. Ct. 
1969) ; Levine v . B . 0 . A . C . , 11 Avi . 18,353 (N.Y. City Ct.. , 
1971) ; Antar v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 11 Avi. 17,603 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. I970), rev1d , 11 Avi. 17,892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
App. Term, 1970). See also MacCarthy v. East African Airways 
Corp., 13 Avi. 17,385 (S.D. nTy ." 1974).
6l/ This possibility is offered to the parties to the Warsaw 
Convention in the Additional Protocol to that Convention.
- 4l4 -
was applicable .
The same cases emphasized the fact that the aircraft 
v/as owned, operated, and controlled by the performing car­
rier , and there was no question that he was not a proper 
defendant to actions for wrongful death brought against it. 
This is consistent with the fact that wrongful death actions 
are consistently framed in tort in United States courts , 
The party which performs the carriage appears as the proper 
party to a tortious action based on the breach of legal 
duties arising from the carrier-passenger relationship 6V
A different attitude was adopted in the case of66/Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France — ' where it was 
stated that "the applicability of the Convention undeniably 
is premised upon a contract" and that"in a charter situation, 
the passenger9s cause of action under the Warsaw Convention 
is based on this contract of carriage . . . not on any tort 
theory." — ^  . Accordingly, the Warsaw carrier had to be the • 
contracting carrier.
It should be observed that the Block case is one of 
the very few cases where the Convention was interpreted by 
referring to French legal concepts because such reference 
was seen as the means of harmonizing the interpretation of 
the Convention The direct consequence of that approach
62/ The ruling was particularly clear in Mertens v. The Fly­
ing Tiger Line, Inc., 9 Avi. 17,187 (S.D. N.Y. 19^3), aff'd 
and rem'd, 9 Avi. 17,475 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Warren v. The Fly­
ing Tiger Line, Inc., 9 Avi. 17.621 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev* d 
and rem9d , 9 Avi. 17.848 (9th Cir. 1965)* The applicability 
of the Convention had been assumed in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 
v. The United States, 6 Avi. 17,281 (U.S. Ct. Clms, 19597.
63/ See in particular Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
9 Avi. 17,475 (2d Cir. 1965) at p. 17,476.
64/ above p. 366. 65/ above p. 12.
66/ 8 Avi. 18,335 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff9d, 10 Avi. 17,518 
T5th Cir. 1967).
&2/  at 10 Avi. 17,523.
68/ In so doing, the court expressly endorsed a proposal 
made by J. Sundberg in Air Charter, pp. 242-249. See 10 
Avi. 17,522-17,523.
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was to ascertain the existence of the required contractual 
relationship on the basis of the French concept of contract 
v/hich is different from the notion of contract found in the 
United States since
" This contractual relationship requires only 
that the carrier consent to undertake the 
international transportation of the passenger 
from one designated spot to another, and 
that the passenger in turn consent to the 
undertaking/' 69/
The court found that there was such a contractual 
relationship between Air France and the passengers and that, 
consequently, actions for wrongful death against the airline 
were subject to the conditions and limits of the Warsaw 
Convention.
While emphasizing the requirement that the Warsaw 
carrier be seen as a party to the "contract", as defined 
by the court, the court was at pains to stress that there 
was also in the present case a carrier-passenger relation- 
ship--which is the normal basis on which tortious actions 
are founded--between the "contracting carrier" and the pas­
sengers This is in sharp contrast with the civil law
cases seen above where the charterer was held liable
because he was the contracting carrier, the fact that there 
was an actual relationship carrier-passenger or not being 
of no relevance.
Freight forwarders.
The importance of air cargo in the United States has 
led to the emergence and development of the specific trade
62/ at 10 Avi. 17,523.
70/ at pp. 17,526, 17,531. In Molitch v. Irish International 
Airlines, 11 Avi. 17,396 (S.D. "n y^T" 19707", the court endorsed
the reasoning in Block and labelled the relationship between 
the carrier and passenger as "contractual", even though for 
the court what was essential were those elements of the car­
rier passenger relationship. The decision was reversed on 
appeal, but on other grounds (11 Avi. 17»893» 2d Cir. 1970).
70a/ above pp. 400-402.
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of air freight forwarding ^L/. This has led to a rather 
sophisticated legal regime, regulated by the C.A.B. with 
which air freight forwarders are required to file their 
tariffs. That regime seems to be essentially determined 
by one function of the air freight forwarder, i.e. "group- 
age" , whereby numerous small shipments are consolidated 
into a big shipment. The freight forwarder enters into a 
contract of carriage with each individual consignor and 
issues an air waybill in his own name. After consolidation 
of the small shipments, the forwarder enters into another 
contract of carriage with an air carrier, where he is the 
consignor. The carriage is then performed by the air carrier.
Freight forwarders are in a specific legal situation 
because they are considered as common carriers vis-a-vis the72/ ---------------shippers J— ' . This implies that a freight forwarder cannot
escape liability by claiming that he was the agent of the
carrier who in fact will perform the carriage. The situation
of freight forwarders is seen as an exception to the general
rule that the relational duty of the common carrier arises
71/from the very performance of the carriage J-*/ : although
the freight forwarder does not perform the carriage, he is 
nonetheless a common carrier -2^ /.
71/ See in general on air freight forwarding activities and 
the applicable legal regime : Sundberg, Air Charter, pp.
39ff• ; M. Douglas, Jr., "Air Freight Forwarders--Civil 
Aeronautics Board--Authorization", (1 9 6 8) 3^ J* Air L. &
Com. 298 ; "Transporting goods by air", (1959-60) 69 Yale 
L. J. 993 ; J.W. Snow,”Air Freight Forwarding : A Legal 
and Economic Analysis", (1 9 6 6) 32 J. Air L. & Com. 485. See 
also the detailed description contained in the Eleventh 
Session of the I.C.A.O. Legal Committee (Tokyo, 1957)» Doc. 7921-LC/143.
72/ See generally Elggreen, "What part shaiL Air Freight For­
warders have in the development of the air freight industry" 
(1947) 13 J* Air L. & Com. 170, pp. lfjff, and cases there 
cited. In National Air Freight Forwarding Corporation v. CAB 
197 F.2d 38^ (D.C. Cir. 1952)"» the court stated : "Air freight 
forwarders, like their surface counterparts, are common car­
riers who consolidate individual shipments into bulk lots 
for transportation".
73/ above p. 12.
74/ The exceptional situation of the freight forwarder is 
emphasized in Williston, On Contracts, Section 1071C.
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There does not appear to have been cases where the 
identity of the defendant to a Warsaw action was at issue 
in cases involving an air freight forwarder. However, it 
seems that if a shipper has contracted with the air freight 
forwarder for the "international carriage" of his goods 
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention, 
the freight forwarder would be the Warsaw carrier since, as 
a common carrier, he has concluded a contract coming within 
the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
The shipper can also elect to sue the airline which 
has performed the carriage instead of the forwarder. But 
any suit will be governed by the terms of the contract be­
tween the forwarder and the carrier because, in contracting 
with the air carrier, the forwarder is deemed to have con-7</tracted as the shipper's agent . If that contract is 
for "international carriage" within the meaning of the 
Warsaw Convention, the air carrier will be the Warsaw car­
rier in a suit brought by the shipper. But there is no nec­
essary identity between the legal regimes governing the two 
contracts, i.e. the contract between the shipper and the 
forwarder, and the contract between the forwarder and the 
air carrier. Depending on the points of departure and des­
tination, one may be "international carriage" and not the 
other, which means that one may be governed by the Warsaw 
Convention and not the other 2 /^.
75/ Chicago, M. , St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight 
Inc., 336 U.S."465 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1949)«
76/ see further "Transporting Goods by Air", (1959-60)
69 Yale L. J. 993 at pp. 1013-1014.
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Section 4. - Applicability of the Convention to 
servants and agents of the carrier.
The original Convention does not directly deal 
with the question of the personal liability of the servants 
or agents of a carrier -2^ /. There seems to have been no 
attempt by plaintiffs to sue servants or agents of a carrier
77/ Articles 20 and 25 of the authentic French text of the 
Warsaw Convention are in terms of prgposls■ The essential 
feature of a preposl in French law is his subordination 
to a commettant ( i . e . a master). There is a commettant / 
propose relationship each time a person (the commettant) 
has the power of direction and control over the manner in 
which another person (the prepose) executes his duties for 
the benefit, and on behalf, of the commettant. See Carbon- 
nier, Droit civil, vol. 4, p. 362 ; Starck, Obligations, 
p. 223"]/ The English and American translations of the Con­
vention use the word "agent", but section 5^ of the 1949 
Civil Aviation Act in the United Kingdom provides that the 
term "agent" as used in the Convention was to be interpreted 
as including "servants". (See also Sect. 4 of the Carriage 
by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 in the United 
Kingdom). The official English text of the Hague and Guate­
mala City Protocols, and of the Guadalajara Convention 
refers to "servants and agents". There might be serious 
differences between the notions of preposls, agents, and 
servants and agents, especially because the power to direct 
each of the activities of a prepos§ will often be lacking 
in an agency relationship, thus making the French notion of 
prepos§ much narrower than its English or American counter­
parts. For a wider view of the notion of pr£pos£, see Man- 
kiewicz, "Charter and Interchange of Aircraft", (196I) 10 
Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 707 at p. 714. However, by referring 
to the "scope of employment" in Article 25, the Convention 
itself might provide the means through which the differ­
ences might be limited since anyone who cannot be described 
as being "in the employment" of the carrier would be likely not 
to be seen as his prepose by French courts.In most cases, 
conversely, anyone being "in the employment"of the carrier 
would be likely to be seen as his pr£pos£. The Hague and 
Guatemala City Protocols, the Guadalajara Convention simi­
larly refer to the "scope of employment". On the scope of 
employment, see further below in this section.
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on the basis of Articles 17, 18, and 19 of the Convention. 
Personal liability alv/ays appears to have been engaged on 
a tortious basis. But the applicability of the Convention’s 
provisions has arisen in relation to defences. When they 
were personnally sued, servants and agents sometimes claimed 
the benefit of the liability limitations and the procedural 
defences contained in the contract of carriage in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention. The attitudes towards 
such a claim differed in the various countries considered.
These problems and their differing solutions prompted 
an amendment by the Hague Protocol in 1955 which added a 
new Article 25A to the Convention. It provides :
" If an action is brought against a servant or 
agent of the carrier arising out of damage to 
which this Convention relates, such servant or 
agent, if he proves that he acted within the 
scope of his employment, shall be entitled to 
avail himself of the limits of liability which 
that carrier himself is entitled to invoke 
under Article 22."
The Guadalajara Convention provides that in relation 
to carriage performed by the actual carrier, "any servant 
or agent of that carrier or of the contracting carrier shall, 
if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employ­
ment, be entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability 
which' are applicable under this Convention to the carrier 
whose servant or agent he is . . ." 1 The 1971 Guatemala
City Protocol also allows a servant or agent of the carrier 
acting within the scope of his employment to "avail himself 
of the limits of liability which that carrier is entitled 
to invoke under this Convention."
78/ Article V. 
79/ Article XI.
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The Hague Protocol is more specific than the other 
texts when it states that servants and agents may claim the 
benefit of the limits which the carrier"is entitled to 
invoke under Article 22". The Guadalajara Convention and 
the Guatemala City Protocol simply speak in terms of "the 
limits of liability" applicable to the carrier. It has been 
seen above that determining which are the provisions
of the Convention which exclude or limit liability may be 
a difficult task, particularly in relation to Articles 28 
and 29 of the Convention which deal with the issues of 
jurisdiction and time limitation.
A requirement found in the Hague and Guatemala City 
Protocols, and the Guadalajara Convention, is that in order 
to benefit from the limitations of liability, the servant 
or agent concerned must prove that he acted within the scope 
of his employment .
80/ pp. 161-167.
81/ It seems that similar difficulties are experienced in 
civil law and common law countries when it comes to ascer­
tain whether, in a particular case, the servant was acting 
within the scope of employment. Fleming writes : "'the course 
of employment5 is an expansive concept which provides ample 
scope for policy decisions and, despite the volume of case 
law, has failed to acquire a high degree of precision." 
(Torts, p. 322). This statement would be equally valid in 
relation to French cases. See Starck, Obligations, pp. 225ff. 
St§ Impecel, D.S.1973•J •21, note Larroumet (Cass. crim. 2 
November 1971)• There seems to be a considerable difference 
in the manner in which various courts assess whether a par­
ticular conduct is within the scope of employment. Contrast 
Eve Boutique Imports, Inc, v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc .
10 Ävi~i 177703 (N . Y . Sup . Ct. 1968 ) with Swissair c . Cie La 
Concorde, (I96I) 15 R.F.D.A. 202 (Trib. Fed"] suisse, 22 
September 1959) where, in both cases, goods had been stolen 
by the carrier's servants during the "transportation by air" 
as defined in Article 18(2) of the Convention. The Swiss 
court held the carrier fully liable because the wilful mis­
conduct of the servant had taken place within the scope of 
employment (at p. 205). The New York court seems to have 
assumed that the theft itself established that the employees 
had not acted within the scope of their employment. The 
theft of the goods by some employees could not "impute to 
Seaboard the misconduct which would avoid the limitation 
of the convention" (at p. 17*704).
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In both the Hague Protocol and the Guadalajara 
Convention, the personal liability of a servant or agent 
will be unlimited if it is proved that the servant or agent 
acted in a manner which prevents the limits of liability 
from being invoked , Under the Guatemala City Protocol, 
those limits are made unbreakable in relation to passenger 
cases both for the carrier and for his servants and agents^^, 
But, in relation to cargo, the liability of a servant or 
agent will still be unlimited if it is proved that the dam­
age resulted from an act or omission of the servant or 
agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and 
with knowledge that damage would probably result .
The applicability of the provisions of the Warsaw 
Convention to servants and agents still remains a problem 
because the Guatemala City Protocol is not in force, the 
Guadalajara Convention applies only to cases where carriage 
is performed by a person who is not a party to the agreement 
for carriage , and the Hague Protocol applies only when 
the places of departure and destination are situated either 
in the territories of two parties to the Protocol, or within 
the territory of a single party to the Protocol with an 
agreed stopping place within the territory of another State 
The problem remains to be solved in all other cases.
86/
Common law courts.
The problem of the applicability of the Warsaw Con­
vention to servants and agents of the carrier appears to 
have been treated as only one instance of the more general 
question of whether third parties involved in the perform­
ance of a contract of carriage should benefit from the 
exemptions and limitations protecting the carrier.
82/ Article V of the Guadalajara Convention ; Article 25A(3) 
of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol.
83/ Articles VIII and IX of the Protocol; Article XI.
84/ Article XI of the Protocol.
85/ Article II of the Convention.
86/ Article XVIII of the Protocol.
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Cases specifically dealing with the Warsaw Conven­
tion have arisen in United States courts only. Two early 
cases applied the two-year time limitation of Article 29
to actions directed personally against an agent of the car-
82/rier. In Wanderer v. Sabena the court simply stated
that the action was governed by the Warsaw Convention and 
dismissed it because it had been brought against the car­
rier’s agent more than two years after the accident had 
occurred. The reasoning in Chutter v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch 
is more interesting because the court jus-Airlines
tified its decision by saying that it was impractical to 
distinguish the carrier from the community of persons whose 
joint activity is the carrier's activity 2^/, The court 
invoked as a precedent for this proposition a decision 0^/ 
which was to be overruled a few years later by the Supreme 
Court in Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corn. In that
case, a stevedoring company sought to limit its tortious 
liability towards the shipper to the amount applicable to 
the carrier, pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
and the parallel provisions of the bill of lading to which 
the shipper and the carrier were parties. The court stated :
" No statute has limited its [the stevedoring 
company's] liability, and it was not a party 
to, nor a beneficiary of, the contract of 
carriage between the shipper and the carrier, 
and hence its liability was not limited by 
that contract." 92/
If this reasoning is applied to servants and agents of air 
carriers, it follows that they cannot limit their.liability 
on the sole basis of the Warsaw Convention because that 
treaty has not expressly limited their personal liability.
82/ (1949) U.S. Av. Rep. 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
88/ 4 Avi. 1?,733 (S.D. N.Y. 1955)• 82/ at P- 17,735-
90/ Collins & Co. v. Panama R. Co, 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.19527^
31/ 359 u.s. 297 (u.s. Sup. ct. 1959)
92/ at p. 308.
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Whether they can rely on the provisions of the contract of 
carriage will depend on the wording of that contract. They 
will not be allowed to rely on its clauses in situations 
similar to the Herd case where the agent was neither a party 
to, nor a beneficiary of, the contract of carriage.
Although the Herd case dealt with carriage by sea, 
it had an immediate impact on carriage by air because it 
has overruled the precedent on which the Chutter case had 
relied. Its reasoning appears to have directly influenced 
Hoffman v. B.O.A.C. •zl' where it was held that the provi­
sions of Article 28 delineating the possible fora in which 
plaintiffs may sue the carrier "must be confined to the 
parties to the contract" Sit/1
The reasoning of the Supreme Court that agents 
could not directly claim the benefit of the statute govern­
ing the carriage because they are not specifically included 
in it became still more compelling in cases governed by the 
Warsaw Convention after the adoption of the Hague Protocol 
which expressly extends the monetary limitations of liabil­
ity to servants and agents. This was used in Pierre v .
Eastern Airlines Inc as indicating that the limitations
were not applicable to servants or agents under the unamended 
Warsaw Convention.
There are no air law cases on point in common law 
countries other than the United States but the applicability 
of exemption and limitation clauses to carriers* agents is 
considered in a number of cases dealing with carriage by 
sea. An early case, decided by the House of Lords in 1924, 
was in favour of the availability of exemption clauses to 
stangers to the contract S5/ % The rationale was not explicit.
22/  9 Avi. 17,180 (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
94/ at p. 17,181.
25/  5 Avi. 17,515 (D. N.J. 1957) at pp. 17,515-17,516.
96/ Elder, Dempster & Co. v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co.,
[1924] A .C . 522 (H.L. 1924).
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It seems to have been simply assumed that agents could 
benefit from the same protection as their principals 22/ %
This attitude is now abandoned. Later cases have 
analyzed the issue at length and come to the conclusion that 
exemption clauses cannot benefit anyone not a party to the 
contract of carriage. This is now established in England 20/  ^ 
Australia 22/1 and Canada -20/ . The logical consequence is 
to render the protection contained in the contract of car­
riage in accordance with the Warsaw Convention unavailable 
to the servants and agents who are not parties to the con­
tract of carriage.
One feature that the above mentioned cases had in 
common with the Herd case was that the protection provided 
by the contract was expressly aimed at the carrier. The 
situation is quite different when the contract explicitly 
states that the personal liability of servants and agents 
is limited. Until recently, such contractual provisions 
would have been treated very differently in the United States 
and in the other common law countries. In the United States, 
it is relatively easy for a person to benefit from a contract 
to which he is not a party 2^0/1 Accordingly, if the contract 
of carriage expressly states that the parties have agreed 
to extend the benefit of the limitation of liability to the 
servants and agents of the carrier, these servants and 
agents will be protected by the provision of the contract-^^. 
This is consistent with the Herd case where there was nothing 
in the bill of lading to indicate that the stevedore’s
97/ see especially pp. 53^ (per Viscount Cave) and 5^7 (per 
Viscount Finlay).
98/ Scruttons v. Midland Silicones Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446 
Th .l . 1961).
99/ Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co. Ltd. 
95 C.L.R. 43 (High Ct. 1955)"
100/ Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd, v. The "Lake Bosomtwe" 
Pickford & Black Ltd.j 1970 f~~2~~ Lloyd’s Rep. 8l( Sup . Ct. 1970) .
101/ J.E. Murray Jr., Murray on Contracts, (2d revised ed., 
Indianapolis, 197^)» pp. 560ff, esp. $6kff•
102/ See for instance Carle & Montanari Inc, v. American Ex­
port Lines Inc., [1968] 1 Lloyd’s-Rep. 260 (S.D. N.Y. 1967)•
-  425 -
liability was intended to be limited. The ruling of the 
Supreme Court was that, in the absence of such an expression 
of intent, the stevedore*s liability was not limited.
In other common law countries, the rule of privity 
of contract has in principle retained much more strength^-^/, 
with the consequence that servants and agents, not being 
party to the contract of carriage, cannot directly benefit 
from its provisions. However, the recent Privy Council deci­
sion in New Zealand Shipping Co. v, A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. 
Ltd. (The "Eurymedon" )^^has opened a new way through which 
servants and agents can have their responsibility limited.
In that case, according to the bill of lading, the carrier 
had acted as an agent for the stevedore and had secured 
from the shipper the agreement that the stevedore, and all 
the servants and agents of the carrier, would not be sued 
for more than £1,000. The stevedore was allowed to limit 
his liability to that sum on the basis of the separate 
contract thus concluded on his behalf by the carrier with 
the shipper.
This ruling respected the strict principle according 
to which "a contract between two parties cannot be sued on 
by a third person even though the contract is expressed to 
be for his benefit" -^5/. But, in finding an enforceable 
contract between the stevedore and the shipper, on the 
basis of which the stevedore could limit his liability, 
the Privy Council adopted a notion of consideration very 
different from its classical definition. In doing sc, the 
court emphasized that although English law has committed 
itself to a rather technical and schematic doctrine of 
contract, it takes a practical approach in its application,
103/ Cheshire & Fifoot, Contract, pp.500ff.
104/ [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 53^ (P.C. 1973).
105/ This was how the Privy Council summarized the holding 
of Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd., [1962] A.C.446, at [I97VJ 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 538.
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"often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily 
into the marked slots of offer, acceptance, and considera­
tion." Discharging the goods for the benefit of the
shipper was seen as a valid consideration for the agreement 
by the shipper that the stevedore should have the benefit 
tions and limitations contained in the bill of
conditions are fulfilled, there is no obstacle preventing 
the servants and agents of the carrier from limiting their 
liability to a sum determined in the contract of carriage.
It is essential that several conditions be complied with. 
Firstly, the contract must be carefully worded to make it 
clear that specific persons other than the carrier himself 
are to be protected. Secondly, it has to be shown that the 
third party to the contract of carriage who seeks to rely 
on the protective clause either gave authority or ratified 
what had been done by the carrier. The last condition is 
the existence of some consideration. It is not certain that 
that last requirement will be satisfied in future cases as 
easily as it was in the New Zealand Shipping Co. case. On 
the one hand, a court may not necessarily adopt an attitude 
as liberal as that of the Privy Council. On the other hand, 
the Privy Council dealt with a stevedore, i„e. someone 
whose services are in fact separate from the services per­
formed by the carrier himself, even though, legally speaking, 
they are all performing the contract of carriage. It is 
doubtful whether the performance of the carrier0s own services 
by his servants or agents could be seen as consideration for 
the separate agreement allegedly existing between the shipper 
and the servants and agents to the effect that the shipper 
renounces his right to sue them for more than the limit
It follows that, in theory, and provided certain
106/ at p. 539-
107/ at p. 539.
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determined in the contract of carriage. It should be kept 
in mind, however, that these difficulties might disappear 
if the following sweeping statement of the Privy Council 
is given its full effect in future cases :
" The exemption is designed to cover the whole 
carriage from loading to discharge, by whom­
soever it is performed: the performance attracts 
the exemption or immunity in favour of whoever 
the performer turns out to be.” 108/
Solution in French law.
There is no French case taking an explicit stand 
on the question. However, the Billet case reveals the
attitude of French courts. The plaintiffs had brought an 
action civile against the pilot of a plane who had
survived an accident in which many passengers were injured 
or killed. The carrier himself was joined in the proceed­
ings on grounds of vicarious liability. It was held that 
the Warsaw Convention ousted the court’s jurisdiction in 
relation to the action against the carrier himself, but 
nowhere was it argued that the Convention might also oust 
the jurisdiction of the court in the action civile against 
the pilot himself. That action was simply not governed by 
the Warsaw Convention
The general principles of French law clearly 
explain why personal actions against servants and agents 
of air carriers cannot be protected by the terms of the 
unamended Convention. It has been seen above that French 
courts see the Convention as regulating the contract of
108/ at p. 539-
109/ Billet fMinistere Public c.*1 (1964) 27 R.G.A.E. 257, 
note E. du Pontavice (Trib. corr, Versailles, 11 July 1964), 
rev1d, (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 408, note E. du Pontavice (C.A. 
Paris, 25 June 1965), cassation sub nom. Cie U .T.A .,Lagarri- 
gue, D.S. 1970.J.81, note P. Chauveau (Cass.crim. 3 Pec.1969) .
110/ On the action civile in general, and the Billet case 
in particular, see further above pp. 360-363.
Ill/ The Cour de Cassation affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeal which had condemned the pilot to compensate 
the plaintiffs on the basis of the action civile against the 
pilot (D.S. 1970.J.81 at p. 82).
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carriage, to which servants and agents are not parties 
From the principe de la relativite des conventions, it 
follows that only contracting parties can benefit from con­
tractual terms. Since servants and agents are not parties 
to the contract of carriage, they cannot claim the benefit 
of its provisions
The only possible exception to that rule which 
could apply to the situation of the servants and agents 
would be the mechanism of stipulation pour autrui 
But any such stipulation which might be inserted by the 
carrier in the contract of carriage for the benefit of 
its servants or agents would be declared null and void 
by a French court because the personal liability of ser­
vants and agents is tortious, and the rules of tortious-------- 113/liability are considered in France as ordre public-- u .
This means that they cannot be modified in advance by the
agreement of the parties involved.
112/ above pp. 356-363.
113/ There are doctrinal opinions to the contrary : M. Le- 
moine, Tratte de droit a6rien (Paris, 1947), pp- 549ft* ;
R.H. Mankiewicz, "Charter and Interchange of Aircraft and 
the Warsaw Convention" (1961) 10 Int*l & Comp. L.Q. 707 at 
pp. 7l4ff. ; M. Pourcelet, "Transporteur contractuel et 
transporteur de fait dans la Convention de Guadalajara" 
(1962-63) 9 McGill L.J. 317 at p. 329* But nothing in the 
Convention contradicts the principle of relativite des con­
ventions which is contained in two Articles of the Civil 
Code. Article 1119 provides : On ne peut, en geniral, s’en­
gager, ni stipuler en son propre nom que pour soi-meme". 
Article 1165 provides : "Les conventions n9ont d*effet 
qu°entre les parties contractantes ; elles ne nuisent pas 
au tiers, et elles ne lui profitent que dans les cas pr£- 
vus par l*article 1121". See further Carbonnier, Droit ci­
vil , vol. 4, pp. I84ff. ; Starck, Obligations, pp5 574ff.
These principles were reflected in the attitude of the French 
delegate at the Hague Conference in 1955 in relation to the 
adoption of Article 25A. See International Conference on 
Private Air Law, The Hague, 1955(lCAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 p.222).
114/ Article 1121 Civil Code. See further above pp. 358-359*
115/ above p. 373.
-  429 -
Comparison.
In all the countries examined here, servants and 
agents of air carriers cannot directly invoke the benefit 
of the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Neither can 
they rely on contractual clauses when the contract of car­
riage does not contain any provision expressly purporting 
to limit their personal liability. But when the contract 
of carriage contains such a clause, common law courts are 
willing to consider the application of such a clause and, 
provided certain conditions are satisfied, will enforce it. 
By contrast, French courts could not possibly do so because 
the personal liability of servants and agents is tortious 
and cannot be limited in advance by private agreement. This 
shows the importance of the differences in the underlying 
legal attitudes toward the distinction between contractual 
and tortious liability.
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CONCLUSION
Before trying to draw any conclusions from the 
comparative study of the judicial interpretations of the 
Warsaw system, it should be remembered that, generally 
speaking, only borderline cases ever come to court0 A 
great number of cases are settled out of court and, while 
it cannot be assumed that all settlements take place on 
the strict basis of the provisions of the Convention, these 
provisions play an essential role by broadly determining 
the legal framework within which the respective rights of 
the parties will be assessed.
A number of the causes of disparity between the 
cases have been identified in the preceding chapters. These 
will be brought together and examined in Section One of the . 
conclusion. The second Section will consider possible means 
to avoid or reduce the influence of these factors.
Section One. - Factors generating differences in the cases
The differences considered will encompass not only 
cases of clear divergence in the final results achieved by 
the various courts, but also the variations in reasoning 
which may produce identical results by chance. In addition, 
potential differences which have not materialized simply 
because an issue has been judicially considered only in one 
country will also be taken into account.
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1) Application of rules of domestic law not excluded by 
the Convention (including cases of renvoi).
A number of the differences between actual cases
governed by the Warsaw system are due to the fact that the
Convention only unified "certain rules relating to interna­
tional carriage by airM I/. The drafters expressly excluded 
from the Convention matters of contributory negligence ^ , 
determination of who can sue under Article 17 ^ ^ the deter-4/mination of the equivalent fault to dol</ ---^ . In such cases, the solution will vary
, and many ques- 
c /tions of procedure 
depending on the provisions of the applicable national law. 
One good example of the importance of the application of 
the lex fori in matters of procedure on the final outcome 
of a case is given by the differing approaches to the assess­
ment of the conditions of unlimited liability under Article 
25* Common law decisions are clearly influenced by the fact 
that a jury often assesses these conditions and that the 
jury*s verdict can be upset only under stringent conditions. 
In France, the whole issue is a question of law. This means 
that French courts act under the continual supervision of 
the Cour de Cassation. This feature provided the scope neces­
sary for the developments in French courts of a major legal 
controversy which would not have been possible in a common 
law environment ^ .
There are instances where the Convention is simply 
silent on particular issues. In such cases, the rules of 
domestic law have been applied, thus introducing into Warsaw 
cases the differences existing between domestic laws. This 
appears clearly in relation to the adequate notice that
1/ The official title of the Convention is "Convention pour 
1 * unification de certaines regies relatives au transport 
aSrien international".
2/ Article 21.
4/ Article 25.
6/ above, pp. 333^^«
_3/ Article 24.
$/ Articles 28 and 29.
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common law courts require in the passenger ticket whilst
French courts content themselves with a much more formal7/reading of the requirements of the ticket provisions -L/ .
The assessment of the contractual duties of the air
carrier provides another example. In determining whether the
carrier v/as in charge of the goods, French courts naturally
used the concept of delivery, which marks the end of the
carrier’s duties in the general law of carriage ^ . It was
just as natural for common law courts to hold the carrier9/liable as a bailee after the end of transit ^  .
Similarly, in assessing the validity of the provi­
sions of the contract of carriage relating to delay, French 
courts searched for the real intent of the parties--rather 
than strictly interpreting the terms of the contract--while 
common law courts used their habitual test of reasonable­
ness In assessing the validity of contractual clauses
limiting the time within which notice of a claim was to be 
given to the carrier, American courts also appear to have 
been influenced by the commonness of such clauses in Amer­
ican law where they are seen simply as sound business prac­
tices
The question whether damages can be awarded in 
excess of the declared value of cargo is not answered by 
the Convention. The solution adopted in American courts 
will probably differ from that likely to be provided by 
French courts should the issue there arise. The divergence 
will be caused by the differing rules of domestic law .
jJ above, pp. 126ff. 
2/ above, pp. 215-216. 
ll/above, pp. 262ff.
8/ above, pp. 219ff. 
10/ above, pp. 235ff« 
12/ above, pp. 285ff.
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In all these cases, any difference between the 
results achieved in the various courts does not denote a 
failure of the uniform law convention, or of the courts 
which applied it. The issues were simply outside the scope 
of the uniform law.
2) Discrepancies between the texts applied in the different 
courts.
Apart from an isolated instance where the English
translation of the original French text of the Convention
13/added to the plain wording of the original text — “  , the 
discrepancies between the French text and its English ver­
sions reflect deeper difficulties. Firstly, translators 
who are not legally trained in several legal systems can 
hardly appreciate the precise technical meaning of one 
term in one text, and exactly express the same meaning in 
the translation. This is illustrated by the translation of 
the word "avarie" in Article 26 of the Convention by "damage" 
in the English text, although "damage" is less precise than 
. The same observation may be made in relation"avarie"
to the new Article 17 of the Convention, as amended by the 
Guatemala City Protocol. It is possible that an appropriate­
ly legally trained interpreter would have noticed the dis­
crepancy existing between "lesion cornorelle", with its 
physical connotations, and "personal injury", which appears 
to be much wider .
Secondly, it is impossible to find in one legal 
system the exact equivalent of a concept which belongs to 
another legal system. An approximation will not do, as is 
demonstrated by Articles 20 and 25. In Article 20, the 
drafters of the Convention wanted to introduce the concept
13/ above, pp. 155-156. 14/ above, p. 258.
15/ above, pp. I88-I89. See also above pp. 13-15*
of "due diligence" which does not exist in the civil law. 
After some hesitation, they finally settled on "mesures nl- 
cessaires" as the best wording . Unfortunately, the 
translators were not aware of the drafters' intent and, 
instead of referring to "due diligence" in translating 
mesures necessaires, they used "necessary measures". The 
best example of the impossibility of expressing concepts 
specifically belonging to one legal system in another legal 
system is the case of Article 25. Whilst the English dele­
gate had said during the Conference that "wilful misconduct" 
corresponded to the whole range of cases where liability 
would be unlimited (i.e. dol and faute lourde), the trans­
lators simply followed the French text word by word, trans­
lating dol itself as wilful misconduct, and referring for 
the rest to "such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the Court seised of the case, is considered
17/to be equivalent to wilful misconduct" — 1u  .
3) Application of different techniques of interpretation.
The differing attitudes of French law and the common 
law towards legislative texts are reflected in the tech­
niques of interpretation used in the cases considering the 
Warsaw Convention. In the absence of detailed definitions 
given at the beginning of the Convention, several common 
law courts read the Convention almost as a closed system, 
where each provision was to be construed in the light of 
the others, and in a manner which would made each article 
consistent with the others. The absence of definitions was 
natural to French courts for which, unless otherwise pro­
vided, an expression used in a particular legislative text
16/ pp. 101-102 above. 17/ p. 124, above.
18/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, pp. 85ff ; pp. 
322ff.
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has the same technical meaning throughout French law. If 
the expression is to have another meaning, then another 
wording should he employed. This difference of attitude 
appears in ascertaining the identity of the High Contract­
ing Parties to the Warsaw Convention. In doing so, French 
courts did not refer to the Convention itself, which does 
not contain explicit provisions on that point, hut to the 
general principles of Public International Law . The 
House of Lords for its part paid considerable attention 
to the wording of the provisions where High Contracting 
Parties were referred to in order to assess the construc­
tion suited to these provisions % Similarly, in ascer­
taining who is consignor/consignee, French courts used the 
normal meaning of these words in the law of carriage , 
but several common law courts determined the issue by 
analyzing the provisions of the Convention, for the limited 
purpose of the application of the Convention
At the same time, other common law courts adopted 
particular rulings mainly, or partly, on the strength of 
policy considerations which are very rarely found in French 
decisions
4) Ambiguities in the Convention.
A number of cases which have adopted different 
views on the Convention have done so on the basis of pro­
visions which are inherently ambiguous such as :
- the meaning of the ”provisions of the Convention which 
exclude or limit liability" Qi/.
- the meaning of "le poids, la quantity, le volume ou les25/dimensions de la marchandise" — *J ;
19/ above, pp. 3^ff. 20/ above, p. 38• See also p. 225.
21/ above, pp. 381-383* See also p. 26l.
22/ above, pp. 383-384.
23/ above, pp. 133-13^» 158, 159» 209*
24/ above, pp. l6lff. 25/ above, pp. 155tf*
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- the meaning of the "operations of embarking or disembark-
. „ 26/mg" — ' ;
- the meaning of the carrier being "in charge of" the
goods ;
- the meaning of "delay in the carriage by air" for passen­
gers and cargo £2/,
The interpretation of "international carriage" pro­
vides a notable exception to this list because the questions 
which arose in several countries were almost similarly 
answered by the various courts involved-^Generally speaking, 
however, uniformity has little chance to be achieved by 
ambiguous provisions.
5) Differences in the techniques of insertion of the Con­
vention into the legal system of each country.
In England, Australia, and Canada, there is enacting 
legislation giving force of law to the Convention. In the 
United States, the Convention was seen as self-executing, 
and no enacting legislation was necessary. In France, the 
Convention, as an international treaty, enjoys a direct 
authority which is superior to the authority of any statutory 
text ^ .
These different techniques have had a direct influ­
ence on Warsaw cases. Strictly speaking, the treaty as such 
has no force of law in Australia, Canada, or the United 
Kingdom, and the courts are in principle bound to consider 
only the text which has been enacted into law. This created 
very difficult problems in the Corocraft case where there 
was a discrepancy between the text of the treaty and the 
text of the Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act containing
26/ pp. 209ffj above. 
28/ pp. 238ff, above. 
30/ pp. 27-29, above.
27/ pp. 2l8ff, above. 
29/ pp. 237-238, above. 
31/ pp. 41-42, above.
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the translation of the treaty *2^ /. At the same time, the 
direct application of international treaties in France was 
one cause of the difficulties experienced by French courts 
in relation to the retrospective application of the Hague 
Protocol. There was no enacting legislation telling the 
courts to which cases the new provisions would apply *22/, 
The absence of enacting legislation ”naturalizing" 
the Convention into domestic law explains the difficulties 
experienced in the United States in relation to the cause 
of action in wrongful death cases. The same issue existed 
in other common law countries, but it was immediately 
settled by specific provisions contained in the legislation 
enacting the Convention -2^ /.
6) Intrusion in Warsaw cases of more general issues of 
domestic law.
A number of Warsaw cases seem to be due to the 
intervention of more general issues of domestic law, natu­
rally different from country to country. This is so in 
France with the retrospective application of the Hague 
Protocol, which provided an ideal field for testing new 
doctrinal ideas on the general question of the retrospec­
tive application of the law *22/f 0r with the assessment 
of the conditions of unlimited liability where partisans 
and adversaries of the objective assessment of human 
behaviour found a new battlefield / , or with the question 
of whether the victims of a criminal act could in all cases
--including international carriage by air--claim damages
37/through the action civile .
32/ above, p. 157- 
34/ above, p. 351«
36/ above, pp. 309ff., 332-333
33/ above, p. 63.
35/ above, pp. 60ff. 
37/ above, pp. j60ff.
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This is also the case in common law countries where 
the applicability of the Convention’s provisions to servants 
and agents of air carriers appears to have followed the 
variations on whether third parties involved in the perfor­
mance of a contract of carriage should benefit from the 
exemptions and limitations protecting the carrier ^ 0/, 
Another example is provided by the difficulties of ascer­
taining the kinds of damages compensable under Article 17.
The difficulties seen by the common law courts reflect39/similar problems in their national legal systems
?) Use of a frame of reference different from that prevailing 
at the time of drafting.
The civil law environment was determinant in the
wording of a number of provisions of the Convention %
When translated into English and transplanted into a common
law environment, some provisions became almost meaningless.
Such is the case for the reference to carriage performed
41/"by legally constituted public bodies" — ' . But the best 
illustration is the unamended Article 25 which reflected 
two fundamental rules of many civil law countries, i.e. 
the impossibility of limiting one's liability in the case 
of dol, and a similar impossibility in the case of faute 
lourde, considered to be equivalent to dol for the purposes 
of the unavailability of limitations on liability. When 
transplanted into a common law environment, the article 
lost much of its meaning since the common law does not have 
a general rule rendering inoperative clauses limiting or 
excluding liability. To speak of "such default as, in accord­
ance with the law of the Court seised of the case, is con­
sidered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct" is simply
38/ above, pp. 421ff. 39/ above, pp. 171ff.
40/ above, pp. 8ff., 97ff«
4l/ Article 2(l) of the Convention. See above, p. 3^*
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meaningless in a common law environment where the equivalence
relates to a rule--the inapplicability of limitation provi-
sions--which does not even exist in cases of wilful mis- 
42/conduct — ' .
The consequence, in the above two instances, was
simply that common law courts ignored the provisions in
question. But this was not always the case, and the shift
in the frame of reference between the drafting of a provision
and its application by a court has produced results damaging
uniformity when common law courts looked for an answer to
questions which were unsuspected by the civil law drafters,
as was the case in relation to the question of damages
compensable under Article 17, or in relation to the
question of the creation of a cause of action by the Warsaw 
44/Convention — ' .
8) Use or non-use of precedents decided in other countries.
Access to cases decided in other countries can be
very difficult. But, even when such precedents can be brought
to the attention of a court, this does not necessarily lead
to greater uniformity. It is true that common law courts
consider decisions emanating from other common law countries,
415/and may follow them — ^ . But this seems to be made possible
by a community of background, which will set the problem
considered in identical terms. Such a community of background
will often be lacking where different legal systems are
concerned. This seems to be the main reason why the American
cases requiring adequate notice in the passenger ticket
undeniably influenced Canadian courts but totally
47/failed to influence French courts — 1^  .
42/ above, pp. 112ff., 300_3C1* 
44/ above, p. 351*
46/ above, pp. 131-133
43/ above, pp. I88ff.
45/ e.g. above, pp.l43, 160. 
42/ pp. 134ff.
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The resistance of French courts to follow several 
United States precedents shows that it is not enough that 
a court knows the answer given by another court to a par­
ticular question ; it must be convinced by the reasoning 48 /of that court — ' . This is done easily between common law 
courts whose decisions have almost the same format and can 
be easily understood in the other common law countries. But 
the succint reasoning of many decisions of the French Cour 
de Cassation would no doubt leave unanswered a number of 
questions which would have been covered by a decision 
emanating from a common law court. Other obstacles are due 
to the fact that, in order to solve the ambiguities of the 
Convention, judges use rules of domestic law which can be 
totally unconvincing when taken out of their original back­
ground. It is doubtful whether a common law court could be 
persuaded to award to a shipper damages in excess of the 
declared value of the goods in cases of dol ^2/t simply 
because there is no necessary link in the common law 
between being guilty of an intentional wrongdoing and being 
unable to limit one's liability.
It should be added, however, that the resistance 
to the use of foreign precedents seems considerably less 
strong when the issue is merely technical and has been 
solved by other courts without recourse to principles which 
can be abhorent, or meaningless, to another court. Such may 
have been the case in the interpretation of "international 
carriage by air" where the case of a round trip has been 
seen as one international carriage governed by the Conven­
tion, in France as well as in common law countries, the 
French case having been decided after the solution adopted
48/ See above pp. 13^-135• In Emery c . Sabena (JCP i968.II. 
15350, Cass. civ. Ire, 5 December 1967), the Avocat General 
stated in his conclusions : ". . .s'il est vrai qu'une cer- 
taine unit§ est souhaitable dans 1*application de la Con­
vention de Varsov.ie, on ne voit pas pourquoi ce serait aux 
juridictions frangaises de s'aligner sur les juridictions 
am§ricaines."
49/ above, pp. 287-289.
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in the United Kingdom had received a wide coverage in 
France
9) Influence of policy considerations.
The role of policy considerations appears much more 
clearly in common law--particularly American--cases than in 
French cases, where judges always tend to hide behind the 
process of interpretation of a given text in arriving at a 
. Policy considerations were expressly referredo /solution '
to in the American cases dealing with the delivery of a 
ticket to passengers
Policy considerations also played a prominent role 
in cargo cases. The commercial nature of the transaction 
was seen as evidence that the parties were on an equal 
footing, and that the courts did not have to protect one 
against the other. The commercial nature of the operation 
was also an element in favour of interpreting the Convention 
in accordance with what was seen as sound business practices-^
In France, policy considerations can be identified 
when they take the form of principes g£n§raux du droit, the 
function of which has been described as ensuring "a subordi­
nation of law to the commands of justice, such as it is con-
54/ceived at a given moment, in a given period" . One of 
these principles is the impossibility for anyone guilty of 
dol to be allowed to limit his liability. This may have 
serious consequences in the interpretation of the Guatemala 
City Protocol which does not expressly provide that the 
liability limits are unbreakable, even in cases of dol
50/ above, pp. 27-29.
51/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 98* 
52/ above, pp. 133-13^• See also p. 209*
52/ above, pp. 143, 158.
54/ David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems, p. 115» 
55/ above, pp. 113-H^«
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Another principle is the ordre public nature of the rules 
of delictual liability, which explains why contracting 
parties cannot opt out of their contractual remedies, and 
also why servants and agents of the air carrier cannot in 
advance limit their tortious liability .
Section 2. - Possible solutions .
Firstly, it should be pointed out that the differ­
ences due to a renvoi, or to the silence of the Convention 
on a particular point will not be dealt with since they do 
not reveal any failure in ensuring uniformity but simply 
result from the voluntarily limited scope of the Convention.
Secondly, no attempt will be made to remedy the 
differences due to the insertion of the Convention into 
municipal law because this expresses fundamental rules of 
the States involved as to the relationship between inter­
national treaties and municipal law. This is a direct 
manifestation of the sovereign power of each State. Such 
differences are the price to be paid for the selection of 
unification by means of an international convention rather 
than other possible forms of unification of law .
General solutions to the problem of differing inter­
pretations of uniform laws have been proposed, especially 
the creation of an international court which would have the 
function of deciding obscure points in a text, thus unifying 
the interpretations emanating from the countries parties to
56/ above, pp. 373f‘f•
57/ For a discussion of other possible forms of unification 
of law, see ’'Progressive development of the law of interna­
tional trade : Report of the Secretary General” Doc. A/6396 
[UNCITRAL Yearbook, vol. 1, 1968-70, United Nations, pp. 39- 
40] ; R. David,"The International Unification of Private 
Law”, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 2, 
Ch. 5 » PP• f•
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the particular Convention involved or, at least, a consult­
ative body which would serve a similar purpose without 
openly breaching state sovereignty ^0/1 These proposals 
would provide an ideal solution to many of the problems 
seen above. But they will not be considered here because 
experience shows that sweeping proposals, however attractive 
they may be in theory, have very little chance of ever 
being adopted, at least in the immediate future Instead,
a series of reasonably achievable practical proposals which 
would help avoid the appearance of divergent interpretations 
of a uniform law convention in the future will be proposed.
Many difficulties described in the thesis would be 
eliminated by improving the drafting techniques of interna­
tional Conventions :
1) Instead of concepts which are meaningful in one legal 
system only, it is much better to phrase the text in terms 
of physical events, or descriptions of mental attitudes.
This was done in the Hague Protocol in its definition of 
the conditions of unlimited liability which is very close 
to the meaning of "wilful misconduct" as understood by 
common law courts. But that definition could also be readily 
translated into a meaningful French legal text, and that 
would not have been possible had the label "wilful miscon­
duct" been used. Such a "factual definition" is easier to 
interpret in a uniform manner because it does not automat­
ically trigger the intervention of rules which are associated
58/ See further on these general proposals P. Chauveau, Rap­
port sur la creation d'une Cour internationale pour la solu­
tion des difficultes nies de 1*interpretation et de 1*appli­
cation des Conventions internationales en matiere de droit 
aerien" , International Lav/ Association, Report of the 47th 
Conference (Dubrovnik, 1958), pp. 181-195 ; R. David, "The 
International Unification of Private Law", pp. 10?ff. ; H. 
Drion, "Towards a Uniform Interpretation of the Private Air 
Lav/ Conventions" (1952) 19 J» Air L. & Com. 423 » E. Geor- 
giades, "De la methodologie juridique pour 1'unification du 
Droit aerien international prive" (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 3^9 ;
G. Jacquemin, "Tribunaux aSriens" (1974) 37 R.G.A.E. 105 ;
R. Mankiewicz, "The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Pri­
vate Lav/ Conventions" (1972)21 Int'l & Comp.L.Q. 718 at 751ff«
59/ See for instance the lack of response to a French proposal
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with particular concepts.
However, concepts may be difficult to avoid, partic­
ularly at the stage of preparing a draft convention where 
their use in drafts and proposals will be natural for the 
delegates who are familiar with them. The dangers inherent 
in their use would be lessened if the secretariat of the 
international organization preparing a new Convention issued 
a detailed background study of any proposed concept in its 
original environment so that its meaning in the proposed 
text could be properly assessed. The same study could in­
vestigate how this concept could fit into other major legal 
systems. Any incompatibility or inconsistency would appear 
and could be remedied at this preliminary stage.
2) The text would be improved by being translated by legally 
trained translators, who can appreciate the technical mean­
ing and the connotations of the various versions. Making 
sure that the different versions express the same idea may 
mean that, superficially, one text may appear quite different 
from another, as was rightly the case in the definition of 
the contracting carrier in the Guadalajara Convention , 
and as should have been the case in the English version of 
the unamended Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention .
3) A number of ambiguities in the text can be avoided by 
using very precise wording and avoiding expressions such as 
"the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit 
liability". It would have been much better to list these 
provisions — ' .
59/ (cont*d) to create a jus commune for international trade 
law [UNCITRAL Yearbook, vol. 1, 1968-70, pp. 288ff., vol. 2, 
pp. 139-1^0].
60/ above, p. 398. 6l/ above, p. 124.
62/ as was done by the Hague Frotocol (new Articles 3(2), 
*5(4), 9» 25, 25A). But contrast Article V of the Guadala- 
jare Convention.
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4) When amendments to a draft Convention are made,the v/hole 
of the Convention should be carefully reconsidered so that 
what was a consistent whole before the amendment does not 
become inconsistent afterwards ,
5) An authoritative commentary or explanation of the meaning 
of a text may avoid the difficulties created when agreement 
can be made only on a text which may be unclear. It is often 
the case that a difficult question, on which conflicting 
views exist, is sent to a drafting group. The resulting text 
is then endorsed or rejected by the Conference, but no 
explanation is given for the particular wording finally 
selected . If an explanatory statement was issued by 
the drafting group, and endorsed by the Conference which 
adopts the proposed text, this would be a precious guide 
to interpretation. That procedure would answer most of the 
usual objections against the use of travaux preparatoires 
in the construction of a legislative text because the 
explanatory statement would not be a collection of indi­
vidual, and possibly contradictory, views, but an official 
expression of the drafters* intent.
A formal justification of the wording of a text by 
its drafting group would also avoid the frequent practice 
of drafting by compromise, where a drafting group is asked 
to work out a compromise between irreconcilable views. Very 
often, the resulting text is adopted only because the reasons 
for its formulation are not spelt out, which would in fact 
reveal that the difficulties are still there. Compromise 
solutions are rarely satisfactory . Avoiding them means
63/ see above, pp. 203-204 where the amendments did not 
introduce real inconsistency but made the real meaning of 
the text depend on principles which were merely assumed and 
no longer expressly stated.
64/ above, pp. 101-102, in relation to "mesures n£cessaires".
65/ above, p. 217, in relation to the carrier being "in 
charge" of the goods. See generally "Ratification of or 
Adherence to Conventions Concerning International Trade 
Law", Report of the Secretary-General (A/CN.9/91) [UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, vol. V, 1974, p. 191]«
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that it may take longer to elaborate a text acceptable to 
all participants, but the chances are that it would be 
better suited to solve the problems involved.
6) The risk of divergence created by the intrusion in Warsaw 
cases of the general issues of domestic law could be greatly 
lessened if detailed background studies were made in as many 
countries as possible prior to consideration of the draft 
text by a diplomatic Conference , The secretariat of the 
international organization preparing a new Convention could 
then prepare an analysis of these studies which would reveal 
any serious difficulties due to the lack of coordination 
between the text and its future environment. This procedure 
would have revealed the difficulties likely to be experienced 
by common lav/ countries in relation to the cause of action
in wrongful death cases, and in relation to damages compen­
sable under Article 17. Possible solutions could be canvassed 
by the secretariat and proposed to the diplomatic Conference. 
It might not always be possible that the Convention itself 
solve these problems but, at least, their existence would be 
made apparent to all countries which could then make a 
decision with full knowledge of the possible consequences.
7) The conditions which now prevail in the elaboration of 
international conventions greatly reduce the risk of a 
dominant frame of reference that ignores the specific pro­
blems existing in other legal systems. This is due to the 
active participation of countries belonging to many legal 
systems. This seems to be the only way to avoid "legal
66/ Many countries send their comments on draft Conventions 
prior to diplomatic Conferences, but they usually relate to 
the text itself, and not to its insertion into the general 
legal framework where it will apply if adopted. In addition, 
these comments are usually fairly succint. See for instance 
the comments submitted in relation to the Hague Protocol 
(ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/l4o, vol. 2, Documents, pp. l45ff.) and 
to the Guatemala City Protocol (ICAO Doc. 90^0-LC/l67-2, 
pp. 25ff.).
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ethnocentrism" on the part of the drafters of a convention, 
i.e. the assumption, generally involuntary, that their own 
legal values possess universal validity. The dangers of one 
dominating legal system should lead to the rejection of 
suggestions that a single expert he entrusted with the 
drafting of an international convention .
8) If policy considerations become so strong as to overcome 
the letter of a uniform law, it is the sign of a serious 
hiatus between the text and the state of the society where 
it is to apply. It is particularly serious in the case of 
international conventions which apply in countries with 
widely differing social conditions. The importance of this 
factor should be fully exposed at the drafting stages of a 
new text , as they were prior to the adoption of the 
Guatemala City Protocol although, in that case, the opinions 
relating to liability limits were so far apart that one may 
wonder whether the text which was finally adopted can fit 
the social conditions of the majority of the participants-^^. 
But, at least, the delegates knew the scope of the problem 
and, consequently, were able to make fully informed decisions.
While the differences between the economic conditions 
of the participating States were fully realized at the Gua­
temala City Conference, there was no similar awareness in 
relation to the differences existing between the legal 
systems on the issue of dpi. Despite the repeated warnings 
of several civil law representatives, the Protocol does 
not expressly state that the liability limits are not to
67/ R. David, "The International Unification of Private Law"
p. 86.
68/ Detailed background studies from as many countries as 
possible (point 6 above) would help in bringing out the 
existence of conflicting policy considerations.
69/ Disparities between States were made particularly clear 
during the seventeenth session of the ICAO Legal Committee 
(Montreal 1970), ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162, pp. 73ff.
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to be broken, "even in cases of dol" . This silence might
easily allow the courts of several civil law countries to
70/break the new limits in such cases 1— ' .
All the above suggestions would help prevent the
occurrence of divergent interpretations, but they do not
help remedy the divergences existing today between the
interpretations of conventions already in existence. To
that effect, it has been proposed that the basic principles
of the French legal system, which were so important in the
elaboration of the original Convention, be given the role
of guidelines in the interpretation of the Convention ,
There have been isolated attempts to do so in the United 72/States 1— ' , but other American cases have rejected such a73/proposal, either implicitly or explicitly . In one of 
the rare cases where the French legal system was referred 
to, it seems that the court projected a great deal of its 
own values into its analysis of the situation and did not 
succeed in assembling all the varied elements of French 
law which would have been necessary for meaningful guidance 
towards a solution This demonstrates the danger of
using unfamiliar foreign law concepts taken out of their 
context. In addition, even if a reference to French law 
was technically possible, would it have to be made to French 
law as it was in 1929» or to French law today ? More specif­
ically, if a foreign court were to look for the meaning of 
dol as it is understood in France, would it look at the 
definition prevailing in 1929» or at the new definitions 
given by the Cour de Cassation in the last few years -2-5/?
70/ above, pp. 113-114.
71/ Sundberg, Air Charter, pp. 242-249.
72/ above, pp. 181-182, 414-415.
73/ above, p. I83.
74/ above, pp. 194ff., pp. 185-186.
75/ above, pp. 294-295.
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Finally, apart from these technical reasons, and perhaps 
more importantly, it seems politically inconceivable that 
the courts of one country would accept the system of values 
of another country, as expressed in its basic legal principles.
Making available decisions applying the uniform lav/ 
to the courts of other countries is a proposal which seems 
to have a better chance of alleviating some of the dangers 
of nationalistic interpretations. Steps have already been 
taken in that direction , but several reasons indicate 
that one should not overemphasize the practical impact of 
foreign judgments. Firstly, it seems to be in exceptional 
cases only that judges are interested in considering pre­
cedents from another legal system. This might be due, not 
only to a lack of intellectual interest in what happens in 
other legal systems, but also to the specificity of a number 
of problems v/hich arise because of the domestic law back­
ground, and for which little help can be found in countries 
which do not have that same background. American or common 
law cases in general were useless to French courts deciding 
whether the action civile was affected by the Warsaw Con­
vention because common law countries have no equivalent 
for actions civiles , Secondly, in order to make a 
foreign decision available to the courts of other countries, 
it has to be translated into several languages. This requires 
enormous technical skills, first to understand fully the 
meaning of the original decision, and then to express it in 
such a manner that it can be really useful in other legal 
systems. Also, varying judicial techniques will often res­
trict the persuasiveness of a decision, however commendable 
from an international law point of view that decision may be.
76/ The International Institute for the Unification of Pri­
vate Law (UNIDROIT) publishes many important decisions 
relating to the application of several uniform law conven­
tions, including the Warsaw Convention, in a periodical 
entitled Jurisprudence de droit uniforme--Uniform Law Cases.
77/ This obstacle disappears in relation to highly technical 
areas which do not involve considerations specific to one 
country or another.
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These reasons show that it will be only in rare instances 
that a widely distributed collection of foreign precedents 
could have a direct, and significant impact.
In last analysis, it seems that the most important 
immediate hope for a more uniform interpretation of existing 
uniform law conventions rests with the slowly growing aware­
ness, at the interpretation level, that an international 
convention is at stake, and that such a text cannot be treated 
as an ordinary legislative text 20/ 9 This can only be a slow 
process, which can be developed through the study of compar­
ative law, helped by the diffusion of decisions having 
applied the Convention in other countries, the increasing 
contact between lawyers of different countries, and— at 
least in France--the careful watch of doctrine that is 
ready to criticize decisions showing too much of a national­
istic approach 22/  m When members of the legal community 
achieve some distance vis-a-vis their own legal system, 
the application of domestic law rules ceases to be synonymous 
with strict justice or the expression of pure reason. Other 
solutions can be found, which will respect the Convention 
without violating the rights usually protected by municipal 
law.
There is evidence of the growing awareness of the 
various legal communities to the need of adjusting their 
methods and ways of thinking to the particular problems of
78/ This awareness of the special character of the text to 
be interpreted would doubtless be greatly increased by pro­
visions such as Article 7 of the Convention on the Limita­
tion Period in the International Sale of Goods, adopted in 
New York on 12 June 1974, which reads : "In the interpreta­
tion and application of the provisions of this Convention, 
regard shall be had to its international character and to 
the need to promote uniformity". The draft Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods similarly provides in its 
Article 13 :"In interpreting and applying the provisions' of 
this Convention, regard shall be had to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity". The full 
text of the draft Convention appears in United Nations, Ge­
neral Assembly, Doc. A/CN.9/100, Annex 1.
79/ see above, p. 361, n. 28.
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the interpretation of uniform law conventions — '. For 
instance, in the United States, the issue of jurisdiction 
under Article 28 of the Convention was considered by many 
conflicting decisions where courts treated the issue along 
the same lines as in municipal law cases . A new approach 
was introduced by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Smith v, Canadian Pacific Airways,
Ltd. . The court stated :
" We hold that in a Warsaw Convention case 
there are two levels of judicial power that 
must be examined to determine whether suit 
may be maintained. The first level, on which 
this opinion turns, is that of jurisdiction 
in the international or treaty sense under 
Article 28(1). The second level involves the 
power of a particular United States court, 
under federal statutes and practice * to hear 
a Warsaw Convention case--jurisdiction in the 
domestic law sense. It is only after jurisdic­
tion in both senses is had that the question 
of venue is reached and a determination made 
regarding the appropriateness and convenience 
for the parties of a particular domestic court."8_3/
In the United Kingdom, courts have abandoned their
traditional reluctance to using extrinsic materials in
interpreting legislative texts when there is an evident
relationship between the text involved and an international
84/treaty. This was done in the Corocraft case — ' which 
followed the lead given by Salomon v. Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise . In both cases, the court looked at 
the international convention itself in order to give a 
better interpretation of the applicable text contained in 
the legislation.
80/ see above p. $6 on the diminishing resistance of French 
shipping lav/ to the use of the concept of unseaworthiness 
which was at first totally alien to a French law environment.
81/ see G. Miller, Protection of victims in the exercise of 
actions against air carriers (LL.M. thesis,~McGill University, 
1971), pp. 10-22.
82/ 12 Avi. 17,143 (2d Cir. 1971) §2/ at p. 17,144.
84/ above, pp. 156-158.
8$/ [1967] 2 Q.B. 116 (Ct. App. 1966).
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In France, the Cour de Cassation has shown a remark­
able evolution in relation to actions civiles. In 1966, it 
seemed to open a whole area where the liability of air car­
riers could be assessed outside the rules of the Convention 
through the action civile but, in 1975» it decided that 
that action was not available when the Convention was appli­
cable, thus eradicating an important source of divergence 
This last example provides a very interesting 
illustration of how the coordination of a uniform law con­
vention with the municipal law background can be made in a 
manner easily compatible with the basic principles of the 
domestic law. By considering the Convention alone, the easy 
solution would have been to say that the Convention applies 
to all possible forms of actions in liability, including the 
action civile. But that would have been contrary to the 
traditional view that the rules of criminal procedure, which 
govern the action civile, are ordre public and cannot be 
disregarded. The solution finally adopted by the Cour de 
Cassation respected the ordre public character of the action 
civile. That action remains governed by its own rules, but 
it is simply made unavailable to cases where the Warsaw Con­
vention applies. This was achieved by distinguishing the 
action governed by the Convention from the action civile, 
and by denying the criminal courts jurisdiction to hear any 
action which is not action civile. Since actions civiles 
can be brought only in criminal courts, they are unavailable 
to plaintiffs whose action is governed by the Warsaw Conven­
tion. It is doubtful whether any international court, consid­
ering the Convention alone, without a deep knowledge of each 
of the municipal legal systems where the Convention applies, 
could have found such a formula. Any decision not taking 
into account the particular legal values and principles of
-  5^3 -
the country concerned would have been resented as unfair.
To sum up, it seems that no miracle solution will 
suddenly ensure a uniform interpretation of uniform law 
conventions. However, a series of practical steps at the 
drafting stage would greatly reduce the chances of dispar­
ities occurring at the interpretation stage. For the present, 
a greater consciousness of the special character of the 
rules of uniform law seems to be the best hope that can 
exist in order that these rules be interpreted in a less 
ethnocentric manner.
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giades,” (1974) 37 R.G.A.E. 130, D.S. 1974.J.48 (C.A. Paris,
26 May 1973)» rev1 g Ciolkowski c. Cie Air France, (1971) 25 
R.F.D.A. 186 (T.G.I. Paris, 12 February 1971).
Morel Freres c. Bardon & Cie, D.P. 1917.2.33» note Capitant 
(C.A. Paris, 21 December 1916).
Munier es qualites c. Divry, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 76 (Trib. civ. 
Seine, 27 November 1953)•
Orchestre Synrphonique de Vienne c. T.W.A. (1972) 35 R.G.A.E. 
202, note-E . du Pontavice (T. G.I. Paris, 22 March 1971)•
Pateyron fMinistere Public c.1 , Bull. crim. 1973» No. 238, 
568 CCassT. crim. 24 May 1973) •
Pelerinages de Paris (Les) c. Air France, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 
198, J.C.P. 1971•II*I079I» note M. de Juglart & E. du Ponta­
vice (C.A. Paris, 13 February 1970).
Petit c. Perissel, (1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 292, note E. du Ponta- 
vice, (1972) 2b R.F.D.A. 162, note E. Georgiades, J.C.P.
1971.II•16621, note M. de Juglart & E. du Pontavice (C.A. 
Aix-en-Provence, 29 September 1970).
-  476 -
P i n g e t  c .  B a r b i e r , D.S.  197^*J*90,  n o t e  J .  G h e s t i n  ( Ca s s ,  
c i v .  I r e ,  24 O c t o b e r  1973)•
P r $ v o t  c .  D e m e t t r e , G az . P a l . I .312 ( C a s s .  Cr im.  26 November
1 9 6 4 )  .
P r e y v a l  c .  Cie  A i r  F r a n c e , (1973)  27 R.F .D.A.  345 ( T r i b .  
com. N i c e ,  7 May 1973)
Randoin  c .  A i r  F r a n c e , ( 1949)  3 R.F .D.A.  I l l  (2d c a s e ) ,
( T r i b . c i v .  G r e n o b l e , 11 F e b r u a r y  1 9 4 8 ) .
Regi e  autonome des  t r a n s p o r t s  de l a  v i l l e  de M a r s e i l l e  c .
D e f e z , D.S .  1 9 7 2 . Somm. l 60 ( C a s s . c i v .  I r e , 22 March 1972 ) .
R i o u l t  c .  M u t u e l l e  d 1a s s u r a n c e s  a £ r i e n n e s , J . C . P .  i 96 l . I I .  
12214,  n o t e  M. de J u g l a r t ,  D. 1 9 6 1 . J . 780 ,  n o t e  R. S a i n t -  
A l a r y  ( T . G . I .  Caen,  24 J a n u a r y  1 9 6 1 ) ,  rev* d , J . C . P .  1 9 6 2 . 
I I . I 2 6 7 9 , n o t e  M. de J u g l a r t ,  ( 1 9 6 2 ) 16 R .F .D.A.  185,
( 1 962 ) 25 R.G.A.  398 (C.A. Caen,  17 J a n u a r y  1 9 6 2 ) ,  c a s s a ­
t i o n , J . C . P .  1 9 6 4 . I I . 1 3 6 9 6 , n o t e  M. de J u g l a r t ,  (1964)
27 R.G.A.E.  7^» n o t e s  M. de J u g l a r t  and P.  de La P r a d e l l e  
( C a s s .  c i v .  2me, 5 March 1964 ) .
R i v i e r e  c . F r a n c , (1970)  24 R.F.D.A.  319,  n o t e  G e o r g i a d e s
(C.A. L y o n , 2 J u l y  1970 ) ,  c a s s a t i o n ,  (1973)  27 R.F.D.A.  419 
(C a s s .  c i v .  I r e ,  15 may 1973)«
R o b e r t - H o u d i n  c .  La P a n a i r  do B r a z i l , ( 1961 ) 24 R.G.A.  285 
n o t e  J . S u n d b e r g , J . C . P .  i 9 6 0 . I I . I I 83O, n o t e  M. de J u g l a r t  
( T . G . I .  S e i n e ,  9 J u l y  i 9 6 0 ) .
Rophe f M i n i s t e r e  P u b l i c  c . ~1, (1970)  24 R .F .D.A.  95,  n o t e  
E.  G e o r g i a d e s  (C.A.  P a r i s , 20 December 1 968 )
Rousseau  f M i n i s t e r e  P u b l i c  c . ~j, (1973)  36 R.G.A.E.  109,
(1973)  27 R .F .D.A.  328,  n o t e  P.  Chauveau ( T . G . I .  B r e s t ,
19 J a n u a r y  1 97 3 ) ,  r e v ! d i n  p a r t , (1973)  27 R .F .D.A .  3 2 2 ,
D.S.  19 73*F .663 ,  n o t e  P.  Chauveau (C.A.  Rennes ,  22 June  
1973 ) ,  c a s s a t i o n , (1975)  29 R.F .D.A.  181 ( C a s s .  c r i m .  9 
J  a n u a r y  1975) •
Sa c re  c .  B r o u x , D. 1 9 6 4 . J . 733,  w i t h  c o n c l u s i o n s  A y d a l o t ,  
JTC.P.  1 9 6 4 . I I . 13972,  n o t e  P.  Esmein  (2d c a s e ) ,  ( Chambres 
R i u n i e s ,  25 November 1964 ) .
S .A . G .E .T . A .  c .  A q u i l a n a , ( 1 967 ) 21 R.F .D.A.  68 (C.A.  P a r i s ,  
29 O c t o b e r  1 9 6 6 ) .
S e g h e r s  c . A i r  F r a n c e , ( 1 9 6 5 ) 28 R.G.A.E.  25,  n o t e  P.  de La 
P r a d e l l e , ( 1 9 6 5 ) 19 R.F .D.A.  352 ( T . G . I .  S e i n e ,  29 J a n u a r y
1 9 6 5 )  *
[The name 1 s o c i e t e " i s  a b b r e v i a t e d  i n " S t e " 1
S t e  A i r  Cameroun c .  Cie  m a r i t i m e  d e s  C h a r g e u r s  r £ u n i s , B u l l ,  
c i v .  I V , No. 142 ( C a s s .  c i v .  com. 29 A p r i l  1 9 6 9 )
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[The name "Soci£t6 Anonyme" is abbreviated in "S . A . "~|
S.A. Electricity de Strasbourg c. S.N.C.F., Bull. I. No. 27 
(Cass. civ. Ire, 26 January 1971)•
S.A. Ets Perusau c. S.A.R.L. Nouveaut£s des Pyr^n^es, Bull. 
Ill. No . 305 (Calss. civ. 3 m e » 5 May 1970) .
S.A. Mus£e Grlvin c. Electricity de France, D.S. 1968.J.279» 
note H.S. (Cass. civ. com. 21 November 1967)•
[The name ”Soci£t£ Anonyme a Responsabilit£ Limit£e" is 
abbreviated in "S.A.R .L .
S.A.R.L. Pätisfrance c. Capitaine commandant le S/S Glaciar 
Blanco, D . S . 1974”. Somm”. £>0 (C. A~. Rouen, 8 March 1974) .
S.A.R.L. Transtours c . Desnoyers, (1961) 24 R.G.A. 75» note 
G~. Cas (1st case), (Cass. civ. com. 11 May i96 0).
S.A.R.L. X... c. T... de J..., D.S. 1970.J.326, note P. Cou- 
vrat (Cass. civ. Ire, 15 December 1969)•
St§ auxiliaire des chemins de fer secondaires c. Maffre, D . 
1961.J .75 (Cass. civ. Ire, 29 November i960).
St£ des Comediens francais c. Giraud, D.S. I9 6 9.JL6OI, note 
J. Mazeaud (Cass. civ. Ire, 4 February 1969)•
St§ Cotaufruits c . St§ Fuller Freres, (1951) 14 R.G.A. 393» 
(1951) 5 R.F.D.A. 437 (Trib. com. Seine, 19 January 1950), 
aff* d , (1951) 5 R.F.D.A. 433 (C.A. Paris, 8 November 1951)» 
aff1d , (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 220, note E. Georgiades (Cass, 
civ. com. 22 February 1956).
St£ Croisieres et tourisme c. Vasseur, D.S. 1971.J.449, note 
P"! Couvrat, J.C.P. 1971 • II • 16624, note R. Rodiere (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 27 October 1970).
St£ Dalei Motion Pictures c. Zachiva, J.C.P. 1971•II •16751 
(C.A. Paris, 14 May 1970), aff'd, Bull. IV No. 83 (Cass, 
civ. com. 7 March 1972).
Stg Daro Voyages c. Gaultier, (1968) 3 Eur. Tr. L. 749
Ste des Ets Thevenon c. Sti de Transit et Transports Agro- 
Mar it ime~s~, J.C.P. 1973 • II «17 > 432 , note R. Rodiere ( Cass . 
civ. com. 6 February 1973)•
St6 Franpaise de transports et entrepots frigorifiaues c .
St£ Cherencq et Fils~j D^ i9 6 0 . J . 97 (Cass. civ. c o m . 15 June 
I960) .
Ste General Air Fret c. Stl TWA Transworld Airlines, (1956) 
10 R.F.D.A. 324”, note E. Georgiades (Trib. com. Seine, 23 
February 1956).
St£ Impecel, D.S. 1973*J*21, note Larroumet (Cass. crim. 2 
November 1971)•
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St£ Kelton-Timex c. Ste Kirman, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 413 
(Trib. com. Pontoise, l4 May 1974).
St§ Kuoni c. Lemaistre, J.C.P. 1973•II•17478, note R.
Rodiere (C .A. Angers, 3 April 1973)«
St& Locaroute c. Casties, J.C.P. 1973•II•17503» note E.M.B.
(C .A . Paris, 8 January 1973)•
St6 Mat Transports c. Cie Air France, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A.
337 (C.A. Paris, 7 June 1966).
Stg Michelson & Cie c. Pilleboue, J.C.P. 1953•II•7650,
(1953) 7 R.F.D.A. 99 (C.A. Paris, 11 December 1952), cassa­
tion, (1956) 10 R.F.D.A. 217, note E. Georgiades (Cass. civ. 
Ire, 28 February 1956).
St£ Mutuelle dfassurances airiennes c. Gauvain, (1967) 21
R. F.D.A. 436 (Cass. civ. Ire, 4 July 1967).
St& Mutuelle d'assurances airiennes c. Thierache, (1967)
21 R.F.D.A. 443 (Cass. civ. 2me, 18 July 1967)» on remand, 
(1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 81 (C .A . Rouen, 10 June 1970).
[The name "Soci6te Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais" 
is abbreviated in " S . N. C . F . " ~|
S . N.C ■ F. c . Cie d'assurances La Neuchl.teloise , (1973) Eur. 
Tr. L. 760 (Cass. civ. com. 26 June 1972).
S. N.C.F. c. Cie La Pr§servatrice, D. 1956.J.17» note P. 
Esmein (Cass. civ. 2me, 17 February 1955)•
S.N.C.F. c. Cie de Navigation mixte, D.M.F. 1962, 722, 
note R. Rodiere (Cass. civ. com. 18 June 1962).
S.N.C.F. c. Decharme, D. 197o.J.767» note Abadir (Cass, 
civ. Ire, 21 July 1970).
S.N.C.F. c. Humbert, D.S. 1967.Somm. 101 (Cass. civ. Ire,
3" October 1967) •
S.N.C.F. c . Thomas, D.S. 1974.Somm. 64 (Cass. civ. Ire, 26 
February 1974).
Ste Nouvelle de manutention c. Abecassis, D. 1950.J.225 
(Cass. civ. com. 3 January 1950).
St£ Nouvelle des transports mondiaux c. Air France, (i960) 
14 R.F.D.A. 317» note E. Georgiades (C.A. Paris, 14 March
i960).
St§ S.A.S. c. Cie La Fortune, (1972) 26 R.F.D.A. 49 (C.A. 
Paris, 3 February 1971)•
Stg Transports Cauchois c. S.A. Kleber-Colombes, (1971)
TT Eur. Tr. L"! 397 (Cass, c i v . com. 21 December 1970) .
St£ Transports d^rmorique c. Stl La Langouste, (1974) 28 
R.F.D.A. 404 (Cass. civ. com. 28 .May 197^).
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St6 des Transports Clasquin c. St£ Socotra, (1949) 3 R.F.D.A. 
204, (1950) 13 R.G.A. 1181,“note' J.L. (Trib. com. Seine, 17 
January 1949)•
St£ Vve Terrasson c. St£ Messageries Nationales, (1957) 11 
R.F.D.A. 31, note E. Georgiades (Cass. civ. com. 11 June 
1956) .
St§ de voyages FRAM c. Martinolle, (1966) 1 Eur. Tr. L.
950 (Cass. civ. 26 April 1966).
Sofimex c. TWA, (1949) 3 R.F.D.A. 210 (Trib. com. Seine,
30“July-1948).
Soltner c. Kaci, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 289 (C.A. Chamb£ry, 28 
March 1974).
Sontag c. Cie Air France, (1971) 25 R.F.D.A. 176 (T.G.I. 
Paris, 8 January 1971)«
Souillac c. Air France, (1965) 28 R.G.A.E. 15, note H.
Matouk (T.G.I. Seine, 26 June 1964).
Spiers c. Cie Air France, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 42 (T.G.I.
Seine, 6 November”1964), rev1d , (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 49, note 
P. Fontaine (C.A. Paris, 15 February 1966)--these two deci­
sions are identical to those in the Diop and Kamara cases-- 
cassation, J.C.P. 1969»II•15814 bis, note M. de Juglart and 
E. du Pontavice (Cass. civ. Ire,-4 November 1968), on remand, 
(1970) 33 R.G.A.E. 4o4, note P. Fontaine (C.A. Rouen, 11 
May 1970) .
Sprinks & Cie, Ste Loevenbruck c. Air France, (1969) 23 
R.F.D.A. 405 (C.A. Paris, 27 June 1969)•
Syndicat d'assurances des Lloyds c. Ste A^rofret, (1967)
30 R.G.A.E. 168, J.C.P. 1967.11.15261 (1st case) note M. 
de Juglart and E. du Pontavice (C.A. Paris, 27 June 1966), 
aff* d, (1969) 23 R.F.D.A. 397 (Cass. civ. com. 22 April 
1969)•
Tanneries de Lutece c. Air France, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 105 
(Trib. com. Seine, 23 February 1965)1 rev*d in part, (1967) 
21 R.F.D.A. 70, (1966) 29 R.G.A.E. 380, note M. de Juglart 
(C.A. Paris, 16 November 1966).
Transports maritimes de l*Etat c. Brossette ("Le Lamoricie- 
re11) , D. 1951 • J • 717» note G. Ripert (Cass. civ. com. 19 
June 1951)•
Tresor Public c. Cie Aigle Azur, (i960) 14 R.F.D.A. 214 
"(T.G.I. Seine , 1_February-1960) .
Tresor Public c. Cie Air Laos, (i960) 13 Rev. Trim. Dr. com. 
434^ note M. de Juglart (Trib. civ. Seine, 4 March 1958), 
aff'd on other grounds, J.C.P. 1961.11.12158, note M. de 
Juglart, (1961)15 R.F.D.A. 276 (C.A. Paris, 17 June i960).
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Truchetet c. Stg Hgli Union, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 437 (T.G.I. 
Paris, 19 October 1973)•
Vairon & Cie c. Air Express International France, (1964) 18 
R.F.D.A. 410 (Trib"! com. Seine, 10 June 1964).
Valot c. Jamet, D. 1950.J.227, (Cass. civ. com. 18 January 
1950).
Vi Bian Rosa c. Cie Francaise de Tourisme, Gaz.Pal. i960.I. 
227 (Trib. com. Seine, 22 January i960).
Villa c. Cie des Assurances g£n£rales (arret ,,ProviniH) ,
J .C .P. 1941.II.1705 note Mihura, D.C. 1941.117, note Rouast 
(Ch. Rlunies, 15 July 1941).
Vivioz c. Cie Air France, (1954) 8 R.F.D.A. 420, J.C.P.I955. 
11.851^ note M. de Juglart, D. 19-55 -J* 32, note G. Ripert (C.A. Bordeaux, 10 November 1954), aff'd, D. 1959-J.101, 
note Savatier, J.C.P. 1959•II•11002, note M. de Juglart 
(Cass. civ. 2me, 23 January 1959)*
X.X.X. c. U .T.A .(1967) 21 R.F.D.A. 350, (1967) 30 R.G.A.E. 
178, note P. de La Pradelle, J.C.P. 1967.II.15261 (2d case) 
note M. de Juglart and E. du Pontavice (T.G.I. Seine, 17 
March 1967)•
Zarraluqui c. Le Toursime Francais, Gaz.Pal. 1960.2.230,
(19681 3 Eur" Tr. IT. 874 (T.G.I. Seine, 29 February i960), 
aff»d, Gaz.Pal. 1961.2.283, (1968) 3 Eur. Tr. L. 801 (C.A. 
Paris, 23 May 1961).
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Bart v. British West Indian Airways, Ltd. [1967] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 239 (Guyana Ct. App. 1966).
Braathens South American & Far East Air Transport A.S. v .
The Borneo Company Ltd., 25 Malayan L.J. 11, 253» noted in 
(i960) Journ. Business Law 313-
Cheker.ji c. Lebanese International Airways, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 
218 (C.A. Beirut, 10 March 1967).
Collet c. S .A.B.E.N.A., (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. 4ll, note E.G.
(T.G.I. Bruxelles, 17 April 1958).
[The name "compagnie" is abbreviated in ”Cie"1
Cie Alitalia c. Commercial Ins. Company, (1968) 22 R.F.D.A.
471 (C.A. Beirut, 20 July 1967).
Cie Air France c. Karam, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 204 (C.A. Beirut,
8 November 1973) •
Cie d*Assurances Alnina c. Cie Trans World Airlines, (1964)
18 R.F.D.A. 234 (C. justice civile Geneve, 16 March 1962).
Cie d*Assurances La Baloise c. Cie Air France, (i960) 14 
R.F.D.A. 93 (Trib. civ. Beirut, 3 October 1958).
Cie Middle East Airlines c. La Baloise Transports, (1970)
33 R.G.A.E. 44 (C.A." Beirut, 27 November 1969)3 aff'd, (1972) 
26 R.F.D.A. 186 (Cass. Liban, 20 January 1971).
Cie Sabena c. Moutafis, (1959) 13 R.F.D.A. 178 (C.A. Leopold­
ville , 16 March 1959)•
Cie Swissair c. Cie La Concorde, (1961) 15 R.F.D.A. 202 
(Trib. Fgd . Suisse, 22 September 1959)•
Dabrai v. Air India, A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 18 (Vol. 42),
(High Ct Bombay 1952).
Defer c. Sabena, (1950) Pas.Ill 96 (Trib. Bruxelles, 12 May 
1950).
Delaby c. Sotramat, (1969) 32 R.G.A.E. 66, note R. Nys 
(C.A. Bruxelles, 12 January 1965)•
Deutsche Lufthansa A.G. c . Basler Transport Versicherung^ 
Gesellschaft A.gT ~, (1971) 6 EurT Tr. L. 147 (Trib. F§d. 
suisse, 14 November 1967).
Favre c. Belgian State, (1950) U.S.Av.Rep. 392 (C.A. Bru- 
xelles, 10 June 1950).
Hornlinie A.G. c. St6 Nationale des P^troles d'Aquitaine, 
(197^5"28 R.F.D.A. 307 (Netherlands Sup. Ct. l4 April 1972) .
Italia Film c. Ets Georges Asfour, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 109» 
note E. Georgiades (Trib. Beirut, 11 February 1969).
Jacquet c. Club Neuchatelois dfaviation, (1958) 12 R.F.D.A.
82 (Trib. Fed. suisse, 12 March 1957).
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K.L.M. c. Zahra Kachour, (1970) 24 R.F.D.A. 223» note E. 
Georgiades (C .A . Beirut, 17 July 1969)» aff'd, (1972) 26 
R.F.D.A. 190 (Cass. Liban, 26 March 1970*K
Lacroix Baartmans, Callens Und Van Tichelen S.A. c. Swiss 
Air, (1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 75» related by R.H. Mankiewicz 
"(Trib. Fed. suisse, 11 July 1972).
M. D. c . L.A.I., (1958) 12 R.F.D.A. 190 (Trib. Ire inst. 
Geneve, 26 March 1957)•
N. V. Heerfur t.v.v.d. Vellen-En-Pelteri.jenhandel v. J.M. 
Koninkli.ike~Luchtvaart Maatschappi.i N.V. (K.L.M. Royal 
Dutch Airlines"!] I.A.T.A. Reports No. 127 (C. A. The Hague,
8 March 19^2).
Obeid (Succession) c. Middle East Airlines, (1968) 22
R. F.D.A. 213, note N.P. Boulos (C.A. Beirut, 23 May 1967)«
Pan American World Airways Inc, v. S.A. Fire and Accident 
Insurance Co. Ltd. [_ 1965J 3 App. Div. 150 (South Africa, 
Appellate Division Court, 1965)•
Rambler Cycle Co. v. P. 0. Steam Navigation Co. [1968] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 42 (Malaysia Fed. Ct. App. Jurisdiction, 
Singapore, 1964).
S . .. c . B ..., (1959) 13 R.F.D.A. 405 (Trib. Ire inst. Geneve
9 December 1958)•
S.A. Ass. Rotterdam c. S.A. Sabena, (1969) 4 Eur. Tr. L.1174 
(Trib. com. Bruxelles, 19 April 1969).
1 Straat Cumberland" (The) , [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 492 (Malay­
sia, Kuala Lumpur Sessions Ct. 1973)*
Style c. Braun, (1961) 24 R.G.A. 375» note J. Sundberg 
(Trib. Geneve, 9 December 1958).
Transmediterranean Airlines c . Black Sea, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 
441 (C.A. Beirut, 4 April 1973)•
Transmediterranean Airlines c. Bleybel, (1973) 27 R.F.D.A. 
347 (C.A. Beirut, l6 November 1972).”
Twinnings & Co. c. Chemins de Fer Industriels, (1973) 3 
Eur. Tr. L. 516 (Trib. com. Bruxelles, 26 October 1972).
Wegge c. Sabena, (1966) 20 R.F.D.A. 353 (Trib. com. Bruxel­
les, 20 December 1965).
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